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

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THE THEAETETUS

OF

PLATO,

WITH TRANSLATION AND NOTES.



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δῶρον λάβ᾽ ἥτις ἀξιωτάτη τόδε·
χάρις χάριν γάρ ἐστιν ἡ τίκτουσ᾽ ἀεί.

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INTRODUCTION.

I. THE dialogues of Plato, which I chose, from time to time, for the school work of my Sixth Form, were chiefly the Protagoras, the Euthydemus, and the Hippias Major; since this last, if not Platonic, is very amusing and instructive. But I seldom allowed any of my foremost boys to leave school without reading with them privately in the evenings the Theaetetus also, as the best preparative for their deeper study of Plato and of Greek philosophy in general: often adding to it the earlier books (1—4) of Aristotle's Ethics. In the past year, 1880, I took it for the subject of my Cambridge Lectures, reading a translation to my class, and commenting as occasion required. This was executed in the first instance quite independently, without reference to Professor Jowett's version; but in revising my translation for the press I have compared the two, with frequent advantage, as might be expected, to the correction of my own work. Still the result is, that I have generally departed less widely from the literal Greek than my *confrère* in the Sister University: and the reason of this is evident:

the Master of Balliol has translated for the instruction of all English-speaking students of Plato, whether Greek scholars or not: I for the special convenience of Greek students in Universities.

II. The order of Plato's writings, and the genuineness of many, are questions respecting which the varieties of opinion and the controversies resulting, chiefly within the present century, have been so many and so discordant, as to prove that no certainty can be reached on either point. Schleiermacher's translation with its prefaces (first published 1804—1810) was the trumpet-call of the warfare which has gone on ever since. His elaborate attempt to arrange the dialogues on a systematic principle of nascent and ever growing philosophic doctrine has not been fully accepted by any of the scholars who have since published their views, Ast, Socher, Stallbaum, K. F. Hermann, Steinhart, Susemihl, Suckow, Munk, Bonitz, Ueberweg, Schaarschmidt and others: while Ritter Brandis and Zeller, historians of Greek philosophy, are less unfavourable to the principle of Schleiermacher, though not admitting it in its details. Out of 35 or 36 dialogues usually set down as Plato's, Ast will only accept 14 as genuine; viz. (1) Protagoras, Phaedrus, Gorgias, Phaedo: (2) Theaetetus, Sophista, Politicus, Parmenides, Cratylus: (3) Philebus, Symposium, Respublica, Timaeus, Critias: in this order. Thus he even rejects the Leges, though cited by Aristotle. This may be considered the extreme opinion on the sceptical side, as Grote in his work on 'Plato and the other companions of Socrates' represents the extreme credulous

view, supporting the Alexandrine canon of Thrasyllus, a grammarian of the Augustan age, cited by Diogenes of Laerta. This canon rejected ten dialogues, which Diogenes enumerates; and these have since then been universally treated as spurious. Some of them did not survive: seven are printed at the close of the Tauchnitz edition and by Bekker, along with the 13 Epistles (which Grote, differing from most scholars, accepts as genuine) and the Definitions (ὅροι). Thrasyllus distributed the dialogues of Plato into two classes; (1) d. of Investigation (ζητητικοί); (2) d. of Exposition (ὑφηγητικοί). These he also subdivided variously: but his subdivisions have little interest. The chronological order of the dialogues, like the genuineness of many, is a much disputed question on some points: strikingly so respecting the date of the Phaedrus, which Schleiermacher, as an essential feature in his system, deems the earliest; while others, as Stallbaum and Steinhart, place it among the latest.

Generally it may be said that the shorter and slighter dialogues, when accepted as genuine, are ascribed to Plato's youth; the Republic, Timaeus and Leges are universally admitted to be the latest: while the Theaetetus, Sophista and Politicus (usually too the Parmenides and Cratylus) are supposed to have been written by Plato during his travels or on his return—at all events before his 40th year.

The following arrangement is that of a critic who had evidently given much time and thought, with great zeal, to the elucidation of these questions; I mean K. F. Hermann. He, in common with most

writers on this subject, distributes the works which he accepts into three groups: (1) the earlier, composed partly before the death of Socrates B.C. 399, partly after it, before Plato quitted Megara: (2) those written under the influence of the Megarian dialectic, during or immediately after the years of travel: (3) the later, commencing with the Phaedrus, and going on during the second half of Plato's career, while he was scholarch of the Academy, from 386 (probably) till his death in 347.

(1)	(2)	(3)
Hippias II.	Cratylus *e*	Phaedrus *e*
Ion	Theaetetus	Menexenus*
Alcibiades I.	Sophistes *e*	Symposium *e*
Charmides	Politicus *e*	Phaedo *e*
Lysis	Parmenides.	Philebus *e*
Laches		Respublica *e*
Protagoras		Timaeus *e*
Euthydemus		Critias *e*
Apologia Socr.*		Leges *e*.
Crito *e*		
Gorgias		
Euthyphro		
Meno		
Hippias I.		

Those to which *e* is appended are classed by Grote as dialogues of exposition; the rest are of investigation (zetetic) except the two with asterisks, which are of neither kind. Grote accepts seven others which Hermann disallows.

It is satisfactory to gather from these notices that the Theaetetus is admitted on all hands to be a genuine work of Plato. It is almost universally ascribed to his age of manhood, and to a time when (having imbibed before his 27th year the lore and didactic skill of Socrates, having in the subtle discussions of Megara had full opportunity of practising the dialectic method) he had enlarged his learning and experience by intercourse with the mathematicians of Cyrene and the Pythagorean schoolmen of Italy. The dialogues called Sophistes and Politicus are connected with the Theaetetus, and their genuineness is generally admitted, though the Sophistes is disallowed by Ueberweg.

III. A preface to the Theaetetus would be incomplete without some account of antecedent Hellenic philosophy. But in a preface, even to Plato's works, much more to a single dialogue, such an account must be brief and eclectic. Some topics must be placed in stronger light, and more fully considered than others. What are these?

(1) In the first place, Socrates is an interlocutor in all Plato's dialogues, excepting 'the Laws': and in most of them (though not in the Sophistes) we find him discussing, more or less, some principle or practice of those who are called Sophists. With Socrates himself therefore, with his method, and with the Sophists and their doctrines, a young student will do well to make acquaintance, before he enters upon any of Plato's writings.

(2) In several of Plato's works (as in the Theaete-

tus) appears the contrast between (1) the physical teaching of the Eleatic School (Melissus, Parmenides, Zeno), the forerunner of pantheism, in which the universe is one Being (Ens) at rest, and (2) that of Heracleitus of Ephesus, who taught Becoming in the place of Being, Many rather than One, Motion and Change instead of Rest, ascribing such motion to the flow of a prevailing fiery element (*πάντα ῥεῖ*). Distinct again from these were (1) the teaching of Empedocles of Agrigentum, who took the concord of four elements (fire, air, earth, water) as the base of existence; (2) that of the Atomists, Leucippus and Democritus, who ascribed the origin of things to the fortuitous concurrence in space of small indivisible particles (*ἄτομα*); (3) that of Anaxagoras, who assigned the arrangement of his *ὁμοιομέρειαι* to supreme Intelligence (*νοῦς*). All these philosophers had been preceded by two other famous schools in the 6th century B.C.: (1) the Ionian (Thales, Anaximander, Anaximenes), who imagined the primary substance of things to be—the first, Water, the second, Indeterminate Matter (*τὸ ἄπειρον*), the third, Air: (2) the Italic sect of Pythagoras, which lasted long, and formed a powerful order. This school ascribed marvellous organic properties to Number, and believed in the transmigration of souls. All the philosophers above-named, from Thales to Anaxagoras, flourished during the century and a half anterior to the age of Socrates (600—440 B.C.), though their exact dates are uncertain.

Zeller, whose views are welcomed by Professor

Jowett, maintains that all these various schools were engaged in teaching purely physical doctrines; for that even the seeming abstractions, assumed as primal by the Pythagoreans the Eleatics and Anaxagoras (Number, Being, Intellect), were not understood by them as absolutely incorporeal. See Zeller's Presocratic Philosophy (translated by Alleyne); also Preller's Historia Philosophiae (for citation of passages), Schwegler's History of Philosophy (translated by Stirling), and the fuller work of Ueberweg (published by Messrs Hodder and Stoughton).

IV. Socrates is said by Cicero to have called down philosophy from heaven; by which is meant that Socrates was the first to change the direction of philosophical studies in Hellas; to divert them from the universe to man himself, from cosmogony to anthropology. But this credit belongs rather to that school of thinkers with whom Socrates was most at war, to those who are called Sophists: especially to Protagoras the eldest and most influential of their number—the author of the famous dogma 'man is the measure of all things,' in other words 'what seems to each is to each.' Protagoras was born at Abdera in Thrace, and flourished B.C. 450—430. Gorgias of Leontini was contemporary, but lived to a great age, dying 380. Prodicus of Ceos flourished 435. Others of note were Hippias of Elis, Polus, Thrasymachus, and the brothers Euthydemus and Dionysodorus. They professed to teach all subjects of liberal education; philosophy, rhetoric, language, logical eristic, &c.: and they travelled from city to

city, exacting and obtaining large fees for the instruction given. This instruction was calculated, as they declared, to acquaint their pupils with the progress of human civilization, to free them from prejudices, to give breadth and strength to their mental faculties, to make them wise thinkers and fluent speakers, to teach them how to form just opinions on public affairs, how to manage their own property, and to deal with mankind in general.

In mentioning this famous Sophistic school, so far as it deserves to be called a school, we may note the fate which has attended the name itself and its derived words. Sophist, sophistical, sophism, sophistry, sophistication, are all of them terms used to designate what is delusive and false. A similar discredit in modern times attaches to the words jesuit, jesuitical, jesuitry, jesuitism. So the words heresy, heretic, heresiarch, heretical, are now never used except in a vituperative sense. Yet Sophist was a creditable name originally: it is given by Herodotus to the Seven Sages and to Pythagoras. Jesuit simply means a member of the Society of Jesus, such title being allowed by the Pope (who calls himself 'Vicar of Jesus Christ on earth') to the Order of Ignatius Loyola, for the enhancement of its dignity and credit. Heresy (*αἵρεσις, choice*) merely meant the Latin 'secta,' a *sect:* and Clement of Alexandria calls the Catholic Church itself 'the best of all heresies' (sects). Each of these terms therefore acquired its evil sense, partly, no doubt, by errors and faults of those who bore them, partly by the charges and invectives of powerful ene-

mies. Undoubtedly the Sophists, as a class, found their most powerful enemy in Plato: and upon his dialogues (especially the Euthydemus, Gorgias, Hippias I. and Sophistes) the principal charges against them as a class originally rest. In the great historian of Greece, Mr Grote, they have found their most powerful champion and rehabilitater; their cause being likewise pleaded strongly by the late Mr Lewes in his History of Philosophy. All Greek students have in their hands Grote's History; and they may be referred to that work for a general statement of the case on both sides; but more particularly to the facts and arguments urged by him as counsel (so to say) for the defendants in Part II. Ch. lxvii.[1] On the other side, as not fully agreeing with Mr Grote's strong championship, may be consulted Thirlwall's History of Greece, Ferrier's Lectures, and Professor Jowett's prefaces to the Platonic Dialogues, especially his preface to the Sophistes.

V. Besides the Academic school of Plato and his successors, philosophic schools of minor influence were founded by three other pupils of Socrates. These were Antisthenes, Aristippus, and Eucleides. Antisthenes taught at Athens in the gymnasium called Cynosarges, whence his school was called that of the Cynics. He held that virtue alone suffices for happiness, anticipating the later Stoic doctrines. Diogenes of Sinope, whose interview with Alexander the Great is so famous, was the best known member of

[1] Grote's views are supported by Mr H. Sidgwick in two able papers printed in the Cambridge Journal of Philology (Nos. VIII. IX.).

this school. Aristippus of Cyrene founded the Cyrenaic or Hedonic school, which taught that pleasure is the supreme good of man, thus forerunning the later teaching of Epicurus. Eucleides of Megara founded the short-lived Megaric school, which is said to have taught a fusion of Eleatic and Socratic doctrines. Dialectic was among its special studies, and was occasionally carried to the excess known as Eristic. Many curious puzzles of thought are ascribed to its disciples. Of these three schools see a brief account in Schwegler's History of Philosophy (Transl. p. 53), and consult also the larger work of Ueberweg (Vol. I. §§ 34—38). It was to Megara that Plato retired after the death of Socrates, and resided there before his travels, probably exercising himself in dialectic discussion. Susemihl thinks that in gratitude for this kindness he commemorates his Megarian friends in the introduction to the Theaetetus, thus indirectly dedicating the dialogue to them.

VI. An analysis of the Theaetetus is given in the headings of the several sections, noted in the Greek text I.—XLIV., in the translation 1—44. In the notes at the close, as in the Greek text, the marginal pages and alphabetic divisions of the first edition of Stephens are also referred to. These notes are chiefly designed to trace the chain of Plato's reasoning in places where it is not easily discerned: but occasionally they refer to the commentaries of Professor Campbell and H. Schmidt.

ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ.

ΤΑ ΤΟΥ ΔΙΑΛΟΓΟΥ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΑ.

ΕΥΚΛΕΙΔΗΣ, | ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ,
ΤΕΡΨΙΩΝ, | ΘΕΟΔΩΡΟΣ,
ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ.

ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ.



[*Numeri marginales Arabici qui vocantur, editionis primae Stephanianae paginas indicant, Romani ejusdem editionis capitula. Stellula paginae, signum* | *sectionis initium notat.*]

I. * Ἄρτι, ὦ Τερψίων, ἢ πάλαι ἐξ ἀγροῦ; ΤΕΡ. 142
Ἐπιεικῶς πάλαι. καὶ σέ γε ἐζήτουν κατ' ἀγορὰν καὶ ἐθαύμαζον ὅτι οὐχ οἷός τ' ἦ εὑρεῖν. ΕΥ. Οὐ γὰρ ἦ κατὰ πόλιν. ΤΕΡ. Ποῦ μήν; ΕΥ. Εἰς λιμένα καταβαίνων Θεαιτήτῳ ἐνέτυχον φερομένῳ ἐκ Κορίνθου ἀπὸ τοῦ στρατοπέδου Ἀθήναζε. ΤΕΡ. Ζῶντι ἢ τετελευτηκότι; ΕΥ. | Ζῶντι καὶ μάλα μόγις· χαλεπῶς μὲν B
γὰρ ἔχει καὶ ὑπὸ τραυμάτων τινῶν, μᾶλλον μὴν αὐτὸν αἱρεῖ τὸ γεγονὸς νόσημα ἐν τῷ στρατεύματι. ΤΕΡ. Μῶν ἡ δυσεντερία; ΕΥ. Ναί. ΤΕΡ. Οἷον ἄνδρα λέγεις ἐν κινδύνῳ εἶναι. ΕΥ. Καλόν τε καὶ ἀγαθόν, ὦ Τερψίων· ἐπεί τοι καὶ νῦν ἤκουόν τινων μάλα ἐγκωμιαζόντων αὐτὸν περὶ τὴν μάχην. ΤΕΡ. Καὶ οὐδέν γ' ἄτοπον, ἀλλὰ πολὺ θαυμαστότερον, εἰ μὴ τοιοῦτος ἦν. ἀτὰρ πῶς οὐκ | αὐτοῦ Μεγαροῖ κατέλυεν; ΕΥ. C
Ἠπείγετο οἴκαδε· ἐπεὶ ἔγωγ' ἐδεόμην καὶ συνεβούλευον, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἤθελε. καὶ δῆτα προπέμψας αὐτόν, ἀπιὼν πάλιν ἀνεμνήσθην καὶ ἐθαύμασα Σωκράτους, ὡς μαντικῶς ἄλλα τε δὴ εἶπε καὶ περὶ τούτου. δοκεῖ γάρ μοι

ὀλίγον πρὸ τοῦ θανάτου ἐντυχεῖν αὐτῷ μειρακίῳ ὄντι, καὶ συγγενόμενός τε καὶ διαλεχθεὶς πάνυ ἀγασθῆναι αὐτοῦ τὴν φύσιν. καί μοι ἐλθόντι Ἀθήναζε τούς τε
D λόγους οὓς διελέχθη αὐτῷ διηγήσατο, καὶ μάλα ἀξίους ἀκοῆς, εἰπέ τε ὅτι πᾶσα ἀνάγκη εἴη τοῦτον ἐλλόγιμον γενέσθαι, εἴπερ εἰς ἡλικίαν ἔλθοι. ΤΕΡ. Καὶ ἀληθῆ γε, ὡς ἔοικεν, εἶπεν. ἀτὰρ τίνες ἦσαν οἱ λόγοι; ἔχοις ἂν διηγήσασθαι; ΕΤ. Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, οὔκουν οὕτω γε
143 ἀπὸ στόματος· ἀλλ' ἐγραψάμην μὲν τότ' εὐθὺς * οἴκαδ' ἐλθὼν ὑπομνήματα, ὕστερον δὲ κατὰ σχολὴν ἀναμιμνησκόμενος ἔγραφον, καὶ ὁσάκις Ἀθήναζε ἀφικοίμην, ἐπανηρώτων τὸν Σωκράτην ὃ μὴ ἐμεμνήμην, καὶ δεῦρο ἐλθὼν ἐπηνωρθούμην. ὥστε μοι σχεδόν τι πᾶς ὁ λόγος γέγραπται. ΤΕΡ. Ἀληθῆ· ἤκουσά σου καὶ πρότερον, καὶ μέντοι ἀεὶ μέλλων κελεύσειν ἐπιδεῖξαι διατέτριφα δεῦρο. ἀλλὰ τί κωλύει νῦν ἡμᾶς διελθεῖν; πάντως ἔγωγε καὶ ἀναπαύσασθαι δέομαι, ὡς ἐξ ἀγροῦ ἥκων.
B ΕΤ. Ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ καὶ αὐτὸς μέχρι Ἐρινοῦ Θεαίτητον προὔπεμψα, ὥστε οὐκ ἂν ἀηδῶς ἀναπαυοίμην. ἀλλ' ἴωμεν, καὶ ἡμῖν ἅμα ἀναπαυομένοις ὁ παῖς ἀναγνώσεται. ΤΕΡ. Ὀρθῶς λέγεις.—ΕΤ. Τὸ μὲν δὴ βιβλίον, ὦ Τερψίων, τουτί· ἐγραψάμην δὲ δὴ οὑτωσὶ τὸν λόγον, οὐκ ἐμοὶ Σωκράτην διηγούμενον ὡς διηγεῖτο, ἀλλὰ διαλεγόμενον οἷς ἔφη διαλεχθῆναι. ἔφη δὲ τῷ τε γεωμέτρῃ Θεοδώρῳ καὶ τῷ Θεαιτήτῳ. ἵνα οὖν ἐν τῇ γραφῇ
C μὴ παρέχοιεν πράγματα αἱ μεταξὺ τῶν λόγων διηγήσεις περὶ αὐτοῦ τε, ὁπότε λέγοι ὁ Σωκράτης, οἷον Καὶ ἐγὼ ἔφην ἢ Καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον, ἢ αὖ περὶ τοῦ ἀποκρινομένου, ὅτι Συνέφη ἢ Οὐχ ὡμολόγει, τούτων ἕνεκα ὡς αὐτὸν αὐτοῖς διαλεγόμενον ἔγραψα, ἐξελὼν τὰ τοιαῦτα. ΤΕΡ. Καὶ οὐδέν γε ἀπὸ τρόπου, ὦ Εὐκλείδη.

ΕΥ. Ἀλλά, παῖ, λαβὲ τὸ βιβλίον καὶ λέγε. — ΙΙ. ΣΩ. Εἰ μὲν τῶν ἐν Κυρήνῃ μᾶλλον ἐκηδόμην, ὦ Θεόδωρε, D τὰ ἐκεῖ ἄν σε καὶ περὶ ἐκείνων ἀνηρώτων, εἴ τινες αὐτόθι περὶ γεωμετρίαν ἤ τινα ἄλλην φιλοσοφίαν εἰσὶ τῶν νέων ἐπιμέλειαν ποιούμενοι· νῦν δέ—ἧττον γὰρ ἐκείνους ἢ τούσδε φιλῶ, καὶ μᾶλλον ἐπιθυμῶ εἰδέναι, τίνες ἡμῖν τῶν νέων ἐπίδοξοι γενέσθαι ἐπιεικεῖς· ταῦτα δὴ αὐτός τε σκοπῶ καθ' ὅσον δύναμαι, καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἐρωτῶ, οἷς ἂν ὁρῶ τοὺς νέους ἐθέλοντας ξυγγίγνεσθαι. σοὶ δὴ οὐκ ὀλίγιστοι πλησιάζουσι, καὶ δικαίως· ἄξιος γὰρ τά τε ἄλλα καὶ γεωμετρίας ἕνεκα. εἰ δὴ οὖν τινὶ E ἐνέτυχες ἀξίῳ λόγου, ἡδέως ἂν πυθοίμην. ΘΕΟ. Καὶ μήν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐμοί τε εἰπεῖν καὶ σοὶ ἀκοῦσαι πάνυ ἄξιον, οἵῳ ὑμῖν τῶν πολιτῶν μειρακίῳ ἐντετύχηκα. καὶ εἰ μὲν ἦν καλός, ἐφοβούμην ἂν σφόδρα λέγειν, μὴ καί τῳ δόξω ἐν ἐπιθυμίᾳ αὐτοῦ εἶναι· νῦν δέ, καὶ μή μοι ἄχθου, οὐκ ἔστι καλός, προσέοικε δὲ σοὶ τήν τε σιμότητα καὶ τὸ ἔξω τῶν ὀμμάτων· ἧττον δὲ ἢ σὺ ταῦτ' ἔχει. ἀδεῶς δὴ λέγω. εὖ * γὰρ ἴσθι ὅτι ὧν δὴ πώ- 144 ποτε ἐνέτυχον—καὶ πάνυ πολλοῖς πεπλησίακα—οὐδένα πω ἠσθόμην οὕτω θαυμαστῶς εὖ πεφυκότα. τὸ γὰρ εὐμαθῆ ὄντα, ὡς ἄλλῳ χαλεπόν, πρᾶον αὖ εἶναι διαφερόντως, καὶ ἐπὶ τούτοις ἀνδρεῖον παρ' ὀντινοῦν, ἐγὼ μὲν οὔτ' ἂν ᾠόμην γενέσθαι οὔτε ὁρῶ γιγνομένους· ἀλλ' οἵ τε ὀξεῖς ὥσπερ οὗτος καὶ ἀγχίνοι καὶ μνήμονες ὡς τὰ πολλὰ καὶ πρὸς τὰς ὀργὰς ὀξύῤῥοποί εἰσι, καὶ ἄττοντες φέρονται ὥσπερ τὰ ἀνερμάτιστα πλοῖα, καὶ μα- B νικώτεροι ἢ ἀνδρειότεροι φύονται, οἵ τε αὖ ἐμβριθέστεροι νωθροί πως ἀπαντῶσι πρὸς τὰς μαθήσεις καὶ λήθης γέμοντες. ὁ δὲ οὕτω λείως τε καὶ ἁπταίστως καὶ ἀνυσίμως ἔρχεται ἐπὶ τὰς μαθήσεις τε καὶ ζητήσεις

μετὰ πολλῆς πραότητος, οἷον ἐλαίου ῥεῦμα ἀψοφητὶ ῥέοντος, ὥστε θαυμάσαι τὸ τηλικοῦτον ὄντα οὕτω ταῦτα διαπράττεσθαι. ΣΩ. Εὖ ἀγγέλλεις. τίνος δὲ καί ἐστι τῶν πολιτῶν; ΘΕΟ. Ἀκήκοα μὲν τοὔνομα, μνημονεύω
C δὲ οὔ. ἀλλὰ γάρ ἐστι | τῶνδε τῶν προσιόντων ὁ ἐν τῷ μέσῳ. ἄρτι γὰρ ἐν τῷ ἔξω δρόμῳ ἠλείφοντο ἑταῖροί τέ τινες οὗτοι αὐτοῦ καὶ αὐτός, νῦν δέ μοι δοκοῦσιν ἀλειψάμενοι δεῦρο ἰέναι. ἀλλὰ σκόπει εἰ γιγνώσκεις αὐτόν. ΣΩ. Γιγνώσκω· ὁ τοῦ Σουνιέως Εὐφρονίου ἐστί, καὶ πάνυ γε, ὦ φίλε, ἀνδρὸς οἷον καὶ σὺ τοῦτον διηγεῖ, καὶ ἄλλως εὐδοκίμου, καὶ μέντοι καὶ οὐσίαν μάλα πολλὴν κατέλιπε. τὸ δ' ὄνομα οὐκ οἶδα τοῦ μειρακίου.
D ΘΕΟ. Θεαίτητος, ὦ Σώκρατες, | τό γε ὄνομα· τὴν μέντοι οὐσίαν δοκοῦσί μοι ἐπίτροποί τινες διεφθαρκέναι. ἀλλ' ὅμως καὶ πρὸς τὴν τῶν χρημάτων ἐλευθεριότητα θαυμαστός, ὦ Σώκρατες. ΣΩ. Γεννικὸν λέγεις τὸν ἄνδρα. καί μοι κέλευε αὐτὸν ἐνθάδε παρακαθίζεσθαι. ΘΕΟ. Ἔσται ταῦτα. Θεαίτητε, δεῦρο παρὰ Σωκράτη. ΣΩ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ἵνα κἀγὼ ἐμαυτὸν ἀνασκέψωμαι, ποῖόν τι ἔχω τὸ πρόσωπον.
E φησὶ γὰρ Θεόδωρος ἔχειν με σοί | ὅμοιον. ἀτὰρ εἰ νῷν ἐχόντοιν ἑκατέρου λύραν ἔφη αὐτὰς ἡρμόσθαι ὁμοίως, πότερον εὐθὺς ἂν ἐπιστεύομεν ἢ ἐπεσκεψάμεθ' ἂν εἰ μουσικὸς ὢν λέγει; ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐπεσκεψάμεθ' ἄν. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τοιοῦτον μὲν εὑρόντες ἐπειθόμεθ' ἄν, ἄμουσον δέ, ἠπιστοῦμεν; ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθῆ. ΣΩ. Νῦν δέ γ' οἶμαι, εἴ τι μέλει ἡμῖν τῆς τῶν προσώπων ὁμοιό-
145 τητος, σκεπτέον εἰ γραφικὸς * ὢν λέγει ἢ οὔ. ΘΕΑΙ. Δοκεῖ μοι. ΣΩ. Ἦ οὖν ζωγραφικὸς Θεόδωρος; ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐχ, ὅσον γ' ἐμὲ εἰδέναι. ΣΩ. Ἆρ' οὐδὲ γεωμετρικός; ΘΕΑΙ. Πάντως δήπου, ὦ Σώκρατες. ΣΩ. Ἦ καὶ

ἀστρονομικὸς καὶ λογιστικός τε καὶ μουσικὸς καὶ ὅσα παιδείας ἔχεται; ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ. ΣΩ. Εἰ μὲν ἄρα ἡμῖν τοῦ σώματός τι ὁμοίους φησὶν εἶναι ἐπαινῶν πῃ ἢ ψέγων, οὐ πάνυ αὐτῷ ἄξιον τὸν νοῦν προσέχειν. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἴσως οὔ. ΣΩ. Τί δ' εἰ ποτέρου τὴν ψυχὴν ἐπαινοῖ πρὸς ἀρετήν τε καὶ σοφίαν; ἆρ' οὐκ B ἄξιον τῷ μὲν ἀκούσαντι προθυμεῖσθαι ἀνασκέψασθαι τὸν ἐπαινεθέντα, τῷ δὲ προθύμως ἑαυτὸν ἐπιδεικνύναι; ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ὦ Σώκρατες. III. ΣΩ. Ὥρα τοίνυν, ὦ φίλε Θεαίτητε, σοὶ μὲν ἐπιδεικνύναι, ἐμοὶ δὲ σκοπεῖσθαι· ὡς εὖ ἴσθι, ὅτι Θεόδωρος πολλοὺς δὴ πρός με ἐπαινέσας ξένους τε καὶ ἀστοὺς οὐδένα πω ἐπῄνεσεν ὡς σὲ νῦν δή. ΘΕΑΙ. Εὖ ἂν ἔχοι, ὦ Σώκρατες· ἀλλ' ὅρα μὴ παίζων ἔλεγεν. ΣΩ. Οὐχ οὗτος ὁ τρόπος C Θεοδώρου. ἀλλὰ μὴ ἀναδύου τὰ ὡμολογημένα σκηπτόμενος παίζοντα λέγειν τόνδε, ἵνα μὴ καὶ ἀναγκασθῇ μαρτυρεῖν· πάντως γὰρ οὐδεὶς ἐπισκήψει αὐτῷ. ἀλλὰ θαῤῥῶν ἔμμενε τῇ ὁμολογίᾳ. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλὰ χρὴ ταῦτα ποιεῖν, εἴ σοι δοκεῖ. ΣΩ. Λέγε δή μοι· μανθάνεις που παρὰ Θεοδώρου γεωμετρίας ἄττα; ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔγωγε. ΣΩ. Καὶ τῶν περὶ ἀστρονομίαν τε καὶ ἁρμονίας καὶ D λογισμούς; ΘΕΑΙ. Προθυμοῦμαί γε δή. ΣΩ. Καὶ γὰρ ἐγώ, ὦ παῖ, παρά γε τούτου καὶ παρ' ἄλλων, οὓς ἂν οἴωμαί τι τούτων ἐπαΐειν. ἀλλ' ὅμως τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ἔχω περὶ αὐτὰ μετρίως, σμικρὸν δέ τι ἀπορῶ, ὃ μετὰ σοῦ τε καὶ τῶνδε σκεπτέον. καί μοι λέγε· ἆρ' οὐ τὸ μανθάνειν ἐστὶ τὸ σοφώτερον γίγνεσθαι περὶ ὃ μανθάνει τις; ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ; ΣΩ. Σοφίᾳ δέ γ' οἶμαι σοφοὶ οἱ σοφοί. ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Τοῦτο δὲ μῶν E διαφέρει τι ἐπιστήμης; ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποῖον; ΣΩ. Ἡ σοφία. ἢ οὐχ ἅπερ ἐπιστήμονες, ταῦτα καὶ σοφοί;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί μήν; ΣΩ. Ταὐτὸν ἄρα ἐπιστήμη καὶ σοφία; ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Τοῦτ' αὐτὸ τοίνυν ἐστὶν ὃ ἀπορῶ καὶ οὐ δύναμαι λαβεῖν ἱκανῶς παρ' ἐμαυτῷ,
146 ἐπιστήμη ὅ τί ποτε τυγχάνει ὄν. ἆρ' οὖν δὴ ἔχομεν * λέγειν αὐτό; τί φατέ; τίς ἂν ἡμῶν πρῶτος εἴποι; ὁ δὲ ἁμαρτών, καὶ ὃς ἂν ἀεὶ ἁμαρτάνῃ, καθεδεῖται, ὥσπερ φασὶν οἱ παῖδες οἱ σφαιρίζοντες, ὄνος· ὃς δ' ἂν περιγένηται ἀναμάρτητος, βασιλεύσει ἡμῶν καὶ ἐπιτάξει ὅ τι ἂν βούληται ἀποκρίνεσθαι. Τί σιγᾶτε; οὔ τί που, ὦ Θεόδωρε, ἐγὼ ὑπὸ φιλολογίας ἀγροικίζομαι, προθυμούμενος ἡμᾶς ποιῆσαι διαλέγεσθαι καὶ φίλους τε
B καὶ προσηγόρους ἀλλήλοις γίγνεσθαι; ΘΕΟ. Ἥκιστα μέν, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸ τοιοῦτον ἂν εἴη ἄγροικον, ἀλλὰ τῶν μειρακίων τι κέλευέ σοι ἀποκρίνεσθαι. ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ ἀήθης τῆς τοιαύτης διαλέκτου, καὶ οὐδ' αὖ συνεθίζεσθαι ἡλικίαν ἔχω· τοῖσδε δὲ πρέποι τε ἂν τοῦτο καὶ πολὺ πλεῖον ἐπιδιδοῖεν· τῷ γὰρ ὄντι ἡ νεότης εἰς πᾶν ἐπίδοσιν ἔχει. ἀλλ', ὥσπερ ἤρξω, μὴ ἀφίεσο τοῦ
— Θεαιτήτου, ἀλλ' ἐρώτα. IV. ΣΩ. Ἀκούεις δή, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ἃ λέγει Θεόδωρος, ᾧ ἀπιστεῖν, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι,
C οὔτε σὺ ἐθελήσεις, οὔτε θέμις περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀνδρὶ σοφῷ ἐπιτάττοντι νεώτερον ἀπειθεῖν. ἀλλ' εὖ καὶ γενναίως εἰπέ· τί σοι δοκεῖ εἶναι ἐπιστήμη; ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλὰ χρή, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐπειδήπερ ὑμεῖς κελεύετε. πάντως γάρ, ἄν τι καὶ ἁμάρτω, ἐπανορθώσετε. ΣΩ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἄν πέρ γε οἷοί τε ὦμεν. ΘΕΑΙ. Δοκεῖ τοίνυν μοι καὶ ἃ παρὰ Θεοδώρου ἄν τις μάθοι ἐπιστῆμαι εἶναι, γεωμετρία τε καὶ ἃς νῦν δὴ σὺ διῆλθες, καὶ
D αὖ σκυτοτομική τε καὶ αἱ τῶν ἄλλων δημιουργῶν τέχναι, πᾶσαί τε καὶ ἑκάστη τούτων, οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἢ ἐπιστήμη εἶναι. ΣΩ. Γενναίως γε καὶ φιλοδώρως, ὦ

φίλε, ἢν αἰτηθεὶς πολλὰ δίδως, καὶ ποικίλα ἀνθ' ἁπλοῦ. ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς τί τοῦτο λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες; ΣΩ. Ἴσως μὲν οὐδέν· ὃ μέντοι οἶμαι, φράσω. ὅταν λέγῃς σκυτικήν, μή τι ἄλλο φράζεις ἢ ἐπιστήμην ὑποδημάτων ἐργασίας; ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδέν. ΣΩ. Τί δ' ' ὅταν E τεκτονικήν; μή τι ἄλλο ἢ ἐπιστήμην τῆς τῶν ξυλίνων σκευῶν ἐργασίας; ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδὲ τοῦτο. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐν ἀμφοῖν, οὗ ἑκατέρα ἐπιστήμη, τοῦτο ὁρίζεις; ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Τὸ δέ γε ἐπερωτηθέν, ὦ Θεαίτητε, οὐ τοῦτο ἦν, τίνων ἡ ἐπιστήμη, οὐδὲ ὁπόσαι τινές. οὐ γὰρ ἀριθμῆσαι αὐτὰς βουλόμενοι ἠρόμεθα, ἀλλὰ γνῶναι ἐπιστήμην αὐτὸ ὅ τί ποτ' ἐστίν. ἢ οὐδὲν λέγω; ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν ὀρθῶς. ΣΩ. * Σκέψαι δὴ καὶ 147 τόδε. εἴ τις ἡμᾶς τῶν φαύλων τι καὶ προχείρων ἔροιτο, οἷον περὶ πηλοῦ, ὅ τί ποτ' ἐστίν, εἰ ἀποκριναίμεθα αὐτῷ πηλὸς ὁ τῶν χυτρέων καὶ πηλὸς ὁ τῶν ἰπνοπλαθῶν καὶ πηλὸς ὁ τῶν πλινθουργῶν, οὐκ ἂν γελοῖοι εἶμεν; ΘΕΑΙ. Ἴσως. ΣΩ. Πρῶτον μέν γέ που οἰόμενοι συνιέναι ἐκ τῆς ἡμετέρας ἀποκρίσεως τὸν ἐρωτῶντα, ὅταν εἴπωμεν πηλός, εἴτε ὁ τῶν κοροπλαθῶν προσθέντες εἴτε ' ἄλλων ὡντινωνοῦν δημιουργῶν. ἢ οἴει, τίς τι B συνίησί τινος ὄνομα, ὃ μὴ οἶδε τί ἐστιν; ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδαμῶς. ΣΩ. Οὐδ' ἄρα ἐπιστήμην ὑποδημάτων συνίησιν ὁ ἐπιστήμην μὴ εἰδώς. ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ γάρ. ΣΩ. Σκυτικὴν ἄρα οὐ συνίησιν ὃς ἂν ἐπιστήμην ἀγνοῇ, οὐδέ τινα ἄλλην τέχνην. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔστιν οὕτω. ΣΩ. Γελοία ἄρα ἡ ἀπόκρισις τῷ ἐρωτηθέντι ἐπιστήμη τί ἐστιν, ὅταν ἀποκρίνηται τέχνης τινὸς ὄνομα. τινὸς γὰρ ἐπιστήμην ' ἀποκρίνεται, οὐ τοῦτ' ἐρωτηθείς. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔοικεν. C ΣΩ. Ἔπειτά γέ που ἐξὸν φαύλως καὶ βραχέως ἀποκρίνασθαι περιέρχεται ἀπέραντον ὁδόν. οἷον καὶ ἐν τῇ

τοῦ πηλοῦ ἐρωτήσει φαῦλόν που καὶ ἁπλοῦν εἰπεῖν, ὅτι γῇ ὑγρῷ φυραθεῖσα πηλὸς ἂν εἴη, τὸ δ' ὅτου ἐᾶν χαίρειν.
V. ΘΕΑΙ. Ῥᾴδιον, ὦ Σώκρατες, νῦν γε οὕτω φαίνεται· ἀτὰρ κινδυνεύεις ἐρωτᾶν οἷον καὶ αὐτοῖς ἡμῖν ἔναγχος
D εἰσῆλθε διαλεγομένοις, ἐμοί τε καὶ τῷ σῷ | ὁμωνύμῳ τούτῳ Σωκράτει. ΣΩ. Τὸ ποῖον δή, ὦ Θεαίτητε; ΘΕΑΙ. Περὶ δυνάμεών τι ἡμῖν Θεόδωρος ὅδε ἔγραφε, τῆς τε τρίποδος πέρι καὶ πεντέποδος, ἀποφαίνων ὅτι μήκει οὐ ξύμμετροι τῇ ποδιαίᾳ, καὶ οὕτω κατὰ μίαν ἑκάστην προαιρούμενος μέχρι τῆς ἑπτακαιδεκάποδος· ἐν δὲ ταύτῃ πως ἐνέσχετο. ἡμῖν οὖν εἰσῆλθέ τι τοιοῦτον, ἐπειδὴ ἄπειροι τὸ πλῆθος αἱ δυνάμεις ἐφαίνοντο, πειρα-
E θῆναι ξυλλαβεῖν εἰς ἕν, ὅτῳ πάσας ταύτας | προσαγορεύσομεν τὰς δυνάμεις. ΣΩ. Ἦ καὶ εὕρετέ τι τοιοῦτον; ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔμοιγε δοκοῦμεν. σκόπει δὲ καὶ σύ. ΣΩ. Λέγε. ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸν ἀριθμὸν πάντα δίχα διελάβομεν. τὸν μὲν δυνάμενον ἴσον ἰσάκις γίγνεσθαι τῷ τετραγώνῳ τὸ σχῆμα ἀπεικάσαντες τετράγωνόν τε καὶ ἰσόπλευρον προσείπομεν. ΣΩ. Καὶ εὖ γε. ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸν τοίνυν
148 μεταξὺ τούτου, ὧν καὶ τὰ τρία καὶ τὰ πέντε * καὶ πᾶς ὃς ἀδύνατος ἴσος ἰσάκις γενέσθαι, ἀλλ' ἢ πλείων ἐλαττονάκις ἢ ἐλάττων πλεονάκις γίγνεται, μείζων δὲ καὶ ἐλάττων ἀεὶ πλευρὰ αὐτὸν περιλαμβάνει, τῷ προμήκει αὖ σχήματι ἀπεικάσαντες προμήκη ἀριθμὸν ἐκαλέσαμεν. ΣΩ. Κάλλιστα. ἀλλὰ τί τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο; ΘΕΑΙ. Ὅσαι μὲν γραμμαὶ τὸν ἰσόπλευρον καὶ ἐπίπεδον ἀριθμὸν τετραγωνίζουσι, μῆκος ὡρισάμεθα, ὅσαι
B δὲ τὸν ἑτερομήκη, δυνάμεις, ὡς μήκει μὲν οὐ | ξυμμέτρους ἐκείναις, τοῖς δ' ἐπιπέδοις ἃ δύνανται. καὶ περὶ τὰ στερεὰ ἄλλο τοιοῦτον. ΣΩ. Ἄριστά γ' ἀνθρώπων, ὦ παῖδες, ὥστε μοι δοκεῖ ὁ Θεόδωρος οὐκ ἔνοχος τοῖς ψευδο-

μαρτυρίοις ἔσεσθαι. ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ μήν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅ γε ἐρωτᾷς περὶ ἐπιστήμης, οὐκ ἂν δυναίμην ἀποκρίνασθαι ὥσπερ περὶ τοῦ μήκους καὶ τῆς δυνάμεως. καίτοι σύ γέ μοι δοκεῖς τοιοῦτόν τι ζητεῖν. ὥστε πάλιν αὖ φαίνεται ψευδὴς ὁ Θεόδωρος. ΣΩ. Τί δαί; εἴ σε | πρὸς δρόμον C ἐπαινῶν μηδενὶ οὕτω δρομικῷ ἔφη τῶν νέων ἐντετυχηκέναι, εἶτα διαθέων τοῦ ἀκμάζοντος καὶ ταχίστου ἡττήθης, ἧττόν τι ἂν οἴει ἀληθῆ τόνδ' ἐπαινέσαι; ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκ ἔγωγε. ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην, ὥσπερ νῦν δὴ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, σμικρόν τι οἴει εἶναι ἐξευρεῖν καὶ οὐ τῶν πάντῃ ἄκρων; ΘΕΑΙ. Νὴ τὸν Δί' ἔγωγε καὶ μάλα γε τῶν ἀκροτάτων. ΣΩ. Θάῤῥει τοίνυν περὶ σαυτῷ καί τι οἷον Θεόδωρον λέγειν, | προθυμήθητι δὲ παντὶ τρόπῳ D τῶν τε ἄλλων πέρι καὶ ἐπιστήμης λαβεῖν λόγον, τί ποτε τυγχάνει ὄν. ΘΕΑΙ. Προθυμίας μὲν ἕνεκεν, ὦ Σώκρατες, φανεῖται. VI. ΣΩ. Ἴθι δή· καλῶς γὰρ ἄρτι ὑφηγήσω· πειρῶ μιμούμενος τὴν περὶ τῶν δυνάμεων ἀπόκρισιν, ὥσπερ ταύτας πολλὰς οὔσας ἑνὶ εἴδει περιέλαβες, οὕτω καὶ τὰς πολλὰς ἐπιστήμας ἑνὶ λόγῳ προσειπεῖν. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλ' εὖ ἴσθι, ὦ Σώκρατες, | πολλάκις E δὴ αὐτὸ ἐπεχείρησα σκέψασθαι, ἀκούων τὰς παρὰ σοῦ ἀποφερομένας ἐρωτήσεις· ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὔτ' αὐτὸς δύναμαι πεῖσαι ἐμαυτὸν ὡς ἱκανῶς τι λέγω, οὔτ' ἄλλου ἀκοῦσαι λέγοντος οὕτως ὡς σὺ διακελεύει, οὐ μὲν δὴ αὖ οὐδ' ἀπαλλαγῆναι τοῦ μέλλειν. ΣΩ. Ὠδίνεις γάρ, ὦ φίλε Θεαίτητε, διὰ τὸ μὴ κενὸς ἀλλ' ἐγκύμων εἶναι. ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκ οἶδα, ὦ Σώκρατες· ὃ μέντοι πέπονθα λέγω. ΣΩ. Εἶτα, ὦ * καταγέλαστε, οὐκ ἀκήκοας ὡς ἐγώ εἰμι υἱὸς μαίας 149 μάλα γενναίας τε καὶ βλοσυρᾶς, Φαιναρέτης; ΘΕΑΙ.

143 c. Num legendum sit *του* pro *τοῦ* quaeri potest, non decerni.

Ἤδη τοῦτό γε ἤκουσα. ΣΩ. Ἆρα καὶ ὅτι ἐπιτηδεύω τὴν αὐτὴν τέχνην ἀκήκοας; ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδαμῶς. ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' εὖ ἴσθ' ὅτι· μὴ μέντοι μου κατείπῃς πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους. λέληθα γάρ, ὦ ἑταῖρε, ταύτην ἔχων τὴν τέχνην· οἱ δέ, ἅτε οὐκ εἰδότες, τοῦτο μὲν οὐ λέγουσι περὶ ἐμοῦ, ὅτι δὲ ἀτοπώτατός εἰμι καὶ ποιῶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἀπορεῖν. ἦ
B καὶ τοῦτο ἀκήκοας; ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔγωγε. ΣΩ. Εἶπω οὖν σοι τὸ αἴτιον; ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. ΣΩ. Ἐννόησον δὴ τὸ περὶ τὰς μαίας ἅπαν ὡς ἔχει, καὶ ῥᾷον μαθήσει ὃ βούλομαι. οἶσθα γάρ που ὅτι οὐδεμία αὐτῶν ἔτι αὐτὴ κυϊσκομένη τε καὶ τίκτουσα ἄλλας μαιεύεται, ἀλλ' αἱ ἤδη ἀδύνατοι τίκτειν. ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. ΣΩ. Αἰτίαν δέ γε τούτου φασὶν εἶναι τὴν Ἄρτεμιν, ὅτι ἄλοχος οὖσα τὴν λοχείαν εἴληχε. στερίφαις μὲν
C οὖν ἄρα οὐκ ἔδωκε μαιεύεσθαι, ὅτι ἡ ἀνθρωπίνη φύσις ἀσθενεστέρα ἢ λαβεῖν τέχνην ὧν ἂν ᾖ ἄπειρος· ταῖς δὲ δι' ἡλικίαν ἀτόκοις προσέταξε, τιμῶσα τὴν αὑτῆς ὁμοιότητα. ΘΕΑΙ. Εἰκός. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τόδε εἰκός τε καὶ ἀναγκαῖον, τὰς κυούσας καὶ μὴ γιγνώσκεσθαι μᾶλλον ὑπὸ τῶν μαιῶν ἢ τῶν ἄλλων; ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ γε. ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν καὶ διδοῦσαί γε αἱ μαῖαι φαρμάκια
D καὶ ἐπᾴδουσαι δύνανται ἐγείρειν τε τὰς ὠδῖνας καὶ μαλθακωτέρας, ἂν βούλωνται, ποιεῖν, καὶ τίκτειν τε δὴ τὰς δυστοκούσας, καὶ ἐὰν νέον ὂν δόξῃ ἀμβλίσκειν, ἀμβλίσκουσιν; ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔστι ταῦτα. ΣΩ. Ἆρ' οὖν ἔτι καὶ τόδε αὐτῶν ἤσθησαι, ὅτι καὶ προμνήστριαί εἰσι δεινόταται, ὡς πάσσοφοι οὖσαι περὶ τοῦ γνῶναι, ποίαν χρὴ ποίῳ ἀνδρὶ συνοῦσαν ὡς ἀρίστους παῖδας τίκτειν; ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ πάνυ τοῦτο οἶδα. ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' ἴσθ' ὅτι ἐπὶ

149 D. νέον ὂν corruptum videtur.

τούτῳ μεῖζον φρονοῦσιν ἢ ἐπὶ τῇ ὀμφαλητομίᾳ. | ἐννόει E
γάρ· τῆς αὐτῆς ἡ ἄλλης οἴει τέχνης εἶναι θεραπείαν τε
καὶ ξυγκομιδὴν τῶν ἐκ γῆς καρπῶν καὶ αὖ τὸ γιγνώ-
σκειν εἰς ποίαν γῆν ποῖον φυτόν τε καὶ σπέρμα κατα-
βλητέον; ΘΕΑΙ. Οὔκ, ἀλλὰ τῆς αὐτῆς. ΣΩ. Εἰς
γυναῖκα δέ, ὦ φίλε, ἄλλην μὲν οἴει τοῦ τοιούτου, ἄλλην
δὲ ξυγκομιδῆς; ΘΕΑΙ. Οὔκουν εἰκός γε. ΣΩ. * Οὐ 150
γάρ. ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν ἄδικόν τε καὶ ἄτεχνον ξυναγωγὴν
ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναικός, ᾗ δὴ προαγωγεία ὄνομα, φεύγουσι
καὶ τὴν προμνηστικὴν ἅτε σεμναὶ οὖσαι αἱ μαῖαι, φο-
βούμεναι μὴ εἰς ἐκείνην τὴν αἰτίαν διὰ ταύτην ἐμπέ-
σωσιν· ἐπεὶ ταῖς γε ὄντως μαίαις μόναις που προσήκει
καὶ προμνήσασθαι ὀρθῶς. ΘΕΑΙ. Φαίνεται. ΣΩ. Τὸ
μὲν τοίνυν τῶν μαιῶν τοσοῦτον, ἔλαττον δὲ τοῦ ἐμοῦ
δράματος. οὐ γὰρ πρόσεστι γυναιξὶν ἐνίοτε μὲν εἴδωλα
τίκτειν, ἔστι δ' ὅτε | ἀληθινά, τοῦτο δὲ μὴ ῥᾴδιον εἶναι B
διαγνῶναι. εἰ γὰρ προσῆν, μέγιστόν τε καὶ κάλλιστον
ἔργον ἦν ἂν ταῖς μαίαις τὸ κρίνειν τὸ ἀληθές τε καὶ
μή. ἢ οὐκ οἴει; ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔγωγε. VII. ΣΩ. Τῇ δέ γ'
ἐμῇ τέχνῃ τῆς μαιεύσεως τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ὑπάρχει, ὅσα
ἐκείναις, διαφέρει δὲ τῷ τε ἄνδρας ἀλλὰ μὴ γυναῖκας
μαιεύεσθαι, καὶ τῷ τὰς ψυχὰς αὐτῶν τικτούσας ἐπι-
σκοπεῖν, ἀλλὰ μὴ τὰ σώματα. μέγιστον δὲ τοῦτ' ἔνι τῇ
ἡμετέρᾳ τέχνῃ, βασανίζειν δυνατὸν εἶναι παντὶ | τρόπῳ, C
πότερον εἴδωλον καὶ ψεῦδος ἀποτίκτει τοῦ νέου ἡ διάνοια
ἢ γόνιμόν τε καὶ ἀληθές. ἐπεὶ τόδε γε καὶ ἐμοὶ ὑπάρ-
χει, ὅπερ ταῖς μαίαις· ἄγονός εἰμι σοφίας, καὶ ὅπερ ἤδη
πολλοί μοι ὠνείδισαν, ὡς τοὺς μὲν ἄλλους ἐρωτῶ, αὐτὸς
δὲ οὐδὲν ἀποκρίνομαι περὶ οὐδενὸς διὰ τὸ μηδὲν ἔχειν
σοφόν, ἀληθὲς ὀνειδίζουσι. τὸ δὲ αἴτιον τούτου τόδε·
μαιεύεσθαί με ὁ θεὸς ἀναγκάζει, γεννᾶν δὲ ἀπεκώλυσεν.

εἰμὶ δὴ οὖν αὐτὸς μὲν οὐ πάνυ τι σοφός, οὐδέ τί μοι
D ἔστιν εὕρημα | τοιοῦτον, γεγονὸς τῆς ἐμῆς ψυχῆς ἔκγονον· οἱ δ' ἐμοὶ ξυγγιγνόμενοι τὸ μὲν πρῶτον φαίνονται ἔνιοι μὲν καὶ πάνυ ἀμαθεῖς, πάντες δὲ προϊούσης τῆς ξυνουσίας, οἷσπερ ἂν ὁ θεὸς παρείκῃ, θαυμαστὸν ὅσον ἐπιδιδόντες, ὡς αὐτοῖς τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις δοκοῦσι· καὶ τοῦτο ἐναργές, ὅτι παρ' ἐμοῦ οὐδὲν πώποτε μαθόντες, ἀλλ' αὐτοὶ παρ' αὑτῶν πολλὰ καὶ καλὰ εὑρόντες τε καὶ κατέχοντες. τῆς μέντοι μαιείας ὁ θεός τε καὶ ἐγὼ
E αἴτιος. ὧδε δὲ δῆλον· πολλοὶ ἤδη τοῦτο | ἀγνοήσαντες καὶ ἑαυτοὺς αἰτιασάμενοι, ἐμοῦ δὲ καταφρονήσαντες, ἢ αὐτοὶ ἢ ὑπ' ἄλλων πεισθέντες, ἀπῆλθον πρωϊαίτερον τοῦ δέοντος, ἀπελθόντες δὲ τά τε λοιπὰ ἐξήμβλωσαν διὰ πονηρὰν ξυνουσίαν καὶ τὰ ὑπ' ἐμοῦ μαιευθέντα κακῶς τρέφοντες ἀπώλεσαν, ψευδῆ καὶ εἴδωλα περὶ πλείονος ποιησάμενοι τοῦ ἀληθοῦς, τελευτῶντες δ' αὐτοῖς τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἔδοξαν ἀμαθεῖς εἶναι. ὧν εἷς
151 γέγονεν Ἀριστείδης * ὁ Λυσιμάχου καὶ ἄλλοι πάνυ πολλοί οἷς, ὅταν πάλιν ἔλθωσιν δεόμενοι τῆς ἐμῆς ξυνουσίας καὶ θαυμαστὰ δρῶντες, ἐνίοις μὲν τὸ γιγνόμενόν μοι δαιμόνιον ἀποκωλύει ξυνεῖναι, ἐνίοις δὲ ἐᾷ· καὶ πάλιν αὐτοὶ ἐπιδιδόασι. πάσχουσι δὲ δὴ οἱ ἐμοὶ ξυγγιγνόμενοι καὶ τοῦτο ταὐτὸν ταῖς τικτούσαις· ὠδίνουσι γὰρ καὶ ἀπορίας ἐμπίπλανται νύκτας τε καὶ ἡμέρας πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ ἐκεῖναι. ταύτην δὲ τὴν ὠδῖνα ἐγείρειν τε καὶ ἀποπαύειν ἡ ἐμὴ τέχνη δύναται. καὶ
B οὕτοι μὲν | δὴ οὕτως. ἐνίοτε δέ, ὦ Θεαιτητε, οἷ ἄν μοι μὴ δόξωσί πως ἐγκύμονες εἶναι, γνοὺς ὅτι οὐδὲν ἐμοῦ δέονται, πάνυ εὐμενῶς προμνῶμαι, καὶ ξὺν θεῷ

150 E. ἢ αὐτοὶ ἢ ὑπ' ἄλλων. Ita rectissime Heind. Stallb. alii, pro vulgato ἢ αὐτοὶ ὑπ' ἄλλων.

εἰπεῖν, πάνυ ἱκανῶς τοπάζω οἷς ἂν ξυγγενόμενοι ὄναιντο. ὧν πολλοὺς μὲν δὴ ἐξέδωκα Προδίκῳ, πολλοὺς δὲ ἄλλοις σοφοῖς τε καὶ θεσπεσίοις ἀνδράσι. Ταῦτα δή σοι, ὦ ἄριστε, ἕνεκα τοῦδε ἐμήκυνα, ὑποπτεύων σε, ὥσπερ καὶ αὐτὸς οἴει, ὠδίνειν τι κυοῦντα ἔνδον. προσφέρου οὖν πρός με ὡς πρὸς μαίας υἱὸν καὶ | αὐτὸν μαιευτικόν, καὶ C ἃ ἂν ἐρωτῶ, προθυμοῦ ὅπως οἷός τ' εἶ, οὕτως ἀποκρίνασθαι. καὶ ἐὰν ἄρα σκοπούμενός τι ὧν ἂν λέγῃς, ἡγήσωμαι εἴδωλον καὶ μὴ ἀληθές, εἶτα ὑπεξαιρῶμαι καὶ ἀποβάλλω, μὴ ἀγρίαινε ὥσπερ αἱ πρωτοτόκοι περὶ τὰ παιδία. πολλοὶ γὰρ ἤδη, ὦ θαυμάσιε, πρός με οὕτω διετέθησαν, ὥστε ἀτεχνῶς δάκνειν ἕτοιμοι εἶναι, ἐπειδάν τινα λῆρον αὐτῶν ἀφαιρῶμαι, καὶ οὐκ οἴονταί με εὐνοίᾳ τοῦτο ποιεῖν, πόρρω ὄντες τοῦ εἰδέναι ὅτι οὐδεὶς θεὸς | δύσνους ἀνθρώποις, οὐδ' ἐγὼ δυσνοίᾳ τοιοῦτον D οὐδὲν δρῶ, ἀλλά μοι ψεῦδός τε ξυγχωρῆσαι καὶ ἀληθὲς ἀφανίσαι οὐδαμῶς θέμις. VIII. Πάλιν δὴ οὖν ἐξ ἀρχῆς, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ὅ τί ποτ' ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη, πειρῶ λέγειν· ὡς δ' οὐχ οἷός τ' εἶ, μηδέποτ' εἴπῃς. ἐὰν γὰρ θεὸς ἐθέλῃ καὶ ἀνδρίζῃ, οἷός τ' ἔσει. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλὰ μέντοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, σοῦ γε οὕτω παρακελευομένου αἰσχρὸν μὴ οὐ παντὶ τρόπῳ προθυμεῖσθαι ὅ τί τις ἔχει | λεγειν. E δοκεῖ οὖν μοι ὁ ἐπιστάμενός τι αἰσθάνεσθαι τοῦτο, ὃ ἐπίσταται, καὶ ὥς γε νυνὶ φαίνεται, οὐκ ἄλλο τί ἐστιν ἐπιστήμη ἢ αἴσθησις. ΣΩ. Εὖ γε καὶ γενναίως, ὦ παῖ· χρὴ γὰρ οὕτως ἀποφαινόμενον λέγειν. ἀλλὰ φέρε δὴ αὐτὸ κοινῇ σκεψώμεθα, γόνιμον ἢ ἀνεμιαῖον τυγχάνει ὄν. αἴσθησις, φῂς, ἐπιστήμη; ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Κινδυνεύεις μέντοι λόγον οὐ φαῦλον εἰρηκέναι περὶ ἐπιστήμης, ἀλλ' ὃν ἔλεγε * καὶ Πρωταγόρας. τρόπον δέ τινα ἄλλον 152 εἴρηκε τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα. φησὶ γάρ που πάντων χρημάτων

μέτρον ἀνθρωπον εἶναι, τῶν μὲν ὄντων, ὡς ἔστι, τῶν δὲ μὴ ὄντων, ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν. ἀνέγνωκας γάρ που; ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀνέγνωκα καὶ πολλάκις. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν οὕτω πως λέγει, ὡς οἷα μὲν ἕκαστα ἐμοὶ φαίνεται, τοιαῦτα μέν ἐστιν ἐμοί, οἷα δὲ σοί, τοιαῦτα δὲ αὖ σοί· ἄνθρωπος δὲ σύ τε κἀγώ; ΘΕΑΙ. Λέγει γὰρ οὖν οὕτως. ΣΩ. Εἰκὸς μέντοι
B σοφὸν ἄνδρα μὴ ληρεῖν· ἐπακολουθήσωμεν οὖν αὐτῷ. ἆρ' οὐκ ἐνίοτε πνέοντος ἀνέμου τοῦ αὐτοῦ ὁ μὲν ἡμῶν ῥιγοῖ, ὁ δ' οὔ; καὶ ὁ μὲν ἠρέμα, ὁ δὲ σφόδρα; ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ μάλα. ΣΩ. Πότερον οὖν τότε αὐτὸ ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ τὸ πνεῦμα ψυχρὸν ἢ οὐ ψυχρὸν φήσομεν; ἢ πεισόμεθα τῷ Πρωταγόρᾳ, ὅτι τῷ μὲν ῥιγοῦντι ψυχρόν, τῷ δὲ μὴ οὔ; ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔοικεν. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ φαίνεται οὕτως ἑκατέρῳ; ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Τὸ δέ γε φαίνεται αἰσθά-
C νεσθαί ἐστιν; ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔστι γάρ. ΣΩ. Φαντασία ἄρα καὶ αἴσθησις ταὐτὸν ἔν τε θερμοῖς καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς τοιούτοις. οἷα γὰρ αἰσθάνεται ἕκαστος, τοιαῦτα ἑκάστῳ καὶ κινδυνεύει εἶναι. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔοικεν. ΣΩ. Αἴσθησις ἄρα τοῦ ὄντος ἀεί ἐστι καὶ ἀψευδές, ὡς ἐπιστήμη οὖσα. ΘΕΑΙ. Φαίνεται. ΣΩ. Ἆρ' οὖν πρὸς Χαρίτων πάσσοφός τις ἦν ὁ Πρωταγόρας, καὶ τοῦτο ἡμῖν μὲν ᾐνίξατο τῷ πολλῷ συρφετῷ, τοῖς δὲ μαθηταῖς ἐν ἀπορρήτῳ τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἔλεγεν; ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς δή, ὦ Σώκρατες,
D τοῦτο λέγεις; ΣΩ. Ἐγὼ ἐρῶ καὶ μάλ' οὐ φαῦλον λόγον, ὡς ἄρα ἓν μὲν αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτὸ οὐδέν ἐστιν, οὐδ' ἄν τι προσείποις ὀρθῶς οὐδ' ὁποιονοῦν τι, ἀλλ' ἐὰν ὡς μέγα προσαγορεύῃς, καὶ σμικρὸν φανεῖται, καὶ ἐὰν βαρύ, κοῦφον, ξύμπαντά τε οὕτως, ὡς μηδενὸς ὄντος ἑνὸς μήτε τινὸς μήτε ὁποιουοῦν· ἐκ δὲ δὴ φορᾶς τε καὶ κινήσεως

152 B. ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ. De hac lectione cf. Vers.

καὶ κράσεως πρὸς ἄλληλα γίγνεται πάντα, ἃ δή φαμεν εἶναι, οὐκ ὀρθῶς προσαγορεύοντες· ἔστι μὲν γὰρ οὐδέποτ' οὐδέν, ἀεὶ δὲ γίγνεται. καὶ περὶ τούτου πάντες E
ἐξῆς οἱ σοφοὶ πλὴν Παρμενίδου ξυμφερέσθων, Πρωταγόρας τε καὶ Ἡράκλειτος καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς, καὶ τῶν ποιητῶν οἱ ἄκροι τῆς ποιήσεως ἑκατέρας, κωμῳδίας μὲν Ἐπίχαρμος, τραγῳδίας δὲ Ὅμηρος· εἰπὼν γὰρ

Ὠκεανόν τε θεῶν γένεσιν καὶ μητέρα Τηθύν

πάντα εἴρηκεν ἔκγονα ῥοῆς τε καὶ κινήσεως. ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ τοῦτο λέγειν; ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔμοιγε. ΙΧ. ΣΩ. Τίς οὖν ἂν ἔτι πρός γε τοσοῦτον * στρατόπεδον καὶ στρατηγὸν 153
Ὅμηρον δύναιτο ἀμφισβητήσας μὴ οὐ καταγέλαστος γενέσθαι; ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ ῥᾴδιον, ὦ Σώκρατες. ΣΩ. Οὐ γάρ, ὦ Θεαίτητε. ἐπεὶ καὶ τάδε τῷ λόγῳ σημεῖα ἱκανά, ὅτι τὸ μὲν εἶναι δοκοῦν καὶ τὸ γίγνεσθαι κίνησις παρέχει, τὸ δὲ μὴ εἶναι καὶ ἀπόλλυσθαι ἡσυχία· τὸ γὰρ θερμόν τε καὶ πῦρ, ὃ δὴ καὶ τἆλλα γεννᾷ καὶ ἐπιτροπεύει, αὐτὸ γεννᾶται ἐκ φορᾶς καὶ τρίψεως· τούτῳ δὲ κινήσεις. ἢ οὐχ αὗται γενέσεις πυρός; ΘΕΑΙ. Αὗται B
μὲν οὖν. ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν τό γε τῶν ζώων γένος ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν τούτων φύεται. ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς δ' οὔ; ΣΩ. Τί δαί; ἡ τῶν σωμάτων ἕξις οὐχ ὑπὸ ἡσυχίας μὲν καὶ ἀργίας διόλλυται, ὑπὸ γυμνασίων δὲ καὶ κινήσεων ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ σώζεται; ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Ἡ δ' ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἕξις οὐχ ὑπὸ μαθήσεως μὲν καὶ μελέτης, κινήσεων ὄντων, κτᾶταί τε μαθήματα καὶ σώζεται καὶ γίγνεται βελτίων, ὑπὸ δ' ἡσυχίας, ἀμελετησίας τε καὶ ἀμαθίας οὔσης, οὔτε τι μανθάνει ἅ τε ἂν μάθῃ ἐπιλανθάνεται; C
ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ μάλα. ΣΩ. Τὸ μὲν ἄρα ἀγαθὸν κίνησις

152 E. ξυμφερέσθων recte se habet pro vulg. ξυμφέρεσθον.

κατά τε ψυχὴν καὶ κατὰ σῶμα, τὸ δὲ τοὐναντίον;
ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔοικεν. ΣΩ. Ἔτι οὖν σοι λέγω νηνεμίας τε
καὶ γαλήνας καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα, ὅτι αἱ μὲν ἡσυχίαι σή-
πουσι καὶ ἀπολλύασι, τὰ δ' ἕτερα σώζει; καὶ ἐπὶ τού-
τοις τὸν κολοφῶνα ἀναγκάζω προσβιβάζων, τὴν χρυσῆν
σειρὰν ὡς οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ τὸν ἥλιον Ὅμηρος λέγει, καὶ
D δηλοῖ ὅτι ¹ ἕως μὲν ἂν ἡ περιφορὰ ᾖ κινουμένη καὶ ὁ
ἥλιος, πάντα ἔστι καὶ σώζεται τὰ ἐν θεοῖς τε καὶ ἀν-
θρώποις· εἰ δὲ σταίη τοῦτο ὥσπερ δεθέν, πάντα χρήματ'
ἂν διαφθαρείη καὶ γένοιτ' ἂν τὸ λεγόμενον ἄνω κάτω
πάντα; ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλ' ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ταῦτα
δηλοῦν, ἅπερ λέγεις. Χ. ΣΩ. Ὑπόλαβε τοίνυν, ὦ
ἄριστε, οὑτωσί. κατὰ τὰ ὄμματα πρῶτον, ὃ δὴ καλεῖς
χρῶμα λευκόν, μὴ εἶναι αὐτὸ ἕτερόν τι ἔξω τῶν σῶν
ὀμμάτων μηδ' ἐν τοῖς ὄμμασι· μηδέ τιν' αὐτῷ χώραν ¹
E ἀποτάξῃς. ἤδη γὰρ ἂν εἴη τε ὂν που ἐν τάξει καὶ μένοι
καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἐν γενέσει γίγνοιτο. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλὰ πῶς;
ΣΩ. Ἐπώμεθα τῷ ἄρτι λόγῳ, μηδὲν αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτὸ ἓν
ὂν τιθέντες· καὶ ἡμῖν οὕτω μέλαν τε καὶ λευκὸν καὶ
ὁτιοῦν ἄλλο χρῶμα ἐκ τῆς προσβολῆς τῶν ὀμμάτων
πρὸς τὴν προσήκουσαν φορὰν φανεῖται γεγενημένον, καὶ
ὃ δὴ ἕκαστον εἶναί φαμεν χρῶμα, οὔτε τὸ προσβάλλον
154 οὔτε * τὸ προσβαλλόμενον ἔσται, ἀλλὰ μεταξύ τι ἑκά-
στῳ ἴδιον γεγονός. ἢ σὺ διϊσχυρίσαιο ἄν, ὡς οἷον σοὶ
φαίνεται ἕκαστον χρῶμα, τοιοῦτον καὶ κυνὶ καὶ ὁτῳοῦν
ζώῳ; ΘΕΑΙ. Μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἔγωγε. ΣΩ. Τί δ'; ἄλλῳ
ἀνθρώπῳ ἆρ' ὅμοιον καὶ σοὶ φαίνεται ὁτιοῦν; ἔχεις
τοῦτο ἰσχυρῶς, ἢ πολὺ μᾶλλον, ὅτι οἰδὲ σοὶ αὐτῷ
ταὐτὸν διὰ τὸ μηδέποτε ὁμοίως αὐτὸν σεαυτῷ ἔχειν;
B ΘΕΑΙ. Τοῦτο μᾶλλόν μοι δοκεῖ ἢ ἐκεῖνο. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν
εἰ μὲν ὃ παραμετρούμεθα ἢ οὔ ¹ ἐφαπτόμεθα, μέγα ἢ
λευκὸν ἢ θερμὸν ἦν, οὐκ ἄν ποτε ἄλλῳ τῳ προσπεσὸν

ἄλλο ἂν ἐγεγόνει, αὐτό γε μηδὲν μεταβάλλον· εἰ δὲ αὖ τὸ παραμετρούμενον ἢ ἐφαπτόμενον ἕκαστον ἦν τούτων, οὐκ ἂν αὖ ἄλλου προσελθόντος ἤ τι παθόντος αὐτὸ μηδὲν παθὸν ἄλλο ἂν ἐγένετο. ἐπεὶ νῦν γε, ὦ φίλε, θαυμαστά τε καὶ γελοῖα εὐχερῶς πως ἀναγκαζόμεθα λέγειν, ὡς φαίη ἂν Πρωταγόρας τε καὶ πᾶς ὁ τὰ αὐτὰ ἐκείνῳ ἐπιχειρῶν λέγειν. ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς δὴ καὶ ποῖα λέγεις; ΣΩ. Σμικρὸν λαβὲ παράδειγμα, καὶ πάντα C εἴσει ἃ βούλομαι. ἀστραγάλους γάρ που ἓξ, ἂν μὲν τέτταρας αὐτοῖς προσενέγκῃς, πλείους φαμὲν εἶναι τῶν τεττάρων καὶ ἡμιολίους, ἐὰν δὲ δώδεκα, ἐλάττους καὶ ἡμίσεις· καὶ οὐδὲ ἀνεκτὸν ἄλλως λέγειν. ἢ σὺ ἀνέξει; ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκ ἔγωγε. ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; ἄν σε Πρωταγόρας ἔρηται ἤ τις ἄλλος, Ὦ Θεαίτητε, ἔσθ' ὅπως τι μεῖζον ἢ πλέον γίγνεται ἄλλως ἢ αὐξηθέν; τί ἀποκρινεῖ; ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐὰν μέν, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸ δοκοῦν πρὸς τὴν νῦν ἐρώτησιν ἀποκρίνωμαι, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν· ἐὰν δὲ πρὸς D τὴν προτέραν, φυλάττων μὴ ἐναντία εἴπω, ὅτι ἔστιν. ΣΩ. Εὖ γε νὴ τὴν Ἥραν, ὦ φίλε, καὶ θείως. ἀτάρ, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐὰν ἀποκρίνῃ ὅτι ἔστιν, Εὐριπίδειόν τι ξυμβήσεται· ἡ μὲν γὰρ γλῶττα ἀνέλεγκτος ἡμῖν ἔσται, ἡ δὲ φρὴν οὐκ ἀνέλεγκτος. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθῆ. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἰ μὲν δεινοὶ καὶ σοφοὶ ἐγώ τε καὶ σὺ ἦμεν, πάντα τὰ τῶν φρενῶν ἐξητακότες, ἤδη ἂν τὸ λοιπὸν ἐκ περιουσίας ἀλλήλων ἀποπειρώμενοι, ξυνελθόντες σοφιστικῶς εἰς E μάχην τοιαύτην, ἀλλήλων τοὺς λόγους τοῖς λόγοις ἐκρούομεν· νῦν δὲ ἅτε ἰδιῶται πρῶτον βουλησόμεθα θεάσασθαι αὐτὰ πρὸς αὑτά, τί ποτ' ἐστὶν ἃ διανοούμεθα, πότερον ἡμῖν ἀλλήλοις ξυμφωνεῖ ἢ οὐδ' ὁπωστιοῦν. ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν ἔγωγε τοῦτ' ἂν βουλοίμην. XI. ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν ἔγωγε. ὅτε δ' οὕτως ἔχει,

ἄλλο τι ἢ ἠρέμα, ὡς πάνυ πολλὴν σχολὴν ἄγοντες,
155 πάλιν ἐπανασκεψόμεθα, οὐ * δυσκολαίνοντες, ἀλλὰ τῷ
ὄντι ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς ἐξετάζοντες, ἅττα ποτ' ἐστὶ ταῦτα τὰ
φάσματα ἐν ἡμῖν. ὧν πρῶτον ἐπισκοποῦντες φήσομεν,
ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι, μηδέποτε μηδὲν ἂν μεῖζον μηδὲ ἔλαττον
γενέσθαι μήτε ὄγκῳ μήτε ἀριθμῷ, ἕως ἴσον εἴη αὐτὸ
ἑαυτῷ. οὐχ οὕτως; ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Δεύτερον δέ
γε, ᾧ μήτε προστίθοιτο μήτε ἀφαιροῖτο, τοῦτο μήτε
αὐξάνεσθαί ποτε μήτε φθίνειν, ἀεὶ δὲ ἴσον εἶναι.
Β ΘΕΑΙ. Κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν. ΣΩ. Ἆρ' | οὖν οὐ καὶ τρίτον,
ὃ μὴ πρότερον ἦν, ἀλλὰ ὕστερον τοῦτο εἶναι ἄνευ τοῦ
γενέσθαι καὶ γίγνεσθαι ἀδύνατον; ΘΕΑΙ. Δοκεῖ γε
δή. ΣΩ. Ταῦτα δή, οἶμαι, ὁμολογήματα τρία μάχεται
αὐτὰ αὑτοῖς ἐν τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ ψυχῇ, ὅταν τὰ περὶ τῶν
ἀστραγάλων λέγωμεν, ἢ ὅταν φῶμεν ἐμὲ τηλικόνδε
ὄντα, μήτε αὐξηθέντα μήτε τοὐναντίον παθόντα, ἐν
ἐνιαυτῷ σοῦ τοῦ νέου νῦν μὲν μείζω εἶναι, ὕστερον δὲ
ἐλάττω, μηδὲν τοῦ ἐμοῦ ὄγκου ἀφαιρεθέντος ἀλλὰ σοῦ
C αὐξηθέντος. | εἰμὶ γὰρ δὴ ὕστερον ὃ πρότερον οὐκ ἦν,
οὐ γενόμενος· ἄνευ γὰρ τοῦ γίγνεσθαι γενέσθαι ἀδύνα-
τον, μηδὲν δὲ ἀπολλὺς τοῦ ὄγκου οὐκ ἄν ποτε ἐγιγνόμην
ἐλάττων. καὶ ἄλλα δὴ μυρία ἐπὶ μυρίοις οὕτως ἔχει,
εἴπερ καὶ ταῦτα παραδεξόμεθα. ἔπει γάρ που, ὦ Θεαί-
τητε· δοκεῖς γοῦν μοι οὐκ ἄπειρος τῶν τοιούτων εἶναι.
ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ νὴ τοὺς θεούς γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὑπερφυῶς
ὡς θαυμάζω, τί ποτ' ἐστὶ ταῦτα, καὶ ἐνίοτε ὡς ἀληθῶς
D βλέπων εἰς αὐτὰ σκοτοδινιῶ. ΣΩ. | Θεόδωρος γάρ, ὦ
φίλε, φαίνεται οὐ κακῶς τοπάζειν περὶ τῆς φύσεώς σου.
μάλα γὰρ φιλοσόφου τοῦτο τὸ πάθος, τὸ θαυμάζειν·
οὐ γὰρ ἄλλη ἀρχὴ φιλοσοφίας ἢ αὕτη, καὶ ἔοικεν ὁ τὴν
Ἶριν Θαύμαντος ἔκγονον φήσας οὐ κακῶς γενεαλογεῖν.

ἀλλὰ πότερον μανθάνεις ἤδη, διὸ ταῦτα τοιαῦτ' ἐστὶν ἐξ ὧν τὸν Πρωταγόραν φαμὲν λέγειν, ἢ οὔπω; ΘΕΑΙ. Οὔπω μοι δοκῶ. ΣΩ. Χάριν οὖν μοι εἴσει, ἐάν σοι ἀνδρός, μᾶλλον δὲ ἀνδρῶν ὀνομαστῶν τῆς διανοίας [1] τὴν E ἀληθειαν ἀποκεκρυμμένην συνεξερευνήσωμαι αὐτῶν; ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐκ εἴσομαι, καὶ πάνυ γε πολλήν; XII. ΣΩ. Ἄθρει δὴ περισκοπῶν, μή τις τῶν ἀμυήτων ἐπακούῃ. εἰσὶ δὲ οὗτοι οἱ οὐδὲν ἄλλο οἰόμενοι εἶναι ἢ οὗ ἂν δύνωνται ἁπτὸν τοῖν χεροῖν λαβέσθαι, πράξεις δὲ καὶ γενέσεις καὶ πᾶν τὸ ἀόρατον οὐκ ἀποδεχόμενοι ὡς ἐν οὐσίας μέρει. ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ μὲν δή, ὦ Σώκρατες, σκληρούς γε λέγεις καὶ * ἀντιτύπους ἀνθρώπους. ΣΩ. 156
Εἰσὶ γάρ, ὦ παῖ, μάλ' εὖ ἄμουσοι. ἄλλοι δὲ πολὺ κομψότεροι, ὧν μέλλω σοι τὰ μυστήρια λέγειν. ἀρχὴ δέ, ἐξ ἧς καὶ ἃ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν πάντα ἤρτηται, ἥδε αὐτῶν, ὡς τὸ πᾶν κίνησις ἦν καὶ ἄλλο παρὰ τοῦτο οὐδέν, τῆς δὲ κινήσεως δύο εἴδη, πλήθει μὲν ἄπειρον ἑκάτερον, δύναμιν δὲ τὸ μὲν ποιεῖν ἔχον, τὸ δὲ πάσχειν. ἐκ δὲ τῆς τούτων ὁμιλίας τε καὶ τρίψεως πρὸς ἄλληλα γίγνεται ἔκγονα πλήθει μὲν ἄπειρα, [1] δίδυμα δέ, τὸ μὲν B αἰσθητόν, τὸ δὲ αἴσθησις, ἀεὶ συνεκπίπτουσα καὶ γεννωμένη μετὰ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ. αἱ μὲν οὖν αἰσθήσεις τὰ τοιάδε ἡμῖν ἔχουσιν ὀνόματα, ὄψεις τε καὶ ἀκοαὶ καὶ ὀσφρήσεις καὶ ψύξεις τε καὶ καύσεις καὶ ἡδοναί γε δὴ καὶ λῦπαι καὶ ἐπιθυμίαι καὶ φόβοι κεκλημέναι καὶ ἄλλαι, ἀπέραντοι μὲν αἱ ἀνώνυμοι, παμπληθεῖς δὲ αἱ ὠνομασμέναι· τὸ δ' αὖ αἰσθητὸν γένος τούτων ἑκάσταις ὁμόγονον, ὄψεσι μὲν χρώματα παντοδαπαῖς [1] παντο- C δαπά, ἀκοαῖς δὲ ὡσαύτως φωναί, καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις αἰσθήσεσι τὰ ἄλλα αἰσθητὰ ξυγγενῆ γιγνόμενα. Τί δὴ οὖν ἡμῖν βούλεται οὗτος ὁ μῦθος, ὦ Θεαίτητε, πρὸς τὰ

πρότερα; ἆρα ἐννοεῖς; ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ πάνυ, ὦ Σώκρατες. ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' ἄθρει ἐάν πως ἀποτελεσθῇ. βούλεται γὰρ δὴ λέγειν ὡς ταῦτα πάντα μέν, ὥσπερ λέγομεν, κινεῖται, τάχος δὲ καὶ βραδυτὴς ἔνι τῇ κινήσει αὐτῶν. ὅσον μὲν οὖν βραδύ, ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ πρὸς τὰ πλησιάζοντα τὴν
D κίνησιν ἴσχει καὶ οὕτω δὴ [1] γεννᾷ, τὰ δὲ γεννώμενα οὕτω δὴ [βραδύτερά ἐστιν· ὅσον δὲ αὖ ταχύ, πρὸς τὰ πόῤῥωθεν τὴν κίνησιν ἴσχει καὶ οὕτω γεννᾷ, τὰ δὲ γεννώμενα οὕτω δὴ] θάττω ἐστί· φέρεται γὰρ καὶ ἐν φορᾷ αὐτῶν ἡ κίνησις πέφυκεν. ἐπειδὰν οὖν ὄμμα καὶ ἄλλο τι τῶν τούτῳ ξυμμέτρων πλησιάσαν γεννήσῃ τὴν λευκότητά τε καὶ αἴσθησιν αὐτῇ ξύμφυτον, ἃ οὐκ ἄν ποτε ἐγένετο ἑκατέρου ἐκείνων πρὸς ἄλλο ἐλθόντος, τότε δὴ μεταξὺ φερομένων τῆς μὲν ὄψεως πρὸς τῶν
E ὀφθαλμῶν, τῆς δὲ λευκότητος [1] πρὸς τοῦ συναποτίκτοντος τὸ χρῶμα, ὁ μὲν ὀφθαλμὸς ἄρα ὄψεως ἔμπλεως ἐγένετο καὶ ὁρᾷ δὴ τότε καὶ ἐγένετο οὔ τι ὄψις ἀλλὰ ὀφθαλμὸς ὁρῶν, τὸ δὲ ξυγγεννῆσαν τὸ χρῶμα λευκότητος περιεπλήσθη καὶ ἐγένετο οὐ λευκότης αὖ ἀλλὰ λευκόν, εἴτε ξύλον εἴτε λίθος εἴτε ὁτιοῦν ξυνέβη χρῆμα χρωσθῆναι τῷ τοιούτῳ χρώματι. καὶ τἆλλα δὴ οὕτω, σκληρὸν καὶ θερμὸν καὶ πάντα τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ὑπολεπτέον, αὐτὸ μὲν καθ' αὑτὸ μηδὲν εἶναι, ὃ δὴ καὶ
157 τότε * ἐλέγομεν, ἐν δὲ τῇ πρὸς ἄλληλα ὁμιλίᾳ πάντα γίγνεσθαι καὶ παντοῖα ἀπὸ τῆς κινήσεως, ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ ποιοῦν εἶναί τι καὶ τὸ πάσχον αὖ τι ἐπὶ ἑνὸς νοῆσαι,

156 D. βραδύτερα et quae in uncinis sequuntur, omissa in codd., supplevit Stephanus e Cornarii eclogis: et sine uncinis edidit Bekker, sensu, ut videtur, exposcente; respuunt tamen Campb., Jowett.

E. ὁτιοῦν—χρῆμα ex correctione Cornarii receperunt Heind. et Bekker. pro vulg. ὁτουοῦν—χρῶμα.

ὥς φασιν, οὐκ εἶναι παγίως. οὔτε γὰρ ποιοῦν ἐστί τι, πρὶν ἂν τῷ πάσχοντι ξυνέλθῃ, οὔτε πάσχον, πρὶν ἂν τῷ ποιοῦντι· τό τέ τινι ξυνελθὸν καὶ ποιοῦν ἄλλῳ αὖ προσπεσὸν πάσχον ἀνεφάνη. ὥστε ἐξ ἁπάντων τούτων, ὅπερ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐλέγομεν, οὐδὲν εἶναι ἓν αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτό, ἀλλά τινι ἀεὶ γίγνεσθαι, τὸ δ' εἶναι παντα-
χόθεν ἐξαιρετέον, οὐχ ὅτι ἡμεῖς πολλὰ καὶ ἄρτι ἠναγ- B
κάσμεθα ὑπὸ συνηθείας καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνης χρῆσθαι αὐτῷ. τὸ δ' οὐ δεῖ, ὡς ὁ τῶν σοφῶν λόγος, οὔτε τι ξυγχωρεῖν οὔτε του οὔτ' ἐμοῦ οὔτε τόδε οὔτ' ἐκεῖνο οὔτε ἄλλο οὐδὲν ὄνομα, ὅ τι ἂν ἱστῇ, ἀλλὰ κατὰ φύσιν φθέγγεσθαι γιγνόμενα καὶ ποιούμενα καὶ ἀπολλύμενα καὶ ἀλλοιούμενα· ὡς ἐάν τί τις στήσῃ τῷ λόγῳ, εὐέ-
λεγκτος ὁ τοῦτο ποιῶν. δεῖ δὲ καὶ κατὰ μέρος οὕτω λέγειν καὶ περὶ πολλῶν ἀθροισθέντων, ᾧ δὴ ἀθροίσματι ἄνθρωπόν τε τίθενται καὶ λίθον καὶ ἕκαστον ζῷόν τε C
καὶ εἶδος. Ταῦτα δή, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ἆρ' ἡδέα δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι, καὶ γεύοιο ἂν αὐτῶν ὡς ἀρεσκόντων; ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκ οἶδα ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες· καὶ γὰρ οὐδὲ περὶ σοῦ δύναμαι κατανοῆσαι, πότερα δοκοῦντά σοι λέγεις αὐτὰ ἢ ἐμοῦ ἀποπειρᾷ. ΣΩ. Οὐ μνημονεύεις, ὦ φίλε, ὅτι ἐγὼ μὲν οὔτ' οἶδα οὔτε ποιοῦμαι τῶν τοιούτων οὐδὲν ἐμόν, ἀλλ' εἰμὶ αὐτῶν ἄγονος, σὲ δὲ μαιεύομαι καὶ τούτου ἕνεκα ἐπᾴδω τε καὶ παρατίθημι ἑκάστων τῶν σοφῶν ἀπο-
γεύσασθαι, ἕως ἂν εἰς φῶς τὸ σὸν δόγμα ξυνεξαγάγω· D
ἐξαχθέντος δέ, τότ' ἤδη σκέψομαι εἴτ' ἀνεμιαῖον εἴτε γόνιμον ἀναφανήσεται. ἀλλὰ θαῤῥῶν καὶ καρτερῶν εὖ καὶ ἀνδρείως ἀποκρίνου ἃ ἂν φαίνηταί σοι περὶ ὧν ἂν ἐρωτῶ. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐρώτα δή. XIII. ΣΩ. Λέγε τοίνυν πάλιν, εἴ σοι ἀρέσκει τὸ μή τι εἶναι ἀλλὰ γίγνεσθαι ἀεὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ καλὸν καὶ πάντα, ἃ ἄρτι διῆμεν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλ' ἔμοιγε, ἐπειδὴ σοῦ ἀκούω οὕτω διεξιόντος, θαυμασίως φαίνεται ὡς ἔχειν λόγον καὶ ὑποληπτέον
E ἥπερ διελήλυθας. ΣΩ. Μὴ τοίνυν ἀπολίπωμεν ὅσον ἐλλεῖπον αὐτοῦ. λείπεται δὲ ἐνυπνίων τε πέρι καὶ νόσων, τῶν τε ἄλλων καὶ μανίας, ὅσα τε παρακούειν ἢ παρορᾶν ἤ τι ἄλλο παραισθάνεσθαι λέγεται. οἶσθα γάρ που, ὅτι ἐν πᾶσι τούτοις ὁμολογουμένως ἐλέγχεσθαι δοκεῖ ὃν ἄρτι διῆμεν λόγον, ὡς παντὸς μᾶλλον ἡμῖν
158 ψευδεῖς αἰσθήσεις ἐν * αὐτοῖς γιγνομένας, καὶ πολλοῦ δεῖν τὰ φαινόμενα ἑκάστῳ ταῦτα καὶ εἶναι, ἀλλὰ πᾶν τοὐναντίον οὐδὲν ὧν φαίνεται εἶναι. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθέστατα λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες. ΣΩ. Τίς δὴ οὖν, ὦ παῖ, λείπεται λόγος τῷ τὴν αἴσθησιν ἐπιστήμην τιθεμένῳ καὶ τὰ φαινόμενα ἑκάστῳ ταῦτα καὶ εἶναι τούτῳ, ᾧ φαίνεται; ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐγὼ μέν, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκ ἔχω εἰπεῖν, ὅτι οὐκ ἔχω τί λέγω, διότι μοι νῦν δὴ ἐπέπληξας εἰπόντι
B αὐτό. ἐπεὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς γε οὐκ ἂν δυναίμην ἀμφισβητῆσαι, ὡς οἱ μαινόμενοι ἢ οἱ ὀνειρώττοντες οὐ ψευδῆ δοξάζουσιν, ὅταν οἱ μὲν θεοὶ αὐτῶν οἴωνται εἶναι, οἱ δὲ πτηνοί τε, καὶ ὡς πετόμενοι ἐν τῷ ὕπνῳ διανοῶνται. ΣΩ. Ἆρ' οὖν οὐδὲ τὸ τοιόνδε ἀμφισβήτημα ἐννοεῖς περὶ αὐτῶν, μάλιστα δὲ περὶ τοῦ ὄναρ τε καὶ ὕπαρ; ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποῖον; ΣΩ. Ὃ πολλάκις σε οἶμαι ἀκηκοέναι ἐρωτώντων, τί ἄν τις ἔχοι τεκμήριον ἀποδεῖξαι,
C εἴ τις ἔροιτο νῦν οὕτως ἐν τῷ παρόντι, πότερον καθεύδομεν καὶ πάντα, ἃ διανοούμεθα, ὀνειρώττομεν, ἢ ἐγρηγόραμέν τε καὶ ὕπαρ ἀλλήλοις διαλεγόμεθα. ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ μήν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἄπορόν γε, ὅτῳ χρὴ ἐπιδεῖξαι τεκμηρίῳ. πάντα γὰρ ὥσπερ ἀντίστροφα τὰ αὐτὰ παρακολουθεῖ. ἅ τε γὰρ νυνὶ διειλέγμεθα, οὐδὲν κωλύει καὶ ἐν τῷ ἐνυπνίῳ δοκεῖν ἀλλήλοις διαλέγεσθαι·

καὶ ὅταν δὴ ὄναρ ὀνείρατα δοκῶμεν διηγεῖσθαι, ἄτοπος ἡ ὁμοιότης τούτων ἐκείνοις. ΣΩ. Ὁρᾷς οὖν, ὅτι τό γε ἀμφισβητῆσαι οὐ χαλεπόν, ὅτε καὶ πότερόν ἐστιν ὕπαρ ἢ ὄναρ ἀμφισβητεῖται, | καὶ δὴ ἴσου ὄντος τοῦ χρόνου D ὃν καθεύδομεν ᾧ ἐγρηγόραμεν, ἐν ἑκατέρῳ διαμάχεται ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχὴ τὰ ἀεὶ παρόντα δόγματα παντὸς μᾶλλον εἶναι ἀληθῆ, ὥστε ἴσον μὲν χρόνον τάδε φαμὲν ὄντα εἶναι, ἴσον δὲ ἐκεῖνα, καὶ ὁμοίως ἑφ' ἑκατέροις διϊσχυριζόμεθα. ΘΕΑΙ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ περὶ νόσων τε καὶ μανιῶν ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος, πλὴν τοῦ χρόνου, ὅτι οὐχὶ ἴσος; ΘΕΑΙ. Ὀρθῶς. ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; πλήθει χρόνου καὶ ὀλιγότητι τὸ ἀληθὲς ὁρισθήσεται; ΘΕΑΙ. | Γελοῖον μέντ' ἂν εἴη πολλαχῇ. ΣΩ. Ἀλλά E τι ἄλλο ἔχεις σαφὲς ἐνδείξασθαι, ὁποῖα τούτων τῶν δοξασμάτων ἀληθῆ; ΘΕΑΙ. Οὔ μοι δοκῶ. XIV. ΣΩ. Ἐμοῦ τοίνυν ἄκουε, οἷα περὶ αὐτῶν ἂν λέγοιεν οἱ τὰ ἀεὶ δοκοῦντα ὁριζόμενοι τῷ δοκοῦντι εἶναι ἀληθῆ. λέγουσι δέ, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι, οὕτως ἐρωτῶντες, Ὦ Θεαίτητε, ὃ ἂν ἕτερον ᾖ παντάπασι, μή πῃ τινα δύναμιν τὴν αὐτὴν ἕξει τῷ ἑτέρῳ; καὶ μὴ ὑπολάβωμεν τῇ μὲν ταὐτὸν εἶναι ὃ ἐρωτῶμεν, τῇ δὲ ἕτερον, ἀλλ' ὅλως ἕτερον. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀδύνατον τοίνυν ταὐτόν τι ἔχειν ἢ ἐν δυνάμει * ἢ ἐν 159 ἄλλῳ ὁτῳοῦν, ὅταν ᾖ κομιδῇ ἕτερον. ΣΩ. Ἆρ' οὖν οὐ καὶ ἀνόμοιον ἀναγκαῖον τὸ τοιοῦτον ὁμολογεῖν; ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ. ΣΩ. Εἰ ἄρα τι ξυμβαίνει ὅμοιόν τῳ γίγνεσθαι ἢ ἀνόμοιον, εἴτε ἑαυτῷ εἴτε ἄλλῳ, ὁμοιούμενον μὲν ταὐτὸν φήσομεν γίγνεσθαι, ἀνομοιούμενον δὲ ἕτερον; ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀνάγκη. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν πρόσθεν ἐλέγομεν, ὡς πολλὰ μὲν εἴη τὰ ποιοῦντα καὶ ἄπειρα, ὡσαύτως δέ γε τὰ πάσχοντα; ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Καὶ

μὴν ὅτι γε ἄλλο ἄλλῳ συμμιγνύμενον καὶ ἄλλῳ οὐ
B ταὐτὰ ἀλλ' ἕτερα γεννήσει; ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
ΣΩ. Λέγωμεν δὴ ἐμέ τε καὶ σὲ καὶ τἄλλ' ἤδη κατὰ
τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον, Σωκράτη ὑγιαίνοντα καὶ Σωκράτη
αὖ ἀσθενοῦντα. πότερον ὅμοιον τοῦτ' ἐκείνῳ ἢ ἀνό-
μοιον φήσομεν; ΘΕΑΙ. Ἆρα τὸν ἀσθενοῦντα Σω-
κράτη, ὅλον τοῦτο λέγεις ὅλῳ ἐκείνῳ, τῷ ὑγιαίνοντι
Σωκράτει; ΣΩ. Κάλλιστα ὑπέλαβες· αὐτὸ τοῦτο λέγω.
ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀνόμοιον δήπου. ΣΩ. Καὶ ἕτερον ἄρα οὕτως,
ὥσπερ ἀνόμοιον; ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀνάγκη. ΣΩ. Καὶ καθεύ-
C δοντα δὴ καὶ πάντα, ἃ νῦν διήλθομεν, ὡσαύτως φήσεις;
ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔγωγε. ΣΩ. Ἕκαστον δὴ τῶν πεφυκότων τι
ποιεῖν ἄλλο τι, ὅταν μὲν λάβῃ ὑγιαίνοντα Σωκράτη,
ὡς ἑτέρῳ μοι χρήσεται, ὅταν δὲ ἀσθενοῦντα, ὡς ἑτέρῳ;
ΘΕΑΙ. Τί δ' οὐ μέλλει; ΣΩ. Καὶ ἕτερα δὴ ἐφ'
ἑκατέρου γεννήσομεν ἐγώ τε ὁ πάσχων καὶ ἐκεῖνο τὸ
ποιοῦν; ΘΕΑΙ. Τί μήν; ΣΩ. Ὅταν δὴ οἶνον πίνω
ὑγιαίνων, ἡδύς μοι φαίνεται καὶ γλυκύς; ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.
ΣΩ. Ἐγέννησε γὰρ δὴ ἐκ τῶν προωμολογημένων τό
D τε ποιοῦν καὶ τὸ πάσχον γλυκύτητά τε καὶ αἴσθησιν,
ἅμα φερόμενα ἀμφότερα, καὶ ἡ μὲν αἴσθησις πρὸς τοῦ
πάσχοντος οὖσα αἰσθανομένην τὴν γλῶσσαν ἀπειρ-
γάσατο, ἡ δὲ γλυκύτης πρὸς τοῦ οἴνου περὶ αὐτὸν
φερομένη γλυκὺν τὸν οἶνον τῇ ὑγιαινούσῃ γλώττῃ
ἐποίησε καὶ εἶναι καὶ φαίνεσθαι. ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν
οὖν τὰ πρότερα ἡμῖν οὕτως ὡμολόγητο. ΣΩ. Ὅταν
δὲ ἀσθενοῦντα, ἄλλο τι πρῶτον μὲν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ οὐ τὸν
αὐτὸν ἔλαβεν; ἀνομοίῳ γὰρ δὴ προσῆλθεν. ΘΕΑΙ.
E Ναί. ΣΩ. Ἕτερα δὴ αὖ ἐγεννησάτην ὅ τε τοιοῦτος

159 A. καὶ ἄλλῳ οὐ. Fortasse legendum καὶ ἄλλῳ αὖ οὐ.

Σωκράτης καὶ ἡ τοῦ οἴνου πόσις, περὶ μὲν τὴν γλῶτταν αἴσθησιν πικρότητος, περὶ δὲ τὸν οἶνον γιγνομένην καὶ φερομένην πικρότητα, καὶ τὸν μὲν οὐ πικρότητα ἀλλὰ πικρόν, ἐμὲ δὲ οὐκ αἴσθησιν ἀλλ' αἰσθανόμενον; ΘΕΑΙ. Κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐγώ τε οὐδὲν ἄλλο ποτὲ γενήσομαι οὕτως αἰσθανόμενος· τοῦ γὰρ ἄλλου ἄλλη αἴσθησις, καὶ ἀλλοῖον * καὶ ἄλλον ποιεῖ 160
τὸν αἰσθανόμενον· οὔτ' ἐκεῖνο τὸ ποιοῦν ἐμὲ μή ποτ' ἄλλῳ συνελθὸν ταὐτὸν γεννῆσαν τοιοῦτον γένηται· ἀπὸ γὰρ ἄλλου ἄλλο γεννῆσαν ἀλλοῖον γενήσεται. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔστι ταῦτα. ΣΩ. Οὐδὲ μὴν ἔγωγε ἐμαυτῷ τοιοῦτος, ἐκεῖνό τε ἑαυτῷ τοιοῦτον γενήσεται. ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν. ΣΩ. Ἀνάγκη δέ γε ἐμέ τε τινὸς γίγνεσθαι, ὅταν αἰσθανόμενος γίγνωμαι· αἰσθανόμενον γάρ, μηδενὸς δὲ αἰσθανόμενον ἀδύνατον γίγνεσθαι· ἐκεῖνό τέ τινι γίγνεσθαι, ὅταν γλυκὺ | ἢ πικρὸν ἤ τι τοιοῦτον γίγνηται· Β
γλυκὺ γάρ, μηδενὶ δὲ γλυκὺ ἀδύνατον γενέσθαι. ΘΕΑΙ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. ΣΩ. Λείπεται δή, οἶμαι, ἡμῖν ἀλλήλοις, εἴτ' ἐσμέν, εἶναι, εἴτε γιγνόμεθα, γίγνεσθαι, ἐπείπερ ἡμῶν ἡ ἀνάγκη τὴν οὐσίαν συνδεῖ μέν, συνδεῖ δὲ οὐδενὶ τῶν ἄλλων, οὐδ' αὖ ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς. ἀλλήλοις δὴ λείπεται συνδεδέσθαι. ὥστε εἴτε τις εἶναί τι ἐνομάζει, τινὶ εἶναι ἢ τινὸς ἢ πρός τι ῥητέον αὐτῷ, εἴτε γίγνεσθαι· αὐτὸ δὲ ἐφ' αὑτοῦ τι ἢ ὂν ἢ γιγνόμενον οὔτε αὐτῷ | λεκτέον οὔτ' ἄλλου λέγοντος ἀποδεκτέον, ὡς ὁ C
λόγος ὃν διεληλύθαμεν σημαίνει. ΘΕΑΙ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, ὦ Σώκρατες. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὅτε δὴ τὸ ἐμὲ ποιοῦν ἐμοί ἐστι καὶ οὐκ ἄλλῳ, ἐγὼ καὶ αἰσθάνομαι αὐτοῦ, ἄλλος δ' οὔ; ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ; ΣΩ. Ἀληθὴς ἄρα ἐμοὶ ἡ ἐμὴ αἴσθησις· τῆς γὰρ ἐμῆς οὐσίας ἀεί ἐστι. καὶ ἐγὼ κριτὴς κατὰ τὸν Πρωταγόραν τῶν τε

ὄντων ἐμοί, ὡς ἔστι, καὶ τῶν μὴ ὄντων, ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν.
D ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔοικεν. XV. ΣΩ. Πῶς ἂν [1] οὖν ἀψευδὴς ὢν καὶ μὴ πταίων τῇ διανοίᾳ περὶ τὰ ὄντα ἢ γιγνόμενα οὐκ ἐπιστήμων ἂν εἴην ὥνπερ αἰσθητής; ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδαμῶς ὅπως οὔ. ΣΩ. Παγκάλως ἄρα σοι εἴρηται, ὅτι ἐπιστήμη οὐκ ἄλλο τί ἐστιν ἢ αἴσθησις, καὶ εἰς ταὐτὸν συμπέπτωκε, κατὰ μὲν Ὅμηρον καὶ Ἡράκλειτον καὶ πᾶν τὸ τοιοῦτον φῦλον οἷον ῥεύματα κινεῖσθαι τὰ πάντα, κατὰ δὲ Πρωταγόραν τὸν σοφώτατον πάντων χρημάτων ἄνθρωπον μέτρον εἶναι, κατὰ δὲ Θεαίτητον τούτων
E οὕτως [1] ἐχόντων αἴσθησιν ἐπιστήμην γίγνεσθαι. ἦ γάρ, ὦ Θεαίτητε; φῶμεν τοῦτο σὸν μὲν εἶναι οἷον νεογενὲς παιδίον, ἐμὸν δὲ μαίευμα; ἢ πῶς λέγεις; ΘΕΑΙ. Οὕτως ἀνάγκη, ὦ Σώκρατες. ΣΩ. Τοῦτο μὲν δή, ὡς ἔοικε, μόγις ποτὲ ἐγεννήσαμεν, ὅ τι δή ποτε καὶ τυγχάνει ὄν. μετὰ δὲ τὸν τόκον τὰ ἀμφιδρόμια αὐτοῦ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἐν κύκλῳ περιθρεκτέον τῷ λόγῳ, σκοπουμένους μὴ λάθῃ ἡμᾶς οὐκ ἄξιον ὂν τροφῆς τὸ
161 γιγνόμενον, ἀλλὰ * ἀνεμιαῖόν τε καὶ ψεῦδος. ἢ σὺ οἴει πάντως δεῖν τό γε σὸν τρέφειν καὶ μὴ ἀποτιθέναι; ἢ καὶ ἀνέξει ἐλεγχόμενον ὁρῶν, καὶ οὐ σφόδρα χαλεπανεῖς, ἐάν τις σοῦ ὡς πρωτοτόκου αὐτὸ ὑφαιρῇ; ΘΕΟ. Ἀνέξεται, ὦ Σώκρατες, Θεαίτητος· οὐδαμῶς γὰρ δύσκολος. ἀλλὰ πρὸς θεῶν εἰπέ, ἦ αὖ οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει; ΣΩ. Φιλολόγος γ' εἶ ἀτεχνῶς καὶ χρηστός, ὦ Θεόδωρε, ὅτι με οἴει λόγων τινὰ εἶναι θύλακον καὶ ῥᾳδίως ἐξε-
B λόντα ἐρεῖν, ὡς οὐκ αὖ ἔχει οὕτω ταῦτα. τὸ δὲ [1] γιγνόμενον οὐκ ἐννοεῖς, ὅτι οὐδεὶς τῶν λόγων ἐξέρχεται παρ' ἐμοῦ, ἀλλ' ἀεὶ παρὰ τοῦ ἐμοὶ προσδιαλεγομένου, ἐγὼ δὲ οὐδὲν ἐπίσταμαι πλέον πλὴν βραχέος, ὅσον λόγον παρ' ἑτέρου σοφοῦ λαβεῖν καὶ ἀποδέξασθαι μετρίως.

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καὶ νῦν τοῦτο παρὰ τοῦδε πειράσομαι, οὔ τι αὐτὸς εἰπεῖν. ΘΕΟ. Σὺ κάλλιον, ὦ Σώκρατες, λέγεις· καὶ ποίει οὕτως. XVI. ΣΩ. Οἶσθ' οὖν, ὦ Θεόδωρε, ὃ θαυμάζω τοῦ ἑταίρου σου Πρωταγόρου; ΘΕΟ. Τὸ C ποῖον; ΣΩ. Τὰ μὲν ἄλλα μοι πάνυ ἡδέως εἴρηκεν, ὡς τὸ δοκοῦν ἑκάστῳ τοῦτο καὶ ἔστι· τὴν δ' ἀρχὴν τοῦ λόγου τεθαύμακα, ὅτι οὐκ εἶπεν ἀρχόμενος τῆς Ἀληθείας, ὅτι πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἐστὶν ὗς ἡ κυνοκέφαλος ἤ τι ἄλλο ἀτοπώτερον τῶν ἐχόντων αἴσθησιν, ἵνα μεγαλοπρεπῶς καὶ πάνυ καταφρονητικῶς ἤρξατο ἡμῖν λέγειν, ἐνδεικνύμενος, ὅτι ἡμεῖς μὲν αὐτὸν ὥσπερ θεὸν ἐθαυμάζομεν ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ, ὁ δ' ἄρα ἐτύγχανεν ὢν εἰς φρόνησιν οὐδὲν βελτίων | βατράχου γυρίνου, μὴ ὅτι D ἄλλου του ἀνθρώπων. ἦ πῶς λέγομεν, ὦ Θεόδωρε; εἰ γὰρ δὴ ἑκάστῳ ἀληθὲς ἔσται ὃ ἂν δι' αἰσθήσεως δοξάζῃ, καὶ μήτε τὸ ἄλλου πάθος ἄλλος βέλτιον διακρινεῖ, μήτε τὴν δόξαν κυριώτερος ἔσται ἐπισκέψασθαι ἕτερος τὴν ἑτέρου, ὀρθὴ ἢ ψευδής, ἀλλ' ὃ πολλάκις εἴρηται, αὐτὸς τὰ αὑτοῦ ἕκαστος μόνος δοξάσει, ταῦτα δὲ πάντα ὀρθὰ καὶ ἀληθῆ, τί δή ποτε, ὦ ἑταῖρε, Πρωταγόρας μὲν σοφός, ὥστε καὶ ἄλλων διδάσκαλος ἀξιοῦσθαι | δικαίως E μετὰ μεγάλων μισθῶν, ἡμεῖς δὲ ἀμαθέστεροί τε καὶ φοιτητέον ἡμῖν ἦν παρ' ἐκεῖνον, μέτρῳ ὄντι αὐτῷ ἑκάστῳ τῆς αὑτοῦ σοφίας; ταῦτα πῶς μὴ φῶμεν δημούμενον λέγειν τὸν Πρωταγόραν; τὸ δὲ δὴ ἐμόν τε καὶ τῆς ἐμῆς τέχνης τῆς μαιευτικῆς σιγῶ, ὅσον γέλωτα ὀφλισκάνομεν· οἶμαι δὲ καὶ ξύμπασα ἡ τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι πραγματεία. τὸ γὰρ ἐπισκοπεῖν καὶ ἐπιχειρεῖν ἐλέγχειν τὰς ἀλλήλων φαντασίας τε καὶ δόξας, ὀρθὰς ἑκάστου οὔσας, οὐ μακρὰ * μὲν καὶ διωλύγιος φλυαρία, εἰ ἀλη- 162
θὴς ἡ ἀλήθεια Πρωταγόρου, ἀλλὰ μὴ παίζουσα ἐκ τοῦ

ἀδύτου τῆς βίβλου ἐφθέγξατο; ΘΕΟ. Ὦ Σώκρατες, φίλος ἀνήρ, ὥσπερ σὺ νῦν δὴ εἶπες. οὐκ ἂν οὖν δεξαίμην δι' ἐμοῦ ὁμολογοῦντος ἐλέγχεσθαι Πρωταγόραν, οὐδ' αὖ σοὶ παρὰ δόξαν ἀντιτείνειν. τὸν οὖν Θεαίτητον πάλιν λαβέ. πάντως καὶ νῦν δὴ μάλ' ἐμμελῶς σοι ἐφαίνετο ὑπακούειν. ΣΩ. Ἆρα κἂν εἰς Λακεδαίμονα
B ἐλθών, ὦ Θεόδωρε, | πρὸς τὰς παλαίστρας ἀξιοῖς ἂν ἄλλους θεώμενος γυμνούς, ἐνίους φαύλους, αὐτὸς μὴ ἀντεπιδεικνύναι τὸ εἶδος παραποδυόμενος; ΘΕΟ. Ἀλλὰ τί μὴν δοκεῖς, εἴπερ μέλλοιέν μοι ἐπιτρέψειν καὶ πείσεσθαι; ὥσπερ νῦν οἶμαι ὑμᾶς πείσειν ἐμὲ μὲν ἐᾶν θεᾶσθαι καὶ μὴ ἕλκειν πρὸς τὸ γυμνάσιον σκληρὸν ἤδη ὄντα, τῷ δὲ δὴ νεωτέρῳ τε καὶ ὑγροτέρῳ ὄντι προσπαλαίειν. XVII. ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' εἰ οὕτως, ὦ Θεόδωρε,
C σοὶ φίλον, οὐδ' ἐμοὶ ἐχθρόν, φασὶν | οἱ παροιμιαζόμενοι. πάλιν δὴ οὖν ἐπὶ τὸν σοφὸν Θεαίτητον ἰτέον. Λέγε δή, ὦ Θεαίτητε, πρῶτον μὲν ἃ νῦν διήλθομεν, ἆρα οὐ συνθαυμάζεις, εἰ ἐξαίφνης οὕτως ἀναφανήσει μηδὲν χείρων εἰς σοφίαν ὁτουοῦν ἀνθρώπων ἢ καὶ θεῶν; ἢ ἧττόν τι οἴει τὸ Πρωταγόρειον μέτρον εἰς θεοὺς ἢ εἰς ἀνθρώπους λέγεσθαι; ΘΕΑΙ. Μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἔγωγε. καὶ ὅπερ γε ἐρωτᾷς, πάνυ θαυμάζω. ἡνίκα γὰρ διῇμεν,
D ὃν τρόπον λέγοιεν τὸ δοκοῦν ἑκάστῳ τοῦτο καὶ | εἶναι τῷ δοκοῦντι, πάνυ μοι εὖ ἐφαίνετο λέγεσθαι· νῦν δὲ τοὐναντίον τάχα μεταπέπτωκεν. ΣΩ. Νέος γὰρ εἶ, ὦ φίλε παῖ· τῆς οὖν δημηγορίας ὀξέως ὑπακούεις καὶ πείθει. πρὸς γὰρ ταῦτα ἐρεῖ Πρωταγόρας ἢ τις ἄλλος ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ, Ὦ γενναῖοι παῖδές τε καὶ γέροντες, δημηγορεῖτε ξυγκαθεζόμενοι, θεούς τε εἰς τὸ μέσον ἄγοντες,
E οὓς ἐγὼ ἔκ τε τοῦ λέγειν καὶ τοῦ γράφειν περὶ | αὐτῶν, ὡς εἰσὶν ἢ ὡς οὐκ εἰσίν, ἐξαιρῶ· καὶ ἃ οἱ πολλοὶ ἂν

ἀποδέχοιντο ἀκούοντες, λέγετε ταῦτα, ὡς δεινὸν εἰ μηδὲν διοίσει εἰς σοφίαν ἕκαστος τῶν ἀνθρώπων βοσκήματος ὑτουοῦν· ἀπόδειξιν δὲ καὶ ἀνάγκην οὐδ' ἡντινοῦν λέγετε, ἀλλὰ τῷ εἰκότι χρῆσθε, ᾧ εἰ ἐθέλοι Θεόδωρος ἢ ἄλλος τις τῶν γεωμετρῶν χρώμενος γεωμετρεῖν, ἄξιος οὐδενὸς μόνου ἂν εἴη. σκοπεῖτε οὖν σύ τε καὶ Θεόδωρος, εἰ ἀποδέξεσθε πιθανολογίᾳ τε καὶ εἰκόσι περὶ * τηλικού- 163
των λεγομένους λόγους. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλ' οὐ δίκαιον, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὔτε σὺ οὔτε ἂν ἡμεῖς φαῖμεν. ΣΩ. Ἄλλῃ δὴ σκεπτέον, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὡς ὅ τε σὸς καὶ ὁ Θεοδώρου λόγος. ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν ἄλλῃ. ΣΩ. Τῇδε δὴ σκοπῶμεν, εἰ ἄρα ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη τε καὶ αἴσθησις ταὐτὸν ἢ ἕτερον. εἰς γὰρ τοῦτό που πᾶς ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν ἔτεινε, καὶ τούτου χάριν τὰ πολλὰ καὶ ἄτοπα ταῦτα ἐκινήσαμεν. οὐ γάρ; ΘΕΑΙ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.
ΣΩ. Ἦ οὖν ὁμολογήσομεν, ἃ τῷ ὁρᾶν αἰσθανόμεθα B
ἢ τῷ ἀκούειν, πάντα ταῦτα ἅμα καὶ ἐπίστασθαι; οἷον τῶν βαρβάρων πρὶν μαθεῖν τὴν φωνὴν πότερον οὐ φήσομεν ἀκούειν, ὅταν φθέγγωνται, ἢ ἀκούειν τε καὶ ἐπίστασθαι ἃ λέγουσι; καὶ αὖ γράμματα μὴ ἐπιστάμενοι, βλέποντες εἰς αὐτὰ πότερον οὐχ ὁρᾶν ἢ ἐπίστασθαι, εἴπερ ὁρῶμεν, διισχυριούμεθα; ΘΕΑΙ. Αὐτό γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοῦτο αὐτῶν, ὅπερ ὁρῶμέν τε καὶ ἀκούομεν, ἐπίστασθαι φήσομεν· τῶν μὲν γὰρ τὸ σχῆμα καὶ τὸ χρῶμα ὁρᾶν τε καὶ ἐπίστασθαι, τῶν δὲ τὴν ὀξύ- C
τητα καὶ βαρύτητα ἀκούειν τε ἅμα καὶ εἰδέναι· ἃ δὲ οἵ τε γραμματισταὶ περὶ αὐτῶν καὶ οἱ ἑρμηνεῖς διδάσκουσιν, οὔτε αἰσθάνεσθαι τῷ ὁρᾶν ἢ ἀκούειν οὔτε ἐπίστασθαι.
ΣΩ. Ἀριστά γ', ὦ Θεαίτητε, καὶ οὐκ ἄξιόν σοι πρὸς ταῦτα ἀμφισβητῆσαι, ἵνα καὶ αὐξάνῃ. XVIII. Ἀλλ' ὅρα δὴ καὶ τόδε ἄλλο προσιόν, καὶ σκόπει, πῇ αὐτὸ

διωσόμεθα. ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποῖον δή; ΣΩ. Τὸ τοιόνδε, εἴ τις ἔροιτο, ἆρα δυνατόν, ὅτου τις ἐπιστήμων γένοιτό
D ποτε, ἔτι ἔχοντα [1] μνήμην αὐτοῦ τούτου καὶ σωζόμενον τότε ὅτε μέμνηται μὴ ἐπίστασθαι αὐτὸ τοῦτο, ὃ μέμνηται. μακρολογῶ δέ, ὡς ἔοικε, βουλόμενος ἐρέσθαι, εἰ μαθών τίς τι μεμνημένος μὴ οἶδε. ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ πῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες; τέρας γὰρ ἂν εἴη ὃ λέγεις. ΣΩ. Μὴ οὖν ἐγὼ ληρῶ; σκόπει δέ. ἆρα τὸ ὁρᾶν οὐκ αἰσθάνεσθαι λέγεις καὶ τὴν ὄψιν αἴσθησιν; ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔγωγε. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὁ ἰδών τι ἐπιστήμων ἐκείνου γέγονεν ὃ εἶδε κατὰ
E τὸν ἄρτι λόγον; ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί. ΣΩ. [1] Τί δαί; μνήμην οὐ λέγεις μέντοι τι; ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Πότερον οὐδενὸς ἢ τινός; ΘΕΑΙ. Τινὸς δήπου. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὧν ἔμαθε καὶ ὧν ᾔσθετο, τοιουτωνί τινων; ΘΕΑΙ. Τί μήν; ΣΩ. Ὃ δὴ εἰδέ τις, μέμνηταί που ἐνίοτε; ΘΕΑΙ. Μέμνηται. ΣΩ. Ἢ καὶ μύσας; ἢ τοῦτο δράσας ἐπελάθετο; ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλὰ δεινόν, ὦ Σώκρατες,
164 τοῦτό γε φάναι. ΣΩ. * Δεῖ γε μέντοι, εἰ σώσοιμεν τὸν πρόσθεν λόγον· εἰ δὲ μή, οἴχεται. ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ ἐγὼ νὴ τὸν Δί' ὑποπτεύω, οὐ μὴν ἱκανῶς γε συννοῶ· ἀλλ' εἰπὲ πῇ. ΣΩ. Τῇδε· ὁ μὲν ὁρῶν ἐπιστήμων, φαμέν, τούτου γέγονεν, οὗπερ ὁρῶν· ὄψις γὰρ καὶ αἴσθησις καὶ ἐπιστήμη ταὐτὸν ὡμολόγηται. ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ γε. ΣΩ. Ὁ δέ γε ὁρῶν καὶ ἐπιστήμων γεγονὼς οὐ ἐώρα, ἐὰν μύσῃ, μέμνηται μέν, οὐχ ὁρᾷ δὲ αὐτό. ἦ γάρ;
B ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Τὸ δέ γε οὐχ ὁρᾷ οὐκ [1] ἐπίσταταί ἐστιν, εἴπερ καὶ τὸ ὁρᾷ ἐπίσταται. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθῆ. ΣΩ. Συμβαίνει ἄρα, οὗ τις ἐπιστήμων ἐγένετο, ἔτι μεμνημένον αὐτὸν μὴ ἐπίστασθαι, ἐπειδὴ οὐχ ὁρᾷ· ὃ τέρας ἔφαμεν ἂν εἶναι εἰ γίγνοιτο. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθέστατα λέγεις. ΣΩ. Τῶν ἀδυνάτων δή τι ξυμβαίνειν

φαίνεται, ἐάν τις ἐπιστήμην καὶ αἴσθησιν ταὐτὸν φῇ εἶναι. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔοικεν. ΣΩ. Ἄλλο ἄρα ἑκάτερον φατέον. ΘΕΑΙ. Κινδυνεύει. ΣΩ. Τί οὖν δῆτ' ἂν εἴη ἐπιστήμη; | πάλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς, ὡς ἔοικε, λεκτέον. Καίτοι C τί ποτε μέλλομεν, ὦ Θεαίτητε, δρᾶν; ΘΕΑΙ. Τίνος πέρι; ΣΩ. Φαινόμεθά μοι ἀλεκτρυόνος ἀγεννοῦς δίκην, πρὶν νενικηκέναι, ἀποπηδήσαντες ἀπὸ τοῦ λόγου ἄδειν. ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς δή; ΣΩ. Ἀντιλογικῶς ἐοίκαμεν πρὸς τὰς τῶν ὀνομάτων ὁμολογίας ἀνομολογησάμενοι καὶ τοιούτῳ τινὶ περιγενόμενοι τοῦ λόγου ἀγαπᾶν, καὶ οὐ φάσκοντες ἀγωνίσταὶ ἀλλὰ φιλόσοφοι εἶναι λανθάνομεν ταὐτὰ ἐκείνοις | τοῖς δεινοῖς ἀνδράσι ποιοῦντες. ΘΕΑΙ. Οὔπω D μανθάνω ὅπως λέγεις. ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' ἐγὼ πειράσομαι δηλῶσαι περὶ αὐτῶν ὅ γε δὴ νοῶ. ἡρόμεθα γὰρ δή, εἰ μαθὼν καὶ μεμνημένος τίς τι μὴ ἐπίσταται, καὶ τὸν ἰδόντα καὶ μύσαντα μεμνημένον, ὁρῶντα δὲ οὔ, ἀποδείξαντες, οὐκ εἰδότα ἀπεδείξαμεν καὶ ἅμα μεμνημένον· τοῦτο δ' εἶναι ἀδύνατον. καὶ οὕτω δὴ μῦθος ἀπώλετο ὁ Πρωταγόρειος, καὶ ὁ σὸς ἅμα ὁ τῆς ἐπιστήμης καὶ αἰσθήσεως, ὅτι ταὐτόν ἐστι. ΘΕΑΙ. | Φαίνεται. ΣΩ. E Οὔ τι ἄν, οἶμαι, ὦ φίλε, εἴπερ γε ὁ πατὴρ τοῦ ἑτέρου μύθου ἔζη, ἀλλὰ πολλὰ ἂν ἤμυνε· νῦν δὲ ὀρφανὸν αὐτὸν ἡμεῖς προπηλακίζομεν. καὶ γὰρ οὐδ' οἱ ἐπίτροποι, οὓς Πρωταγόρας κατέλιπε, βοηθεῖν ἐθέλουσιν, ὧν Θεόδωρος εἷς ὅδε. ἀλλὰ δὴ αὐτοὶ κινδυνεύσομεν τοῦ δικαίου ἕνεκ' αὐτῷ βοηθεῖν. ΘΕΟ. Οὐ γὰρ ἐγώ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον Καλλίας ὁ Ἱππονίκου τῶν * ἐκείνου ἐπίτροπος· 165 ἡμεῖς δέ πως θᾶττον ἐκ τῶν ψιλῶν λόγων πρὸς τὴν γεωμετρίαν ἀπενεύσαμεν. χάριν γε μέντοι ἕξομεν, ἐὰν αὐτῷ βοηθῇς. ΣΩ. Καλῶς λέγεις, ὦ Θεόδωρε. σκέψαι οὖν τήν γ' ἐμὴν βοήθειαν. τῶν γὰρ ἄρτι δεινότερα ἄν

τις ὁμολογήσειε μὴ προσέχων τοῖς ῥήμασι τὸν νοῦν, ἢ τὸ πολὺ εἰθίσμεθα φάναι τε καὶ ἀπαρνεῖσθαι. σοὶ λέγω ὅπῃ, ἢ Θεαιτήτῳ; ΘΕΟ. Εἰς τὸ κοινὸν μὲν οὖν,
B ἀποκρινέσθω δὲ ὁ νεώτερος· σφαλεὶς γὰρ ἧττον ἀσχημονήσει. XIX. ΣΩ. Λέγω δὴ τὸ δεινότατον ἐρώτημα. ἔστι δέ, οἶμαι, τοιόνδε τι· ἆρα οἷόν τε τὸν αὐτὸν εἰδότα τι τοῦτο ὃ οἶδε μὴ εἰδέναι; ΘΕΟ. Τί δὴ οὖν ἀποκρινούμεθα, ὦ Θεαίτητε; ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀδύνατόν που, οἶμαι ἔγωγε. ΣΩ. Οὔκ, εἰ τὸ ὁρᾶν γε ἐπίστασθαι θήσεις. τί γὰρ χρήσει ἀφύκτῳ ἐρωτήματι, τὸ λεγόμενον ἐν φρέατι συνεχόμενος, ὅταν ἐρωτᾷ ἀνέκπληκτος ἀνήρ, καταλαβὼν τῇ χειρὶ σοῦ τὸν ἕτερον ὀφθαλμόν, εἰ ὁρᾷς
C τὸ ἱμάτιον τῷ κατειλημμένῳ; ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ φήσω, οἶμαι, τούτῳ γε, τῷ μέντοι ἑτέρῳ. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὁρᾷς τε καὶ οὐχ ὁρᾷς ἅμα ταὐτόν; ΘΕΑΙ. Οὕτω γέ πως. ΣΩ. Οὐδὲν ἐγώ, φήσει, τοῦτο οὔτε τάττω οὔτ' ἠρόμην τὸ ὅπως, ἀλλ' εἰ ὃ ἐπίστασαι, τοῦτο καὶ οὐκ ἐπίστασαι. νῦν δὲ ὃ οὐχ ὁρᾷς, ὁρῶν φαίνει. ὡμολογηκὼς δὲ τυγχάνεις τὸ ὁρᾶν ἐπίστασθαι καὶ τὸ μὴ ὁρᾶν μὴ ἐπίστασθαι. ἐξ οὖν τούτων λογίζου τί σοι συμβαίνει.
D ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλὰ λογίζομαι, ὅτι τἀναντία οἷς ὑπεθέμην. ΣΩ. Ἴσως δέ γ', ὦ θαυμάσιε, πλείω ἂν τοιαῦτ' ἔπαθες, εἴ τίς σε προσηρώτα, εἰ ἐπίστασθαι ἔστι μὲν ὀξύ, ἔστι δὲ ἀμβλύ, καὶ ἐγγύθεν μὲν ἐπίστασθαι, πόῤῥωθεν δὲ μή, καὶ σφόδρα καὶ ἠρέμα τὸ αὐτό, καὶ ἄλλα μυρία, ἃ ἐλλοχῶν ἂν πελταστικὸς ἀνὴρ μισθοφόρος ἐν λόγοις ἐρόμενος, ἡνίκ' ἐπιστήμην καὶ αἴσθησιν ταὐτὸν ἔθου, ἐμβαλὼν ἂν εἰς τὸ ἀκούειν καὶ ὀσφραίνεσθαι καὶ τὰς τοιαύτας αἰσθήσεις, ἤλεγχεν ἂν ἐπέχων καὶ οὐκ ἀνιείς,
E πρὶν θαυμάσας τὴν πολυάρατον σοφίαν ξυνεποδίσθης ὑπ' αὐτοῦ, οὗ δή σε χειρωσάμενός τε καὶ ξυνδήσας ἤδη

ἂν τότε ἐλύτρου χρημάτων, ὅσων σοί τε κἀκείνῳ ἐδόκει. Τίν' οὖν δὴ ὁ Πρωταγόρας, φαίης ἂν ἴσως, λόγον ἐπίκουρον τοῖς αὑτοῦ ἐρεῖ; ἄλλο τι πειρώμεθα λέγειν; ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. XX. ΣΩ. Ταῦτά τε δὴ πάντα, ὅσα ἡμεῖς ἐπαμύνοντες αὐτῷ λέγομεν, καὶ ὁμόσε, οἶμαι, * χωρήσεται, καταφρονῶν ἡμῶν καὶ λέγων, Οὗτος δὴ 166
ὁ Σωκράτης ὁ χρηστός, ἐπειδὴ αὐτῷ παιδίον τι ἐρωτηθὲν ἔδεισεν, εἰ οἷόν τε τὸν αὐτὸν τὸ αὐτὸ μεμνῆσθαι ἅμα καὶ μὴ εἰδέναι, καὶ δεῖσαν ἀπέφησε διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι προορᾶν, γέλωτα δὴ τὸν ἐμὲ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἀπέδειξε. τὸ δέ, ὦ ῥᾳθυμότατε Σώκρατες, τῇδ' ἔχει· ὅταν τι τῶν ἐμῶν δι' ἐρωτήσεως σκοπῇς, ἐὰν μὲν ὁ ἐρωτηθεὶς οἷάπερ ἂν ἐγὼ ἀποκριναίμην ἀποκρινάμενος σφάλληται, ἐγὼ ἐλέγχομαι, εἰ δὲ ἀλλοῖα, | αὐτὸς ὁ ἐρωτηθείς. αὐτίκα B
γὰρ δοκεῖς τινά σοι ξυγχωρήσεσθαι μνήμην παρεῖναί τῳ ὧν ἔπαθε τοιοῦτόν τι οὖσαν πάθος, οἷον ὅτε ἔπασχε, μηκέτι πάσχοντι; πολλοῦ γε δεῖ. ἢ αὖ ἀποκνήσειν ὁμολογεῖν οἷόν τ' εἶναι εἰδέναι καὶ μὴ εἰδέναι τὸν αὐτὸν τὸ αὐτό; ἢ ἔἀνπερ τοῦτο δείσῃ, δώσειν ποτὲ τὸν αὐτὸν εἶναι τὸν ἀνομοιούμενον τῷ πρὶν ἀνομοιοῦσθαι ὄντι; μᾶλλον δὲ τὸν εἶναί τινα, ἀλλ' οὐχὶ τούς, καὶ τούτους γιγνομένους ἀπείρους, ἐάνπερ ἀνομοίωσις γίγνηται, | εἰ C
δὴ ὀνομάτων γε δεήσει θηρεύσεις διευλαβεῖσθαι ἀλλήλων; ἀλλ', ὦ μακάριε, φήσει, γενναιοτέρως ἐπ' αὐτὸ ἐλθών, ὃ λέγω, εἰ δύνασαι, ἐξέλεγξον, ὡς οὐχὶ ἴδιαι αἰσθήσεις ἑκάστῳ ἡμῶν γίγνονται, ἢ ὡς ἰδίων γιγνομένων οὐδέν τι ἂν μᾶλλον τὸ φαινόμενον μόνῳ ἐκείνῳ γίγνοιτο, ἤ, εἰ εἶναι δεῖ ὀνομάζειν, εἴη, ᾧπερ φαίνεται. ὑς δὲ δὴ καὶ κυνοκεφάλους λέγων οὐ μόνον αὐτὸς ὑηνεῖς, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς ἀκούοντας τοῦτο δρᾶν εἰς τὰ συγγράμματά μου ἀναπείθεις, οὐ καλῶς | ποιῶν. ἐγὼ γὰρ D

φημὶ μὲν τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἔχειν ὡς γέγραφα· μέτρον γὰρ ἕκαστον ἡμῶν εἶναι τῶν τε ὄντων καὶ μή· μυρίον μέντοι διαφέρειν ἕτερον ἑτέρου αὐτῷ τούτῳ, ὅτι τῷ μὲν ἄλλα ἔστι τε καὶ φαίνεται, τῷ δὲ ἄλλα. καὶ σοφίαν καὶ σοφὸν ἄνδρα πολλοῦ δέω τὸ μὴ φάναι εἶναι, ἀλλ' αὐτὸν τοῦτον καὶ λέγω σοφόν, ὃς ἄν τινι ἡμῶν, ᾧ φαίνεται καὶ ἔστι κακά, μεταβάλλων ποιήσῃ ἀγαθὰ φαίνεσθαί τε καὶ εἶναι. τὸν δὲ λόγον αὖ μὴ τῷ ῥήματί μου
E δίωκε, | ἀλλ' ὧδε ἔτι σαφέστερον μάθε, τί λέγω. οἷον γὰρ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ἐλέγετο ἀναμνήσθητι, ὅτι τῷ μὲν ἀσθενοῦντι πικρὰ φαίνεται ἃ ἐσθίει, καὶ ἔστι, τῷ δὲ ὑγιαίνοντι τἀναντία ἔστι καὶ φαίνεται. σοφώτερον μὲν οὖν τούτων οὐδέτερον δεῖ ποιῆσαι· οὐδὲ γὰρ δυνατόν·
167 οὐδὲ * κατηγορητέον, ὡς ὁ μὲν κάμνων ἀμαθής, ὅτι τοιαῦτα δοξάζει, ὁ δὲ ὑγιαίνων σοφός, ὅτι ἀλλοῖα· μεταβλητέον δ' ἐπὶ θάτερα· ἀμείνων γὰρ ἡ ἑτέρα ἕξις. οὕτω δὲ καὶ ἐν τῇ παιδείᾳ ἀπὸ ἑτέρας ἕξεως ἐπὶ τὴν ἀμείνω μεταβλητέον. ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν ἰατρὸς φαρμάκοις μεταβάλλει, ὁ δὲ σοφιστὴς λόγοις. ἐπεὶ οὔ τί γε ψευδῆ δοξάζοντά τίς τινα ὕστερον ἀληθῆ ἐποίησε δοξάζειν· οὔτε γὰρ τὰ μὴ ὄντα δυνατὸν δοξάσαι, οὔτε ἄλλα παρ' ἃ ἂν πάσχῃ, ταῦτα δὲ ἀεὶ ἀληθῆ. ἀλλ'
B οἶμαι, πονηρᾷ ψυχῆς ἕξει | δοξάζοντας συγγενῆ αὐτῆς χρηστὴ ἐποίησε δοξάσαι ἕτερα τοιαῦτα, ἃ δή τινες τὰ φαντάσματα ὑπὸ ἀπειρίας ἀληθῆ καλοῦσιν, ἐγὼ δὲ βελτίω μὲν τὰ ἕτερα τῶν ἑτέρων, ἀληθέστερα δὲ οὐδέν. καὶ τοὺς σοφούς, ὦ φίλε Σώκρατες, πολλοῦ δέω βατράχους λέγειν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ μὲν σώματα ἰατροὺς λέγω, κατὰ δὲ φυτὰ γεωργούς. φημὶ γὰρ καὶ τούτους τοῖς φυτοῖς ἀντὶ πονηρῶν αἰσθήσεων, ὅταν τι αὐτῶν ἀσθενῇ,
C χρηστὰς καὶ | ὑγιεινὰς αἰσθήσεις τε καὶ ἀληθείας ἐμ-

ποιεῖν, τοὺς δέ γε σοφούς τε καὶ ἀγαθοὺς ῥήτορας ταῖς πόλεσι τὰ χρηστὰ ἀντὶ τῶν πονηρῶν δίκαια δοκεῖν εἶναι ποιεῖν. ἐπεὶ οἷά γ' ἂν ἑκάστῃ πόλει δίκαια καὶ καλὰ δοκῇ, ταῦτα καὶ εἶναι αὐτῇ, ἕως ἂν αὐτὰ νομίζῃ. ἀλλ' ὁ σοφὸς ἀντὶ πονηρῶν ὄντων αὐτοῖς ἑκάστων χρηστὰ ἐποίησεν εἶναι καὶ δοκεῖν· κατὰ δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον καὶ ὁ σοφιστὴς τοὺς παιδευομένους οἵτω δυνάμενος παιδαγωγεῖν σοφός τε καὶ ἄξιος πολλῶν χρημάτων τοῖς | παιδευθεῖσι. καὶ οὕτω σοφώτεροί τέ εἰσιν D ἕτεροι ἑτέρων καὶ οὐδεὶς ψευδῆ δοξάζει, καί σοι, ἐάν τε βούλῃ ἐάν τε μή, ἀνεκτέον ὄντι μέτρῳ· σώζεται γὰρ ἐν τούτοις ὁ λόγος οὗτος, ᾧ σὺ εἰ μὲν ἔχεις ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἀμφισβητεῖν, ἀμφισβήτει, λόγῳ ἀντιδιεξελθών, εἰ δὲ δι' ἐρωτήσεων βούλει, δι' ἐρωτήσεων· οὐδὲ γὰρ τοῦτο φευκτέον, ἀλλὰ πάντων μάλιστα διωκτέον τῷ νοῦν ἔχοντι. ποίει μέντοι οὑτωσί· μὴ ἀδίκει ἐν τῷ | ἐρωτᾶν. E καὶ γὰρ πολλὴ ἀλογία ἀρετῆς φάσκοντα ἐπιμελεῖσθαι μηδὲν ἀλλ' ἢ ἀδικοῦντα ἐν λόγοις διατελεῖν. ἀδικεῖν δ' ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ, ὅταν τις μὴ χωρὶς μὲν ὡς ἀγωνιζόμενος τὰς διατριβὰς ποιῆται, χωρὶς δὲ διαλεγόμενος, καὶ ἐν μὲν τῷ παίζῃ τε καὶ σφάλλῃ καθ' ὅσον ἂν δύνηται, ἐν δὲ τῷ διαλέγεσθαι σπουδάζῃ τε καὶ ἐπανορθοῖ τὸν προσδιαλεγόμενον, ἐκεῖνα μόνα αὐτῷ ἐνδεικνύμενος τὰ σφάλματα, ἃ αὐτὸς ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ καὶ τῶν * προτέρων συνουσιῶν παρεκέκρουστο. ἂν μὲν γὰρ 168 οὕτω ποιῇς, ἑαυτοὺς αἰτιάσονται οἱ προσδιατρίβοντές σοι τῆς αὑτῶν ταραχῆς καὶ ἀπορίας, ἀλλ' οὐ σέ, καὶ σὲ μὲν διώξονται καὶ φιλήσουσιν, αὑτοὺς δὲ μισήσουσι, καὶ φεύξονται ἀφ' ἑαυτῶν εἰς φιλοσοφίαν, ἵν' ἄλλοι γενόμενοι ἀπαλλαγῶσι τῶν οἵ πρότερον ἦσαν· ἐὰν δὲ τἀναντία τούτων δρᾷς, ὥσπερ οἱ πολλοί, τἀναντία

ξυμβήσεταί σοι καὶ τοὺς ξυνόντας ἀντὶ φιλοσόφων
B μισοῦντας τοῦτο τὸ | πρᾶγμα ἀποφανεῖς, ἐπειδὰν πρεσβύτεροι γένωνται. ἐὰν οὖν ἐμοὶ πείθῃ, ὃ καὶ πρότερον ἐῤῥήθη, οὐ δυσμενῶς οὐδὲ μαχητικῶς, ἀλλ' ἵλεῳ τῇ διανοίᾳ ξυγκαθεὶς ὡς ἀληθῶς σκέψει, τί ποτε λέγομεν, κινεῖσθαί τε ἀποφαινόμενοι τὰ πάντα τό τε δοκοῦν ἑκάστῳ τοῦτο καὶ εἶναι ἰδιώτῃ τε καὶ πόλει, καὶ ἐκ τούτων ἐπισκέψει, εἴτε ταὐτὸν εἴτε καὶ ἄλλο ἐπιστήμη καὶ αἴσθησις, ἀλλ' οὐχ, ὥσπερ ἄρτι, ἐκ συνηθείας ῥημά-
C των τε καὶ ὀνομάτων ἃ οἱ | πολλοὶ ὅπῃ ἂν τύχωσιν ἕλκοντες ἀπορίας ἀλλήλοις παντοδαπὰς παρέχουσι. Ταῦτα, ὦ Θεόδωρε, τῷ ἑταίρῳ σου εἰς βοήθειαν προσηρξάμην κατ' ἐμὴν δύναμιν, σμικρὰ ἀπὸ σμικρῶν· εἰ δ' αὐτὸς ἔζῃ, μεγαλειότερον ἂν τοῖς αὑτοῦ ἐβοήθησεν.

XXI. ΘΕΟ. Παίζεις, ὦ Σώκρατες· πάνυ γὰρ νεανικῶς τῷ ἀνδρὶ βεβοήθηκας. ΣΩ. Εὖ λέγεις, ὦ ἑταῖρε. καί μοι εἰπέ· ἐνενόησάς που λέγοντος ἄρτι τοῦ Πρωταγόρου
D καὶ ὀνειδίζοντος ἡμῖν, ὅτι | πρὸς παιδίον τοὺς λόγους ποιούμενοι τῷ τοῦ παιδὸς φόβῳ ἀγωνιζοίμεθα εἰς τὰ ἑαυτοῦ, καὶ χαριεντισμόν τινα ἀποκαλῶν, ἀποσεμνύνων δὲ τὸ πάντων μέτρον, σπουδάσαι ἡμᾶς διεκελεύσατο περὶ τὸν αὑτοῦ λόγον; ΘΕΟ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐκ ἐνενόησα, ὦ Σώκρατες; ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; κελεύεις πείθεσθαι αὐτῷ; ΘΕΟ. Σφόδρα γε. ΣΩ. Ὁρᾷς οὖν ὅτι τάδε πάντα πλὴν σοῦ παιδία ἐστίν; εἰ οὖν πεισόμεθα τῷ ἀνδρί, ἐμὲ
E καὶ σὲ δεῖ ἐρωτῶντάς τε καὶ | ἀποκρινομένους ἀλλήλοις σπουδάσαι περὶ τὸν αὐτοῦ λόγον, ἵνα μή τοι τοῦτό γ' ἔχῃ ἐγκαλεῖν, ὡς παίζοντες πρὸς μειράκια διεσκεψάμεθ' αὖ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον. ΘΕΟ. Τί δ'; οὐ πολλῶν τοι Θεαίτητος μεγάλους πώγωνας ἐχόντων ἄμεινον ἂν ἑπακολουθήσειε λόγῳ διερευνωμένῳ; ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' οὔ τοι

σοῦ γε, ὦ Θεόδωρε, ἄμεινον. μὴ οὖν οἷόν ἐμὲ μὲν τῷ σῷ ἑταίρῳ τετελευτηκότι δεῖν παντὶ τρόπῳ ἐπαμύνειν, σὲ * δὲ μηδενί, ἀλλ' ἴθι, ὦ ἄριστε, ὀλίγον ἐπίσπου, 169 μέχρι τούτου αὐτοῦ ἕως ἂν εἰδῶμεν, εἴτε ἄρα σὲ δεῖ διαγραμμάτων πέρι μέτρον εἶναι, εἴτε πάντες ὁμοίως σοὶ ἱκανοὶ ἑαυτοῖς εἷς τε ἀστρονομίαν καὶ τἆλλα, ὧν δὴ σὺ πέρι αἰτίαν ἔχεις διαφέρειν. ΘΕΟ. Οὐ ῥᾴδιον, ὦ Σώκρατες, σοὶ παρακαθήμενον μὴ διδόναι λόγον, ἀλλ' ἐγὼ ἄρτι παρελήρησα φάσκων σε ἐπιτρέψειν μοι μὴ ἀποδύεσθαι, καὶ οὐχὶ ἀναγκάσειν καθάπερ Λακεδαιμόνιοι· σὺ δέ μοι δοκεῖς πρὸς τὸν Σκίῤῥωνα μᾶλλον τείνειν. Λακεδαιμόνιοι μὲν γὰρ ἀπιέναι ἢ ἀποδύεσθαι Β κελεύουσι, σὺ δὲ κατ' Ἀνταῖόν τί μοι μᾶλλον δοκεῖς τὸ δρᾶμα δρᾶν· τὸν γὰρ προσελθόντα οὐκ ἀνίης πρὶν ἀναγκάσῃς ἀποδύσας ἐν τοῖς λόγοις προσπαλαῖσαι. ΣΩ. Ἀριστά γε, ὦ Θεόδωρε, τὴν νόσον μου ἀπείκασας· ἰσχυρικώτερος μέντοι ἐγὼ ἐκείνων. μυρίοι γὰρ ἤδη μοι Ἡρακλέες τε καὶ Θησέες ἐντυγχάνοντες καρτεροὶ πρὸς τὸ λέγειν μάλ' εὖ ξυγκεκόφασιν, ἀλλ' ἐγὼ οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον ἀφισταμαι· οὕτω τις ἔρως δεινὸς ἐνδέδυκε τῆς περὶ ταῦτα γυμνασίας. μὴ οὖν μηδὲ σὺ φθονήσῃς C προσανατριψάμενος σαυτόν τε ἅμα καὶ ἐμὲ ὀνῆσαι. ΘΕΟ. Οὐδὲν ἔτι ἀντιλέγω, ἀλλ' ἄγε ὅπῃ ἐθέλεις· πάντως τὴν περὶ ταῦτα εἱμαρμένην, ἣν ἂν σὺ ἐπικλώσῃς, δεῖ ἀνατλῆναι ἐλεγχόμενον. οὐ μέντοι περαιτέρω γε ὧν προτίθεσαι οἷός τ' ἔσομαι παρασχεῖν ἐμαυτόν σοι. ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' ἀρκεῖ καὶ μέχρι τούτων. καί μοι πάνυ τήρει τὸ τοιόνδε, μή που παιδικόν τι λάθωμεν εἶδος τῶν λόγων ποιούμενοι, καί τις πάλιν ἡμῖν αὐτὸ D ὀνειδίσῃ. ΘΕΟ. Ἀλλὰ δὴ πειράσομαί γε καθ' ὅσον ἂν δύνωμαι. XXII. ΣΩ. Τοῦδε τοίνυν πρῶτον πάλιν

ἀντιλαβώμεθα, οὔπερ τὸ πρότερον, καὶ ἴδωμεν, ὀρθῶς ἢ οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἐδυσχεραίνομεν ἐπιτιμῶντες τῷ λόγῳ, ὅτι αὐτάρκη ἕκαστον εἰς φρόνησιν ἐποίει, καὶ ἡμῖν ξυνεχώρησεν ὁ Πρωταγόρας, περί τε τοῦ ἀμείνονος καὶ χείρονος διαφέρειν τινάς, οὓς δὴ καὶ εἶναι σοφούς. οὐχί; ΘΕΟ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Εἰ μὲν τοίνυν αὐτὸς παρὼν ὡμολόγει, Ε ἀλλὰ μὴ ἡμεῖς | βοηθοῦντες ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ ξυνεχωρήσαμεν, οὐδὲν ἂν πάλιν ἔδει ἐπαναλαβόντας βεβαιοῦσθαι· νῦν δὲ τάχ' ἄν τις ἡμᾶς ἀκύρους τιθείη τῆς ὑπὲρ ἐκείνου ὁμολογίας. διὸ καλλιόνως ἔχει σαφέστερον περὶ τούτου αὐτοῦ διομολογήσασθαι· οὐ γάρ τι σμικρὸν παραλλάττει οὕτως ἔχον ἢ ἄλλως. ΘΕΟ. Λέγεις ἀληθῆ. ΣΩ. Μὴ τοίνυν δι' ἄλλων, ἀλλ' ἐκ τοῦ ἐκείνου λόγου ὡς διὰ 170 βραχυτάτων * λάβωμεν τὴν ὁμολογίαν. ΘΕΟ. Πῶς; ΣΩ. Οὑτωσί. Τὸ δοκοῦν ἑκάστῳ τοῦτο καὶ εἶναί φησί που ᾧ δοκεῖ; ΘΕΟ. Φησὶ γὰρ οὖν. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, καὶ ἡμεῖς ἀνθρώπου, μᾶλλον δὲ πάντων ἀνθρώπων δόξας λέγομεν, καὶ φαμὲν οὐδένα ὄντινα οὐ τὰ μὲν αὑτὸν ἡγεῖσθαι τῶν ἄλλων σοφώτερον, τὰ δὲ ἄλλους ἑαυτοῦ, καὶ ἔν γε τοῖς μεγίστοις κινδύνοις, ὅταν ἐν στρατείαις ἢ νόσοις ἢ ἐν θαλάττῃ χειμάζωνται, ὥσπερ πρὸς θεοὺς ἔχειν τοὺς ἐν ἑκάστοις ἄρχοντας, Β σωτῆρας σφῶν | προσδοκῶντας, οὐκ ἄλλῳ τῳ διαφέροντας ἢ τῷ εἰδέναι. καὶ πάντα που μεστὰ τἀνθρώπινα ζητούντων διδασκάλους τε καὶ ἄρχοντας ἑαυτῶν τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζώων τῶν τε ἐργασιῶν, οἰομένων τε αὖ ἱκανῶν μὲν διδάσκειν, ἱκανῶν δὲ ἄρχειν εἶναι. καὶ ἐν τούτοις ἅπασι τί ἄλλο φήσομεν ἢ αὐτοὺς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἡγεῖσθαι σοφίαν καὶ ἀμαθίαν εἶναι παρὰ σφίσιν; ΘΕΟ. Οὐδὲν ἄλλο. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὴν μὲν σοφίαν ἀληθῆ διάνοιαν ἡγοῦνται, τὴν δὲ ἀμαθίαν ψευδῆ δόξαν;

ΘΕΟ. Τί μήν; ΣΩ. Τί οὖν, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, χρησό- C
μεθα τῷ λόγῳ; πότερον ἀληθῆ φῶμεν ἀεὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώ-
πους δοξάζειν, ἢ ποτὲ μὲν ἀληθῆ, ποτὲ δὲ ψευδῆ; ἐξ
ἀμφοτέρων γάρ που ξυμβαίνει μὴ ἀεὶ ἀληθῆ ἀλλ' ἀμ-
φότερα αὐτοὺς δοξάζειν. σκόπει γάρ, ὦ Θεόδωρε, εἰ
ἐθέλοι ἄν τις τῶν ἀμφὶ Πρωταγόραν ἢ σὺ αὐτὸς δια-
μάχεσθαι, ὡς οὐδεὶς ἡγεῖται ἕτερος ἕτερον ἀμαθῆ τε
εἶναι καὶ ψευδῆ δοξάζειν. ΘΕΟ. Ἀλλ' ἄπιστον, ὦ
Σώκρατες. ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν εἰς τοῦτό γε ἀνάγκης ὁ D
λόγος ἥκει ὁ πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἄνθρωπον λέγων.
ΘΕΟ. Πῶς δή; ΣΩ. Ὅταν σὺ κρίνας τι παρὰ σαυτῷ
πρός με ἀποφαίνῃ περί τινος δόξαν, σοὶ μὲν δὴ τοῦτο
κατὰ τὸν ἐκείνου λόγον ἀληθὲς ἔστω, ἡμῖν δὲ δὴ τοῖς
ἄλλοις περὶ τῆς σῆς κρίσεως πότερον οὐκ ἔστι κριταῖς
γενέσθαι, ἢ ἀεί σε κρίνομεν ἀληθῆ δοξάζειν; ἢ μυρίοι
ἑκάστοτέ σοι μάχονται ἀντιδοξάζοντες, ἡγούμενοι ψευ-
δῆ κρίνειν τε καὶ οἴεσθαι; ΘΕΟ. Νὴ τὸν Δία, ὦ Σώ-
κρατες, μάλα μυρίοι δῆτα, φησὶν Ὅμηρος, οἵ γέ μοι E
τὰ ἐξ ἀνθρώπων πράγματα παρέχουσιν. ΣΩ. Τί οὖν;
βούλει λέγωμεν, ὡς σὺ τότε σαυτῷ μὲν ἀληθῆ δοξάζεις,
τοῖς δὲ μυρίοις ψευδῆ; ΘΕΟ. Ἔοικεν ἔκ γε τοῦ λόγου
ἀνάγκη εἶναι. ΣΩ. Τί δὲ αὐτῷ Πρωταγόρᾳ; ἆρ' οὐχὶ
ἀνάγκη, εἰ μὲν μηδὲ αὐτὸς ᾤετο μέτρον εἶναι ἄνθρωπον
μηδὲ οἱ πολλοί, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ οἴονται, μηδενὶ δὴ εἶναι
ταύτην τὴν ἀλήθειαν, ἣν ἐκεῖνος ἔγραψεν; εἰ δὲ * αὐτὸς 171
μὲν ᾤετο, τὸ δὲ πλῆθος μὴ συνοίεται, οἶσθ' ὅτι πρῶτον
μὲν ὅσῳ πλείους οἷς μὴ δοκεῖ ἢ οἷς δοκεῖ, τοσούτῳ
μᾶλλον οὐκ ἔστιν ἢ ἔστιν; ΘΕΟ. Ἀνάγκη, εἴπερ γε
καθ' ἑκάστην δόξαν ἔσται καὶ οὐκ ἔσται. ΣΩ. Ἔπειτά
γε τοῦτ' ἔχει κομψότατον· ἐκεῖνος μὲν περὶ τῆς αὐτοῦ
οἰήσεως τὴν τῶν ἀντιδοξαζόντων οἴησιν, ᾗ ἐκεῖνον ἡ-

γοῦνται ψεύδεσθαι, ξυγχωρεῖ που ἀληθῆ εἶναι ὁμολογῶν τὰ ὄντα δοξάζειν ἅπαντας. ΘΕΟ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
Β ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὴν αὐτοῦ ἂν ψευδῆ | ξυγχωροῖ, εἰ τὴν τῶν ἡγουμένων αὐτὸν ψεύδεσθαι ὁμολογεῖ ἀληθῆ εἶναι; ΘΕΟ. Ἀνάγκη. ΣΩ. Οἱ δέ γ' ἄλλοι οὐ ξυγχωροῦσιν ἑαυτοὺς ψεύδεσθαι; ΘΕΟ. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν. ΣΩ. Ὁ δέ γ' αὖ ὁμολογεῖ καὶ ταύτην ἀληθῆ τὴν δόξαν ἐξ ὧν γέγραφε. ΘΕΟ. Φαίνεται. ΣΩ. Ἐξ ἁπάντων ἄρα ἀπὸ Πρωταγόρου ἀρξαμένων ἀμφισβητήσεται, μᾶλλον δὲ ὑπό γε ἐκείνου ὁμολογήσεται, ὅταν τῷ ταναντία λέγοντι ξυγχωρῇ ἀληθῆ αὐτὸν δοξάζειν, τότε καὶ ὁ
C Πρωταγόρας αὐτὸς | ξυγχωρήσεται μήτε κύνα μήτε τὸν ἐπιτυχόντα ἄνθρωπον μέτρον εἶναι μηδὲ περὶ ἑνὸς οὗ ἂν μὴ μάθῃ. οὐχ οὕτως; ΘΕΟ. Οὕτως. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐπειδὴ ἀμφισβητεῖται ὑπὸ πάντων, οὐδενὶ ἂν εἴη ἡ Πρωταγόρου ἀλήθεια ἀληθής, οὔτε τινὶ ἄλλῳ οὔτ' αὐτῷ ἐκείνῳ. ΘΕΟ. Ἄγαν, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸν ἑταῖρόν μου καταθέομεν. ΣΩ. Ἀλλά τοι, ὦ φίλε, δῆλον, εἰ καὶ παραθέομεν τὸ ὀρθόν. εἰκός γε ἄρα ἐκεῖνον πρεσβύ-
D τερον ὄντα σοφώτερον ἡμῶν εἶναι· καὶ εἰ αὐτίκα | ἐντεῦθεν ἀνακύψειε μέχρι τοῦ αὐχένος, πολλὰ ἂν ἐμέ τε ἐλέγξας ληροῦντα, ὡς τὸ εἰκός, καὶ σὲ ὁμολογοῦντα, καταδὺς ἂν οἴχοιτο ἀποτρέχων. ἀλλ' ἡμῖν ἀνάγκη, οἶμαι, χρῆσθαι ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς, ὁποῖοί τινές ἐσμεν, καὶ τὰ δοκοῦντα ἀεὶ ταῦτα λέγειν. καὶ δῆτα καὶ νῦν ἄλλο τι φῶμεν ὁμολογεῖν ἂν τοῦτό γε ὀντινοῦν, τὸ εἶναι σοφώτερον ἕτερον ἑτέρου, εἶναι δὲ καὶ ἀμαθέστερον; ΘΕΟ. Ἐμοί γ' οὖν δοκεῖ. XXIII. ΣΩ. Ἦ καὶ ταύτῃ ἂν μάλιστα ἵστασθαι τὸν λόγον, ᾗ ἡμεῖς ὑπεγράψαμεν
Ε βοηθοῦντες | Πρωταγόρᾳ, ὡς τὰ μὲν πολλὰ ᾗ δοκεῖ, ταύτῃ καὶ ἔστιν ἑκάστῳ, θερμά, ξηρά, γλυκέα, πάντα

ὅσα τοῦ τύπου τούτου· εἰ δέ που ἔν τισι ξυγχωρήσεται διαφέρειν ἄλλον ἄλλου, περὶ τὰ ὑγιεινὰ καὶ νοσώδη ἐθελῆσαι ἂν φάναι μὴ πᾶν γύναιον καὶ παιδίον καὶ θηρίον δὲ ἱκανὸν εἶναι ἰᾶσθαι αὑτὸ γιγνῶσκον ἑαυτῷ τὸ ὑγιεινόν, ἀλλὰ ἐνταῦθα δὴ ἄλλον ἄλλου διαφέρειν, εἴπερ που; ΘΕΟ. Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ οὕτως. ΣΩ. * Οὐκ- 172
οὖν καὶ περὶ πολιτικῶν, καλὰ μὲν καὶ αἰσχρὰ καὶ δίκαια καὶ ἄδικα καὶ ὅσια καὶ μή, οἷα ἂν ἑκάστη πόλις οἰηθεῖσα θῆται νόμιμα ἑαυτῇ, ταῦτα καὶ εἶναι τῇ ἀληθείᾳ ἑκάστῃ, καὶ ἐν τούτοις μὲν οὐδὲν σοφώτερον οὔτε ἰδιώτην ἰδιώτου οὔτε πόλιν πόλεως εἶναι· ἐν δὲ τῷ ξυμφέροντα ἑαυτῇ ἢ μὴ ξυμφέροντα τίθεσθαι, ἐνταῦθ', εἴπερ που, αὖ ὁμολογήσει ξύμβουλόν τε ξυμβούλου διαφέρειν καὶ πόλεως δόξαν ἑτέραν ἑτέρας πρὸς ἀλήθειαν, καὶ οὐκ ἂν πάνυ τολμήσειε ' φῆσαι, ἃ ἂν B
θῆται πόλις ξυμφέροντα οἰηθεῖσα αὑτῇ, παντὸς μᾶλλον ταῦτα καὶ ξυνοίσειν. ἀλλ' ἐκεῖ, οὗ λέγω, ἐν τοῖς δικαίοις καὶ ἀδίκοις καὶ ὁσίοις καὶ ἀνοσίοις, ἐθέλουσιν ἰσχυρίζεσθαι, ὡς οὐκ ἔστι φύσει αὐτῶν οὐδὲν οὐσίαν ἑαυτοῦ ἔχον, ἀλλὰ τὸ κοινῇ δόξαν τοῦτο γίγνεται ἀληθὲς τότε ὅταν δόξῃ καὶ ὅσον ἂν δοκῇ χρόνον. καὶ ὅσοι γε δὴ μὴ παντάπασι τὸν Πρωταγόρου λόγον λέγουσιν, ὧδέ πως τὴν σοφίαν ἄγουσι. Λόγος δὲ ἡμᾶς, ὦ Θεόδωρε, ἐκ λόγου, μείζων ἐξ ἐλάττονος, ' καταλαμβάνει. ΘΕΟ. C
Οὐκοῦν σχολὴν ἄγομεν, ὦ Σώκρατες; ΣΩ. Φαινόμεθα. καὶ πολλάκις μέν γε δή, ὦ δαιμόνιε, καὶ ἄλλοτε κατενόησα, ἀτὰρ καὶ νῦν, ὡς εἰκότως οἱ ἐν ταῖς φιλοσοφίαις πολὺν χρόνον διατρίψαντες εἰς τὰ δικαστήρια ἰόντες γελοῖοι φαίνονται ῥήτορες. ΘΕΟ. Πῶς δὴ οὖν λέγεις; ΣΩ. Κινδυνεύουσιν οἱ ἐν δικαστηρίοις καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις ἐκ νέων κυλινδούμενοι πρὸς τοὺς ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ καὶ

D τῇ τοιᾷδε διατριβῇ | τεθραμμένους ὡς οἰκέται πρὸς ἐλευθέρους τεθράφθαι. ΘΕΟ. Πῇ δή; ΣΩ. Ἡι τοῖς μέν, τοῦτο ὃ σὺ εἶπες, ἀεὶ πάρεστι σχολὴ καὶ τοὺς λόγους ἐν εἰρήνῃ ἐπὶ σχολῆς ποιοῦνται· ὥσπερ ἡμεῖς νυνὶ τρίτον ἤδη λόγον ἐκ λόγου μεταλαμβάνομεν, οὕτω κἀκεῖνοι, ἐὰν αὐτοὺς ὁ ἐπελθὼν τοῦ προκειμένου μᾶλλον, καθάπερ ἡμᾶς, ἀρέσῃ, καὶ διὰ μακρῶν ἢ βραχέων μέλει οὐδὲν λέγειν, ἂν μόνον τύχωσι τοῦ ὄντος. οἱ δὲ ἐν ἀσχολίᾳ τε ἀεὶ λέγουσι· κατεπείγει γὰρ ὕδωρ ῥέον,
E καὶ οὐκ | ἐγχωρεῖ περὶ οὗ ἂν ἐπιθυμήσωσι τοὺς λόγους ποιεῖσθαι, ἀλλ' ἀνάγκην ἔχων ὁ ἀντίδικος ἐφέστηκε καὶ ὑπογραφὴν παραναγιγνωσκομένην, ὧν ἐκτὸς οὐ ῥητέον· (ἣν ἀντωμοσίαν καλοῦσιν·) οἱ δὲ λόγοι ἀεὶ περὶ ὁμοδούλου πρὸς δεσπότην καθήμενον, ἐν χειρὶ τὴν δίκην ἔχοντα, καὶ οἱ ἀγῶνες οὐδέποτε τὴν ἄλλως ἀλλ' ἀεὶ τὴν περὶ αὐτοῦ· πολλάκις δὲ καὶ περὶ ψυχῆς ὁ δρόμος.
173 ὥστ' ἐξ * ἁπάντων τούτων ἔντονοι καὶ δριμεῖς γίγνονται, ἐπιστάμενοι τὸν δεσπότην λόγῳ τε θωπεῦσαι καὶ ἔργῳ χαρίσασθαι, σμικροὶ δὲ καὶ οὐκ ὀρθοὶ τὰς ψυχάς. τὴν γὰρ αὔξην καὶ τὸ εὐθύ τε καὶ τὸ ἐλεύθερον ἡ ἐκ νέων δουλεία ἀφῄρηται, ἀναγκάζουσα πράττειν σκολιά, μεγάλους κινδύνους καὶ φόβους ἔτι ἁπαλαῖς ψυχαῖς ἐπιβάλλουσα, οὓς οὐ δυνάμενοι μετὰ τοῦ δικαίου καὶ ἀληθοῦς ὑποφέρειν, εὐθὺς ἐπὶ τὸ ψεῦδός τε καὶ τὸ ἀλλήλους ἀνταδικεῖν τρεπόμενοι πολλὰ κάμπτονται καὶ
B συγκλῶνται, | ὥσθ' ὑγιὲς οὐδὲν ἔχοντες τῆς διανοίας εἰς ἄνδρας ἐκ μειρακίων τελευτῶσι, δεινοί τε καὶ σοφοὶ γεγονότες, ὡς οἴονται. Καὶ οὗτοι μὲν δὴ τοιοῦτοι, ὦ Θεόδωρε· τοὺς δὲ τοῦ ἡμετέρου χοροῦ πότερον βούλει διελθόντες ἢ ἐάσαντες πάλιν ἐπὶ τὸν λόγον τραπώμεθα, ἵνα μὴ καί, ὃ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν, λίαν πολὺ τῇ ἐλευθερίᾳ

καὶ μεταλήψει τῶν λόγων καταχρώμεθα; ΘΕΟ. Μηδαμῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ διελθόντες. πάνυ γὰρ εὖ τοῦτο εἴρηκας, ὅτι [1] οὐχ ἡμεῖς οἱ ἐν τῷ τοιῷδε χορεύοντες τῶν λόγων ὑπηρέται. ἀλλ᾽ οἱ λόγοι οἱ ἡμέτεροι ὥσπερ οἰκέται, καὶ ἕκαστος αὐτῶν περιμένει ἀποτελεσθῆναι, ὅταν ἡμῖν δοκῇ· οὔτε γὰρ δικαστὴς οὔτε θεατής, ὥσπερ ποιηταῖς, ἐπιτιμήσων τε καὶ ἄρξων ἐπιστατεῖ παρ᾽ ἡμῖν. XXIV. ΣΩ. Λέγωμεν δή, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐπεὶ σοί γε δοκεῖ, περὶ τῶν κορυφαίων· τί γὰρ ἄν τις τούς γε φαύλως διατρίβοντας ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ λέγοι; Οὗτοι δέ που ἐκ νέων πρῶτον μὲν εἰς ἀγορὰν οὐκ ἴσασι τὴν ὁδόν, οὐδὲ [1] ὅπου δικαστήριον ἢ βουλευτήριον ἤ τι κοινὸν ἄλλο τῆς πόλεως συνέδριον· νόμους δὲ καὶ ψηφίσματα λεγόμενα ἢ γεγραμμένα οὔτε ὁρῶσιν οὔτε ἀκούουσι. σπουδαὶ δὲ ἑταιρειῶν ἐπ᾽ ἀρχὰς καὶ σύνοδοι καὶ δεῖπνα καὶ σὺν αὐλητρίσι κῶμοι, οὐδὲ ὄναρ πράττειν προσίσταται αὐτοῖς. εὖ δὲ ἢ κακῶς τις γέγονεν ἐν πόλει, ἢ τί τῳ κακόν ἐστιν ἐκ προγόνων γεγονὸς ἢ πρὸς ἀνδρῶν ἢ γυναικῶν, μᾶλλον αὐτὸν λέληθεν ἢ οἱ τῆς θαλάττης λεγόμενοι χόες. καὶ ταῦτα πάντ᾽ [1] οὐδ᾽ ὅτι οὐκ οἶδεν, οἶδεν· οὐδὲ γὰρ αὐτῶν ἀπέχεται τοῦ εὐδοκιμεῖν χάριν, ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι τὸ σῶμα μόνον ἐν τῇ πόλει κεῖται αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐπιδημεῖ, ἡ δὲ διάνοια, ταῦτα πάντα ἡγησαμένη σμικρὰ καὶ οὐδέν, ἀτιμάσασα πανταχῇ φέρεται κατὰ Πίνδαρον, τά τε γᾶς ὑπένερθε καὶ τὰ ἐπίπεδα γεωμετροῦσα, οὐρανοῦ τε ὕπερ ἀστρονομοῦσα, καὶ πᾶσαν πάντῃ φύσιν * ἐρευνωμένη τῶν ὄντων ἑκάστου ὅλου, εἰς τῶν ἐγγὺς οὐδὲν αὐτὴν συγκαθιεῖσα. ΘΕΟ. Πῶς τοῦτο λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες; ΣΩ. Ὥσπερ καὶ Θαλῆν ἀστρονομοῦντα, ὦ Θεόδωρε, καὶ ἄνω βλέποντα, πεσόντα εἰς φρέαρ, Θρᾷττά τις ἐμμελὴς καὶ

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χαρίεσσα θεραπαινὶς ἀποσκῶψαι λέγεται, ὡς τὰ μὲν ἐν οὐρανῷ προθυμοῖτο εἰδέναι, τὰ δ' ἔμπροσθεν αὐτοῦ καὶ παρὰ πόδας λανθάνοι αὐτόν. ταὐτὸν δὲ ἀρκεῖ
B σκῶμμα ἐπὶ πάντας, ὅσοι ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ διάγουσι. | τῷ γὰρ ὄντι τὸν τοιοῦτον ὁ μὲν πλησίον καὶ ὁ γείτων λέληθεν, οὐ μόνον ὅ τι πράττει, ἀλλ' ὀλίγου καὶ εἰ ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν ἤ τι ἄλλο θρέμμα· τί δέ ποτ' ἐστὶν ἄνθρωπος καὶ τί τῇ τοιαύτῃ φύσει προσήκει διάφορον τῶν ἄλλων ποιεῖν ἢ πάσχειν, ζητεῖ τε καὶ πράγματ' ἔχει διερευνώμενος. μανθάνεις γάρ που, ὦ Θεόδωρε. ἢ οὔ; ΘΕΟ. Ἔγωγε· καὶ ἀληθῆ λέγεις. ΣΩ. Τοιγάρτοι,
C ὦ φίλε, ἰδίᾳ τε συγγιγνόμενος ὁ τοιοῦτος ἑκάστῳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ, ὅπερ ἀρχόμενος | ἔλεγον, ὅταν ἐν δικαστηρίῳ ἢ που ἄλλοθι ἀναγκασθῇ περὶ τῶν παρὰ πόδας καὶ τῶν ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς διαλέγεσθαι, γέλωτα παρέχει οὐ μόνον Θρᾴτταις, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ ἄλλῳ ὄχλῳ, εἰς φρέατά τε καὶ πᾶσαν ἀπορίαν ἐμπίπτων ὑπὸ ἀπειρίας, καὶ ἡ ἀσχημοσύνη δεινή, δόξαν ἀβελτερίας παρεχομένη. ἔν τε γὰρ ταῖς λοιδορίαις ἴδιον ἔχει οὐδὲν οὐδένα λοι-
D δορεῖν, ἅτ' οὐκ εἰδὼς κακὸν οὐδὲν οὐδενὸς ἐκ τοῦ μὴ μεμελετηκέναι· ἀπορῶν οὖν γελοῖος φαίνεται· ἔν | τε τοῖς ἐπαίνοις καὶ ταῖς τῶν ἄλλων μεγαλαυχίαις, οὐ προσποιήτως, ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι γελῶν ἔνδηλος γιγνόμενος ληρώδης δοκεῖ εἶναι. τύραννόν τε γὰρ ἢ βασιλέα ἐγκωμιαζόμενον ἕνα τῶν νομέων, οἷον συβώτην, ἢ ποιμένα, ἤ τινα βουκόλον ἡγεῖται ἀκούειν εὐδαιμονιζόμενον πολὺ βδάλλοντα· δυσκολώτερον δὲ ἐκείνων ζῷον καὶ ἐπι-
βουλότερον ποιμαίνειν τε καὶ βδάλλειν νομίζει αὐτούς· ἄγροικον δὲ καὶ ἀπαίδευτον ὑπὸ ἀσχολίας οὐδὲν ἧττον
E τῶν νομέων τὸν | τοιοῦτον ἀναγκαῖον γίγνεσθαι, σηκὸν ἐν ὄρει τὸ τεῖχος περιβεβλημένον. γῆς δὲ ὅταν μυρία

πλέθρα ἢ ἔτι πλείω ἀκούσῃ ὥς τις ἄρα κεκτημένος θαυμαστὰ πλήθει κέκτηται, πάνσμικρα δοκεῖ ἀκούειν εἰς ἅπασαν εἰωθὼς τὴν γῆν βλέπειν. τὰ δὲ δὴ γένη ὑμνούντων, ὡς γενναῖός τις ἑπτὰ πάππους πλουσίους ἔχων ἀποφῆναι, παντάπασιν ἀμβλὺ καὶ ἐπὶ σμικρὸν ὁρώντων ἡγεῖται τὸν ἔπαινον, ὑπὸ * ἀπαιδευσίας οὐ δυναμένων εἰς 175
τὸ πᾶν ἀεὶ βλέπειν, οὐδὲ λογίζεσθαι, ὅτι πάππων καὶ προγόνων μυριάδες ἑκάστῳ γεγόνασιν ἀναρίθμητοι, ἐν αἷς πλούσιοι καὶ πτωχοὶ καὶ βασιλεῖς καὶ δοῦλοι βάρβαροί τε καὶ Ἕλληνες πολλάκις μυρίοι γεγόνασιν ὁτῳοῦν, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ πέντε καὶ εἴκοσι καταλόγῳ προγόνων σεμνυνομένων καὶ ἀναφερόντων εἰς Ἡρακλέα τὸν Ἀμφιτρύωνος ἄτοπα αὐτῷ καταφαίνεται τῆς σμικρολογίας, ὅτι δὲ ὁ ἀπ' Ἀμφιτρύωνος εἰς τὸ | ἄνω πεντεκαιεικοστὸς B
τοιοῦτος ἦν, οἷα συνέβαινεν αὐτῷ τύχη, καὶ ὁ πεντηκοστὸς ἀπ' αὐτοῦ, γελᾷ οὐ δυναμένων λογίζεσθαί τε καὶ χαυνότητα ἀνοήτου ψυχῆς ἀπαλλάττειν. ἐν ἅπασι δὴ τούτοις ὁ τοιοῦτος ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν καταγελᾶται, τὰ μὲν ὑπερηφάνως ἔχων, ὡς δοκεῖ, τὰ δ' ἐν ποσὶν ἀγνοῶν τε καὶ ἐν ἑκάστοις ἀπορῶν. ΘΕΟ. Παντάπασι τὰ γιγνόμενα λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες. XXV. ΣΩ. Ὅταν δέ γέ τινα αὐτός, ὦ φίλε, ἑλκύσῃ ἄνω, καὶ ἐθελήσῃ τις αὐτῷ | ἐκβῆναι ἐκ τοῦ Τί ἐγὼ σὲ ἀδικῶ ἢ σὺ ἐμέ; εἰς C
σκέψιν αὐτῆς δικαιοσύνης τε καὶ ἀδικίας, τί τε ἑκάτερον αὐτοῖν καὶ τί τῶν πάντων ἢ ἀλλήλων διαφέρετον, ἢ ἐκ τοῦ Βασιλεὺς εὐδαίμων κεκτημένος τ' αὖ πολὺ χρυσίον, βασιλείας πέρι καὶ ἀνθρωπίνης ὅλως εὐδαιμονίας καὶ ἀθλιότητος ἐπὶ σκέψιν, ποίω τέ τινε ἑστὸν καὶ τίνα τρόπον ἀνθρώπου φύσει προσήκει τὸ μὲν κτήσασθαι αὐτοῖν, τὸ δὲ ἀποφυγεῖν, — περὶ τούτων ἁπάντων ὅταν αὖ δέῃ λόγον διδόναι τὸν | σμικρὸν ἐκεῖνον τὴν ψυχὴν D

καὶ δριμὺν καὶ δικανικόν, πάλιν αὖ τὰ ἀντίστροφα ἀποδίδωσιν· ἰλιγγιῶν τε ἀφ' ὑψηλοῦ κρεμασθεὶς καὶ βλέπων μετέωρος ἄνωθεν ὑπὸ ἀηθείας ἀδημονῶν τε καὶ ἀπορῶν καὶ βαρβαρίζων γέλωτα Θρᾴτταις μὲν οὐ παρέχει οὐδ' ἄλλῳ ἀπαιδεύτῳ οὐδενί, οὐ γὰρ αἰσθάνονται, τοῖς δ' ἐναντίως ἢ ὡς ἀνδραπόδοις τραφεῖσιν ἅπασιν. Οὗτος δὴ ἑκατέρου τρόπος, ὦ Θεόδωρε, ὁ μὲν τῷ ὄντι ἐν
E ἐλευθερίᾳ τε καὶ σχολῇ τεθραμμένου, [1] ὃν δὴ φιλόσοφον καλεῖς, ᾧ ἀνεμέσητον εὐήθει δοκεῖν καὶ οὐδενὶ εἶναι, ὅταν εἰς δουλικὰ ἐμπέσῃ διακονήματα, οἷον στρωματόδεσμον μὴ ἐπιστάμενος συσκευάσασθαι μηδὲ ὄψον ἡδῦναι ἢ θῶπας λόγους· ὁ δ' αὖ τὰ μὲν τοιαῦτα πάντα δυναμένου τορῶς τε καὶ ὀξέως διακονεῖν, ἀναβάλλεσθαι δὲ οὐκ ἐπισταμένου ἐπιδέξια ἐλευθέρως οὐδέ γ' ἁρμονίαν
176 λόγων λαβόντος * ὀρθῶς ὑμνῆσαι θεῶν τε καὶ ἀνδρῶν εὐδαιμόνων βίον ἀληθῆ. ΘΕΟ. Εἰ πάντας, ὦ Σώκρατες, πείθοις ἃ λέγεις, ὥσπερ ἐμέ, πλείων ἂν εἰρήνη καὶ κακὰ ἐλάττω κατ' ἀνθρώπους εἴη. ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' οὔτ' ἀπολέσθαι τὰ κακὰ δυνατόν, ὦ Θεόδωρε· ὑπεναντίον γὰρ τι τῷ ἀγαθῷ ἀεὶ εἶναι ἀνάγκη· οὔτ' ἐν θεοῖς αὐτὰ ἱδρύσθαι, τὴν δὲ θνητὴν φύσιν καὶ τόνδε τὸν τόπον περιπολεῖ ἐξ ἀνάγκης. διὸ καὶ πειρᾶσθαι χρὴ ἐνθένδε
B ἐκεῖσε φεύγειν ὅ τι τάχιστα. φυγὴ [1] δὲ ὁμοίωσις θεῷ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν· ὁμοίωσις δὲ δίκαιον καὶ ὅσιον μετὰ φρονήσεως γενέσθαι. ἀλλὰ γάρ, ὦ ἄριστε, οὐ πάνυ τι ῥᾴδιον πεῖσαι, ὡς ἄρα οὐχ ὧν ἕνεκα οἱ πολλοί φασι δεῖν πονηρίαν μὲν φεύγειν, ἀρετὴν δὲ διώκειν, τούτων χάριν τὸ μὲν ἐπιτηδευτέον, τὸ δ' οὔ, ἵνα δὴ μὴ κακὸς καὶ ἵνα ἀγαθὸς δοκῇ εἶναι, ταῦτα γάρ ἐστιν ὁ λεγόμενος γραῶν ὕθλος, ὡς ἐμοὶ φαίνεται· τὸ δὲ ἀληθὲς ὧδε λέγωμεν. [1]
C θεὸς οὐδαμῇ οὐδαμῶς ἄδικος, ἀλλ' ὡς οἷόν τε δικαιότα-

τος, καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν αὐτῷ ὁμοιότερον οὐδὲν ἢ ὃς ἂν ἡμῶν αὖ γένηται ὅ τι δικαιότατος. περὶ τούτου καὶ ἡ ὡς ἀληθῶς δεινότης ἀνδρὸς καὶ οὐδενία τε καὶ ἀνανδρία. ἡ μὲν γὰρ τούτου γνῶσις σοφία καὶ ἀρετὴ ἀληθινή, ἡ δὲ ἄγνοια ἀμαθία καὶ κακία ἐναργής· αἱ δ' ἄλλαι δεινότητές τε δοκοῦσαι καὶ σοφίαι ἐν μὲν πολιτικαῖς δυναστείαις γιγνόμεναι φορτικαί, ἐν δὲ τέχναις βάναυσοι. τῷ οὖν ἀδικοῦντι καὶ ἀνόσια λέγοντι ἢ [1] πράττοντι μακρῷ D ἄριστ' ἔχει τὸ μὴ συγχωρεῖν δεινῷ ὑπὸ πανουργίας εἶναι. ἀγάλλονται γὰρ τῷ ὀνείδει, καὶ οἴονται ἀκούειν, ὅτι οὐ λῆροι εἰσί, γῆς ἄλλως ἄχθη, ἀλλ' ἄνδρες, οἵους δεῖ ἐν πόλει τοὺς σωθησομένους. λεκτέον οὖν τἀληθές, ὅτι τοσούτῳ μᾶλλόν εἰσιν οἷοι οὐκ οἴονται, ὅτι οὐχὶ οἴονται· ἀγνοοῦσι γὰρ ζημίαν ἀδικίας, ὃ δεῖ ἥκιστα ἀγνοεῖν. οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἣν δοκοῦσι, πληγαί τε καὶ θάνατοι, ὧν ἐνίοτε πάσχουσιν οὐδὲν ἀδικοῦντες, ἀλλὰ ἣν ἀδύνατον [1] ἐκφυγεῖν. ΘΕΟ. Τίνα δὴ λέγεις; ΣΩ. E Παραδειγμάτων, ὦ φίλε, ἐν τῷ ὄντι ἑστώτων, τοῦ μὲν θείου εὐδαιμονεστάτου, τοῦ δὲ ἀθέου ἀθλιωτάτου, οὐχ ὁρῶντες ὅτι οὕτως ἔχει, ὑπὸ ἠλιθιότητός τε καὶ τῆς ἐσχάτης ἀνοίας λανθάνουσι τῷ μὲν ὁμοιούμενοι διὰ τὰς * ἀδίκους πράξεις, τῷ δὲ ἀνομοιούμενοι. οὗ δὴ 177 τίνουσι δίκην ζῶντες τὸν εἰκότα βίον ᾧ ὁμοιοῦνται. ἐὰν δ' εἴπωμεν, ὅτι, ἂν μὴ ἀπαλλαγῶσι τῆς δεινότητος, καὶ τελευτήσαντας αὐτοὺς ἐκεῖνος μὲν ὁ τῶν κακῶν καθαρὸς τόπος οὐ δέξεται, ἐνθάδε δὲ τὴν αὐτοῖς ὁμοιοτητα τῆς διαγωγῆς ἀεὶ ἕξουσι, κακοὶ κακοῖς συνόντες, ταῦτα δὴ καὶ παντάπασιν ὡς δεινοὶ καὶ πανοῦργοι ἀνοήτων τινῶν ἀκούσονται. ΘΕΟ. Καὶ μάλα δή, ὦ Σώκρατες. ΣΩ. Οἶδά τοι, [1] ὦ ἑταῖρε. ἓν μέντοι τι B αὐτοῖς συμβέβηκεν, ὅτι ἂν ἰδίᾳ λόγον δέῃ δοῦναί τε καὶ

δέξασθαι περὶ ὧν ψέγουσι, καὶ ἐθελήσωσιν ἀνδρικῶς πολὺν χρόνον ὑπομεῖναι καὶ μὴ ἀνάνδρως φεύγειν, τότε ἀτόπως, ὦ δαιμόνιε, τελευτῶντες οὐκ ἀρέσκουσιν αὐτοὶ αὑτοῖς περὶ ὧν λέγουσι, καὶ ἡ ῥητορικὴ ἐκείνη πως ἀπομαραίνεται, ὥστε παίδων μηδὲν δοκεῖν διαφέρειν. Περὶ μὲν οὖν τούτων, ἐπειδὴ καὶ πάρεργα τυγχάνει λεγόμενα,
C ἀποστῶμεν· εἰ δὲ μή, πλείω ἀεὶ ἐπιῤῥέοντα | καταχώσει ἡμῶν τὸν ἐξ ἀρχῆς λόγον· ἐπὶ δὲ τὰ ἔμπροσθεν ἴωμεν, εἰ καὶ σοὶ δοκεῖ. ΘΕΟ. Ἐμοὶ μὲν τὰ τοιαῦτα, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκ ἀηδέστερα ἀκούειν· ῥᾴω γὰρ τηλικῷδε ὄντι ἐπακολουθεῖν· εἰ μέντοι δοκεῖ, πάλιν ἐπανίωμεν. XXVI. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐνταῦθά που ἦμεν τοῦ λόγου, ἐν ᾧ ἔφαμεν τοὺς τὴν φερομένην οὐσίαν λέγοντας, καὶ τὸ ἀεὶ δοκοῦν ἑκάστῳ τοῦτο καὶ εἶναι τούτῳ ᾧ δοκεῖ, ἐν μὲν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐθέλειν διισχυρίζεσθαι, καὶ οὐχ ἥκιστα
D περὶ τὰ δίκαια, ὡς παντὸς | μᾶλλον, ἃ ἂν θῆται πόλις δόξαντα αὐτῇ, ταῦτα καὶ ἔστι δίκαια τῇ θεμένῃ, ἕωσπερ ἂν κέηται· περὶ δὲ ταγαθοῦ οὐδένα ἀνδρεῖον ἔθ' οὕτως εἶναι, ὥστε τολμᾶν διαμάχεσθαι, ὅτι καὶ ἃ ἂν ὠφέλιμα οἰηθεῖσα πόλις ἑαυτῇ θῆται, καὶ ἔστι τοσοῦτον χρόνον ὅσον ἂν κέηται ὠφέλιμα, πλὴν εἴ τις τὸ ὄνομα λέγοι· τοῦτο δέ που σκῶμμ' ἂν εἴη πρὸς ὃ λέγομεν. οὐχί;
E ΘΕΟ. Πάνυ γε. ΣΩ. Μὴ | λεγέτω τὸ ὄνομα, ἀλλὰ τὸ πρᾶγμα, ὃ ὀνομαζόμενον θεωρεῖται. ΘΕΟ. Μὴ γάρ. ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' ὃ ἂν τοῦτο ὀνομάζῃ, τούτου δήπου στοχάζεται νομοθετουμένη, καὶ πάντας τοὺς νόμους, καθ' ὅσον οἴεταί τε καὶ δύναται, ὡς ὠφελιμωτάτους ἑαυτῇ τίθεται.
178 ἢ πρὸς ἄλλο τι βλέπουσα νομοθετεῖται; ΘΕΟ. * Οὐδαμῶς. ΣΩ. Ἦ οὖν καὶ τυγχάνει ἀεί, ἢ πολλὰ καὶ διαμαρτάνει ἑκάστη; ΘΕΟ. Οἶμαι ἔγωγε καὶ διαμαρτάνειν. ΣΩ. Ἔτι τοίνυν ἐνθένδε ἂν μᾶλλον πᾶς τις

ὁμολογήσειε ταὐτὰ ταῦτα, εἰ περὶ παντός τις τοῦ εἴδους ἐρωτῷη, ἐν ᾧ καὶ τὸ ὠφέλιμον τυγχάνει ὄν. ἔστι δέ που καὶ περὶ τὸν μέλλοντα χρόνον. ὅταν γὰρ νομοθετώμεθα, ὡς ἐσομένους ὠφελίμους τοὺς νόμους τιθέμεθα εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον. τοῦτο δὲ μέλλον ὀρθῶς ἂν λέγοιμεν. ΘΕΟ. Πάνυ γε. ΣΩ. Ἴθι δή, οὑτωσὶ ἐρωτῶμεν Πρωταγόραν ἢ ἄλλον τινὰ τῶν ἐκείνῳ τὰ αὐτὰ λεγόντων· Πάντων μέτρον ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν, ὡς φατέ, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, λευκῶν, βαρέων, κούφων, οὐδενὸς ὅτου οὐ τῶν τοιούτων. ἔχων γὰρ αὐτῶν τὸ κριτήριον ἐν αὑτῷ, οἷα πάσχει τοιαῦτα οἰόμενος, ἀληθῆ τε οἴεται αὑτῷ καὶ ὄντα. οὐχ οὕτως; ΘΕΟ. Οὕτως. ΣΩ. Ἦ καὶ τῶν μελλόντων ἔσεσθαι, φήσομεν, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, ἔχει τὸ κριτήριον ἐν αὑτῷ, καὶ οἷα ἂν οἰηθῇ ἔσεσθαι, ταῦτα καὶ γίγνεται ἐκείνῳ τῷ οἰηθέντι; οἷον θερμά· ἆρ' ὅταν τις οἰηθῇ ἰδιώτης αὐτὸν πυρετὸν λήψεσθαι καὶ ἔσεσθαι ταύτην τὴν θερμότητα, καὶ ἕτερος, ἰατρὸς δέ, ἀντοιηθῇ, κατὰ τὴν ποτέρου δόξαν φῶμεν τὸ μέλλον ἀποβήσεσθαι, ἢ κατὰ τὴν ἀμφοτέρων, καὶ τῷ μὲν ἰατρῷ οὐ θερμὸς οὐδὲ πυρέττων γενήσεται, ἑαυτῷ δὲ ἀμφότερα; ΘΕΟ. Γελοῖον μέντ' ἂν εἴη. ΣΩ. Ἀλλ', οἶμαι, περὶ οἴνου γλυκύτητος καὶ αὐστηρότητος μελλούσης ἔσεσθαι ἡ τοῦ γεωργοῦ δόξα, ἀλλ' οὐχὶ ἡ τοῦ κιθαριστοῦ, κυρία. ΘΕΟ. Τί μήν; ΣΩ. Οὐδ' ἂν αὖ περὶ ἀναρμόστου τε καὶ εὐαρμόστου ἐσομένου παιδοτρίβης ἂν βέλτιον δοξάσειε μουσικοῦ, ὃ καὶ ἔπειτα αὐτῷ τῷ παιδοτρίβῃ δόξει εὐάρμοστον εἶναι. ΘΕΟ. Οὐδαμῶς. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος ἐστιάσεσθαι μὴ μαγειρικοῦ ὄντος, σκευαζομένης θοίνης, ἀκυροτέρα ἡ κρίσις τῆς τοῦ ὀψοποιοῦ περὶ τῆς ἐσομένης ἡδονῆς. περὶ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ ἥδη ὄντος ἑκάστῳ ἡδέος ἢ γεγονότος μηδέν

πω τῷ λόγῳ διαμαχώμεθα, ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος ἑκάστῳ καὶ δόξειν καὶ ἔσεσθαι πότερον αὐτὸς αὑτῷ ἄριστος κριτής; ἢ σύ, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, τό γε περὶ λόγους πιθανὸν ἑκάστῳ ἡμῶν ἐσόμενον εἰς δικαστήριον βέλτιον ἂν προδοξάσαις ἢ τῶν ἰδιωτῶν ὁστισοῦν; ΘΕΟ. Καὶ μάλα, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοῦτό γε σφόδρα ὑπισχνεῖτο πάντων διαφέρειν αὐτός. ΣΩ. Νὴ Δία, ὦ
179 μέλε· ἢ οὐδείς γ' ἂν αὐτῷ διελέγετο * διδοὺς πολὺ ἀργύριον, εἴ πῃ τοὺς συνόντας ἔπειθεν, ὅτι καὶ τὸ μέλλον ἔσεσθαί τε καὶ δόξειν οὔτε μάντις οὔτε τις ἄλλος ἄμεινον κρίνειεν ἂν ἢ αὐτὸς αὑτῷ. ΘΕΟ. Ἀληθέστατα. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ αἱ νομοθεσίαι καὶ τὸ ὠφέλιμον περὶ τὸ μέλλον ἐστί, καὶ πᾶς ἂν ὁμολογοῖ νομοθετουμένην πόλιν πολλάκις ἀνάγκην εἶναι τοῦ ὠφελιμωτάτου ἀποτυγχάνειν; ΘΕΟ. Μάλα γε. ΣΩ. Μετρίως ἄρα ἡμῖν
Β πρὸς τὸν διδάσκαλόν σου εἰρήσεται, ὅτι ἀνάγκη [1] αὐτῷ ὁμολογεῖν σοφώτερόν τε ἄλλον ἄλλου εἶναι καὶ τὸν μὲν τοιοῦτον μέτρον εἶναι, ἐμοὶ δὲ τῷ ἀνεπιστήμονι μηδὲ ὁπωστιοῦν ἀνάγκην εἶναι μέτρῳ γίγνεσθαι, ὡς ἄρτι με ἠνάγκαζεν ὁ ὑπὲρ ἐκείνου λόγος, εἴτ' ἐβουλόμην εἴτε μή, τοιοῦτον εἶναι. ΘΕΟ. Ἐκείνῃ μοι δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, μάλιστα ἁλίσκεσθαι ὁ λόγος, ἁλισκόμενος καὶ ταύτῃ, ἢ τὰς τῶν ἄλλων δόξας κυρίας ποιεῖ, αὗται δὲ ἐφάνησαν τοὺς ἐκείνου λόγους οὐδαμῇ ἀληθεῖς ἡγούμεναι.
C ΣΩ. [1] Πολλαχῇ, ὦ Θεόδωρε, καὶ ἄλλῃ ἂν τό γε τοιοῦτον ἁλοίη, μὴ πᾶσαν παντὸς ἀληθῆ δόξαν εἶναι· περὶ δὲ τὸ παρὸν ἑκάστῳ πάθος, ἐξ ὧν αἱ αἰσθήσεις καὶ αἱ κατὰ ταύτας δόξαι γίγνονται, χαλεπώτερον ἐλεῖν, ὡς οὐκ ἀληθεῖς. ἴσως δὲ οὐδὲν λέγω· ἀνάλωτοι γάρ, εἰ ἔτυχον, εἰσί, καὶ οἱ φάσκοντες αὐτὰς ἐναργεῖς τε εἶναι καὶ ἐπιστήμας τάχα ἂν ὄντα λέγοιεν, καὶ Θεαίτητος

ὅδε οὐκ ἄπο σκοποῦ εἴρηκεν αἴσθησιν καὶ ἐπιστήμην ταὐτὸν θέμενος. προσιτέον οὖν ἐγγυτέρω, | ὡς ὁ ὑπὲρ D
Πρωταγόρου λόγος ἐπέταττε, καὶ σκεπτέον τὴν φερομένην ταύτην οὐσίαν διακρούοντα, εἴτε ὑγιὲς εἴτε σαθρὸν φθέγγεται. μάχη δ' οὖν περὶ αὐτῆς οὐ φαύλη οὐδ' ὀλίγοις γέγονε. XXVII. ΘΕΟ. Πολλοῦ καὶ δεῖ φαύλη εἶναι, ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τὴν Ἰωνίαν καὶ ἐπιδίδωσι πάμπολυ. οἱ γὰρ τοῦ Ἡρακλείτου ἑταῖροι χορηγοῦσι τούτου τοῦ λόγου μάλα ἐῤῥωμένως. ΣΩ. Τῷ τοι, ὦ φίλε Θεόδωρε, μᾶλλον σκεπτέον καὶ ἐξ ἀρχῆς, ὥσπερ αὐτοὶ | ὑποτείνονται. ΘΕΟ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. καὶ E
γάρ, ὦ Σώκρατες, περὶ τούτων τῶν Ἡρακλειτείων, ἢ ὥσπερ σὺ λέγεις Ὁμηρείων, καὶ ἔτι παλαιοτέρων, αὐτοῖς μὲν τοῖς περὶ τὴν Ἔφεσον, ὅσοι προσποιοῦνται ἔμπειροι εἶναι, οὐδὲν μᾶλλον οἷόν τε διαλεχθῆναι ἢ τοῖς οἰστρῶσιν. ἀτεχνῶς γὰρ κατὰ τὰ συγγράμματα φέρονται, τὸ δ' ἐπιμεῖναι ἐπὶ λόγῳ καὶ ἐρωτήματι καὶ ἡσυχίως ἐν μέρει ἀποκρίνασθαι καὶ ἐρέσθαι ἥττον * 180
αὐτοῖς ἔνι ἢ τὸ μηδέν· μᾶλλον δὲ ὑπερβάλλει τὸ οὐδ' οὐδὲν πρὸς τὸ μηδὲ σμικρὸν ἐνεῖναι τοῖς ἀνδράσιν ἡσυχίας· ἀλλ' ἄν τινά τι ἔρῃ, ὥσπερ ἐκ φαρέτρας ῥηματίσκια αἰνιγματώδη ἀνασπῶντες ἀποτοξεύουσι, κἂν τούτου ζητῇς λόγον λαβεῖν, τί εἴρηκεν, ἑτέρῳ πεπλήξει καινῶς μετωνομασμένῳ, περανεῖς δὲ οὐδέποτε οὐδὲν πρὸς οὐδένα αὐτῶν· οὐδέ γε ἐκεῖνοι αὐτοὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλους, ἀλλ' εὖ πάνυ φυλάττουσι τὸ μηδὲν βέβαιον ἐᾶν εἶναι | μήτ' B
ἐν λόγῳ μήτ' ἐν ταῖς αὑτῶν ψυχαῖς, ἡγούμενοι, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, αὐτὸ στάσιμον εἶναι· τούτῳ δὲ πάνυ πολεμοῦσι, καὶ καθ' ὅσον δύνανται πανταχόθεν ἐκβάλλουσιν. ΣΩ. Ἴσως, ὦ Θεόδωρε, τοὺς ἄνδρας μαχομένους ἑώρακας, εἰρηνεύουσι δὲ οὐ συγγέγονας· οὐ γάρ σοι ἑταῖροί εἰσιν.

ἀλλ', οἶμαι, τὰ τοιαῦτα τοῖς μαθηταῖς ἐπὶ σχολῆς φράζουσιν, οὓς ἂν βούλωνται ὁμοίους αὑτοῖς ποιῆσαι. ΘΕΟ. Ποίοις μαθηταῖς, ὦ δαιμόνιε; οὐδὲ γίγνεται τῶν C τοιούτων ἕτερος ἑτέρου μαθητής, | ἀλλ' αὐτόματοι ἀναφύονται, ὁπόθεν ἂν τύχῃ ἕκαστος αὐτῶν ἐνθουσιάσας, καὶ τὸν ἕτερον ὁ ἕτερος οὐδὲν ἡγεῖται εἰδέναι. παρὰ μὲν οὖν τούτων, ὅπερ ἦα ἐρῶν, οὐκ ἄν ποτε λάβοις λόγον οὔτε ἑκόντων οὔτε ἀκόντων· αὐτοὺς δὲ δεῖ παραλαβόντας ὥσπερ πρόβλημα ἐπισκοπεῖσθαι. ΣΩ. Καὶ μετρίως γε λέγεις. τό γε δὴ πρόβλημα ἄλλο τι παρειλήφαμεν παρὰ μὲν τῶν ἀρχαίων, μετὰ ποιήσεως D ἐπικρυπτομένων τοὺς | πολλούς, ὡς ἡ γένεσις τῶν ἄλλων πάντων Ὠκεανός τε καὶ Τηθὺς ῥεύματα τυγχάνει καὶ οὐδὲν ἕστηκε, παρὰ δὲ τῶν ὑστέρων, ἅτε σοφωτέρων, ἀναφανδὸν ἀποδεικνυμένων, ἵνα καὶ οἱ σκυτοτόμοι αὐτῶν τὴν σοφίαν μάθωσιν ἀκούσαντες καὶ παύσωνται ἠλιθίως οἰόμενοι τὰ μὲν ἑστάναι, τὰ δὲ κινεῖσθαι τῶν ὄντων, μαθόντες δ' ὅτι πάντα κινεῖται τιμῶσιν αὐτούς; ὀλίγου δὲ ἐπελαθόμην, ὦ Θεόδωρε, ὅτι ἄλλοι αὖ E τἀναντία τούτοις ἀπεφήναντο, οἷον | ἀκίνητον τελέθειν τῷ πάντ' ὄνομ' εἶναι, καὶ ἄλλα ὅσα Μέλισσοί τε καὶ Παρμενίδαι ἐναντιούμενοι πᾶσι τούτοις διισχυρίζονται, ὡς ἕν τε πάντα ἐστὶ καὶ ἕστηκεν αὐτὸ ἐν αὑτῷ, οὐκ ἔχον χώραν, ἐν ᾗ κινεῖται. Τούτοις οὖν, ὦ ἑταῖρε, πᾶσι τί χρησόμεθα; κατὰ σμικρὸν γὰρ προϊόντες λελήθαμεν ἀμφοτέρων εἰς τὸ μέσον πεπτωκότες, καὶ ἂν μή πῃ 181 ἀμυνόμενοι διαφύγωμεν, * δίκην δώσομεν ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν ταῖς παλαίστραις διὰ γραμμῆς παίζοντες, ὅταν ὑπ' ἀμφοτέρων ληφθέντες ἕλκωνται εἰς τἀναντία. δοκεῖ οὖν μοι τοὺς ἑτέρους πρότερον σκεπτέον, ἐφ' οὕσπερ ὡρμήσαμεν, τοὺς ῥέοντας. καὶ ἐὰν μέν τι φαίνωνται

λέγοντες, συνέλξομεν μετ' αὐτῶν ἡμᾶς αὐτούς, τοὺς ἑτέρους ἐκφυγεῖν πειρώμενοι· ἐὰν δὲ οἱ τοῦ ὅλου στασιῶται ἀληθέστερα λέγειν δοκῶσι, φευξόμεθα παρ' αὐτοὺς ἀπὸ τούτων τῶν καὶ τὰ ἀκίνητα κινούντων. ἀμφότεροι δ' ἂν φανῶσι μηδὲν μέτριον λέγοντες, γελοῖοι ἐσόμεθα ἡγούμενοι ἡμᾶς μέν τι λέγειν φαύλους ὄντας, παμπαλαίους δὲ καὶ πασσόφους ἄνδρας ἀποδεδοκιμακότες. ὅρα οὖν, ὦ Θεόδωρε, εἰ λυσιτελεῖ εἰς τοσοῦτον προϊέναι κίνδυνον. ΘΕΟ. Οὐδὲν μὲν οὖν ἀνεκτόν, ὦ Σώκρατες, μὴ οὐ διασκέψασθαι, τί λέγουσιν ἑκάτεροι τῶν ἀνδρῶν. XXVIII. ΣΩ. Σκεπτέον ἂν εἴη σοῦ γε οὕτω προθυμουμένου. Δοκεῖ οὖν μοι ἀρχὴ εἶναι τῆς σκέψεως κινήσεως πέρι, ποῖόν τί ποτε ἄρα λέγοντες φασὶ τὰ πάντα κινεῖσθαι. βούλομαι δὲ λέγειν τὸ τοιόνδε· πότερον ἕν τι εἶδος αὐτῆς λέγουσιν ἢ ὥσπερ ἐμοὶ φαίνεται, δύο; μὴ μέντοι μόνον ἐμοὶ δοκείτω, ἀλλὰ συμμέτεχε καὶ σύ, ἵνα κοινῇ πάσχωμεν, ἄν τι καὶ δέῃ. καί μοι λέγε· ἆρα κινεῖσθαι καλεῖς, ὅταν τι χώραν ἐκ χώρας μεταβάλλῃ ἢ καὶ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ στρέφηται; ΘΕΟ. Ἔγωγε. ΣΩ. Τοῦτο μὲν τοίνυν ἓν ἔστω εἶδος. ὅταν δὲ ᾖ μὲν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ, γηράσκῃ δὲ ἢ μέλαν ἐκ λευκοῦ ἢ σκληρὸν ἐκ μαλακοῦ γίγνηται, ἤ τινα ἄλλην ἀλλοίωσιν ἀλλοιῶται, ἆρα οὐκ ἄξιον ἕτερον εἶδος φάναι κινήσεως; ΘΕΟ. Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ. ΣΩ. Ἀναγκαῖον μὲν οὖν. δύο δὴ λέγω τούτω εἴδη κινήσεως, ἀλλοίωσιν, τὴν δὲ περιφοράν. ΘΕΟ. Ὀρθῶς γε λέγων. ΣΩ. Τοῦτο τοίνυν οὕτω διελόμενοι διαλεγώμεθα ἤδη τοῖς τὰ πάντα φάσκουσι κινεῖσθαι, καὶ ἐρωτῶμεν, Πότερον πᾶν φατὲ ἀμφοτέρως κινεῖσθαι, φερόμενόν τε καὶ ἀλλοιούμενον, ἢ τὸ μέν τι

181 D. *τὴν δὲ περιφοράν.* Latere videtur corruptio. Cf. Vers. Angl.

ἀμφοτέρως, τὸ δ' ἑτέρως; ΘΕΟ. Ἀλλὰ μὰ Δί' ἔγωγε οὐκ ἔχω εἰπεῖν· οἶμαι δ' ἂν φάναι ἀμφοτέρως. ΣΩ. Εἰ δέ γε μή, ὦ ἑταῖρε, κινούμενά τε αὐτοῖς καὶ ἑστῶτα φανεῖται, καὶ οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ὀρθῶς ἕξει εἰπεῖν, ὅτι κινεῖται τὰ πάντα ἢ ὅτι ἕστηκεν. ΘΕΟ. Ἀληθέστατα λέγεις. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐπειδὴ κινεῖσθαι αὐτὰ δεῖ, τὸ δὲ μὴ
182 κινεῖσθαι μὴ ἐνεῖναι μηδενί, πάντα δὴ πᾶσαν * κίνησιν ἀεὶ κινεῖται. ΘΕΟ. Ἀνάγκη. ΣΩ. Σκόπει δή μοι τόδε αὐτῶν· τῆς θερμότητος ἢ λευκότητος ἢ ὁτουοῦν γένεσιν οὐχ οὕτω πως ἐλέγομεν φάναι αὐτούς, φέρεσθαι ἕκαστον τούτων ἅμα αἰσθήσει μεταξὺ τοῦ ποιοῦντός τε καὶ πάσχοντος, καὶ τὸ μὲν πάσχον αἰσθητὸν ἀλλ' οὐκ αἴσθησιν ἔτι γίγνεσθαι, τὸ δὲ ποιοῦν ποιόν τι ἀλλ' οὐ ποιότητα; ἴσως οὖν ἡ ποιότης ἅμα ἀλλόκοτόν τε φαίνεται ὄνομα, καὶ οὐ μανθάνεις ἀθρόον λεγόμενον· κατὰ
Β μέρη οὖν ἄκουε. ¹ τὸ γὰρ ποιοῦν οὔτε θερμότης οὔτε λευκότης, θερμὸν δὲ καὶ λευκὸν γίγνεται, καὶ τἆλλα οὕτω. μέμνησαι γάρ που, ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ὅτι οὕτως ἐλέγομεν, ἓν μηδὲν αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτὸ εἶναι, μηδ' αὖ τὸ ποιοῦν ἢ πάσχον, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων πρὸς ἄλληλα συγγιγνομένων τὰς αἰσθήσεις καὶ τὰ αἰσθητὰ ἀποτίκτοντα τὰ μὲν ποιὰ ἄττα γίγνεσθαι, τὰ δὲ αἰσθανόμενα. ΘΕΟ. Μέμνημαι· πῶς δ' οὔ; ΣΩ. Τὰ μὲν τοίνυν ἄλλα
C χαίρειν ἐάσωμεν, εἴτε ἄλλως ¹ εἴτε οὕτως λέγουσιν· οὗ δ' ἕνεκα λέγομεν, τοῦτο μόνον φυλάττωμεν, ἐρωτῶντες· Κινεῖται καὶ ῥεῖ, ὡς φατέ, τὰ πάντα; ἦ γάρ; ΘΕΟ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἀμφοτέρας, ἃς διειλόμεθα, κινήσεις, φερόμενά τε καὶ ἀλλοιούμενα; ΘΕΟ. Πῶς δ' οὔ;

182 B. *ἀποτίκτοντα* suspectum facit sequens *τά*. Conici potest *ἀποτικτόμενα*. Quod si nihil mutetur, statuenda est accusativi absoluti constructio.

εἴπερ γε δὴ τελέως κινήσεται. ΣΩ. Εἰ μὲν τοίνυν ἐφέρετο μόνον, ἠλλοιοῦτο δὲ μή, εἴχομεν ἄν που εἰπεῖν, οἷα ἅττα ῥεῖ τὰ φερόμενα. ἢ πῶς λέγωμεν; ΘΕΟ. Οὕτως. ΣΩ. Ἐπειδὴ δὲ οὐδὲ | τοῦτο μένει, τὸ λευκὸν D ῥεῖν τὸ ῥέον, ἀλλὰ μεταβάλλει, ὥστε καὶ αὐτοῦ τούτου εἶναι ῥοήν, τῆς λευκότητος, καὶ μεταβολὴν εἰς ἄλλην χρόαν, ἵνα μὴ ἁλῷ ταύτῃ μένον, ἆρά ποτε οἷόν τέ τι προσειπεῖν χρῶμα, ὥστε καὶ ὀρθῶς προσαγορεύειν; ΘΕΟ. Καὶ τίς μηχανή, ὦ Σώκρατες; ἢ ἄλλο γέ τι τῶν τοιούτων, εἴπερ ἀεὶ λέγοντος ὑπεξέρχεται, ἅτε δὴ ῥέον. ΣΩ. Τί δὲ περὶ αἰσθήσεως ἐροῦμεν ὁποιασοῦν, οἷον τῆς τοῦ ὁρᾶν ἢ ἀκούειν; μένειν ποτὲ ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ | ὁρᾶν E ἢ ἀκούειν; ΘΕΟ. Οὔκουν δεῖ γε, εἴπερ πάντα κινεῖται. ΣΩ. Οὔτε ἄρα ὁρᾶν προσρητέον τι μᾶλλον ἢ μὴ ὁρᾶν, οὐδέ τιν' ἄλλην αἴσθησιν μᾶλλον ἢ μή, πάντων γε πάντως κινουμένων. ΘΕΟ. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν. ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν αἴσθησίς γε ἐπιστήμη, ὡς ἔφαμεν ἐγώ τε καὶ Θεαίτητος. ΘΕΟ. Ἦν ταῦτα. ΣΩ. Οὐδὲν ἄρα ἐπιστήμην μᾶλλον ἢ μὴ ἐπιστήμην ἀπεκρινάμεθα ἐρωτώμενοι, ὅ τί ἐστιν ἐπιστήμη. ΘΕΟ. * Ἐοίκατε. ΣΩ. Καλὸν ἂν ἡμῖν 183 συμβαίνοι τὸ ἐπανόρθωμα τῆς ἀποκρίσεως, προθυμηθεῖσιν ἀποδεῖξαι, ὅτι πάντα κινεῖται, ἵνα δὴ ἐκείνη ἡ ἀπόκρισις ὀρθὴ φανῇ. τὸ δ', ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐφάνη, εἰ πάντα κινεῖται, πᾶσα ἀπόκρισις, περὶ ὅτου ἄν τις ἀποκρίνηται, ὁμοίως ὀρθὴ εἶναι, οὕτω τ' ἔχειν φάναι καὶ μὴ οὕτως, εἰ δὲ βούλει, γίγνεσθαι, ἵνα μὴ στήσωμεν αὐτοὺς τῷ λόγῳ. ΘΕΟ. Ὀρθῶς λέγεις. ΣΩ. Πλήν γε, ὦ Θεόδωρε, ὅτι οὕτω τε εἶπον καὶ οὐχ οὕτω. δεῖ δὲ οὐδὲ τοῦτο οὕτω λέγειν· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν ἔτι | κινοῖτο οὕτω· οὐδ' αὖ μὴ οὕτω· B οὐδὲ γὰρ τοῦτο κίνησις· ἀλλά τιν' ἄλλην φωνὴν θετέον τοῖς τὸν λόγον τοῦτον λέγουσιν, ὡς νῦν γε πρὸς τὴν

αὐτῶν ὑπόθεσιν οὐκ ἔχουσι ῥήματα, εἰ μὴ ἄρα τὸ οὐδ' ὅπως. μάλιστα δ' οὕτως ἂν αὐτοῖς ἁρμόττοι, ἄπειρον λεγόμενον. ΘΕΟ. Οἰκειοτάτη γοῦν διάλεκτος αὕτη αὐτοῖς. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν, ὦ Θεόδωρε, τοῦ τε σοῦ ἑταίρου ἀπηλλάγμεθα, καὶ οὔπω συγχωροῦμεν αὐτῷ πάντ' C ἄνδρα πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον εἶναι, ἂν μὴ [1] φρόνιμός τις ᾖ· ἐπιστήμην τε αἴσθησιν οὐ συγχώρησόμεθα κατά γε τὴν τοῦ πάντα κινεῖσθαι μέθοδον. εἰ μή τί πως ἄλλως Θεαίτητος ὅδε λέγει. ΘΕΟ. Ἄριστ' εἴρηκας, ὦ Σώκρατες· τούτων γὰρ περανθέντων καὶ ἐμὲ δεῖ ἀπηλλάχθαι σοι ἀποκρινόμενον κατὰ τὰς συνθήκας, ἐπειδὴ τὸ περὶ τοῦ Πρωταγόρου λόγου τέλος σχοίη. XXIX. ΘΕΑΙ. Μὴ πρίν γ' ἄν, ὦ Θεόδωρε, Σωκράτης τε καὶ σὺ D τοὺς φάσκοντας αὖ τὸ [1] πᾶν ἑστάναι διέλθητε, ὥσπερ ἄρτι προὔθεσθε. ΘΕΟ. Νέος ὤν, ὦ Θεαίτητε, τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους ἀδικεῖν διδάσκεις ὁμολογίας παραβαίνοντας; ἀλλὰ παρασκευάζου ὅπως τῶν ἐπιλοίπων Σωκράτει δώσεις λόγον. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐάν πέρ γε βούληται. ἥδιστα μέντ' ἂν ἤκουσα περὶ ὧν λέγω. ΘΕΟ. Ἱππέας εἰς πεδίον προκαλεῖ Σωκράτη εἰς λόγους προκαλούμενος· ἐρώτα οὖν καὶ ἀκούσει. ΣΩ. Ἀλλά μοι δοκῶ, ὦ Θεό- E δωρε, περί γε ὧν κελεύει Θεαίτητος οὐ πείσεσθαι [1] αὐτῷ. ΘΕΟ. Τί δὴ οὖν οὐ πείσεσθαι; ΣΩ. Μέλισσον μὲν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, οἳ ἓν ἑστὸς λέγουσι τὸ πᾶν, αἰσχυνόμενος μὴ φορτικῶς σκοπῶμεν, ἧττον αἰσχύνομαι ἢ ἕνα ὄντα Παρμενίδην. Παρμενίδης δέ μοι φαίνεται, τὸ τοῦ Ὁμήρου, αἰδοῖός τέ μοι ἅμα δεινός τε. ξυμπροσέμιξα γὰρ δὴ τῷ ἀνδρὶ πάνυ νέος πάνυ πρεσβύτῃ, καί μοι 184 ἐφάνη βάθος τι ἔχειν παντάπασι γενναῖον. * φοβοῦμαι οὖν, μὴ οὔτε τὰ λεγόμενα ξυνιῶμεν, τί τε διανοούμενος εἶπε πολὺ πλέον λειπώμεθα, καὶ τὸ μέγιστον, οὗ ἕνεκα

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ὁ λόγος ὥρμηται, ἐπιστήμης πέρι, τί ποτ' ἐστίν, σκεπτέον
τον γένηται ὑπὸ τῶν ἐπεισκωμαζόντων λόγων, εἴ τις
αὐτοῖς πείσεται· ἄλλως τε καὶ ὃν νῦν ἐγείρομεν πλήθει
ἀμήχανον εἴτε τις ἐν παρέργῳ σκέψεται, ἀνάξι' ἂν
πάθοι, εἴτε ἱκανῶς, μηκυνόμενος τὸ τῆς ἐπιστήμης ἀφα-
νιεῖ. δεῖ δὲ οὐδέτερα, ἀλλὰ Θεαίτητον ὧν | κυεῖ περὶ B
ἐπιστήμης πειρᾶσθαι ἡμᾶς τῇ μαιευτικῇ τέχνῃ ἀπο-
λῦσαι. ΘΕΟ. Ἀλλὰ χρή, εἰ δοκεῖ, οὕτω ποιεῖν. ΣΩ.
Ἔτι τοίνυν, ὦ Θεαίτητε, τοσόνδε περὶ τῶν εἰρημένων
ἐπίσκεψαι. αἴσθησιν γὰρ δὴ ἐπιστήμην ἀπεκρίνω.
ἦ γάρ; ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Εἰ οὖν τίς σε ὧδ' ἐρωτῴη·
τῷ τὰ λευκὰ καὶ μέλανα ὁρᾷ ἄνθρωπος καὶ τῷ τὰ ὀξέα
καὶ βαρέα ἀκούει; εἴποις ἄν, οἶμαι, ὅμμασί τε καὶ ὠσίν.
ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔγωγε. ΣΩ. Τὸ δὲ εὐχερὲς τῶν | ὀνομάτων τε C
καὶ ῥημάτων καὶ μὴ δι' ἀκριβείας ἐξεταζόμενον τὰ μὲν
πολλὰ οὐκ ἀγεννές, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τὸ τούτου ἐναντίον
ἀνελεύθερον, ἔστι δὲ ὅτε ἀναγκαῖον, οἷον καὶ νῦν ἀνάγκη
ἐπιλαβέσθαι τῆς ἀποκρίσεως, ἣν ἀποκρίνει, ᾗ οὐκ ὀρθή·
σκόπει γάρ, ἀπόκρισις ποτέρα ὀρθοτέρα, ᾧ ὁρῶμεν,
τοῦτο εἶναι ὀφθαλμούς, ἢ δι' οὗ ὁρῶμεν, καὶ ᾧ ἀκούομεν,
ὦτα, ἢ δι' οὗ ἀκούομεν; ΘΕΑΙ. Δι' ὧν ἕκαστα αἰσθα-
νόμεθα, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, μᾶλλον ἢ οἷς. ΣΩ. | D
Δεινὸν γάρ που, ὦ παῖ, εἰ πολλαί τινες ἐν ἡμῖν, ὥσπερ
ἐν δουρείοις ἵπποις, αἰσθήσεις ἐγκάθηνται, ἀλλὰ μὴ εἰς
μίαν τινὰ ἰδέαν, εἴτε ψυχὴν εἴτε ὅ τι δεῖ καλεῖν, πάντα
ταῦτα ξυντείνει, ᾗ διὰ τούτων οἷον ὀργάνων αἰσθανό-
μεθα ὅσα αἰσθητά. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλά μοι δοκεῖ οὕτω
μᾶλλον ἢ ἐκείνως. ΣΩ. Τοῦ δέ τοι ἕνεκα αὐτά σοι
διακριβοῦμαι; εἴ τινι ἡμῶν αὐτῶν τῷ αὐτῷ διὰ μὲν
ὀφθαλμῶν ἐφικνούμεθα λευκῶν τε καὶ μελάνων, διὰ δὲ
τῶν ἄλλων ἑτέρων αὖ τινῶν, καὶ | ἔξεις ἐρωτώμενος E

πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα εἰς τὸ σῶμα ἀναφέρειν; ἴσως δὲ βελτιον σὲ λέγειν αὐτὰ ἀποκρινόμενον μᾶλλον ἢ ἐμὲ ὑπὲρ σοῦ πολυπραγμονεῖν. καί μοι λέγε· θερμὰ καὶ σκληρὰ καὶ κοῦφα καὶ γλυκέα δι' ὧν αἰσθάνει, ἆρα οὐ τοῦ σώματος ἕκαστα τίθης; ἢ ἄλλου τινός; ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδενὸς ἄλλου. ΣΩ. Ἦ καὶ ἐθελήσεις ὁμολογεῖν, ἃ δι' ἑτέρας
185 δυνάμεως αἰσθάνει, ἀδύνατον εἶναι * δι' ἄλλης ταῦτ' αἰσθέσθαι, οἷον ἃ δι' ἀκοῆς, δι' ὄψεως, ἢ ἃ δι' ὄψεως, δι' ἀκοῆς; ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐκ ἐθελήσω; ΣΩ. Εἴ τι ἄρα περὶ ἀμφοτέρων διανοεῖ, οὐκ ἂν διά γε τοῦ ἑτέρου ὀργάνου, οὐδ' αὖ διὰ τοῦ ἑτέρου περὶ ἀμφοτέρων αἰσθάνοι' ἄν. ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν. ΣΩ. Περὶ δὴ φωνῆς καὶ περὶ χρόας πρῶτον μὲν αὐτὸ τοῦτο περὶ ἀμφοτέρων διανοεῖ, ὅτι ἀμφοτέρω ἐστόν; ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔγωγε. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ὅτι ἑκάτερον ἑκατέρου μὲν ἕτερον, ἑαυτῷ δὲ ταὐτόν;
B ΘΕΑΙ. Τί μήν; ΣΩ. Καὶ ὅτι ἀμφοτέρω δύο, ἑκάτερον δὲ ἕν; ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ τοῦτο. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ εἴτε ἀνομοίω εἴτε ὁμοίω ἀλλήλοιν, δυνατὸς εἶ ἐπισκέψασθαι; ΘΕΑΙ. Ἴσως. ΣΩ. Ταῦτα δὴ πάντα διὰ τίνος περὶ αὐτοῖν διανοεῖ; οὔτε γὰρ δι' ἀκοῆς οὔτε δι' ὄψεως οἷόν τε τὸ κοινὸν λαμβάνειν περὶ αὐτῶν. ἔτι δὲ καὶ τόδε τεκμήριον περὶ οὗ λέγομεν· εἰ γὰρ δυνατὸν εἴη ἀμφοτέρω σκέψασθαι, ἆρ' ἐστὸν ἁλμυρὼ ἢ οὔ, οἶσθ' ὅτι ἔξεις
C εἰπεῖν ᾧ ἐπισκέψει, καὶ τοῦτο οὔτε ὄψις οὔτε ἀκοὴ φαίνεται, ἀλλά τι ἄλλο. ΘΕΑΙ. Τί δ' οὐ μέλλει, ἥ γε διὰ τῆς γλώττης δύναμις; ΣΩ. Καλῶς λέγεις. ἡ δὲ δὴ διὰ τίνος δύναμις τό τ' ἐπὶ πᾶσι κοινὸν καὶ τὸ ἐπὶ τούτοις δηλοῖ σοι, ᾧ τὸ ἔστιν ἐπονομάζεις καὶ τὸ οὐκ ἔστι καὶ ἃ νῦν δὴ ἠρωτῶμεν περὶ αὐτῶν; τούτοις πᾶσι ποῖα ἀποδώσεις ὄργανα, δι' ὧν αἰσθάνεται ἡμῶν τὸ αἰσθανόμενον ἕκαστα; ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐσίαν λέγεις καὶ τὸ

μὴ εἶναι, καὶ ὁμοιότητα καὶ ἀνομοιότητα, καὶ τὸ ταὐτόν
τε καὶ τὸ ἕτερον, ἔτι δὲ ἕν | τε καὶ τὸν ἄλλον ἀριθμὸν D
περὶ αὐτῶν. δῆλον δέ, ὅτι καὶ ἄρτιόν τε καὶ περιττὸν
ἐρωτᾷς, καὶ τἆλλα, ὅσα τούτοις ἕπεται, διὰ τίνος ποτὲ
τῶν τοῦ σώματος τῇ ψυχῇ αἰσθανόμεθα. ΣΩ. Ὑπέρευ,
ὦ Θεαίτητε, ἀκολουθεῖς, καὶ ἔστιν ἃ ἐρωτῶ αὐτὰ ταῦτα.
ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλὰ μὰ Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔγωγε οὐκ ἂν ἔχοιμι
εἰπεῖν, πλήν γ' ὅτι μοι δοκεῖ τὴν ἀρχὴν οὐδ' εἶναι τοιοῦ-
τον οὐδὲν τούτοις ὄργανον ἴδιον, ὥσπερ ἐκείνοις, ἀλλ'
αὐτὴ δι' αὑτῆς ἡ ψυχὴ τὰ | κοινά μοι φαίνεται περὶ E
πάντων ἐπισκοπεῖν. ΣΩ. Καλὸς γὰρ εἶ, ὦ Θεαίτητε,
καὶ οὐχ, ὡς ἔλεγε Θεόδωρος, αἰσχρός· ὁ γὰρ καλῶς
λέγων καλός τε κἀγαθός. πρὸς δέ τῷ καλῷ εὖ ἐποίησάς
με μάλα συχνοῦ λόγου ἀπαλλάξας, εἰ φαίνεταί σοι τὰ
μὲν αὐτὴ δι' αὑτῆς ἡ ψυχὴ ἐπισκοπεῖν, τὰ δὲ διὰ τῶν
τοῦ σώματος δυνάμεων. τοῦτο γὰρ ἦν, ὃ καὶ αὐτῷ μοι
ἐδόκει, ἐβουλόμην δὲ καὶ σοὶ δόξαι. ΘΕΑΙ. * Ἀλλὰ 186
μὴν φαίνεταί γε. XXX. ΣΩ. Ποτέρων οὖν τίθης
τὴν οὐσίαν; τοῦτο γὰρ μάλιστα ἐπὶ πάντων παρέ-
πεται. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐγὼ μὲν ὧν αὐτὴ ἡ ψυχὴ καθ' αὑτὴν
ἐπορέγεται. ΣΩ. Ἦ καὶ τὸ ὅμοιον καὶ τὸ ἀνόμοιον,
καὶ τὸ ταὐτὸν καὶ ἕτερον; ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Τί
δὲ καλὸν καὶ αἰσχρόν, καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακόν; ΘΕΑΙ.
Καὶ τούτων μοι δοκεῖ ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα πρὸς ἄλληλα
σκοπεῖσθαι τὴν οὐσίαν, ἀναλογιζομένη ἐν ἑαυτῇ τὰ
γεγονότα καὶ τὰ παρόντα | πρὸς τὰ μέλλοντα. ΣΩ. B
Ἔχε δή· ἄλλο τι τοῦ μὲν σκληροῦ τὴν σκληρότητα
διὰ τῆς ἐπαφῆς αἰσθήσεται, καὶ τοῦ μαλακοῦ τὴν
μαλακότητα ὡσαύτως; ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Τὴν δέ γε
οὐσίαν καὶ ὅ τι ἐστὸν καὶ τὴν ἐναντιότητα πρὸς ἀλ-
λήλω καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν αὖ τῆς ἐναντιότητος αὐτὴ ἡ ψυχὴ

ἐπανιοῦσα καὶ συμβάλλουσα πρὸς ἄλληλα κρίνειν πειρᾶται ἡμῖν. ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὰ
C μὲν εὐθὺς γενομένοις πάρεστι φύσει | αἰσθάνεσθαι ἀνθρώποις τε καὶ θηρίοις, ὅσα διὰ τοῦ σώματος παθήματα ἐπὶ τὴν ψυχὴν τείνει, τὰ δὲ περὶ τούτων ἀναλογίσματα πρός τε οὐσίαν καὶ ὠφέλειαν μόγις καὶ ἐν χρόνῳ διὰ πολλῶν πραγμάτων καὶ παιδείας παραγίγνεται οἷς ἂν καὶ παραγίγνηται; ΘΕΑΙ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. ΣΩ. Οἷόν τε οὖν ἀληθείας τυχεῖν, ᾧ μηδὲ οὐσίας; ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀδύνατον. ΣΩ. Οὗ δὲ ἀληθείας τις ἀτυχήσει, ποτὲ τούτου ἐπιστήμων ἔσται; ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ
D πῶς ἄν, | ὦ Σώκρατες; ΣΩ. Ἐν μὲν ἄρα τοῖς παθήμασιν οὐκ ἔνι ἐπιστήμη, ἐν δὲ τῷ περὶ ἐκείνων συλλογισμῷ· οὐσίας γὰρ καὶ ἀληθείας ἐνταῦθα μέν, ὡς ἔοικε, δυνατὸν ἅψασθαι, ἐκεῖ δὲ ἀδύνατον. ΘΕΑΙ. Φαίνεται. ΣΩ. Ἦ οὖν ταὐτὸν ἐκεῖνό τε καὶ τοῦτο καλεῖς, τοσαύτας διαφορὰς ἔχοντε; ΘΕΑΙ. Οὔκουν δὴ δίκαιόν γε. ΣΩ. Τί οὖν δὴ ἐκείνῳ ἀποδίδως ὄνομα, τῷ ὁρᾶν, ἀκούειν, ὀσφρωνεσθαι, ψύχεσθαι, θερμαίνεσθαι; ΘΕΑΙ.
E Αἰσθάνεσθαι | ἔγωγε· τί γὰρ ἄλλο; ΣΩ. Ξύμπαν ἄρ' αὐτὸ καλεῖς αἴσθησιν; ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀνάγκη. ΣΩ. Ὦι γε, φαμέν, οὐ μέτεστιν ἀληθείας ἅψασθαι· οὐδὲ γὰρ οὐσίας. ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν. ΣΩ. Οὐδ' ἄρ' ἐπιστήμης. ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ γάρ. ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρ' ἂν εἴη ποτέ, ὦ Θεαίτητε, αἴσθησίς τε καὶ ἐπιστήμη ταὐτόν. ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ φαίνεται, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ μάλιστά γε νῦν καταφανέστατον γέγονεν ἄλλο ὂν αἰσθήσεως ἐπιστήμη. ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' οὔ
187 τι * μὲν δὴ τούτου γε ἕνεκα ἠρχόμεθα διαλεγόμενοι, ἵνα εὕρωμεν τί ποτ' οὐκ ἔστ' ἐπιστήμη, ἀλλὰ τί ἔστιν. ὅμως δὲ τοσοῦτόν γε προβεβήκαμεν, ὥστε μὴ ζητεῖν αὐτὴν ἐν αἰσθήσει τὸ παράπαν, ἀλλ' ἐν ἐκείνῳ τῷ

ὀνόματι, ὅ τί ποτ' ἔχει ἡ ψυχή, ὅταν αὐτὴ καθ' αὑτὴν πραγματεύηται περὶ τὰ ὄντα. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν τοῦτό γε καλεῖται, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὡς ἐγῷμαι, δοξάζειν. ΣΩ. Ὀρθῶς γὰρ οἴει, ὦ φίλε. καὶ ὅρα δὴ νῦν πάλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς, πάντα τὰ πρόσθεν | ἐξαλείψας, εἴ τι μᾶλλον καθορᾷς, B ἐπειδὴ ἐνταῦθα προελήλυθας. καὶ λέγε αὖθις, τί ποτ' ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη. XXXI. ΘΕΑΙ. Δόξαν μὲν πᾶσαν εἰπεῖν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀδύνατον, ἐπειδὴ καὶ ψευδὴς ἐστι δόξα· κινδυνεύει δὲ ἡ ἀληθὴς δόξα ἐπιστήμη εἶναι, καί μοι τοῦτο ἀποκεκρίσθω. ἐὰν γὰρ μὴ φανῇ προϊοῦσιν, ὥσπερ τὸ νῦν, ἄλλο τι πειρασόμεθα λέγειν. ΣΩ. Οὕτω μέντοι χρή, ὦ Θεαίτητε, λέγειν, προθύμως μᾶλλον, ἢ ὡς τὸ πρῶτον ὤκνεις ἀποκρίνεσθαι. ἐὰν γὰρ οὕτω δρῶμεν, δυοῖν θάτερα, ἢ εὑρήσομεν ἐφ' ὃ ἐρχόμεθα, | C ἢ ἧττον οἰησόμεθα εἰδέναι ὃ μηδαμῇ ἴσμεν· καίτοι οὐκ ἂν εἴη μεμπτὸς μισθὸς ὁ τοιοῦτος· καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν τί φῄς; δυοῖν ὄντοιν εἰδέοιν δόξης, τοῦ μὲν ἀληθινοῦ, ψευδοῦς δὲ τοῦ ἑτέρου, τὴν ἀληθῆ δόξαν ἐπιστήμην ὁρίζει; ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔγωγε· τοῦτο γὰρ αὖ νῦν μοι φαίνεται. ΣΩ. Ἆρ' οὖν ἔτ' ἄξιον περὶ δόξης ἀναλαβεῖν πάλιν; ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποῖον δὴ λέγεις; ΣΩ. Θράττει μέ πως νῦν τε καὶ ἄλλοτε δὴ πολλάκις, ὥστ' ἐν ἀπορίᾳ πολλῇ πρὸς | D ἐμαυτὸν καὶ πρὸς ἄλλον γεγονέναι, οὐκ ἔχοντα εἰπεῖν τί ποτ' ἐστὶ τοῦτο τὸ πάθος παρ' ἡμῖν καὶ τίνα τρόπον ἐγγιγνόμενον. ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποῖον δή; ΣΩ. Τὸ δοξάζειν τινὰ ψευδῆ. σκοπῶ δὴ καὶ νῦν ἔτι διστάζων, πότερον ἐάσωμεν αὐτὸ ἢ ἐπισκεψώμεθα ἄλλον τρόπον ἢ ὀλίγον πρότερον. ΘΕΑΙ. Τί μήν, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἴπερ γε καὶ ὁπηοῦν φαίνεται δεῖν; ἄρτι γὰρ οὐ κακῶς γε σὺ καὶ Θεόδωρος ἐλέγετε σχολῆς πέρι, ὡς οὐδὲν ἐν τοῖς τοιοῖσδε κατεπείγει. ΣΩ. | Ὀρθῶς ὑπέμνησας. ἴσως γὰρ οὐκ E

ἀπὸ καιροῦ πάλιν ὥσπερ ἴχνος μετελθεῖν. κρεῖττον γάρ
που σμικρὸν εὖ ἢ πολὺ μὴ ἱκανῶς περᾶναι. ΘΕΑΙ. Τί
μήν; ΣΩ. Πῶς οὖν; τί δὴ καὶ λέγομεν; ψευδῆ φαμὲν
ἐκάστοτε εἶναι δόξαν, καί τινα ἡμῶν δοξάζειν ψευδῆ,
τὸν δ' αὖ ἀληθῆ, ὡς φύσει οὕτως ἐχόντων; ΘΕΑΙ.
Φαμὲν γὰρ δή. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τόδε γ' ἔσθ' ἡμῖν περὶ
188 πάντα * καὶ καθ' ἕκαστον, ἤτοι εἰδέναι ἢ μὴ εἰδέναι,
μανθάνειν γὰρ καὶ ἐπιλανθάνεσθαι μεταξὺ τούτων ὡς
ὄντα χαίρειν λέγω ἐν τῷ παρόντι· νῦν γὰρ ἡμῖν πρὸς
λόγον ἐστὶν οὐδέν. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλὰ μήν, ὦ Σώκρατες,
ἄλλο γ' οὐδὲν λείπεται περὶ ἕκαστον πλὴν εἰδέναι ἢ μὴ
εἰδέναι. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἤδη ἀνάγκη τὸν δοξάζοντα δο-
ξάζειν ἢ ὧν τι οἶδεν ἢ μὴ οἶδεν; ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀνάγκη.
ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν εἰδότα γε μὴ εἰδέναι τὸ αὐτὸ ἢ μὴ εἰδότα
B εἰδέναι | ἀδύνατον. ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς δ' οὔ; ΣΩ. Ἆρ' οὖν
ὁ τὰ ψευδῆ δοξάζων, ἃ οἶδε, ταῦτα οἴεται οὐ ταῦτα εἶναι,
ἀλλὰ ἕτερα ἄττα ὧν οἶδε, καὶ ἀμφότερα εἰδὼς ἀγνοεῖ αὖ
ἀμφότερα; ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλ' ἀδύνατον, ὦ Σώκρατες. ΣΩ.
Ἀλλ' ἆρα, ἃ μὴ οἶδεν, ἡγεῖται αὐτὰ εἶναι ἕτερα ἄττα
ὧν μὴ οἶδε, καὶ τοῦτ' ἔστι τῷ μήτε Θεαίτητον μήτε
Σωκράτη εἰδότι εἰς τὴν διάνοιαν λαβεῖν ὡς ὁ Σωκράτης
C Θεαίτητος ἢ ὁ Θεαίτητος Σωκράτης; ΘΕΑΙ. | Καὶ
πῶς ἄν; ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' οὐ μήν, ἅ γέ τις οἶδεν, οἴεταί που
ἃ μὴ οἶδεν αὐτὰ εἶναι, οὐδ' αὖ ἃ μὴ οἶδεν, ἃ οἶδε.
ΘΕΑΙ. Τέρας γὰρ ἔσται. ΣΩ. Πῶς οὖν ἄν τις ἔτι
ψευδῆ δοξάσειεν; ἐκτὸς γὰρ τούτων ἀδύνατόν που δοξά-
ζειν, ἐπείπερ πάντ' ἢ ἴσμεν ἢ οὐκ ἴσμεν, ἐν δὲ τούτοις
οὐδαμοῦ φαίνεται δυνατὸν ψευδῆ δοξάσαι. ΘΕΑΙ.
Ἀληθέστατα. ΣΩ. Ἆρ' οὖν οὐ ταύτῃ σκεπτέον ὃ
ζητοῦμεν, κατὰ τὸ εἰδέναι καὶ μὴ εἰδέναι ἰόντας, ἀλλὰ
D κατὰ τὸ εἶναι | καὶ μή; ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς λέγεις; ΣΩ.

Μὴ ἁπλοῦν ᾖ, ὅτι ὁ τὰ μὴ ὄντα περὶ ὁτουοῦν δοξάζων οὐκ ἔσθ' ὡς οὐ ψευδῆ δοξάσει, κἂν ὁπωσοῦν ἄλλως τὰ τῆς διανοίας ἔχῃ. ΘΕΑΙ. Εἰκός γ' αὖ, ὦ Σώκρατες. ΣΩ. Πῶς οὖν; τί ἐροῦμεν, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ἐάν τις ἡμᾶς ἀνακρίνῃ· Δυνατὸν δὲ ὁτῳοῦν ὃ λέγεται, καί τις ἀνθρώπων τὸ μὴ ὂν δοξάσει, εἴτε περὶ τῶν ὄντων του εἴτε αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτό; Καὶ ἡμεῖς δή, ὡς ἔοικε, πρὸς ταῦτα φήσομεν Ὅταν γε ἀληθῆ μὴ οἴηται οἰόμενος. ἢ πῶς ἐροῦμεν; E
ΘΕΑΙ. Οὕτως. ΣΩ. Ἡ οὖν καὶ ἄλλοθί που τὸ τοιοῦτόν ἐστι; ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποῖον; ΣΩ. Εἴ τις ὁρᾷ μέν τι, ὁρᾷ δὲ οὐδέν. ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ πῶς; ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ ἕν γέ τι ὁρᾷ, τῶν ὄντων τι ὁρᾷ. ἢ σὺ οἴει ποτὲ τὸ ἓν ἐν τοῖς μὴ οὖσιν εἶναι; ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκ ἔγωγε. ΣΩ. Ὁ ἄρα ἕν γέ τι ὁρῶν ὄν τι ὁρᾷ. ΘΕΑΙ. Φαίνεται. ΣΩ. * Καὶ 189
ὁ ἄρα τι ἀκούων ἕν γέ τι ἀκούει καὶ ὂν ἀκούει. ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Καὶ ὁ ἁπτόμενος δή του ἑνός γέ του ἅπτεται καὶ ὄντος, εἴπερ ἑνός; ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ τοῦτο. ΣΩ. Ὁ δὲ δὴ δοξάζων οὐχ ἕν τι δοξάζει; ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀνάγκη. ΣΩ. Ὁ δ' ἕν τι δοξάζων οὐκ ὄν τι; ΘΕΑΙ. Ξυγχωρῶ. ΣΩ. Ὁ ἄρα μὴ ὂν δοξάζων οὐδὲν δοξάζει. ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ φαίνεται. ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ὅ γε μηδὲν δοξάζων τὸ παράπαν οὐδὲ δοξάζει. ΘΕΑΙ. Δῆλον, ὡς ἔοικεν. ΣΩ.
Οὐκ ἄρα οἷόν τε τὸ μὴ ὂν δοξάζειν, οὔτε περὶ τῶν B
ὄντων οὔτε αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτό. ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ φαίνεται. ΣΩ. Ἄλλο τι ἄρ' ἐστὶ τὸ ψευδῆ δοξάζειν τοῦ τὰ μὴ ὄντα δοξάζειν. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἄλλο ἔοικεν. ΣΩ. Οὔτ' ἄρ' οὕτως οὔτε ὡς ὀλίγον πρότερον ἐσκοποῦμεν, ψευδής ἐστι δόξα ἐν ἡμῖν. ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν δή. XXXII. ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' ἆρα ὧδε γιγνόμενον τοῦτο προσαγορεύομεν; ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς; ΣΩ. Ἀλλοδοξίαν τινὰ οὖσαν ψευδῆ φαμὲν εἶναι δόξαν, ὅταν τίς τι τῶν ὄντων ἄλλο αὖ τῶν ὄντων, C

ἀνταλλαξάμενος τῇ διανοίᾳ, φῇ εἶναι. οὕτω γὰρ ὃν μὲν ἀεὶ δοξάζει, ἕτερον δὲ ἀνθ' ἑτέρου, καὶ ἁμαρτάνων οὐ ἐσκόπει δικαίως ἂν καλοῖτο ψευδῆ δοξάζων. ΘΕΑΙ. Ὀρθότατά μοι νῦν δοκεῖς εἰρηκέναι. ὅταν γάρ τις ἀντὶ καλοῦ αἰσχρὸν ἢ ἀντὶ αἰσχροῦ καλὸν δοξάζῃ, τότε ὡς ἀληθῶς δοξάζει ψευδῆ. ΣΩ. Δῆλος εἶ, ὦ Θεαίτητε, καταφρονῶν μου καὶ οὐ δεδιώς. ΘΕΑΙ. Τί μάλιστα; ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄν, οἶμαι, σοὶ δοκῶ τοῦ ἀληθῶς ψεύδους
D ἀντιλαβέσθαι, ἐρόμενος, εἰ οἷόν τε ταχὺ βραδέως ἢ κοῦφον βαρέως ἢ ἄλλο τι ἐναντίον μὴ κατὰ τὴν αὑτοῦ φύσιν ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν τοῦ ἐναντίου γίγνεσθαι ἑαυτῷ ἐναντίως. τοῦτο μὲν οὖν, ἵνα μὴ μάτην θαῤῥήσῃς, ἀφίημι. ἀρέσκει δέ, ὡς φῄς, τὸ τὰ ψευδῆ δοξάζειν ἀλλοδοξεῖν εἶναι; ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔμοιγε. ΣΩ. Ἔστιν ἄρα κατὰ τὴν σὴν δόξαν ἕτερόν τι ὡς ἕτερον καὶ μὴ ὡς ἐκεῖνο τῇ διανοίᾳ τίθεσθαι. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔστι μέντοι. ΣΩ.
E Ὅταν οὖν τοῦθ' ἡ διάνοιά του δρᾷ, οὐ καὶ ἀνάγκη αὐτὴν ἤτοι ἀμφότερα ἢ τὸ ἕτερον διανοεῖσθαι; ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀνάγκη μὲν οὖν. ΣΩ. Ἦτοι ἅμα γε ἢ ἐν μέρει; ΘΕΑΙ. Κάλλιστα. ΣΩ. Τὸ δὲ διανοεῖσθαι ἆρ' ὅπερ ἐγὼ καλεῖς; ΘΕΑΙ. Τί καλῶν; ΣΩ. Λόγον, ὃν αὐτὴ πρὸς αὑτὴν ἡ ψυχὴ διεξέρχεται περὶ ὧν ἂν σκοπῇ. ὡς γε μὴ εἰδὼς σοι ἀποφαίνομαι. τοῦτο γάρ μοι ἐνδάλλεται διανοουμένη, οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἢ διαλέγεσθαι, αὐτὴ ἑαυτὴν
190 ἐρωτῶσα * καὶ ἀποκρινομένη, καὶ φάσκουσα καὶ οὐ φάσκουσα. ὅταν δὲ ὁρίσασα, εἴτε βραδύτερον εἴτε καὶ ὀξύτερον ἐπαΐξασα, τὸ αὐτὸ ἤδη φῇ καὶ μὴ διστάζῃ, δόξαν ταύτην τίθεμεν αὐτῆς. ὥστ' ἔγωγε τὸ δοξάζειν λέγειν καλῶ καὶ τὴν δόξαν λόγον εἰρημένον, οὐ μέντοι πρὸς ἄλλον οὐδὲ φωνῇ, ἀλλὰ σιγῇ πρὸς αὑτόν. σὺ δὲ τί; ΘΕΑΙ. Κἀγώ. ΣΩ. Ὅταν ἄρα τις τὸ ἕτερον

ἕτερον δοξάζῃ, καὶ φησίν, ὡς ἔοικε, τὸ ἕτερον ἕτερον
εἶναι πρὸς ἑαυτόν. ΘΕΑΙ. Τί μήν; ΣΩ. Ἀναμιμνή- B
σκου δή, εἰ πώποτ' εἶπες πρὸς σεαυτόν, ὅτι παντὸς
μᾶλλον τό τοι καλὸν αἰσχρόν ἐστιν ἢ τὸ ἄδικον δίκαιον,
ἢ καὶ τὸ πάντων κεφάλαιον σκόπει, εἴ ποτ' ἐπεχείρησας
σεαυτὸν πείθειν ὡς παντὸς μᾶλλον τὸ ἕτερον ἑτερόν
ἐστιν, ἢ πᾶν τοὐναντίον οὐδ' ἐν ὕπνῳ πώποτε ἐτόλμησας
εἰπεῖν πρὸς σεαυτόν, ὡς παντάπασιν ἄρα τὰ περιττὰ
ἄρτιά ἐστιν ἤ τι ἄλλο τοιοῦτον. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.
ΣΩ. Ἄλλον δέ τινα οἴει ὑγιαίνοντα ἢ μαινόμενον τολ- C
μῆσαι σπουδῇ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν εἰπεῖν, ἀναπείθοντα αὑτόν,
ὡς ἀνάγκη τὸν βοῦν ἵππον εἶναι ἢ τὰ δύο ἕν; ΘΕΑΙ.
Μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἔγωγε. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἰ τὸ λέγειν πρὸς
ἑαυτὸν δοξάζειν ἐστίν, οὐδεὶς ἀμφότερά γε λέγων καὶ
δοξάζων καὶ ἐφαπτόμενος ἀμφοῖν τῇ ψυχῇ εἴποι ἂν καὶ
δοξάσειεν, ὡς τὸ ἕτερον ἑτερόν ἐστιν. ἐατέον δὲ καὶ σοὶ
τὸ ῥῆμα περὶ τοῦ ἑτέρου. λέγω γὰρ αὐτὸ τῇδε, μηδένα
δοξάζειν, ὡς τὸ αἰσχρὸν καλὸν ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων. D
ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλ', ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐῶ τε καί μοι δοκεῖ ὡς
λέγεις. ΣΩ. Ἄμφω μὲν ἄρα δοξάζοντα ἀδύνατον τὸ
ἕτερον ἕτερον δοξάζειν. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔοικεν. ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ
μὴν τό γε ἕτερόν γε μόνον δοξάζων, τὸ δὲ ἕτερον μηδαμῇ,
οὐδέποτε δοξάσει τὸ ἕτερον ἕτερον εἶναι. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθῆ
λέγεις· ἀναγκάζοιτο γὰρ ἂν ἐφάπτεσθαι καὶ οὗ μὴ
δοξάζει. ΣΩ. Οὔτ' ἄρ' ἀμφότερα οὔτε τὸ ἕτερον δο-
ξάζοντι ἐγχωρεῖ ἀλλοδοξεῖν. ὥστ' εἴ τις ὁριεῖται δό- E
ξαν εἶναι ψευδῆ τὸ ἑτεροδοξεῖν, οὐδὲν ἂν λέγοι· οὔτε
γὰρ ταύτῃ οὔτε κατὰ τὰ πρότερα φαίνεται ψευδὴς ἐν
ἡμῖν οὖσα δόξα. ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκ ἔοικεν. XXXIII. ΣΩ.
Ἀλλὰ μέντοι, ὦ Θεαίτητε, εἰ τοῦτο μὴ φανήσεται ὄν,
πολλὰ ἀναγκασθησόμεθα ὁμολογεῖν καὶ ἄτοπα. ΘΕΑΙ.

Τὰ ποῖα δή; ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἐρῶ σοι, πρὶν ἂν πανταχῇ πειραθῶ σκοπῶν. αἰσχυνοίμην γὰρ ἂν ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν, ἐν ᾧ ἀποροῦμεν, ἀναγκαζομένων ὁμολογεῖν οἷα λέγω. ἀλλ' 191 ἐὰν * εὕρωμεν καὶ ἐλεύθεροι γενώμεθα, τότ' ἤδη περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐροῦμεν ὡς πασχόντων αὐτά, ἐκτὸς τοῦ γελοίου ἑστῶτες· ἐὰν δὲ πάντῃ ἀπορήσωμεν, ταπεινωθέντες, οἶμαι, τῷ λόγῳ παρέξομεν ὡς ναυτιῶντες πατεῖν τε καὶ χρῆσθαι ὅ τι ἂν βούληται. ᾗ οὖν ἔτι πόρον τινὰ εὑρίσκω τοῦ ζητήματος ἡμῖν, ἄκουε. ΘΕΑΙ. Λέγε μόνον. ΣΩ. Οὐ φήσω ἡμᾶς ὀρθῶς ὁμολογῆσαι, ἡνίκα ὡμολογήσαμεν, ἃ τις οἶδεν, ἀδύνατον δοξάσαι ἃ μὴ Β οἶδεν εἶναι αὐτά, καὶ | ψευσθῆναι· ἀλλά πῃ δυνατόν. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἆρα λέγεις ὃ καὶ ἐγὼ τότε ὑπώπτευσα ἡνίκ' αὐτὸ ἔφαμεν, τοιοῦτον εἶναι, ὅτι ἐνίοτ' ἐγὼ γιγνώσκων Σωκράτη, πόῤῥωθεν δὲ ὁρῶν ἄλλον, ὃν οὐ γιγνώσκω, φήθην εἶναι Σωκράτη, ὃν οἶδα; γίγνεται γὰρ δὴ ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ οἷον λέγεις. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἀπέστημεν αὐτοῦ, ὅτι ἃ ἴσμεν, ἐποίει ἡμᾶς εἰδότας μὴ εἰδέναι; ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. ΣΩ. Μὴ γὰρ οὕτω τιθῶμεν, ἀλλ' ὧδε. καὶ ἴσως πῃ ἡμῖν συγχωρήσεται, ἴσως δὲ ἀντιτενεῖ. C | ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ ἐχόμεθα, ἐν ᾧ ἀνάγκη πάντα μεταστρέφοντα λόγον βασανίζειν. σκόπει οὖν, εἴ τι λέγω. ἆρα ἔστι μὴ εἰδότα τι πρότερον ὕστερον μαθεῖν; ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔστι μέντοι. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ αὖθις ἕτερον καὶ ἕτερον; ΘΕΑΙ. Τί δ' οὔ; ΣΩ. Θὲς δή μοι λόγου ἕνεκα ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἡμῶν ἐνὸν κήρινον ἐκμαγεῖον, τῷ μὲν μεῖζον, τῷ δ' ἔλαττον, καὶ τῷ μὲν καθαρωτέρου κηροῦ, τῷ δὲ κοπρωδεστέρου, καὶ σκληροτέρου, ἐνίοις D δὲ ὑγροτέρου, | ἔστι δ' οἷς μετρίως ἔχοντος. ΘΕΑΙ. Τίθημι. ΣΩ. Δῶρον τοίνυν αὐτὸ φῶμεν εἶναι τῆς τῶν Μουσῶν μητρὸς Μνημοσύνης, καὶ εἰς τοῦτο, ὅ τι ἂν

βουληθῶμεν μνημονεῦσαι ὧν ἂν ἴδωμεν ἢ ἀκούσωμεν ἢ αὐτοὶ ἐννοήσωμεν, ὑπέχοντες αὐτὸ ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι καὶ ἐννοίαις, ἀποτυποῦσθαι, ὥσπερ δακτυλίων σημεῖα ἐνσημαινομένους. καὶ ὃ μὲν ἂν ἐκμαγῇ, μνημονεύειν τε καὶ ἐπίστασθαι, ἕως ἂν ἐνῇ τὸ εἴδωλον αὐτοῦ. ὅταν δὲ ἐξαλειφθῇ ἢ μὴ οἷόν τε γένηται | ἐκμαγῆναι, ἐπι- E
λελῆσθαί τε καὶ μὴ ἐπίστασθαι. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔστω οὕτως. ΣΩ. Ὃ τοίνυν ἐπιστάμενος μὲν αὐτά, σκοπῶν δέ τι ὧν ὁρᾷ ἢ ἀκούει, ἄθρει εἰ ἄρα τοιῷδε τρόπῳ ψευδῆ ἂν δοξάσαι. ΘΕΑΙ. Ποίῳ δή τινι; ΣΩ. Ἃ οἶδεν, οἰηθεὶς εἶναι τοτὲ μὲν ἃ οἶδε, τοτὲ δὲ ἃ μή. ταῦτα γὰρ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν οὐ καλῶς ὡμολογήσαμεν ὁμολογοῦντες ἀδύνατα. ΘΕΑΙ. Νῦν δὲ πῶς λέγεις; ΣΩ. Δεῖ ὧδε * λέγεσθαι περὶ αὐτῶν, ἐξ ἀρχῆς διοριζομέ- 192
νους, ὅτι ὃ μέν τις οἶδεν ἔχων αὐτοῦ μνημεῖον ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, αἰσθάνεται δὲ αὐτὸ μή, τοῦτο οἰηθῆναι ἕτερόν τι ὧν οἶδεν, ἔχοντα καὶ ἐκείνου τύπον, αἰσθανόμενον δὲ μή, ἀδύνατον. καὶ ὅ γε οἶδεν αὖ, οἰηθῆναι εἶναι ὃ μὴ οἶδε μηδ' ἔχει αὐτοῦ σφραγῖδα· καὶ ὃ μὴ οἶδεν, ὃ μὴ οἶδεν αὖ· καὶ ὃ μὴ οἶδεν, ὃ οἶδε· καὶ ὃ αἰσθάνεταί γε, ἕτερόν τι ὧν αἰσθάνεται, οἰηθῆναι εἶναι· καὶ ὃ αἰσθάνεται, ὧν τι μὴ αἰσθάνεται· καὶ ὃ μὴ αἰσθάνεται, ὧν μὴ αἰσθάνεται· καὶ ὃ μὴ αἰσθάνεται, | ὧν αἰσθάνεται. B
καὶ ἔτι γε αὖ ὧν οἶδε καὶ αἰσθάνεται καὶ ἔχει τὸ σημεῖον κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν, οἰηθῆναι αὖ ἕτερόν τι ὧν οἶδε καὶ αἰσθάνεται καὶ ἔχει αὖ καὶ ἐκείνου τὸ σημεῖον κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν, ἀδυνατώτερον ἔτι ἐκείνων, εἰ οἷόν τε. καὶ ὃ οἶδε καὶ ὃ αἰσθάνεται ἔχων τὸ μνημεῖον ὀρθῶς, ὃ οἶδεν οἰηθῆναι ἀδύνατον· καὶ ὃ οἶδε καὶ αἰσθά-

191 D. ὑπέχοντες. Multi codd. et edd. habent ὑπέχοντας. Cf. Vers. Angl.

νεται ἔχων κατὰ ταὐτά, ὃ αἰσθάνεται· καὶ ὃ αὖ μὴ οἶδε
C μηδὲ | αἰσθάνεται, ὃ μὴ οἶδε μηδὲ αἰσθάνεται· καὶ ὃ
μὴ οἶδε μηδὲ αἰσθάνεται, ὃ μὴ οἶδε· καὶ ὃ μὴ οἶδε μηδὲ
αἰσθάνεται, ὃ μὴ αἰσθάνεται. πάντα ταῦτα ὑπερβάλλει
ἀδυναμίᾳ τοῦ ἐν αὐτοῖς ψευδῆ τινα δοξάσαι. λείπεται
δὴ ἐν τοῖς τοιοῖσδε, εἴπερ που ἄλλοθι, τὸ τοιοῦτον γε-
νέσθαι. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐν τίσι δή; ἐὰν ἄρα ἐξ αὐτῶν τι
μᾶλλον μάθω· νῦν μὲν γὰρ οὐχ ἕπομαι. ΣΩ. Ἐν οἷς
οἶδεν, οἰηθῆναι αὐτὰ ἕτερ' ἄττα εἶναι ὧν οἶδε καὶ αἰσθά-
D νεται· ἢ ὧν μὴ οἶδεν, αἰσθάνεται δέ· ἢ ὧν | οἶδε καὶ
αἰσθάνεται, ὧν οἶδεν αὖ καὶ αἰσθάνεται. ΘΕΑΙ. Νῦν
πολὺ πλεῖον ἀπελείφθην ἢ τότε. XXXIV. ΣΩ. Ὧδε
δὴ ἀνάπαλιν ἄκουε. ἐγὼ εἰδὼς Θεόδωρον καὶ ἐν ἐμαυτῷ
μεμνημένος οἷός ἐστι, καὶ Θεαίτητον κατὰ ταὐτά, ἄλλο
τι ἐνίοτε μὲν ὁρῶ αὐτούς, ἐνίοτε δὲ οὔ, καὶ ἅπτομαί
ποτ' αὐτῶν, τοτὲ δ' οὔ, καὶ ἀκούω ἤ τινα ἄλλην αἴσθη-
σιν αἰσθάνομαι, τοτὲ δ' αἴσθησιν μὲν οὐδεμίαν ἔχω περὶ
ὑμῶν, μέμνημαι δὲ ὑμᾶς οὐδὲν ἧττον καὶ ἐπίσταμαι
E αὐτὸς ἐν ἐμαυτῷ; ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ | μὲν οὖν. ΣΩ. Τοῦτο
τοίνυν πρῶτον μαθὲ ὧν βούλομαι δηλῶσαι, ὡς ἔστι μὲν
ἃ οἶδε μὴ αἰσθάνεσθαι, ἔστι δὲ αἰσθάνεσθαι. ΘΕΑΙ.
Ἀληθῆ. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἃ μὴ οἶδε, πολλάκις μὲν
ἔστι μηδὲ αἰσθάνεσθαι, πολλάκις δὲ αἰσθάνεσθαι μόνον;
ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔστι καὶ τοῦτο. ΣΩ. Ἰδὲ δὴ ἐάν τι μᾶλλον
193 νῦν ἐπίσπῃ. Σωκράτης ἐπιγιγνώσκει * Θεόδωρον καὶ
Θεαίτητον, ὁρᾷ δὲ μηδέτερον, μηδὲ ἄλλη αἴσθησις αὐτῷ
πάρεστι περὶ αὐτῶν· οὐκ ἄν ποτε ἐν ἑαυτῷ δοξάσειεν
ὡς ὁ Θεαίτητος ἐστὶ Θεόδωρος. λέγω τι ἢ οὐδέν;
ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί, ἀληθῆ γε. ΣΩ. Τοῦτο μὲν τοίνυν ἐκείνων
πρῶτον ἦν ὧν ἔλεγον. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἦν γάρ. ΣΩ. Δεύτερον
τοίνυν, ὅτι τὸν μὲν γιγνώσκων ὑμῶν, τὸν δὲ μὴ γιγνώ-

σκων, αἰσθανόμενος δὲ μηδέτερον, οὐκ ἄν ποτε αὖ οἰηθείην, ὃν οἶδα, εἶναι ὃν μὴ οἶδα. ΘΕΑΙ. Ὀρθῶς. ΣΩ. Τρίτον δέ, μηδέτερον γιγνώσκων μηδὲ αἰσθανόμενος | οὐκ ἂν οἰηθείην, ὃν μὴ οἶδα, ἕτερόν τιν' εἶναι B ὧν μὴ οἶδα. καὶ τἆλλα τὰ πρότερα πάνθ' ἑξῆς νόμιζε πάλιν ἀκηκοέναι, ἐν οἷς οὐδέποτ' ἐγὼ περὶ σοῦ καὶ Θεοδώρου τὰ ψευδῆ δοξάσω, οὔτε γιγνώσκων οὔτε ἀγνοῶν ἄμφω, οὔτε τὸν μέν, τὸν δ' οὐ γιγνώσκων. καὶ περὶ αἰσθήσεων κατὰ ταὐτά, εἰ ἄρα ἔπει. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἕπομαι. ΣΩ. Λείπεται τοίνυν τὰ ψευδῆ δοξάσαι ἐν τῷδε, ὅταν γιγνώσκων σὲ καὶ Θεόδωρον, καὶ ἔχων ἐν ἐκείνῳ τῷ κηρίνῳ | ὥσπερ δακτυλίων σφῷν ἀμφοῖν τὰ C σημεῖα, διὰ μακροῦ καὶ μὴ ἱκανῶς ὁρῶν ἄμφω προθυμηθῶ, τὸ οἰκεῖον ἑκατέρου σημεῖον ἀποδοὺς τῇ οἰκείᾳ ὄψει, ἐμβιβάσας προσαρμόσαι εἰς τὸ ἑαυτῆς ἴχνος, ἵνα γένηται ἀναγνώρισις, εἶτα τούτων ἀποτυχὼν καὶ ὥσπερ οἱ ἔμπαλιν ὑποδούμενοι παραλλάξας προσβάλω τὴν ἑκατέρου ὄψιν πρὸς τὸ ἀλλότριον σημεῖον, ἢ καὶ οἷα τὰ ἐν τοῖς κατόπτροις τῆς ὄψεως πάθη, δεξιὰ εἰς ἀριστερὰ μεταῤῥεούσης, ταὐτὸν | παθὼν διαμάρτω· D τότε δὴ συμβαίνει ἡ ἑτεροδοξία καὶ τὸ ψευδῆ δοξάζειν. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔοικε γάρ, ὦ Σώκρατες, θαυμασίως ᾧ λέγεις τὸ τῆς δόξης πάθος. ΣΩ. Ἔτι τοίνυν καὶ ὅταν ἀμφοτέρους γιγνώσκων τὸν μὲν πρὸς τῷ γιγνώσκειν αἰσθάνωμαι, τὸν δὲ μή, τὴν δὲ γνῶσιν τοῦ ἑτέρου μὴ κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν ἔχω, ὃ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν οὕτως ἔλεγον καί μου τότε οὐκ ἐμάνθανες. ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν. ΣΩ. Τοῦτο μὴν ἔλεγον, ὅτι γιγνώσκων τὸν ἕτερον καὶ | αἰσθανόμενος, καὶ τὴν γνῶσιν κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν αὖ- E τοῦ ἔχων, οὐδέποτε οἰήσεται εἶναι αὐτὸν ἕτερόν τινα ὧν γιγνώσκει τε καὶ αἰσθάνεται καὶ τὴν γνῶσιν αὖ

καὶ ἐκείνου ἔχει κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν. ἦν γὰρ τοῦτο; ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Παρελείπετο δέ γέ που τὸ νῦν λεγόμενον, ἐν ᾧ δὴ φαμὲν τὴν ψευδῆ δόξαν γίγνεσθαι τὸ ἄμφω γιγνώσκοντα καὶ ἄμφω ὁρῶντα ἢ τινα ἄλλην
194 * αἴσθησιν ἔχοντα ἀμφοῖν τῶ σημείω μὴ κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ αἴσθησιν ἑκάτερον ἔχειν, ἀλλ' οἷον τοξότην φαῦλον ἱέντα παραλλάξαι τοῦ σκοποῦ καὶ ἁμαρτεῖν, ὃ δὴ καὶ ψεῦδος ἄρα ὠνόμασται. ΘΕΑΙ. Εἰκότως γε. ΣΩ. Καὶ ὅταν τοίνυν τῷ μὲν παρῇ αἴσθησις τῶν σημείων, τῷ δὲ μή, τὸ δὲ τῆς ἀπούσης αἰσθήσεως τῇ παρούσῃ προσαρμόσῃ, πάντῃ ταύτῃ ψεύδεται ἡ διάνοια. καὶ ἐνὶ λόγῳ, περὶ ὧν μὲν μὴ οἶδέ τις μηδὲ ᾔσθετο πώποτε,
B οὐκ ἔστιν, ὡς ἔοικεν, οὔτε ψεύδεσθαι οὔτε ψευδὴς δόξα, εἴ τι νῦν ἡμεῖς ὑγιὲς λέγομεν· περὶ δὲ ὧν ἴσμέν τε καὶ αἰσθανόμεθα, ἐν αὐτοῖς τούτοις στρέφεται καὶ ἐλίττεται ἡ δόξα ψευδὴς καὶ ἀληθὴς γιγνομένη, καταντικρὺ μὲν καὶ κατὰ τὸ εὐθὺ τὰ οἰκεῖα συνάγουσα ἀποτυπώματα καὶ τύπους, ἀληθής, εἰς πλάγια δὲ καὶ σκολιὰ ψευδής. ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκοῦν καλῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες, λέγεται; ΣΩ. Ἔτι τοίνυν καὶ τάδε ἀκούσας μᾶλλον
C αὐτὸ ἐρεῖς. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ταληθὲς δοξάζειν καλόν, τὸ δὲ ψεύδεσθαι αἰσχρόν. ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς δ' οὔ; ΣΩ. Ταῦτα τοίνυν φασὶν ἐνθένδε γίγνεσθαι. ὅταν μὲν ὁ κηρός του ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ βαθύς τε καὶ πολὺς καὶ λεῖος καὶ μετρίως ὠργασμένος ᾖ, τὰ ἰόντα διὰ τῶν αἰσθήσεων, ἐνσημαινόμενα εἰς τοῦτο τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς κέαρ, ὃ ἔφη Ὅμηρος αἰνιττόμενος τὴν τοῦ κηροῦ ὁμοιότητα, τότε μὲν καὶ τούτοις καθαρὰ τὰ σημεῖα ἐγγιγνόμενα καὶ ἱκανῶς
D τοῦ βάθους ἔχοντα πολυχρόνιά τε γίγνεται καὶ εἰσὶν οἱ τοιοῦτοι πρῶτον μὲν εὐμαθεῖς, ἔπειτα μνήμονες, εἶτα οὐ παραλλάττουσι τῶν αἰσθήσεων τὰ σημεῖα, ἀλλὰ

δοξάζουσιν ἀληθῆ. σαφῆ γὰρ καὶ ἐν εὐρυχωρίᾳ ὄντα ταχὺ διανέμουσιν ἐπὶ τὰ αὑτῶν ἕκαστα ἐκμαγεῖα, ἃ δὴ ὄντα καλεῖται. καὶ σοφοὶ δὴ οὗτοι καλοῦνται. ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ σοι; ΘΕΑΙ. Ὑπερφυῶς μὲν οὖν. ΣΩ. Ὅταν [1] τοίνυν λάσιόν του τὸ κέαρ ᾖ, ὃ δὴ ἐπήνεσεν ὁ πάντα E
σοφὸς ποιητής, ἢ ὅταν κοπρῶδες καὶ μὴ καθαροῦ τοῦ κηροῦ, ἢ ὑγρὸν σφόδρα ἢ σκληρόν, ὧν μὲν ὑγρόν, εὐμαθεῖς μέν, ἐπιλήσμονες δὲ γίγνονται, ὧν δὲ σκληρόν, τἀναντία. οἱ δὲ δὴ λάσιον καὶ τραχὺ λιθῶδές τε ἢ γῆς ἢ κόπρου συμμιγείσης ἔμπλεων ἔχοντες ἀσαφῆ τὰ ἐκμαγεῖα ἴσχουσιν. ἀσαφῆ δὲ καὶ οἱ τὰ σκληρά· βάθος γὰρ οὐκ ἔνι. ἀσαφῆ δὲ καὶ οἱ τὰ ὑγρά· ὑπὸ γὰρ τοῦ συγχεῖσθαι ταχὺ * γίγνεται ἀμυδρά. ἐὰν δὲ πρὸς πᾶσι 195
τούτοις ἐπ' ἀλλήλων συμπεπτωκότα ᾖ ὑπὸ στενοχωρίας, ἐάν του σμικρὸν ᾖ τὸ ψυχάριον, ἔτι ἀσαφέστερα ἐκείνων. πάντες οὖν οὗτοι γίγνονται οἷοι δοξάζειν ψευδῆ. ὅταν γάρ τι ὁρῶσιν ἢ ἀκούωσιν ἢ ἐπινοῶσιν, ἕκαστα ἀπονέμειν ταχὺ ἑκάστοις οὐ δυνάμενοι βραδεῖς τέ εἰσι καὶ ἀλλοτριονομοῦντες παρορῶσί τε καὶ παρακούουσι καὶ παρανοοῦσι πλεῖστα, καὶ καλοῦνται αὖ οὗτοι ἐψευσμένοι τε δὴ τῶν ὄντων καὶ ἀμαθεῖς. ΘΕΑΙ. [1] Ὀρ- B
θότατα ἀνθρώπων λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες. ΣΩ. Φῶμεν ἄρα ἐν ἡμῖν ψευδεῖς δόξας εἶναι; ΘΕΑΙ. Σφόδρα γε. ΣΩ. Καὶ ἀληθεῖς δή; ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ ἀληθεῖς. ΣΩ. Ἤδη οὖν οἰόμεθα ἱκανῶς ὡμολογῆσθαι, ὅτι παντὸς μᾶλλον ἐστὸν ἀμφοτέρα τούτω τὼ δόξα; ΘΕΑΙ. Ὑπερφυῶς μὲν οὖν. XXXV. ΣΩ. Δεινόν τε, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ὡς ἀληθῶς κινδυνεύει καὶ ἀηδὲς εἶναι ἀνὴρ ἀδολέσχης. ΘΕΑΙ. Τί δαί; πρὸς τί τοῦτ' εἶπες; ΣΩ. [1] Τὴν ἐμαυ- C
τοῦ δυσμαθίαν δυσχεράνας καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἀδολεσχίαν. τί γὰρ ἄν τις ἄλλο θεῖτο ὄνομα, ὅταν ἄνω κάτω τοὺς

λόγους ἕλκῃ τις ὑπὸ νωθείας οὐ δυνάμενος πεισθῆναι, καὶ ᾖ δυσαπάλλακτος ἀφ' ἑκάστου λόγου; ΘΕΑΙ. Σὺ δὲ δὴ τί δυσχεραίνεις; ΣΩ. Οὐ δυσχεραίνω μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ δέδοικα ὅ τι ἀποκρινοῦμαι, ἄν τις ἔρηταί με· Ὦ Σώκρατες, εὕρηκας δὴ ψευδῆ δόξαν, ὅτι οὔτε ἐν ταῖς αἰσθήσεσίν ἐστι πρὸς ἀλλήλας οὔτ' ἐν ταῖς
D διανοίαις, ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ [1] συνάψει αἰσθήσεως πρὸς διάνοιαν; Φήσω δὲ ἐγώ, οἶμαι, καλλωπιζόμενος ὥς τι εὑρηκότων ἡμῶν καλόν. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκ αἰσχρὸν εἶναι τὸ νῦν ἀποδεδειγμένον. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν, φήσει, λέγεις, ὅτι αὖ τὸν ἄνθρωπον, ὃν διανοούμεθα μόνον, ὁρῶμεν δ' οὔ, ἵππον οὐκ ἄν ποτε οἰηθείημεν εἶναι, ὃν αὖ οὔτε ὁρῶμεν οὔτε ἁπτόμεθα, διανοούμεθα δὲ μόνον καὶ ἄλλ' οὐδὲν αἰσθανόμεθα περὶ αὐτοῦ; Ταῦτα, οἶμαι, φήσω λέγειν. ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ ὀρθῶς
E γε. ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; [1] φήσει· τὰ ἕνδεκα, ἃ μηδὲν ἄλλο ἢ διανοεῖταί τις, ἄλλο τι ἐκ τούτου τοῦ λόγου οὐκ ἄν ποτε οἰηθείη δώδεκα εἶναι, ἃ μόνον αὖ διανοεῖται; ἴθι οὖν δή, σὺ ἀποκρίνου. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλ' ἀποκρινοῦμαι, ὅτι ὁρῶν μὲν ἄν τις ἢ ἐφαπτόμενος οἰηθείη τὰ ἕνδεκα δώδεκα εἶναι, ἃ μέντοι ἐν τῇ διανοίᾳ ἔχει, οὐκ ἄν ποτε περὶ αὐτῶν ταῦτα δοξάσειεν οὕτω. ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; οἴει τινὰ πώποτε αὐτὸν ἐν αὑτῷ πέντε καὶ ἑπτά, λέγω δὲ
196 * μὴ ἀνθρώπους ἑπτὰ καὶ πέντε προθέμενον σκοπεῖν μηδ' ἄλλο τοιοῦτον, ἀλλ' αὐτὰ πέντε καὶ ἑπτά, ἃ φαμεν ἐκεῖ μνημεῖα ἐν τῷ ἐκμαγείῳ εἶναι καὶ ψευδῆ ἐν αὐτοῖς οὐκ εἶναι δοξάσαι, ταῦτα αὐτὰ εἴ τις ἀνθρώπων ἤδη πώποτε ἐσκέψατο λέγων πρὸς αὑτὸν καὶ ἐρωτῶν, πόσα ποτ' ἐστί, καὶ ὁ μέν τις εἶπεν οἰηθεὶς ἕνδεκα αὐτὰ εἶναι, ὁ δὲ δώδεκα· ἢ πάντες λέγουσί τε καὶ οἴονται δώδεκα αὐτὰ εἶναι; ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, ἀλλὰ

πολλοὶ δὴ καὶ ἕνδεκα. | ἐὰν δέ γε ἐν πλείονι ἀριθμῷ B
τις σκοπῆται, μᾶλλον σφάλλεται. οἶμαι γὰρ σε περὶ
παντὸς μᾶλλον ἀριθμοῦ λέγειν. ΣΩ. Ὀρθῶς γὰρ οἴει.
καὶ ἐνθυμοῦ, μή τί ποτε γίγνεται ἄλλο ἢ αὐτὰ τὰ
δώδεκα τὰ ἐν τῷ ἐκμαγείῳ ἕνδεκα οἰηθῆναι. ΘΕΑΙ.
Ἔοικέ γε. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἰς τοὺς πρώτους πάλιν ἀνήκει
λόγους; ὁ γὰρ τοῦτο παθών, ὃ οἶδεν, ἕτερον αὐτὸ οἴεται
εἶναι ὧν αὖ οἶδεν, ὃ ἔφαμεν ἀδύνατον, καὶ τούτῳ αὐτῷ
ἠναγκάζομεν μὴ εἶναι | ψευδῆ δόξαν, ἵνα μὴ τὰ αὐτὰ ὁ C
αὐτὸς ἀναγκάζοιτο εἰδὼς μὴ εἰδέναι ἅμα. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλη-
θέστατα. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἄλλ' ὁτιοῦν δεῖ ἀποφαίνειν τὸ
τὰ ψευδῆ δοξάζειν ἢ διανοίας πρὸς αἴσθησιν παραλ-
λαγήν. εἰ γὰρ τοῦτ' ἦν, οὐκ ἄν ποτε ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς
διανοήμασιν ἐψευδόμεθα· νῦν δὲ ἤτοι οὐκ ἔστι ψευδὴς
δόξα, ἢ ἅ τις οἶδεν, οἷόν τε μὴ εἰδέναι. καὶ τούτων
πότερα αἱρεῖ; ΘΕΑΙ. Ἄπορον αἵρεσιν προτίθης, ὦ
Σώκρατες. ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μέντοι ἀμφότερά | γε κινδυ- D
νεύει ὁ λόγος οὐκ ἐάσειν. ὅμως δέ, πάντα γὰρ τολμη-
τέον, τί εἰ ἐπιχειρήσαιμεν ἀναισχυντεῖν; ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς;
ΣΩ. Ἐθελήσαντες εἰπεῖν, ποιόν τί ποτ' ἐστὶ τὸ ἐπί-
στασθαι. ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ τί τοῦτο ἀναίσχυντον; ΣΩ.
Ἔοικας οὐκ ἐννοεῖν, ὅτι πᾶς ἡμῖν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὁ λόγος
ζήτησις γέγονεν ἐπιστήμης, ὡς οὐκ εἰδόσι, τί ποτ'
ἐστίν. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐννοῶ μὲν οὖν. ΣΩ. Ἔπειτ' οὐκ
ἀναιδὲς δοκεῖ, μὴ εἰδότας ἐπιστήμην ἀποφαίνεσθαι τὸ
ἐπίστασθαι οἷόν ἐστιν; ἀλλὰ γάρ, ὦ Θεαίτητε, | πάλαι E
ἐσμὲν ἀνάπλεῳ τοῦ μὴ καθαρῶς διαλέγεσθαι. μυριάκις
γὰρ εἰρήκαμεν τὸ γιγνώσκομεν καὶ οὐ γιγνώσκομεν, καὶ
ἐπιστάμεθα καὶ οὐκ ἐπιστάμεθα, ὥς τι συνιέντες ἀλ-
λήλων ἐν ᾧ ἔτι ἐπιστήμην ἀγνοοῦμεν. εἰ δὲ βούλει,
καὶ νῦν ἐν τῷ παρόντι κεχρήμεθ' αὖ τῷ ἀγνοεῖν τε

καὶ συνιέναι, ὡς προσῆκον αὐτοῖς χρῆσθαι, εἴπερ στερόμεθα ἐπιστήμης. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλὰ τίνα τρόπον διαλέξει, ὦ Σώκρατες, τούτων ἀπεχόμενος; ΣΩ. * Οὐδένα ὧν γε ὃς εἰμί· εἰ μέντοι ἦν ἀντιλογικός, οἷος ἀνὴρ εἰ καὶ νῦν παρῆν, τούτων τ' ἂν ἔφη ἀπέχεσθαι καὶ ἡμῖν σφόδρ' ἂν ἃ ἐγὼ λέγω ἐπέπληττεν. ἐπειδὴ οὖν ἐσμὲν φαῦλοι, βούλει τολμήσω εἰπεῖν, οἷόν ἐστι τὸ ἐπίστασθαι; φαίνεται γάρ μοι προὔργου τι ἂν γενέσθαι. ΘΕΑΙ. Τόλμα τοίνυν νὴ Δία. τούτων δὲ μὴ ἀπεχομένῳ σοι ἔσται πολλὴ συγγνώμη. XXXVI. ΣΩ. Ἀκήκοας οὖν ὃ νῦν λέγουσι τὸ ἐπίστασθαι; ΘΕΑΙ. Ἴσως· οὐ μέντοι ἔν γε τῷ παρόντι μνημονεύω. ΣΩ. Ἐπιστήμης που ἕξιν φασὶν αὐτὸ εἶναι. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθῆ. ΣΩ. Ἡμεῖς τοίνυν σμικρὸν μεταθώμεθα καὶ εἴπωμεν ἐπιστήμης κτῆσιν. ΘΕΑΙ. Τί οὖν δὴ φήσεις τοῦτο ἐκείνου διαφέρειν; ΣΩ. Ἴσως μὲν οὐδέν· ὃ δ' οὖν δοκεῖ, ἀκούσας συνδοκίμαζε. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐάν πέρ γε οἷός τ' ὦ. ΣΩ. Οὐ τοίνυν μοι ταὐτὸν φαίνεται τὸ κεκτῆσθαι τῷ ἔχειν. οἷον εἰ ἱμάτιον πριάμενός τις καὶ ἐγκρατὴς ὢν μὴ φοροῖ, ἔχειν μὲν οὐκ ἂν αὐτὸν αὐτό, κεκτῆσθαι δέ γε φαῖμεν. ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ ὀρθῶς γε. ΣΩ. Ὅρα δὴ καὶ ἐπιστήμην εἰ δυνατὸν οὕτω κεκτημένον μὴ ἔχειν, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ εἴ τις ὄρνιθας ἀγρίας, περιστερὰς ἤ τι ἄλλο, θηρεύσας οἴκοι κατασκευασάμενος περιστερεῶνα τρέφοι. τρόπον μὲν γὰρ ἄν πού τινα φαῖμεν αὐτὸν αὐτὰς ἀεὶ ἔχειν, ὅτι δὴ κέκτηται. ἢ γάρ; ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Τρόπον δέ γ' ἄλλον οὐδεμίαν ἔχειν, ἀλλὰ δύναμιν μὲν αὐτῷ περὶ αὐτὰς παραγεγονέναι, ἐπειδὴ ἐν οἰκείῳ περιβόλῳ ὑποχειρίους ἐποιήσατο, λαβεῖν καὶ σχεῖν, ἐπειδὰν βούληται, θηρευσαμένῳ ἣν ἂν ἀεὶ ἐθέλῃ, καὶ πάλιν ἀφιέναι· καὶ τοῦτο ἐξεῖναι ποιεῖν, ὁποσάκις ἂν

δοκῇ αὐτῷ. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔστι ταῦτα. ΣΩ. Πάλιν δή, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν κήρινόν τι ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς κατεσκευάζομεν οὐκ οἶδ' ὅ τι πλάσμα, νῦν αὖ ἐν ἑκάστῃ ψυχῇ ποιήσωμεν περιστερεῶνά τινα παντοδαπῶν ὀρνίθων, τὰς μὲν κατ' ἀγέλας οὔσας χωρὶς τῶν ἄλλων, τὰς δὲ κατ' ὀλίγας, ἐνίας δὲ μόνας διὰ πασῶν, ὅπῃ ἂν τύχωσι, πετομένας. ΘΕΑΙ. Πεποιήσθω δή. ἀλλὰ E τί τοὐντεῦθεν; ΣΩ. Παιδίων μὲν ὄντων φάναι χρὴ εἶναι τοῦτο τὸ ἀγγεῖον κενόν, ἀντὶ δὲ τῶν ὀρνίθων ἐπιστήμας νοῆσαι· ἣν δ' ἂν ἐπιστήμην κτησάμενος καθείρξῃ εἰς τὸν περίβολον, φάναι αὐτὸν μεμαθηκέναι ἢ εὑρηκέναι τὸ πρᾶγμα, οὗ ἦν αὕτη ἡ ἐπιστήμη, καὶ τὸ ἐπίστασθαι τοῦτ' εἶναι. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔστω. ΣΩ. Τὸ τοίνυν πάλιν ἦν ἂν * βούληται τῶν ἐπιστημῶν θηρεύειν 198 καὶ λαβόντα ἴσχειν καὶ αὖθις ἀφιέναι σκόπει τίνων δεῖται ὀνομάτων, εἴτε τῶν αὐτῶν ὧν τὸ πρῶτον, ὅτε ἐκτᾶτο, εἴτε ἑτέρων. μαθήσει δ' ἐντεῦθεν σαφέστερον, τί λέγω. ἀριθμητικὴν μὲν γὰρ λέγεις τέχνην; ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Ταύτην δὴ ὑπόλαβε θήραν ἐπιστημῶν ἀρτίου τε καὶ περιττοῦ παντός. ΘΕΑΙ. Ὑπολαμβάνω. ΣΩ. Ταύτῃ δή, οἶμαι, τῇ τέχνῃ αὐτός τε ὑποχειρίους τὰς ἐπιστήμας τῶν ἀριθμῶν | ἔχει καὶ B ἄλλῳ παραδίδωσιν ὁ παραδιδούς. ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Καὶ καλοῦμέν γε παραδιδόντα μὲν διδάσκειν, παραλαμβάνοντα δὲ μανθάνειν, ἔχοντα δὲ δὴ τῷ κεκτῆσθαι ἐν τῷ περιστερεῶνι ἐκείνῳ ἐπίστασθαι. ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. ΣΩ. Τῷ δὲ δὴ ἐντεῦθεν ἤδη πρόσσχες τὸν νοῦν. ἀριθμητικὸς γὰρ ὢν τελέως ἄλλο τι πάντας ἀριθμοὺς ἐπίσταται; πάντων γὰρ ἀριθμῶν εἰσὶν αὐτῷ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἐπιστῆμαι. ΘΕΑΙ. Τί μήν; ΣΩ. Ἦ | οὖν C ὁ τοιοῦτος ἀριθμοῖ ἄν ποτέ τι ἢ αὐτὸ πρὸς αὑτὸν ἢ

ἄλλο τι τῶν ἔξω, ὅσα ἔχει ἀριθμόν; ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ; ΣΩ. Τὸ δὲ ἀριθμεῖν γε οὐκ ἄλλο τι θήσομεν τοῦ σκοπεῖσθαι, πόσος τις ἀριθμὸς τυγχάνει ὤν. ΘΕΑΙ. Οὕτω. ΣΩ. Ὃ ἄρα ἐπίσταται, σκοπούμενος φαίνεται ὡς οὐκ εἰδώς, ὃν ὡμολογήκαμεν ἅπαντα ἀριθμὸν εἰδέναι. ἀκούεις γάρ που τὰς τοιαύτας ἀμφισβητήσεις. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔγωγε. XXXVII. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἡμεῖς ἀπειD κάζοντες τῇ τῶν περιστερῶν κτήσει τε καὶ θήρᾳ ἐροῦμεν, ὅτι διττὴ ἦν ἡ θήρα, ἡ μὲν πρὶν ἐκτῆσθαι τοῦ κεκτῆσθαι ἕνεκα, ἡ δὲ κεκτημένῳ τοῦ λαβεῖν καὶ ἔχειν ἐν ταῖς χερσὶν ἃ πάλαι ἐκέκτητο. οὕτω δὲ καὶ ὧν πάλαι ἐπιστῆμαι ἦσαν αὐτῷ μαθόντι καὶ ἠπίστατο αὐτά, πάλιν ἔστι καταμανθάνειν ταὐτὰ ταῦτα ἀναλαμβάνοντα τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἑκάστου καὶ ἴσχοντα, ἣν ἐκέκτητο μὲν πάλαι, πρόχειρον δ' οὐκ εἶχε τῇ διανοίᾳ; ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθῆ. ΣΩ. Τοῦτο δὴ ἄρτι ἠρώτων, Ε ὅπως χρὴ τοῖς ὀνόμασι χρώμενον λέγειν περὶ αὐτῶν, ὅταν ἀριθμήσων ἴῃ ὁ ἀριθμητικὸς ἢ τι ἀναγνωσόμενος ὁ γραμματικός. ὡς ἐπιστάμενος ἄρα ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ πάλιν ἔρχεται μαθησόμενος παρ' ἑαυτοῦ ἃ ἐπίσταται; ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλ' ἄτοπον, ὦ Σώκρατες. ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' ἃ οὐκ ἐπίσταται φῶμεν αὐτὸν ἀναγνώσεσθαι καὶ ἀριθμήσειν, δεδωκότες αὐτῷ πάντα μὲν γράμματα, πάντα δὲ
199 ἀριθμὸν ἐπίστασθαι; ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦτ' * ἄλογον. ΣΩ. Βούλει οὖν λέγωμεν, ὅτι τῶν μὲν ὀνομάτων οὐδὲν ἡμῖν μέλει, ὅπῃ τις χαίρει ἕλκων τὸ ἐπίστασθαι καὶ μανθάνειν, ἐπειδὴ δὲ ὡρισάμεθα ἕτερον μὲν τι τὸ κεκτῆσθαι τὴν ἐπιστήμην, ἕτερον δὲ τὸ ἔχειν, ὃ μέν τις ἔκτηται μὴ κεκτῆσθαι ἀδύνατόν φαμεν εἶναι, ὥστε οὐδέποτε συμβαίνει ὅ τις οἶδε μὴ εἰδέναι, ψευδῆ μέντοι δόξαν οἷόν τ' εἶναι περὶ αὐτοῦ λαβεῖν; μὴ γὰρ ἔχειν

τὴν ἐπιστήμην | τούτου οἷόν τε, ἀλλ' ἑτέραν ἀντ' ἐκεί- B
νης, ὅταν θηρεύων τινὰ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ ἐπιστήμην διαπε-
τομένων ἀνθ' ἑτέρας ἑτέραν ἁμαρτὼν λάβῃ, ὅτε ἄρα τὰ
ἕνδεκα δώδεκα ᾠήθη εἶναι, τὴν τῶν ἕνδεκα ἐπιστήμην
ἀντὶ τῆς τῶν δώδεκα λαβών, τὴν ἐν ἑαυτῷ οἷον φάτ-
ταν ἀντὶ περιστερᾶς. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔχει γὰρ οὖν λόγον.
ΣΩ. Ὅταν δέ γε ἣν ἐπιχειρεῖ λαβεῖν λάβῃ, ἀψευδεῖν
τε καὶ τὰ ὄντα δοξάζειν τότε, καὶ οὕτω δὴ εἶναι ἀληθῆ
τε καὶ ψευδῆ δόξαν, καὶ ὧν ἐν τοῖς | πρόσθεν ἐδυσ- C
χεραίνομεν οὐδὲν ἐμποδὼν γίγνεσθαι; ἴσως οὖν μοι
συμφήσεις. ἢ πῶς ποιήσεις; ΘΕΑΙ. Οὕτως. ΣΩ.
Καὶ γὰρ τοῦ μὲν ἃ ἐπίσταται μὴ ἐπίστασθαι ἀπηλ-
λάγμεθα· ἃ γὰρ κεκτήμεθα μὴ κεκτῆσθαι οὐδαμοῦ ἔτι
συμβαίνει, οὔτε ψευσθεῖσί τινος οὔτε μή. δεινότερον
μέντοι πάθος ἄλλο παραφαίνεσθαί μοι δοκεῖ. ΘΕΑΙ.
Τὸ ποῖον; ΣΩ. Εἰ ἡ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν μεταλλαγὴ
ψευδὴς γενήσεταί ποτε δόξα. ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς δή; ΣΩ.
| Πρῶτον μὲν τό τινος ἔχοντα ἐπιστήμην τοῦτο αὐτὸ D
ἀγνοεῖν, μὴ ἀγνωμοσύνῃ ἀλλὰ τῇ ἑαυτοῦ ἐπιστήμῃ,
ἔπειτα ἕτερον αὖ τοῦτο δοξάζειν, τὸ δ' ἕτερον τοῦτο,
πῶς οὐ πολλὴ ἀλογία, ἐπιστήμης παραγενομένης γνῶ-
ναι μὲν τὴν ψυχὴν μηδέν, ἀγνοῆσαι δὲ πάντα; ἐκ γὰρ
τούτου τοῦ λόγου κωλύει οὐδὲν καὶ ἄγνοιαν παραγε-
νομένην γνῶναί τι ποιῆσαι καὶ τυφλότητα ἰδεῖν, εἴπερ
καὶ ἐπιστήμη ἀγνοῆσαί ποτέ τινα ποιήσει. ΘΕΑΙ.
Ἴσως γάρ, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐ καλῶς | τὰς ὄρνιθας ἐτί- E
θεμεν ἐπιστήμας μόνον τιθέντες, ἔδει δὲ καὶ ἀνεπιστη-
μοσύνας τιθέναι ὁμοῦ συνδιαπετομένας ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ,
καὶ τὸν θηρεύοντα τοτὲ μὲν ἐπιστήμην λαμβάνοντα,
τοτὲ δ' ἀνεπιστημοσύνην τοῦ αὐτοῦ πέρι ψευδῆ μὲν
δοξάζειν τῇ ἀνεπιστημοσύνῃ, ἀληθῆ δὲ τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ.

ΣΩ. Οὐ ῥᾴδιόν γε, ὦ Θεαίτητε, μὴ ἐπαινεῖν σε. ὃ μέντοι εἶπες, πάλιν ἐπίσκεψαι. ἔστω μὲν γὰρ ὡς
200 λέγεις· ὁ δὲ δὴ τὴν ἀνεπιστημοσύνην * λαβὼν ψευδῆ μέν, φῄς, δοξάσει. ἦ γάρ; ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Οὐ δήπου καὶ ἡγήσεταί γε ψευδῆ δοξάζειν. ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς γάρ; ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' ἀληθῆ γε, καὶ ὡς εἰδὼς διακείσεται περὶ ὧν ἔψευσται. ΘΕΑΙ. Τί μήν; ΣΩ. Ἐπιστήμην ἄρα οἰήσεται τεθηρευκὼς ἔχειν, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀνεπιστημοσύνην. ΘΕΑΙ. Δῆλον. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν μακρὰν περιελθόντες πάλιν ἐπὶ τὴν πρώτην πάρεσμεν ἀπορίαν. ὁ
B γὰρ ἐλεγκτικὸς ἐκεῖνος γελάσας φήσει· | Πότερον, ὦ βέλτιστοι, ἀμφοτέρας τις εἰδώς, ἐπιστήμην τε καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνην, ἣν οἶδεν, ἑτέραν αὐτὴν οἴεταί τινα εἶναι ὧν οἶδεν; ἢ οὐδετέραν αὐτοῖν εἰδώς, ἣν μὴ οἶδε, δοξάζει ἑτέραν ὧν οὐκ οἶδεν; ἢ τὴν μὲν εἰδώς, τὴν δ' οὔ, ἣν οἶδεν, ἣν μὴ οἶδεν; ἢ ἣν μὴ οἶδεν, ἣν οἶδεν ἡγεῖται; ἢ πάλιν αὖ μοι ἐρεῖτε ὅτι τῶν ἐπιστημῶν καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσυνῶν εἰσὶν αὖ ἐπιστῆμαι, ἃς ὁ κεκτημένος ἐν ἑτέροις τισὶ γελοίοις περιστερεῶσιν ἢ κηρίνοις πλάσμασι
C καθείρξας, | ἕωσπερ ἂν κεκτῆται, ἐπίσταται, καὶ ἐὰν μὴ προχείρους ἔχῃ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ καὶ οὕτω δὴ ἀναγκασθήσεσθε εἰς ταὐτὸν περιτρέχειν μυριάκις οὐδὲν πλέον ποιοῦντες; Τί πρὸς ταῦτα, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ἀποκρινούμεθα; ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλὰ μὰ Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔγωγε οὐκ ἔχω, τί χρὴ λέγειν. ΣΩ. Ἆρ' οὖν ἡμῖν, ὦ παῖ, καλῶς ὁ λόγος ἐπιπλήττει, καὶ ἐνδείκνυται, ὅτι οὐκ ὀρθῶς ψευδῆ δόξαν προτέραν ζητοῦμεν ἐπιστήμης, ἐκείνην
D ἀφέντες; | τὸ δ' ἐστὶν ἀδύνατον γνῶναι, πρὶν ἄν τις ἐπιστήμην ἱκανῶς λάβῃ, τί ποτ' ἐστίν. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀνάγκη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐν τῷ παρόντι ὡς λέγεις οἴεσθαι.

XXXVIII. ΣΩ. Τί οὖν τις ἐρεῖ πάλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐπιστή-

μην; οὐ γάρ που ἀπεροῦμέν γέ πω. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἥκιστα, ἐάν περ μὴ σύ γε ἀπαγορεύσῃς. ΣΩ. Λέγε δή, τί ἂν αὐτὸ μάλιστα εἰπόντες ἥκιστ' ἂν ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς ἐναντιωθεῖμεν; ΘΕΑΙ. Ὅπερ ἐπεχειροῦμεν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν· οὐ γὰρ ἔχω ἔγωγε ἄλλο οὐδέν. ΣΩ. Τὸ ποῖον; ΘΕΑΙ. Τὴν ἀληθῆ δόξαν ἐπιστήμην εἶναι. ἀναμάρτητόν γέ πού ἐστι τὸ δοξάζειν ἀληθῆ, καὶ τὰ ὑπ' αὐτοῦ γιγνόμενα πάντα καλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ γίγνεται. ΣΩ. Ὁ τὸν ποταμὸν καθηγούμενος, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ἔφη ἄρα δείξειν αὐτό· καὶ τοῦτο ἐὰν ἰόντες ἐρευνῶμεν, τάχ' ἂν ἐμπόδιον γενόμενον αὐτὸ φήνειε τὸ ζητούμενον, μένουσι δὲ δῆλον οὐδέν. ΘΕΑΙ. Ὀρθῶς λέγεις· ἀλλ' ἴωμέν γε καὶ σκοπῶμεν. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τοῦτό γε βραχείας σκέψεως· τέχνη γάρ σοι ὅλη σημαίνει μὴ εἶναι ἐπιστήμην αὐτό. ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς δή; καὶ τίς αὕτη; ΣΩ. Ἡ τῶν μεγίστων εἰς σοφίαν, οὓς δὴ καλοῦσι ῥήτοράς τε καὶ δικανικούς. οὗτοι γάρ που τῇ ἑαυτῶν τέχνῃ πείθουσιν οὐ διδάσκοντες, ἀλλὰ δοξάζειν ποιοῦντες ἃ ἂν βούλωνται. ἢ σὺ οἴει δεινούς τινας οὕτω διδασκάλους εἶναι, ὥστε οἷς μὴ παρεγένοντό τινες ἀποστερουμένοις χρήματα ἤ τι ἄλλο βιαζομένοις, τούτοις δύνασθαι πρὸς ὕδωρ σμικρὸν διδάξαι ἱκανῶς τῶν γενομένων τὴν ἀλήθειαν; ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδαμῶς ἔγωγε οἶμαι, ἀλλὰ πεῖσαι μέν. ΣΩ. Τὸ πεῖσαι δ' οὐχὶ δοξάσαι λέγεις ποιῆσαι; ΘΕΑΙ. Τί μήν; ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὅταν δικαίως πεισθῶσι δικασταὶ περὶ ὧν ἰδόντι μόνον ἔστιν εἰδέναι, ἄλλως δὲ μή, ταῦτα τότε ἐξ ἀκοῆς κρίνοντες, ἀληθῆ δόξαν λαβόντες, ἄνευ ἐπιστήμης ἔκριναν, ὀρθὰ πεισθέντες, εἴπερ εὖ ἐδίκασαν; ΘΕΑΙ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄν, ὦ φίλε, εἴ γε ταὐτὸν ἦν δόξα τε ἀληθὴς [καὶ δικαστήρια] καὶ ἐπιστήμη, ὀρθά ποτ' ἂν δικαστὴς ἄκρος

ἐδόξαζεν ἄνευ ἐπιστήμης· νῦν δὲ ἔοικεν ἄλλο τι ἑκάτερον εἶναι. ΘΕΑΙ. Ὅ γε ἐγώ, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰπόντος του ἀκούσας ἐπιλελήσμην, νῦν δ' ἐννοῶ. ἔφη δὲ τὴν
D μὲν μετὰ λόγου ἀληθῆ δόξαν ἐπιστήμην εἶναι, | τὴν δὲ ἄλογον ἐκτὸς ἐπιστήμης· καὶ ὧν μὲν μή ἐστι λόγος, οὐκ ἐπιστητὰ εἶναι, οὑτωσὶ καὶ ὀνομάζων, ἃ δ' ἔχει, ἐπιστητά. ΣΩ. Ἢ καλῶς λέγεις. τὰ δὲ δὴ ἐπιστητὰ ταῦτα καὶ μὴ πῇ διήρει, λέγε, εἰ ἄρα κατὰ ταὐτὰ σύ τε κἀγὼ ἀκηκόαμεν. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλ' οὐκ οἶδα, εἰ ἐξευρήσω· λέγοντος μέντ' ἂν ἑτέρου, ὡς ἐγῷμαι, ἀκολουθήσαιμι.
XXXIX. ΣΩ. Ἄκουε δὴ ὄναρ ἀντὶ ὀνείρατος. ἐγὼ
E γὰρ αὖ ἐδόκουν ἀκούειν τινῶν, ὅτι τὰ μὲν· | πρῶτα οἱονπερεὶ στοιχεῖα, ἐξ ὧν ἡμεῖς τε σύγκείμεθα καὶ τἆλλα, λόγον οὐκ ἔχοι. αὐτὸ γὰρ καθ' αὑτὸ ἕκαστον ὀνομάσαι μόνον εἴη, προσειπεῖν δὲ οὐδὲν ἄλλο δυνατόν, οὔθ' ὡς ἔστιν, οὔθ' ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν· ἤδη γὰρ ἂν οὐσίαν
202 * ἢ μὴ οὐσίαν αὐτῷ προστίθεσθαι, δεῖν δὲ οὐδὲν προσφέρειν, εἴπερ αὐτὸ ἐκεῖνο μόνον τις ἐρεῖ. ἐπεὶ οὐδὲ τὸ αὐτὸ οὐδὲ τὸ ἐκεῖνο οὐδὲ τὸ ἕκαστον οὐδὲ τὸ μόνον οὐδὲ τὸ τοῦτο προσοιστέον, οὐδ' ἄλλα πολλὰ τοιαῦτα. ταῦτα μὲν γὰρ περιτρέχοντα πᾶσι προσφέρεσθαι ἕτερα ὄντα ἐκείνων, οἷς προστίθεται, δεῖν δέ, εἴπερ ἦν δυνατὸν αὐτὸ λέγεσθαι καὶ εἶχεν οἰκεῖον αὑτοῦ λόγον, ἄνευ τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων λέγεσθαι. νῦν δὲ ἀδύνατον εἶναι ὁτιοῦν
B τῶν πρώτων ῥηθῆναι | λόγῳ· οὐ γὰρ εἶναι αὐτῷ ἀλλ' ἢ ὀνομάζεσθαι μόνον· ὄνομα γὰρ μόνον ἔχειν, τὰ δὲ ἐκ τούτων ἤδη συγκείμενα, ὥσπερ αὐτὰ πέπλεκται, οὕτω καὶ τὰ ὀνόματα αὐτῶν συμπλακέντα λόγον γεγονέναι· ὀνομάτων γὰρ συμπλοκὴν εἶναι λόγου οὐσίαν. οὕτω δὴ τὰ μὲν στοιχεῖα ἄλογα καὶ ἄγνωστα εἶναι, αἰσθητὰ δέ· τὰς δὲ συλλαβὰς γνωστάς τε καὶ ῥητὰς καὶ ἀληθεῖ

δόξῃ δοξαστάς. ὅταν μὲν οὖν ἄνευ λόγου τὴν ἀληθῆ
δόξαν τινός τις λάβῃ, ἀληθεύειν μὲν αὐτοῦ τὴν ¹ ψυχὴν C
περὶ αὐτό, γιγνώσκειν δ' οὔ· τὸν γὰρ μὴ δυνάμενον
δοῦναί τε καὶ δέξασθαι λόγον ἀνεπιστήμονα εἶναι περὶ
τούτου· προσλαβόντα δὲ λόγον δυνατόν τε ταῦτα πάντα
γεγονέναι καὶ τελείως πρὸς ἐπιστήμην ἔχειν. Οὕτως σὺ
τὸ ἐνύπνιον ἢ ἄλλως ἀκήκοας; ΘΕΑΙ. Οὕτω μὲν οὖν
παντάπασιν. ΣΩ. Ἀρέσκει οὖν σε καὶ τίθεσαι ταύτῃ,
δόξαν ἀληθῆ μετὰ λόγου ἐπιστήμην εἶναι; ΘΕΑΙ.
Κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν. ΣΩ. Ἆρ', ὦ Θεαίτητε, ¹ νῦν οὕτω D
τῇδε τῇ ἡμέρᾳ εἰλήφαμεν ὃ πάλαι καὶ πολλοὶ τῶν
σοφῶν ζητοῦντες πρὶν εὑρεῖν κατεγήρασαν; ΘΕΑΙ.
Ἔμοιγοῦν δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, καλῶς λέγεσθαι τὸ νῦν
ῥηθέν. ΣΩ. Καὶ εἰκός γε αὐτὸ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχειν·
τίς γὰρ ἂν καὶ ἔτι ἐπιστήμη εἴη χωρὶς λόγου τε καὶ
ὀρθῆς δόξης; ἓν μέντοι τί με τῶν ῥηθέντων ἀπαρέσκει.
ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποῖον δή; ΣΩ. Ὃ καὶ δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι
κομψότατα, ὡς τὰ μὲν στοιχεῖα ἄγνωστα, τὸ δὲ τῶν
συλλαβῶν γένος ¹ γνωστόν. ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκοῦν ὀρθῶς; E
ΣΩ. Ἰστέον δή· ὥσπερ γὰρ ὁμήρους ἔχομεν τοῦ λόγου
τὰ παραδείγματα, οἷς χρώμενος εἶπε πάντα ταῦτα.
ΘΕΑΙ. Ποῖα δή; ΣΩ. Τὰ τῶν γραμμάτων στοιχεῖά
τε καὶ συλλαβάς. ἢ οἴει ἄλλοσέ ποι βλέποντα ταῦτα
εἰπεῖν τὸν εἰπόντα, ἃ λέγομεν; ΘΕΑΙ. Οὔκ, ἀλλ' εἰς
ταῦτα. XL. ΣΩ. Βασανίζωμεν * δὴ αὐτὰ ἀναλαμβά- 203
νοντες, μᾶλλον δὲ ἡμᾶς αὐτούς, οὕτως ἢ οὐχ οὕτως
γράμματα ἐμάθομεν. φέρε πρῶτον· ἆρ' αἱ μὲν συλ-
λαβαὶ λόγον ἔχουσι, τὰ δὲ στοιχεῖα ἄλογα; ΘΕΑΙ.
Ἴσως. ΣΩ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν καὶ ἐμοὶ φαίνεται. Σωκρά-
τους γοῦν εἴ τις ἔροιτο τὴν πρώτην συλλαβὴν οὑτωσί,
Ὦ Θεαίτητε, λέγε τί ἐστι σω, τί ἀποκρινεῖ; ΘΕΑΙ.

Ὅτι σῖγμα καὶ ω̄. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τοῦτον ἔχεις λόγον τῆς συλλαβῆς; ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔγωγε. ΣΩ. Ἴθι δή, οὕτως
B εἰπὲ καὶ τὸν τοῦ | σῖγμα λόγον. ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ πῶς τοῦ στοιχείου τις ἐρεῖ στοιχεῖα; καὶ γὰρ δή, ὦ Σώκρατες, τό τε σῖγμα τῶν ἀφώνων ἐστί, ψόφος τις μόνον, οἷον συριττούσης τῆς γλώττης· τοῦ δ' αὖ βῆτα οὔτε φωνὴ οὔτε ψόφος, οὐδὲ τῶν πλείστων στοιχείων. ὥστε πάνυ εὖ ἔχει τὸ λέγεσθαι αὐτὰ ἄλογα, ὧν γε τὰ ἐναργέστατα αὐτά, τὰ ἑπτά, φωνὴν μόνον ἔχει, λόγον δὲ οὐδ' ὁντινοῦν.
ΣΩ. Τουτὶ μὲν ἄρα, ὦ ἑταῖρε, κατωρθώκαμεν περὶ ἐπι-
C στήμης. ΘΕΑΙ. Φαινόμεθα. ΣΩ. Τί δὲ | δή; τὸ μὴ γνωστὸν εἶναι τὸ στοιχεῖον, ἀλλὰ τὴν συλλαβὴν ἄρ' ὀρθῶς ἀποδεδείγμεθα; ΘΕΑΙ. Εἰκός γε. ΣΩ. Φέρε δή, τὴν συλλαβὴν πότερον λέγομεν τὰ ἀμφότερα στοιχεῖα, καὶ ἐὰν πλείω ᾖ ἢ δύο, τὰ πάντα, ἢ μίαν τινὰ ἰδέαν γεγονυῖαν συντεθέντων αὐτῶν; ΘΕΑΙ. Τὰ ἅπαντα ἔμοιγε δοκοῦμεν. ΣΩ. Ὅρα δὴ ἐπὶ δυοῖν, σῖγμα καὶ ω̄. ἀμφότερά ἐστιν ἡ πρώτη συλλαβὴ τοῦ ἐμοῦ ὀνόματος. ἄλλο τι ὁ γιγνώσκων αὐτὴν τὰ ἀμφότερα
D γιγνώσκει; ΘΕΑΙ. | Τί μήν; ΣΩ. Τὸ σῖγμα καὶ τὸ ω̄ ἄρα γιγνώσκει. ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Τί δέ; ἑκάτερον ἄρ' ἀγνοεῖ, καὶ οὐδέτερον εἰδὼς ἀμφότερα γιγνώσκει; ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλὰ δεινὸν καὶ ἄλογον, ὦ Σώκρατες. ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μέντοι εἴ γε ἀνάγκη ἑκάτερον γιγνώσκειν, εἴπερ ἀμφότερά τις γνώσεται, προγιγνώσκειν τὰ στοιχεῖα ἅπασα ἀνάγκη τῷ μέλλοντί ποτε γνώσεσθαι συλλαβήν, καὶ οὕτως ἡμῖν ὁ καλὸς λόγος ἀποδεδρακὼς οἰχή-
E σεται. ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ μάλα γε | ἐξαίφνης. ΣΩ. Οὐ γὰρ καλῶς αὐτὸν φυλάττομεν. χρῆν γὰρ ἴσως τὴν συλλαβὴν τίθεσθαι μὴ τὰ στοιχεῖα, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἐκείνων ἕν τι γεγονὸς εἶδος, ἰδέαν μίαν αὐτὸ αὑτοῦ ἔχον, ἕτερον δὲ

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τῶν στοιχείων. ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν· καὶ τάχ' ἂν μᾶλλον οὕτως ἢ ἐκείνως ἔχοι. ΣΩ. Σκεπτέον, καὶ οὐ προδοτέον οὕτως ἀνάνδρως μέγαν τε καὶ σεμνὸν λόγον. ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν. ΣΩ. Ἐχέτω δή, ὡς νῦν φαμέν, μία * ἰδέα ἐξ ἑκάστων τῶν συναρμοττόντων 204
στοιχείων γιγνομένη ἡ συλλαβὴ ὁμοίως ἔν τε γράμμασι καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασι. ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν μέρη αὐτῆς οὐ δεῖ εἶναι. ΘΕΑΙ. Τί δή; ΣΩ. Ὅτι οὗ ἂν ᾖ μέρη, τὸ ὅλον ἀνάγκη τὰ πάντα μέρη εἶναι. ἢ καὶ τὸ ὅλον ἐκ τῶν μερῶν λέγεις γεγονὸς ἕν τι εἶδος ἕτερον τῶν πάντων μερῶν; ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔγωγε. ΣΩ. Τὸ δὲ δὴ πᾶν καὶ τὸ ὅλον πότερον ταὐτὸν καλεῖς ἢ ἕτερον ¹ ἑκάτερον; ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔχω μὲν οὐδὲν σαφές, Β
ὅτι δὲ κελεύεις προθύμως ἀποκρίνασθαι, παρακινδυνεύων λέγω, ὅτι ἕτερον. ΣΩ. Ἡ μὲν προθυμία, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ὀρθή· εἰ δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀπόκρισις, σκεπτέον. ΘΕΑΙ. Δεῖ δέ γε δή. XLI. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν διαφέροι ἂν τὸ ὅλον τοῦ παντός, ὡς ὁ νῦν λόγος; ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Τί δὲ δή; τὰ πάντα καὶ τὸ πᾶν ἔσθ' ὅ τι διαφέρει; οἷον ἐπειδὰν λέγωμεν ἕν, δύο, τρία, τέτταρα, πέντε, ἕξ, καὶ ἐὰν δὶς τρία ἢ ¹ τρὶς δύο ἢ τέτταρά τε C
καὶ δύο ἢ τρία καὶ δύο καὶ ἕν, πότερον ἐν πᾶσι τούτοις τὸ αὐτὸ ἢ ἕτερον λέγομεν; ΘΕΑΙ. Ταὐτόν. ΣΩ. Ἆρ' ἄλλο τι ἢ ἕξ; ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδέν. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἑφ' ἑκάστης λέξεως πάντα τὰ ἓξ εἰρήκαμεν; ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Πάλιν δ' οὐδὲν λέγομεν τὰ πάντα λέγοντες; ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀνάγκη. ΣΩ. Ἡ ἄλλο τι ἢ τὰ ἕξ; ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδέν. ΣΩ. Ταὐτὸν ἄρα ἔν γε τοῖς ὅσα ἐξ ¹ ἀρι- D
θμοῦ ἐστι τό τε πᾶν προσαγορεύομεν καὶ τὰ ἅπαντα;

204 c. πάντα τὰ ἕξ. Heindorf. legit πᾶν τι τὰ ἕξ.

ΘΕΑΙ. Φαίνεται. ΣΩ. Ὧδε δὴ περὶ αὐτῶν λέγομεν. ὁ τοῦ πλέθρου ἀριθμὸς καὶ τὸ πλέθρον ταὐτόν. ἦ γάρ; ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Καὶ ὁ τοῦ σταδίου δὴ ὡσαύτως; ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν καὶ ὁ τοῦ στρατοπέδου γε καὶ τὸ στρατόπεδον, καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ὁμοίως; ὁ γὰρ ἀριθμὸς πᾶς τὸ ὂν πᾶν ἕκαστον αὐτῶν ἐστί. ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Ὁ δὲ ἑκάστων ἀριθμὸς μῶν ἄλλο
E τι ἢ μέρη | ἐστίν; ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδέν. ΣΩ. Ὅσα ἄρα ἔχει μέρη, ἐκ μερῶν ἂν εἴη; ΘΕΑΙ. Φαίνεται. ΣΩ. Τὰ δέ γε πάντα μέρη τὸ πᾶν εἶναι ὁμολογεῖται, εἴπερ καὶ ὁ πᾶς ἀριθμὸς τὸ πᾶν ἔσται. ΘΕΑΙ. Οὕτω. ΣΩ. Τὸ ὅλον ἄρ' οὐκ ἔστιν ἐκ μερῶν. πᾶν γὰρ ἂν εἴη, τὰ πάντα ὂν μέρη. ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκ ἔοικε. ΣΩ. Μέρος δ' ἔσθ' ὅτου ἄλλου ἐστὶν ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἢ τοῦ ὅλου; ΘΕΑΙ.
205 Τοῦ παντός γε. ΣΩ. * Ἀνδρικῶς γε, ὦ Θεαίτητε, μάχει. τὸ πᾶν δὲ οὐχ ὅταν μηδὲν ἀπῇ, αὐτὸ τοῦτο πᾶν ἐστίν; ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀνάγκη. ΣΩ. Ὅλον δὲ οὐ ταὐτὸν τοῦτο ἔσται, οὗ ἂν μηδαμῇ μηδὲν ἀποστατῇ; οὗ δ' ἂν ἀποστατῇ, οὔτε ὅλον οὔτε πᾶν, ἅμα γενόμενον ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ τὸ αὐτό; ΘΕΑΙ. Δοκεῖ μοι νῦν οὐδὲν διαφέρειν πᾶν τε καὶ ὅλον. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐλέγομεν, ὅτι οὗ ἂν μέρη ᾖ, τὸ ὅλον τε καὶ πᾶν τὰ πάντα μέρη ἔσται; ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ γε. ΣΩ. Πάλιν δή, ὅπερ ἄρτι ἐπεχείρουν, οὐκ, εἴπερ ἡ συλλαβὴ μὴ τὰ στοιχεῖά
B ἐστιν, ἀνάγκη αὐτὴν μὴ ὡς | μέρη ἔχειν ἑαυτῆς τὰ στοιχεῖα, ἢ ταὐτὸν οὖσαν αὐτοῖς ὁμοίως ἐκείνοις γνωστὴν εἶναι; ΘΕΑΙ. Οὕτως. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τοῦτο ἵνα μὴ γένηται, ἕτερον αὐτῶν αὐτὴν ἐθέμεθα; ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Τί δ'; εἰ μὴ τὰ στοιχεῖα συλλαβῆς μέρη ἐστίν, ἔχεις ἄλλ' ἄττα εἰπεῖν, ἃ μέρη μέν ἐστι συλλαβῆς, οὐ μέντοι στοιχεῖά γ' ἐκείνης; ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδαμῶς· εἰ γάρ,

ὦ Σώκρατες, μόρια ταύτης συγχωροίην, γελοῖόν που τὰ στοιχεῖα ἀφέντα ἐπ᾽ ἄλλα ἰέναι. ΣΩ. Παντάπασι δή, ὦ Θεαίτητε, | κατὰ τὸν νῦν λόγον μία τις ἰδέα ἀμέ- C ριστος συλλαβὴ ἂν εἴη. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔοικε. ΣΩ. Μέμνησαι οὖν, ὦ φίλε, ὅτι ὀλίγον ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν ἀπεδεχόμεθα ἡγούμενοι εὖ λέγεσθαι, ὅτι τῶν πρώτων οὐκ εἴη λόγος, ἐξ ὧν τὰ ἄλλα σύγκειται, διότι αὐτὸ καθ᾽ αὑτὸ ἕκαστον εἴη ἀσύνθετον, καὶ οὐδὲ τὸ εἶναι περὶ αὐτοῦ ὀρθῶς ἔχοι προσφέροντα εἰπεῖν, οὐδὲ τοῦτο, ὡς ἕτερα καὶ ἀλλότρια λεγόμενα, καὶ αὕτη δὴ ἡ αἰτία ἄλογόν τε καὶ ἄγνωστον αὐτὸ ποιοῖ; ΘΕΑΙ. Μέμνημαι. ΣΩ. | Ἡ οὖν D ἄλλη τις ἢ αὕτη ἡ αἰτία τοῦ μονοειδές τι καὶ ἀμέριστον αὐτὸ εἶναι; ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ὁρῶ ἄλλην. ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν δὴ φαίνεται. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἰς ταὐτὸν ἐμπέπτωκεν ἡ συλλαβὴ εἶδος ἐκείνῳ, εἴπερ μέρη τε μὴ ἔχει καὶ μία ἐστὶν ἰδέα; ΘΕΑΙ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. ΣΩ. Εἰ μὲν ἄρα πολλὰ στοιχεῖα ἡ συλλαβή ἐστι καὶ ὅλον τι, μέρη δ᾽ αὐτῆς ταῦτα, ὁμοίως αἵ τε συλλαβαὶ γνωσταὶ καὶ ῥηταὶ καὶ τὰ στοιχεῖα, ἐπείπερ τὰ πάντα μέρη τῷ ὅλῳ ταὐτὸν ἐφάνη. ΘΕΑΙ. | Καὶ E μάλα. ΣΩ. Εἰ δέ γε ἕν τε καὶ ἀμερές, ὁμοίως μὲν συλλαβή, ὡσαύτως δὲ στοιχεῖον ἄλογόν τε καὶ ἄγνωστον· ἡ γὰρ αὐτὴ αἰτία ποιήσει αὐτὰ τοιαῦτα. ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκ ἔχω ἄλλως εἰπεῖν. ΣΩ. Τοῦτο μὲν ἄρα μὴ ἀποδεχώμεθα, ὃς ἂν λέγῃ συλλαβὴν μὲν γνωστὸν καὶ ῥητόν, στοιχεῖον δὲ τοὐναντίον. ΘΕΑΙ. Μὴ γάρ, εἴπερ τῷ λόγῳ πειθόμεθα. ΣΩ. * Τί δ᾽ αὖ; τοὐναντίον 206 λέγοντος ἆρ᾽ οὐ μᾶλλον ἂν ἀποδέξαιο ἐξ ὧν αὐτὸς σύνοισθα σαυτῷ ἐν τῇ τῶν γραμμάτων μαθήσει; ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποῖον; ΣΩ. Ὡς οὐδὲν ἄλλο μανθάνων διετέλεσας ἢ τὰ στοιχεῖα ἔν τε τῇ ὄψει διαγιγνώσκειν

πειρώμενος καὶ ἐν τῇ ἀκοῇ αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτὸ ἕκαστον, ἵνα μὴ ἡ θέσις σε ταράττοι λεγομένων τε καὶ γραφομένων. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθέστατα λέγεις. ΣΩ. Ἐν δὲ κιθαριστοῦ τελέως μεμαθηκέναι μῶν ἄλλο τι ἦν ἢ τὸ τῷ φθόγ-
B γῳ | ἑκάστῳ δύνασθαι ἑπακολουθεῖν, ποίας χορδῆς εἴη· ἃ δὴ στοιχεῖα πᾶς ἂν ὁμολογήσειε μουσικῆς λέγεσθαι; ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδὲν ἄλλο. ΣΩ. Ὧν μὲν ἄρ' αὐτοὶ ἐμπειροί ἐσμεν στοιχείων καὶ συλλαβῶν, εἰ δεῖ ἀπὸ τούτων τεκμαίρεσθαι καὶ εἰς τὰ ἄλλα, πολὺ τὸ τῶν στοιχείων γένος ἐναργεστέραν τε τὴν γνῶσιν ἔχειν φήσομεν καὶ κυριωτέραν τῆς συλλαβῆς πρὸς τὸ λαβεῖν τελέως ἕκαστον μάθημα, καὶ ἐάν τις φῇ συλλαβὴν μὲν γνωστόν, ἄγνωστον δὲ πεφυκέναι στοιχεῖον, ἑκόντα ἢ ἄκοντα παίζειν ἡγησόμεθ' αὐτόν. ΘΕΑΙ. Κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν.
C XLII. ΣΩ. | Ἀλλὰ δὴ τούτου μὲν ἔτι κἂν ἄλλαι φανεῖεν ἀποδείξεις, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ· τὸ δὲ προκείμενον μὴ ἐπιλαθώμεθα δι' αὐτὰ ἰδεῖν, ὅ τι δήποτε καὶ λέγεται τὸ μετὰ δόξης ἀληθοῦς λόγον προσγενόμενον τὴν τελεωτάτην ἐπιστήμην γεγονέναι. ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκοῦν χρὴ ὁρᾶν. ΣΩ. Φέρε δή, τί ποτε βούλεται τὸν λόγον ἡμῖν σημαίνειν; τριῶν γὰρ ἕν τί μοι δοκεῖ λέγειν. ΘΕΑΙ. Τί-
D νων δή; ΣΩ. Τὸ μὲν πρῶτον εἴη | ἂν τὸ τὴν αὐτοῦ διάνοιαν ἐμφανῆ ποιεῖν διὰ φωνῆς μετὰ ῥημάτων τε καὶ ὀνομάτων, ὥσπερ εἰς κάτοπτρον ἢ ὕδωρ τὴν δόξαν ἐκτυπούμενον εἰς τὴν διὰ τοῦ στόματος ῥοήν. ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ σοι τὸ τοιοῦτον λόγος εἶναι; ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔμοιγε. τὸν γοῦν αὐτὸ δρῶντα λέγειν φαμέν. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν αὖ τοῦτο γε πᾶς ποιεῖν δυνατὸς θᾶττον ἢ σχολαίτερον, τὸ ἐνδείξασθαι τί δοκεῖ περὶ ἑκάστου αὐτῷ, ὁ μὴ ἐνεὸς ἢ κωφὸς ἀπ' ἀρχῆς· καὶ οὕτως ὅσοι τι ὀρθὸν δοξάζουσι, πάντες
E αὐτὸ μετὰ | λόγου φανοῦνται ἔχοντες, καὶ οὐδαμοῦ

ἔτι ὀρθὴ δόξα χωρὶς ἐπιστήμης γενήσεται. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθῆ. ΣΩ. Μὴ τοίνυν ῥᾳδίως καταγιγνώσκωμεν τὸ μηδὲν εἰρηκέναι τὸν ἀποφηνάμενον ἐπιστήμην, ὃ νῦν σκοποῦμεν. ἴσως γὰρ ὁ λέγων οὐ τοῦτο ἔλεγεν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐρωτηθέντα τί ἕκαστον δυνατὸν εἶναι τὴν ἀπόκρισιν διὰ τῶν στοιχείων ἀποδοῦναι * τῷ ἐρομένῳ. ΘΕΑΙ. 207
Οἷον τί λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες; ΣΩ. Οἷον καὶ Ἡσίοδος περὶ ἁμάξης λέγει τὸ ἑκατὸν δέ τε δούραθ' ἁμάξης. ἃ ἐγὼ μὲν οὐκ ἂν δυναίμην εἰπεῖν, οἶμαι δὲ οὐδὲ σύ· ἀλλ' ἀγαπῷμεν ἂν ἐρωτηθέντες ὅ τί ἐστιν ἅμαξα, εἰ ἔχοιμεν εἰπεῖν τροχοί, ἄξων, ὑπερτερία, ἄντυγες, ζυγόν. ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. ΣΩ. Ὁ δέ γε ἴσως οἴοιτ' ἂν ἡμᾶς, ὥσπερ ἂν τὸ σὸν ὄνομα ἐρωτηθέντας καὶ ἀποκρινομένους κατὰ συλλαβήν, γελοίους εἶναι ὀρθῶς μὲν δοξάζοντας καὶ B
λέγοντας ἃ λέγομεν, οἰομένους δὲ γραμματικοὺς εἶναι καὶ ἔχειν τε καὶ λέγειν γραμματικῶς τὸν τοῦ Θεαιτήτου ὀνόματος λόγον. τὸ δ' οὐκ εἶναι ἐπιστημόνως οὐδὲν λέγειν, πρὶν ἂν διὰ τῶν στοιχείων μετὰ τῆς ἀληθοῦς δόξης ἕκαστον περαίνῃ τις, ὅπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν που ἐῤῥήθη. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐῤῥήθη γάρ. ΣΩ. Οὕτω τοίνυν καὶ περὶ ἁμάξης ἡμᾶς μὲν ὀρθὴν ἔχειν δόξαν, τὸν δὲ διὰ τῶν ἑκατὸν ἐκείνων δυνάμενον διελθεῖν αὐτῆς τὴν οὐ- C
σίαν, προσλαβόντα τοῦτο, λόγον τε προσειληφέναι τῇ ἀληθεῖ δόξῃ καὶ ἀντὶ δοξαστικοῦ τεχνικόν τε καὶ ἐπιστήμονα περὶ ἁμάξης οὐσίας γεγονέναι, διὰ στοιχείων τὸ ὅλον περάναντα. ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκοῦν εὖ δοκεῖ σοι, ὦ Σώκρατες; ΣΩ. Εἰ σοί, ὦ ἑταῖρε, δοκεῖ, καὶ ἀποδέχει τὴν διὰ τοῦ στοιχείου διέξοδον περὶ ἑκάστου λόγον εἶναι, τὴν δὲ κατὰ συλλαβὰς ἢ καὶ κατὰ μεῖζον ἔτι ἀλογίαν, τοῦτό μοι λέγε, ἵν' αὐτὸ ἐπισκοπῶμεν. D

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλὰ πάνυ ἀποδέχομαι. ΣΩ. Πότερον ἡγούμενος ἐπιστήμονα εἶναι ὁντινοῦν ὁτουοῦν, ὅταν τὸ αὐτὸ ὁτὲ μὲν τοῦ αὐτοῦ δοκῇ αὐτῷ εἶναι, τοτὲ δὲ ἑτέρου, ἢ καὶ ὅταν τοῦ αὐτοῦ τοτὲ μὲν ἕτερον, τοτὲ δὲ ἕτερον δοξάζῃ; ΘΕΑΙ. Μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἔγωγε. ΣΩ. Εἶτα ἀμνημονεῖς ἐν τῇ τῶν γραμμάτων μαθήσει κατ' ἀρχὰς σαυτόν τε καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους δρῶντας αὐτά; ΘΕΑΙ. Ἆρα λέγεις τῆς
Ε αὐτῆς συλλαβῆς τοτὲ μὲν ἕτερον, τοτὲ δὲ [1] ἕτερον ἡγουμένους γράμμα, καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ τοτὲ μὲν εἰς τὴν προσήκουσαν, τοτὲ δὲ εἰς ἄλλην τιθέντας συλλαβήν; ΣΩ. Ταῦτα λέγω. ΘΕΑΙ. Μὰ Δί' οὐ τοίνυν ἀμνημονῶ, οὐδέ γέ πω ἡγοῦμαι ἐπίστασθαι τοὺς οὕτως ἔχοντας· ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; ὅταν ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ καιρῷ Θεαίτητον γράφων τις θῆται καὶ ε̄ οἴηταί τε δεῖν γράφειν καὶ
208 γράψῃ, καὶ αὖ * Θεόδωρον ἐπιχειρῶν γράφειν ταῦ καὶ ε̄ οἴηταί τε δεῖν γράφειν καὶ γράψῃ, ἆρ' ἐπίστασθαι φήσομεν αὐτὸν τὴν πρώτην τῶν ὑμετέρων ὀνομάτων συλλαβήν; ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλ' ἄρτι ὡμολογήσαμεν τὸν οὕτως ἔχοντα μήπω εἰδέναι. ΣΩ. Κωλύει οὖν τι καὶ περὶ τὴν δευτέραν συλλαβὴν καὶ τρίτην καὶ τετάρτην οὕτως ἔχειν τὸν αὐτόν; ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδέν γε. ΣΩ. Ἆρ' οὖν τότε τὴν διὰ στοιχείου διέξοδον ἔχων γράψει Θεαίτητον μετὰ ὀρθῆς δόξης, ὅταν ἐξῆς γράφῃ; ΘΕΑΙ. Δῆλον δή.
Β ΣΩ. [1] Οὐκοῦν ἔτι ἀνεπιστήμων ὤν, ὀρθὰ δὲ δοξάζων, ὡς φαμέν; ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Λόγον γε ἔχων μετὰ ὀρθῆς δόξης. τὴν γὰρ διὰ τοῦ στοιχείου ὁδὸν ἔχων ἔγραφεν, ἣν δὴ λόγον ὡμολογήσαμεν. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθῆ. ΣΩ. Ἔστιν ἄρα, ὦ ἑταῖρε, μετὰ λόγου ὀρθὴ δόξα, ἣν οὔπω δεῖ ἐπιστήμην καλεῖν. ΘΕΑΙ. Κινδυνεύει. XLIII. ΣΩ. Ὄναρ δή, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐπλουτήσαμεν οἰηθέντες ἔχειν

τὸν ἀληθέστατον ἐπιστήμης λόγον. ἢ μήπω κατηγορῶμεν; ἴσως γὰρ οὐ τοῦτό τις αὐτὸν ὁριεῖται, | ἀλ- C
λὰ τὸ λοιπὸν εἶδος τῶν τριῶν, ὧν ἕν γέ τι ἔφαμεν λόγον θήσεσθαι τὸν ἐπιστήμην ὁριζόμενον δόξαν εἶναι ὀρθὴν μετὰ λόγου. ΘΕΑΙ. Ὀρθῶς ὑπέμνησας· ἔτι γὰρ ἓν λοιπόν. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἦν διανοίας ἐν φωνῇ ὥσπερ εἴδωλον, τὸ δ' ἄρτι λεχθὲν διὰ στοιχείου ὁδὸς ἐπὶ τὸ ὅλον· τὸ δὲ δὴ τρίτον τί λέγεις; ΣΩ. Ὅπερ ἂν οἱ πολλοὶ εἴποιεν, τὸ ἔχειν τι σημεῖον εἰπεῖν, ᾧ τῶν ἁπάντων διαφέρει τὸ ἐρωτηθέν. ΘΕΑΙ. Οἷον τίνα τίνος ἔχεις μοι λόγον εἰπεῖν; ΣΩ. | Οἷον, εἰ βούλει, ἡλίου D
πέρι ἱκανὸν οἶμαί σοι εἶναι ἀποδέξασθαι, ὅτι τὸ λαμπρότατόν ἐστι τῶν κατὰ τὸν οὐρανὸν ἰόντων περὶ γῆν. ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. ΣΩ. Λαβὲ δὴ οὗ χάριν εἴρηται. ἔστι δὲ ὅπερ ἄρτι ἐλέγομεν, ὡς ἄρα τὴν διαφορὰν ἑκάστου ἂν λαμβάνῃς, ᾗ τῶν ἄλλων διαφέρει, λόγον, ὥς φασί τινες, λήψει· ἕως δ' ἂν κοινοῦ τινος ἐφάπτῃ, ἐκείνων πέρι σοι ἔσται ὁ λόγος, ὧν ἂν ἡ κοινότης ᾖ. ΘΕΑΙ. Μανθάνω· | καί μοι δοκεῖ καλῶς ἔχειν λόγον E
τὸ τοιοῦτον καλεῖν. ΣΩ. Ὃς δ' ἂν μετ' ὀρθῆς δόξης περὶ ὁτουοῦν τῶν ὄντων τὴν διαφορὰν τῶν ἄλλων προσλάβῃ, αὐτοῦ ἐπιστήμων γεγονὼς ἔσται, οὗ πρότερον ἦν δοξαστής. ΘΕΑΙ. Φαμέν γε μὴν οὕτω. ΣΩ. Νῦν δῆτα, ὦ Θεαίτητε, παντάπασιν ἔγωγε, ἐπειδὴ ἐγγὺς ὥσπερ σκιαγραφήματος γέγονα τοῦ λεγομένου, ξυνίημι οὐδὲ σμικρόν. ἕως δὲ ἀφεστήκη πόῤῥωθεν, ἐφαίνετό τί μοι λέγεσθαι. ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς τί τοῦτο; ΣΩ. * Φράσω, 209
ἐὰν οἷός τε γένωμαι. ὀρθὴν ἔγωγε ἔχων δόξαν περὶ σοῦ, ἐὰν μὲν προσλάβω τὸν σὸν λόγον, γιγνώσκω δή σε, εἰ δὲ μή, δοξάζω μόνον. ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Λόγος δέ γε

ἦν ἡ τῆς σῆς διαφορότητος ἑρμηνεία. ΘΕΑΙ. Οὕτως. ΣΩ. Ἡνίκ' οὖν ἐδόξαζον μόνον, ἄλλο τι ᾧ τῶν ἄλλων διαφέρεις, τούτων οὐδενὸς ἡπτόμην τῇ διανοίᾳ; ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκ ἔοικε. ΣΩ. Τῶν κοινῶν τι ἄρα διενοούμην, ὧν B οὐδὲν σὺ μᾶλλον ἢ τις ἄλλος ἔχει. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀνάγκη. ΣΩ. Φέρε δὴ πρὸς Διός· πῶς ποτε ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ σὲ μᾶλλον ἐδόξαζον ἢ ἄλλον ὁντινοῦν; θὲς γάρ με διανοούμενον, ὡς ἔστιν οὗτος Θεαίτητος, ὃς ἂν ᾖ τε ἄνθρωπος καὶ ἔχῃ ῥῖνα καὶ ὀφθαλμοὺς καὶ στόμα καὶ οὕτω δὴ ἓν ἕκαστον τῶν μελῶν. αὕτη οὖν ἡ διάνοια ἔσθ' ὅ τι μᾶλλον ποιήσει με Θεαίτητον ἢ Θεόδωρον διανοεῖσθαι, ἢ τὸ λεγόμενον, Μυσῶν τὸν ἔσχατον; ΘΕΑΙ. Τί γάρ; ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' ἐὰν δὴ μὴ μόνον τὸν ἔχοντα ῥῖνα καὶ ὀφθαλ- C μοὺς διανοηθῶ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸν σιμόν τε καὶ ἐξόφθαλμον, μή τι σὲ αὖ μᾶλλον δοξάσω ἢ ἐμαυτὸν ἢ ὅσοι τοιοῦτοι; ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδέν. ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' οὐ πρότερόν γε, οἶμαι, Θεαίτητος ἐν ἐμοὶ δοξασθήσεται, πρὶν ἂν ἡ σιμότης αὕτη τῶν ἄλλων σιμοτήτων ὧν ἐγὼ ἑώρακα διάφορόν τι μνημεῖον παρ' ἐμοὶ ἐνσημηναμένη καταθῆται, καὶ τἆλλα οὕτως ἐξ ὧν εἶ σύ, ἢ ἐμέ, καὶ ἐὰν αὔριον ἀπαντήσω, ἀναμνήσει καὶ ποιήσει ὀρθὰ δοξάζειν περὶ D σοῦ. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθέστατα. ΣΩ. Περὶ τὴν διαφορότητα ἄρα καὶ ἡ ὀρθὴ δόξα ἂν εἴη ἑκάστου πέρι. ΘΕΑΙ. Φαίνεταί γε. ΣΩ. Τὸ οὖν προσλαβεῖν λόγον τῇ ὀρθῇ δόξῃ τί ἂν ἔτι εἴη; εἰ μὲν γὰρ προσδοξάσαι λέγει ᾗ διαφέρει τι τῶν ἄλλων, πάνυ γελοία γίγνεται ἡ ἐπίταξις. ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς; ΣΩ. Ὧν ὀρθὴν δόξαν ἔχομεν, ᾗ τῶν ἄλλων διαφέρει, τούτων προσλαβεῖν κελεύει

209 c. ἢ ἔμε. Si ἢ Platonis est, neglegentius scriptum videtur. Sed nescio an debuerim vel cum Heindorfio ô vel ἁ reponere.

ἡμᾶς ὀρθὴν δόξαν, ᾗ τῶν ἄλλων διαφέρει. καὶ οὕτως ἡ μὲν σκυτάλης ἢ ὑπέρου ἢ ὅτου δὴ λέγεται περιτροπὴ πρὸς [1] ταύτην τὴν ἐπίταξιν οὐδὲν ἂν λέγοι, τυφλοῦ δὲ E παρακέλευσις ἂν καλοῖτο δικαιότερον· τὸ γὰρ ἃ ἔχομεν ταῦτα προσλαβεῖν κελεύειν, ἵνα μάθωμεν ἃ δοξάζομεν, πάνυ γενναίως ἔοικεν ἐσκοτωμένῳ. ΘΕΑΙ. Εἰπὲ δή, τί νῦν δὴ ὡς ἐρῶν ἐπύθου; ΣΩ. Εἰ τὸ λόγον, ὦ παῖ, προσλαβεῖν γνῶναι κελεύει, ἀλλὰ μὴ δοξάσαι τὴν διαφορότητα, ἡδὺ χρῆμ' ἂν εἴη τοῦ καλλίστου τῶν περὶ ἐπιστήμης λόγου. τὸ γὰρ γνῶναι ἐπιστήμην που λαβεῖν ἐστίν. * ᾗ γάρ; ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν 210 ἐρωτηθείς, ὡς ἔοικε, τί ἐστιν ἐπιστήμη, ἀποκρινεῖται, ὅτι δόξα ὀρθὴ μετὰ ἐπιστήμης διαφορότητος. λόγου γὰρ πρόσληψις τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη κατ' ἐκεῖνον. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔοικε. ΣΩ. Καὶ παντάπασί γε εὔηθες, ζητούντων ἡμῶν ἐπιστήμην, δόξαν φάναι ὀρθὴν εἶναι μετ' ἐπιστήμης εἴτε διαφορότητος εἴτε ὁτουοῦν. οὔτε ἄρα αἴσθησις, ὦ Θεαίτητε, οὔτε δόξα ἀληθὴς οὔτε μετ' ἀληθοῦς δόξης λόγος [1] προσγιγνόμενος ἐπιστήμη ἂν εἴη. ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκ B ἔοικεν. ΣΩ. Ἦ οὖν ἔτι κυοῦμέν τι καὶ ὠδίνομεν, ὦ φίλε, περὶ ἐπιστήμης, ἢ πάντα ἐκτετόκαμεν; ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ ναὶ μὰ Δί' ἔγωγε πλείω ἢ ὅσα εἶχον ἐν ἐμαυτῷ διὰ σὲ εἴρηκα. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ταῦτα μὲν ἅπαντα ἡ μαιευτικὴ ἡμῖν τέχνη ἀνεμιαῖά φησι γεγενῆσθαι καὶ οὐκ ἄξια τροφῆς; ΘΕΑΙ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. XLIV. ΣΩ. Ἐὰν τοίνυν ἄλλων μετὰ ταῦτα ἐγκύμων ἐπιχειρῇς γίγνεσθαι, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ἐάν τε [1] γίγνῃ, βελτιόνων ἔσει C πλήρης διὰ τὴν νῦν ἐξέτασιν, ἐάν τε κενὸς ᾖς, ἧττον ἔσει βαρὺς τοῖς συνοῦσι καὶ ἡμερώτερος, σωφρόνως οὐκ οἰόμενος εἰδέναι ἃ μὴ οἶσθα. τοσοῦτον γὰρ μόνον ἡ

ἐμὴ τέχνη δύναται, πλέον δὲ οὐδέν, οὐδέ τι οἶδα ὧν οἱ ἄλλοι, ὅσοι μεγάλοι καὶ θαυμάσιοι ἄνδρες εἰσί τε καὶ γεγόνασι. τὴν δὲ μαιείαν ταύτην ἐγώ τε καὶ ἡ μήτηρ ἐκ θεοῦ ἐλάχομεν, ἡ μὲν τῶν γυναικῶν, ἐγὼ δὲ τῶν
D νέων τε ¹ καὶ γενναίων καὶ ὅσοι καλοί. νῦν μὲν οὖν ἀπαντητέον μοι εἰς τὴν τοῦ βασιλέως στοὰν ἐπὶ τὴν Μελήτου γραφήν, ἣν με γέγραπται· ἔωθεν δέ, ὦ Θεόδωρε, δεῦρο πάλιν ἀπαντῶμεν.

TRANSLATION

WITH NOTES EXPLANATORY AND ILLUSTRATIVE.

TRANSLATION.

[*Euclides, founder of the Megaric School, and his friend Terpsion, both of them pupils of Socrates, meet in one of the streets of Megara. The former mentions that on his way to the harbour he had met Theaetetus, wounded and dangerously sick, being carried to Athens from the Athenian camp near Corinth. A conversation ensuing on the noble character of Theaetetus, and the estimation in which he was held by Socrates, Euclides says that he has at home in manuscript a dialogue, which Theaetetus took part in with Socrates. As Terpsion expresses a wish to hear this dialogue, the friends adjourn to the house of Euclides, where a slave reads it aloud to them as they repose.*] 1

Eu. Ha, Terpsion! long in[1] from the country[2]?

Ter. A good while. And you[3]—I was looking for you in the Agora, and wondering that I could not find you.

Eu. I was not in the city.

Ter. Where then?

1 [1] Ἄρτι...ἢ πάλαι; English idiom would say 'just in?' or 'long in?' but not both. The translation therefore omits one alternative.

[2] Ἐξ ἀγροῦ. Terpsion has a country residence; whether a town house also, there is nothing to show.

[3] Καὶ σέ γε. This emphasis implies a question as to the cause of Euclid's absence. The ἀγορὰ or market-square was a promenade, where a friend might be looked for at a certain time of day, as in the Cascine at Florence.

Eu. As I was going down[4] to the harbour I met with Theaetetus being carried to Athens from the camp at Corinth.

Ter. Alive or dead?

Eu. Alive, but only just[5]. Besides being very ill from wounds, he is more seriously affected[6] by the malady which has broken out in the army.

Ter. You mean the dysentery?

Eu. Yes.

Ter. In danger, you say, such a man as that!

Eu. Ay, a gallant and good one[7], Terpsion. It was but just now I heard some people praising him highly for his behaviour in the battle[8].

Ter. Nothing strange in that. It were far more surprising if he had not behaved so. But how came he not to put up here at Megara[9]?

Eu. He was in haste to get home. For all my entreaties and advice, he would not stay. So after accompanying him some way, as I went back I bethought me of the marvellous divination shown by Socrates in so many cases, especially in that of Theaetetus. I think it was but a little

[4] Καταβαίνων. The preposition κατὰ compounded with verbs of motion often implies coastward movement, the converse being ἀνά. The harbour was Nisaea.

[5] Καὶ μάλα. The intensive καὶ is largely used by Plato.

[6] Αἱρεῖ. A technical verb for morbid affection.

[7] Καλόν τε καὶ ἀγαθόν. Καλοκαγαθία is the Athenian term for the heroic ideal of a gentleman.

[8] Μάχην. What battle is here meant we cannot absolutely determine. The great battle near Corinth, in which the Lacedaemonians defeated the Athenians, was in July, 394 B.C. Grote, H. Gr. Part II. ch. lxxiv. Demosth. Lept. 41. But Plato may point to some other affair before 387.

[9] Αὐτοῦ Μεγαροῖ, two local adverbs = ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς Μεγάροις, at Megara itself; at the very place he had reached, viz. Megara.

while before his own death that he met him, a mere lad at the time, and, after conversing and arguing with him, admired his genius greatly. When I went to Athens, he repeated to me the arguments he had held with him—well worth hearing they were—and said this youth must inevitably become distinguished, if he should reach man's estate.

Ter. He spoke the truth, manifestly. But what were the arguments? Can you repeat them?

Eu. No indeed: not from mere recollection. But, having returned home immediately, I jotted down[10] some notes at once, and, afterwards taxing my memory at leisure, I went on writing; and, every time I visited Athens, I used to ask Socrates anything I had not remembered, and to make corrections on my return here. So that I have got nearly the whole conversation in writing.

Ter. True: I heard you say so once before; and I have always been meaning to bid you show it me, but have loitered till this moment. What hinders us from perusing it now? Especially as I am in real want of rest, after coming from the country.

Eu. Well, and I too escorted Theaetetus as far as Erineum[11]; so I should not dislike a siesta. Let us go then; and while we repose, the attendant shall read to us.

Ter. A good suggestion.

[*They go to Euclid's house.*]

Eu. Here is the manuscript, Terpsion. I must observe that I wrote out the conversation in my own way:—not in the narrative form as Socrates related it to me, but as a dialogue between him and his fellow-disputants, whom he

[10] Ἐγραψάμην. The use of the middle voice here, as compared with ἔγραφον afterwards, is notable: perhaps it implies the act of writing at the moment from recollection and *for his own* future revision.

[11] Erineum: a locality on the way from Megara to Athens.

stated to be Theodorus the geometrician and Theaetetus. And, in order to escape the troublesome notices between the speeches in my manuscript (such as, when Socrates was speaker, 'I spoke,' 'I said,' and, in case of an answerer, 'he agreed' or 'he disagreed') I wrote as if he were actually talking with them, and got rid of such interpolations.

Ter. Well, no harm in that, Euclid.

Eu. Now, boy, take the volume, and read.

[*The slave reads aloud all that follows.*]

2 [*The interlocutors in the following dialogue are: Socrates, Theodorus the geometrician of Cyrene, and Theaetetus. Two young friends of the latter are also present, one of whom is called Socrates; but neither of them is made to speak. Socrates, meeting Theodorus in a gymnasium at Athens, asks him if he has encountered any youths of promise. Theodorus names Theaetetus with high praise, adding that in some of his features he resembles Socrates. Theaetetus, then approaching with his two friends, is invited to sit beside Socrates, who engages him in a conversation about their personal resemblance. The purpose of it seems to be, partly to test the dialectic faculty of Theaetetus, partly to embolden him by relating the praise he has received from so competent a judge as Theodorus.*]

So. If I had a peculiar interest in Cyrene and its affairs, Theodorus, I would ask you about things there, and about its people, whether any of the young men in those parts are studying geometry or other scientific subjects. But I really care for them less than I do for our youth here, and would rather know which of our own young men are expected to become scholars. This therefore I observe for myself as well as I can, and inquire about it from every body else, with whom I see the young men desirous to converse. Now the largest number of pupils attend

your lectures; and justly: for you deserve it on many grounds, but especially for geometry. So I shall be glad to hear if you have met with any one worth naming.

Theo. Yes, Socrates; among your citizens I have met with a youth, whose character I can cite as well worthy of your attention. If he were handsome, I should be much afraid to mention him, lest any one should fancy I am in love with him. But in fact (don't be vexed with me) he is not handsome: he has a flat nose and protruding eyes like you: but less marked in his case than in yours. I speak then without scruple. And I can assure you that of all the persons I ever met (and I have associated with a great number) I never found any of a nature so wonderfully excellent. Aptitude for learning such as few attain, combined with a temper singularly mild, and furthermore with unrivalled courage, I could never have expected to find, nor have I ever seen any similar instances. Those who, like him, are quick and ready-witted and gifted with a good memory, are liable to keen emotions; they rush impetuously like unballasted vessels, and grow up with more of madness in them than of valour: whilst others of more solid temperament usually approach studies in a somewhat sluggish mood, and laden[1] with forgetfulness. But he comes to all his studies and investigations with perfect gentleness, like a current of oil flowing without sound, so smoothly, firmly and successfully, that we marvel to see one of his age perform these things as he does.

So. Good news indeed. Pray whose son is he?

Theo. I have heard the name, but do not remember it. However, he is the middle one of those who are now approaching us. He and these friends of his were anointing

2 [1] Γέμοντες. A word properly applied to laden vessels, and here opposed to ἀνερμάτιστα πλοῖα.

themselves just now in the outer race-course. They have finished, I suppose, and are coming this way. So see if you know him.

So. I do. He is the son of Sophronius of Sunium, just such a man, my friend, as you describe this one to be, of good repute generally, and, I can tell you, a man who left a considerable property. But I do not know the name of the youth.

Theo. Theaetetus is his name, Socrates: the property I fancy certain trustees have wasted: yet even in money matters he is wonderfully liberal.

So. A noble character you give him. Bid him come and sit down by me here.

Theo. I will. Theaetetus, come and sit here by Socrates.

So. Do by all means, Theaetetus, that I may view myself, and see what kind of face I have. Theodorus says it's like yours. Now if each of us held a lyre in his hand, and he said they were tuned to the same pitch, should we believe him at once, or should we have taken note whether he spoke as a musician?

Theae. We should have taken note.

So. And if we found him such, should we not believe him, if ignorant of music, we should disbelieve?

Theae. True.

So. And in the present case, I suppose, if we care at all for resemblance of faces, we must consider whether he speaks with a painter's skill or not.

Theae. I think so.

So. Is then Theodorus skilled in portrait-painting?

Theae. Not to my knowledge.

So. And is he not skilled in geometry?

Theae. Without doubt, Socrates.

So. And in astronomy and calculations and music[2] and every subject of education?

Theae. I think so.

So. If then he says, either by way of praise or dispraise, that we are alike in some bodily feature, it is not very well worth while to attend to him?

Theae. Perhaps not.

So. But how, if he were to praise the soul of one or the other for virtue and wisdom? Would it not be worth while for the one who heard the praise to observe him who was praised, and for the other to exhibit himself with alacrity?

Theae. Quite so, Socrates.

[*Socrates, after telling Theaetetus of the high praise given to him by* 3
Theodorus, and, questioning him about his studies, leads him to admit that the end to be gained by them is 'wisdom,' and that this is the same thing as 'knowledge.' He goes on to confess the difficulty he finds in defining what knowledge is, and invites the company to discuss the question. Theodorus declines for himself, pleading age and want of dialectic practice, but suggests that Theaetetus should be invited to carry on the discussion with Socrates.]

So. It is time, then, my dear Theaetetus, for you to exhibit and for me to observe. For I must tell you that, although Theodorus has often spoken to me with praise of many persons, both foreigners and citizens, he never gave such praise to anybody as he did to you just now.

Theae. I am glad to hear it, Socrates; but see to it, that he did not speak in jest.

[2] Μουσικός. This word can either mean 'musical,' or 'literary.' The former is more probable here.

So. That is not the way of Theodorus. So do not retract your admissions on the plea that our friend here speaks in jest, lest he be compelled to add an affidavit. I am sure nobody will indict him for perjury[1]. So stand to your confession boldly.

Theae. Yes, I must, if you think so.

So. Tell me now: you learn, I suppose, from Theodorus some lessons of geometry?

Theae. I do.

So. And of astronomy and harmony and calculations?

Theae. I use my best endeavour.

So. So do I, my boy, both from him and from all others whom I suppose to have any acquaintance with the subjects. Nevertheless, though I am in general pretty well versed in them, I have one little difficulty, which I must examine with your help and that of our friends here. Tell me, does not 'to learn' mean to become wiser in that which one learns?

Theae. Certainly.

So. And by wisdom it is, I suppose, that the wise are wise?

Theae. Yes.

So. Does this differ at all from knowledge?

Theae. Does what differ?

So. Wisdom. In things whereof we are knowing, are we not also wise?

Theae. Can it be otherwise?

So. Are then wisdom and knowledge the same thing?

Theae. Yes.

3 [1] Ἐπισκήψει. Heindorf rightly says: ἐπισκήπτειν h. l. est i. q. ἐγκαλεῖν ψευδομαρτυριῶν. The verb in this sense is usually middle; but Aeschines Tim. 142 has the active, ἣν οὐδὲ ψευδομαρτυριῶν ἔστιν ἐπισκῆψαι. See below 5; also Dict. Ant. (Martyria, Ἐπίσκηψις).

So. Now here is precisely my difficulty, and I cannot adequately comprehend in my own mind what knowledge really is. Are we then able to define it? What say ye? Which of us will speak first? Whoever misses the mark on each trial, shall sit down, as boys playing at ball say, for donkey: and whoever goes through to the end without missing, shall be our king[2], and shall command us to answer anything he likes to ask. But perhaps, Theodorus, my love of discussion leads me to be rude in trying so hard to make us argue, and become friendly and chatty with one another.

Theo. No, Socrates, such a wish is the reverse of rudeness. But call on one of the youths to answer you. I am unaccustomed to this kind of debate, and too old to acquire the habit. It would suit our young friends, and they would get on much better: for it is a fact that in all things youth has the gift of progress. So, as you had Theaetetus in hand at first, do not let him go, but continue to question him.

[*Theaetetus, having modestly consented to take his share of the argument,* 4 *endeavours to define 'knowledge' by enumerating various sciences and arts which are specific kinds of it. Hereupon Socrates, by a series of elenctic questions in the dialectic manner, exposes the futility of all attempts to define, which contain the term itself proposed for definition.*]

So. You hear then, Theaetetus, what Theodorus says; and you will not, I think, wish to disobey him. In such matters a wise man's injunctions cannot be lawfully disobeyed by his junior. Speak then well and nobly. What do you think that knowledge is?

Theae. I must, Socrates, since you both require. No doubt, if I make any blunder, you will correct me.

[2] Βασιλεύσει. See Hor. Epist. I. 1, 59: pueri ludentes, Rex eris, aiunt, si recte facies.

So. Certainly, if we are able.

Theae. Well then, I think that all the things one can learn from Theodorus are knowledge; geometry for instance and the others which you enumerated just now: and again leather-dressing[1], and the trades of the other craftsmen, all and each, I consider nothing else than knowledge.

So. In a truly noble and bountiful style, my friend, when asked for one thing you give many, and various things instead of a simple one.

Theae. Why, what is the sense of your words, Socrates?

So. Perhaps none at all[2]: however, I will explain what I mean. When you name leather-dressing, do you intend anything else than the knowledge of the manufacture of shoes?

Theae. Nothing else.

So. Or when you name carpentry, do you intend anything but the knowledge of the manufacture of wooden implements?

Theae. No, nothing.

So. In both cases then, you express that thing of which each is the knowledge?

Theae. Yes.

So. But the question put, Theaetetus, was not concerning the various subjects of knowledge, or their number. We did not ask with a wish to count them, but to know what the nature of knowledge itself is. Am I talking nonsense?

Theae. No, quite correctly.

So. Consider this also. Should some one ask us any trivial and obvious question, such as, what is clay? if we

4 [1] Σκυτοτομική and σκυτική, σκυτοτόμοι and σκυτεῖς are indifferently used for the shoe-trade.

[2] Οὐδέν (λέγω). Λέγειν οὐδέν, to speak unreasonably (wrongly); λέγειν τι to speak reasonably (rightly).

said in reply, the clay of the potters, and the clay of the stove-makers, and the clay of the brickmakers, should we not deserve to be laughed at?

Theae. Probably.

So. In the first place because we thought the questioner would understand us from our answer, when we introduce the word 'clay,' whether we add that of the doll-makers, or of any other craftsmen. Does anybody, think you, understand any name of anything, when he does not know its correct meaning?

Theae. Not at all.

So. Then he who is ignorant of 'knowledge,' does not understand 'knowledge of shoes.'

Theae. He does not.

So. And he who is ignorant of knowledge does not understand leather-dressing or any other art?

Theae. True.

So. Then an answer made to the question—What is knowledge? is ridiculous, when a person gives in his reply the name of some art. For he names 'the knowledge of something,' when that was not the thing asked from him.

Theae. Apparently.

So. In the next place, when he might have answered easily and briefly, he goes an infinite way round. For instance, in the question about clay, it was easy and simple to say, that clay is moistened earth, and to abstain from adding whose it is.

[*Theaetetus now accepts the principle of definition laid down by Socrates, and illustrates it by citing certain mathematical terms adopted by himself and his fellow-student, young Socrates, to distinguish rational and irrational numbers. These terms are* (α) τετράγωνος ἀριθμός, *square number* (4, 9, 16, 25...n^2); (β) προμήκης ἀριθμός, *oblong*

number (the rest exc. 1); (γ) μῆκος, length (all integral numbers after 1) which may be represented by straight lines, and used to form squares; (δ) δυνάμεις (irrational roots, $\sqrt{3}$, $\sqrt{5}$, $\sqrt{6}$ &c.) which are incommensurable with the unit of length (ποδιαῖα), but can become sides of figures commensurable in area with squares. Socrates applauds this invention, and exhorts Theaetetus to apply his mind in the same way to discover a definition of knowledge.]

Theae. Yes, Socrates; this method now indeed appears easy. You seem to be asking the same sort of question that occurred some time since to us in our discussions;—to myself I mean, and your namesake, Socrates here.

So. What was that, Theaetetus?

Theae. Theodorus was writing out for us something about 'powers,' proving, as to the 'tripod[1]' and the 'pentepod,' that in length they are not commensurable with the foot-unit: and so proceeding one by one as far as seventeen: but here he somehow came to a pause. We then bethought us of such a notion as this: since the 'powers' were evidently infinite in number, to try to comprise them under one term, by which we should entitle all these 'powers.'

So. Did you find any such term?

Theae. I think we did. Consider it yourself.

So. Speak on.

Theae. We divided number generally into two classes, one, that which is capable of being formed by the multiplication of equal factors into one another, we likened in form to the square, and called it square and equilateral.

So. Very good.

5 [1] Τρίπους, as Heindorf says, is εὐθεῖα δυνάμει τρίπους, i.e. $\sqrt{3}$, which is irrational (not commensurate with the foot-unit, not integral), but potentially rational (becoming so when squared: $\sqrt{3}\times\sqrt{3}=3$). So πεντέπους and the rest. The use of δύναμις is therefore different from the modern mathematical term "power" (x^2, x^3...x^n).

Theae. All intervening numbers, to which belong 3 and 5 and every one that is incapable of being formed by the multiplication of equal factors, but is formed either by a larger number having a smaller—or by a smaller number having a larger—as its multiplier, we likened on the other hand to the oblong figure, which in every instance has greater and lesser sides, and called it oblong number[2].

So. Excellent. What next?

Theae. All lines which being squared form an equilateral plane figure we defined to be 'length'; all which form an oblong, we comprised under the name 'powers' (i.e. irrational roots), as not being commensurable with the others except through the surfaces which they have power to form[3]. And similarly with respect to the solids (cubes).

So. Nobody in the world could do better, my boys. So I do not think Theodorus will incur the guilt of perjury.

Theae. But as to your question about knowledge, Socrates, I could not answer it in the same way as that about length and power. Yet you seem to me to be looking for some such answer. So that now Theodorus again appears to be a false speaker.

So. Well, but if he had praised your running, and said he had never met with any young man so fleet, and then in

[2] This appears as a general expression in the form

$$n \times 1\frac{1}{n}\left(=1\frac{1}{n}\times n\right)=n+1.$$

Example: $2 \times 1\frac{1}{2}\,(=1\frac{1}{2}\times 2)=3$. As n is any integer, this includes all numbers greater than unity, *τετράγωνος* as well as *προμήκης ἀριθμός*.

[3] *Τοῖς δ' ἐπιπέδοις ἃ δύναται.* Thus $\sqrt{12}$ being 3·464 (nearly), $\sqrt{12}\times\sqrt{12}=12=2\times 6=3\times 4=$(geometrically represented) a rectangle with sides respectively either 2 and 6, or 3 and 4, or an imaginary square with side 3·464 (nearly).

a racing-match you had been defeated by one in the prime of life, and very fleet, do you think his praise would have been any the less true?

Theae. I do not.

So. And, as to knowledge, as I was saying a little while since, do you think it a small thing to discover its nature, and not one of the highest achievements?

Theae. Nay indeed, Socrates, I do place it among the very highest of all.

So. Then be at ease about yourself: and consider that Theodorus speaks truly, and shew desire in every way to obtain a right definition of knowledge, as of all other things.

Theae. As for desire, Socrates, it will not be found wanting.

6 [*Theaetetus, though he has not yet succeeded in finding a definition of knowledge, confesses a mental feeling that he is always on the verge of success. Socrates likens this feeling to the throes of impending child-birth in women: and reminding Theaetetus that he himself (Socrates) is the son of an excellent midwife, he claims the analogous function of assisting the labour of intellectual parturition in the minds of young men; and describes the obstetric art in many of its details, with a view to illustrate and justify his own method as an educator.*]

So. Come then: you made a good suggestion just now. Imitate your answer about the 'powers'. As you comprised their vast number under one term, so also try to describe the many kinds of knowledge by a single definition.

Theae. I assure you, Socrates, I have often endeavoured to gain insight into that matter, while listening to the questions you put. But, though I cannot persuade myself that I have anything important of my own to say, or that I have heard from some one else any such statement as you require,

nevertheless I cannot rid myself of the feeling that I am on the point of doing so[1].

So. Oh! you are in the throes of labour, dear Theaetetus, through being not empty, but pregnant.

Theae. I do not know, Socrates. I tell you my feeling, at all events.

So. Have you not heard then, simpleton, that I am the son of a very famous and solid midwife, Phaenarete?

Theae. I have heard it before now.

So. Have you heard too that I practise the same art?

Theae. Never.

So. I do really. But don't tell of me to other people. I am not known, my friend, to have this skill. And others, being unaware, do not say this of me, but only that I am a very strange person, and that I perplex people. Have you heard this too?

Theae. I have.

So. Shall I tell you the reason?

Theae. Pray do.

So. Reflect then upon the general situation of midwives, and you will more easily learn what I mean. You know, I suppose, that none of them practise while they are still conceiving and bearing children, but those alone who are past child-bearing.

Theae. Certainly.

So. This custom is said to be derived from Artemis, for that she, though a virgin, has the charge of parturition. Accordingly, she did not indeed allow barren women to become midwives, because human nature is too weak to acquire an art of which it has no experience: but she assigned it to

6 [1] Μέλλειν is undoubtedly the true reading, giving the cue to the parable of the midwives. Μέλειν would fail to do this.

those who are past the age of childbearing, in honour of their resemblance to herself.

Theae. Naturally.

So. Is not this also natural, that those who conceive and those who do not are better known by midwives than by others?

Theae. Quite so.

So. Moreover also midwives, by giving drugs and chanting incantations, are able to excite the throes and to quell them, if they will, and to make those who have a hard time bring forth: and they produce abortion[1], if the case require it.

Theae. True.

So. Have you furthermore noted this in them, that they are also very clever match-makers, being well skilled to know what woman uniting with what man must bear the finest children?

Theae. I was not quite aware of that.

So. I assure you they pride themselves on this much more than on their special practice[2]. Just consider. Do you think the care and collection of the fruits of the earth belongs to one art, and the knowledge of what soil you must plant or sow to another?

Theae. No, to the same.

So. And do you consider it different in the case of a woman?

Theae. Seemingly not.

So. No, truly. But on account of the unlawful and

[1] Νέον ὄν. Prof. Campbell writes, 'Sc. τὸ βρέφος, said here of the embryo "at an early stage," i.e. before it is dangerous to do so.' But most commentators do not believe that νέον would be used of τὸ κύημα. Heindorf conjectures δέον for νέον ὄν. The words may be a gloss, and in translation no point is lost by neglecting them, as above.

[2] Gr. ὁμφαλητομίᾳ.

unscientific conciliation of man and woman, which is termed 'procuration,' midwives, being a respectable body, shun match-making, fearing lest by this they should incur the other charge. For it is only to genuine midwives, I suppose, that the art of correct match-making belongs.

Theae. Apparently so.

So. Thus highly important is the function of midwives; but less so than my procedure. For, it does not happen to women at one time to bear idols, at another true children, so that it shall not be easy to distinguish them. Had they been liable to this, the greatest and noblest task for midwives would have been to decide between the true child and the untrue. Do you not think so?

Theae. I do.

[*The parable of the application of the obstetric art to the labours of the intellect is carried on and concluded.*] 7

So. But my art of midwifery, though it has in other respects the same conditions as theirs, differs in these points, that I attend men, not women, and that I inspect the labour of their souls, not of their bodies. The most important skill in our art is, the being able to test in every way whether the young man's mind is bringing forth an idol and an unreality, or a genuine and true progeny. For to me as well as to the midwives belongs the following condition. I am incapable of producing wisdom, and the reproach which many ere now have cast on me, that, while I question others, I myself give no answer about anything, because I have no wisdom in me, is a just reproach. The reason of it is this: the god compels me to act the midwife, but hindered me from engendering. I then am not indeed perfectly wise myself, nor have I brought to birth any discovery of that

kind, as the outcome of my own soul. But of those who resort to me, some indeed appear in the outset utterly ignorant, but all, as the intercourse proceeds, and the god gives opportunity, make wonderful progress, in their own opinion and in that of others. And it is evident that they do so not by any learning they have gained from me, but because they have of themselves discovered many excellent things, which they retain. Of that midwifery however I and the god are authors. The proof is this. Many persons ere now, not knowing that fact, and imputing all to themselves while they despised me, quitted me earlier than they ought, either of their own will or by the persuasion of others[1]. After this, they baulked all subsequent conceptions by evil intercourse, and lost by ill nurture the offspring which I had helped them to, valuing unrealities and idols more than truths; and ended by seeming to themselves, as to everybody else, mere blockheads. One of these, though there are many more, is Aristeides[2] son of Lysimachus. When these truants come back and pray for admission to my society, and move heaven and earth to gain it, with some of them my familiar genius forbids me to consort, with others it allows me: and these

7 [1] ἢ αὐτοὶ ἢ ὑπ' ἄλλων πεισθέντες. The translation follows this conjecture; MSS. omit the second ἢ, by the absence of which αὐτοὶ becomes void of sense and propriety. Is it not possible that Plato wrote καὶ ἢ αὐτοὶ ἑαυτοὺς (μὲν) αἰτιασάμενοι ἐμοῦ δὲ καταφρονήσαντες ἢ ὑπ' ἄλλων πεισθέντες κ.τ.λ. 'Many ere now, being ignorant of this, and either imputing all to themselves, while they contemned me, or persuaded by others &c. &c.'? This would give a still better sense than the adopted reading, viz. Many forsook the teaching of Socrates: *all* did so in ignorance of his divinely given power (τοῦτο ἀγνοήσαντες); but *some* through self-conceit (ἢ αὐτοὶ ἑαυτοὺς αἰτιασάμενοι), *some* through yielding to persuasion (ἢ ὑπ' ἄλλων πεισθέντες). Also the passage would be more perspicuous if ἑαυτοὺς μὲν were written.

[2] Ἀριστείδης, a descendant of the great Aristeides.

latter improve again. And this affection also they that associate with me have in common with women in labour: they feel throes and are full of worry day and night much more than the women. And my art has the power to excite and allay that throe. So much then for them. And sometimes, Theaetetus, when any do not seem to me to be pregnant, perceiving that they do not need me, I very kindly make a match for them, and, with the blessing of heaven, I guess very aptly by whose conversation they will profit. Many I have made over to Prodicus[3], many to other wise and inspired men. I have spoken at this length to you because I suspect, in conformity with your own opinion, that you are suffering throes from some inward conception. Deal with me then as the son of a midwife, and a practitioner myself, and try to answer my questions as well as you are able. And if, on examining anything you say, I consider it an idol and not a true progeny, and so remove it quietly and put it away, don't be angry as women at their first lying in are about their infants. For many, my good friend, have felt towards me so that they are actually ready to bite me when I take from them any cherished trifle: and they imagine I am not acting kindly; so little are they aware that no god is unkind to men, and that I do nothing of this sort from ill will. But my sense of duty will in no wise allow me to accept falsehood and stifle truth.

[*Theaetetus, again exhorted by Socrates, takes courage, and suggests as a* 8
defining term for knowledge αἴσθησις, *perception* (*sensation, sensuous perception*). *Socrates at once identifies this definition with the famous doctrine of Protagoras,* πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἄνθρωπος, '*man is*

[3] Ἐξέδωκα Προδίκῳ. Ἐκδιδόναι (θυγατέρα) means 'to give a daughter in marriage.' Prodicus of Ceos was a famous Sophist, learned in history, mythology, and legend.

the measure of all things.' He goes on to argue that this implies 'what appears to each is true to each;' and after illustrating by an example he farther proceeds to connect this view with that of Heracleitus and his school (to whom he adds Homer) respecting a perpetual motion or flux of all things—πάντα ῥεῖ. This doctrine does not suffer a fixed term of being to be given to anything, such as 'one,' 'some,' 'of some quality,' 'great,' 'small,' 'heavy,' 'light,' &c. Nothing 'is' *any of these, but by motion and commixture all things* 'become' *this or that. There is no 'being,' only 'coming to be.'*]

So now again, returning to the point, Theaetetus, endeavour to say what knowledge is: and never reply that you are unable: for if the god please and you play the man, you will be able.

Theae. Well, Socrates, when you thus exhort, I must own it were disgraceful not to use one's utmost endeavour to state what suggests itself to the mind. It seems to me then that he who knows anything perceives what he knows; and, in my present view, knowledge is nothing else than PERCEPTION[1].

So. Well and nobly said, my boy. It is quite proper to speak with such open frankness. But now let us examine the doctrine in common, to see whether it is a genuine product or a wind-egg. Knowledge, you say, is perception?

Theae. Yes.

So. I really think you have given an account of knowledge which is not insignificant, being one which Protagoras also gave. But he has said the same thing in a different way. He says, I fancy, that 'man[2] is the measure of all

8 [1] Αἴσθησις. *Sensation; perception;* or rather, 'sensuous perception,' which must be understood when either of the two former terms is used in this translation.

[2] Ἄνθρωπον, i.e. the human mind; the mind of each percipient.

things;' of things existing, that they do exist; of non-existing things, that they do not exist. Have you perhaps read this?

Theae. Yes, I have read it often.

So. He speaks then to this effect, that such as things appear to me, they severally are to me; and such as they appear to you, they severally are to you. The term 'man' includes you and me.

Theae. He does speak so.

So. Yes; and it is probable that a wise man is not talking nonsense: so let us follow his track. Does it not sometimes happen that, when the same wind is blowing, one of us is cold, the other not; and one is slightly cold, the other exceedingly?

Theae. No doubt.

So. Shall we then in that case say the wind in itself[3] is cold or not cold; or shall we assent to Protagoras that to one who feels it cold it is cold, to one who does not feel it, not?

Theae. The latter, I should say.

So. And this is apparent to each?

Theae. Yes.

So. And the term 'is apparent' implies 'perceiving'?

Theae. It does.

So. Appearance then and perception concur in things warm and the like generally. For such as each perceives them, they probably are to each.

Theae. Yes.

So. Perception then is always of that which 'is'; and it is unerring, since it is knowledge.

[3] In itself. Codd. have ἐφ' ἑαυτό, which Prof. Campbell supports by examples. Bekker reads ἐφ' ἑαυτῷ. But ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ is most usual in this sense.

Theae. Manifestly.

So. In the name of the Graces, then, was Protagoras a man of consummate shrewdness, and did he hint this darkly to us of the common herd, while to his disciples he spoke 'the truth' in secret confidence[4]?

Theae. What do you mean by this, Socrates?

So. I will state to you a doctrine of no slight importance: namely, that nothing in itself 'is one,' nor can you rightly call a thing 'some' or 'of some kind,' but, if you style it great, it will turn out also small, and if heavy, light, and so in every case; since nothing 'is' 'one' or 'some,' or 'of some kind': but from vection and motion and mixture with each other all things 'come to be,' of which we say that they 'are,' using a wrong term: for nothing at any time 'is,' but always 'comes to be.' And on this point let all philosophers except Parmenides[5] be compared in their order, Protagoras and Heracleitus and Empedocles[6]: and of the poets those that are consummate in each poetic kind,

[4] The work in which Protagoras expounded his doctrine was called Ἀλήθεια, Truth. To this circumstance Plato here alludes, but perhaps, as Prof. Campbell says, he means that Protagoras "*told the real truth*, not in his book which is so entitled, but privately to his disciples."

[5] Πλὴν Παρμενίδου. Parmenides, the greatest name to the Eleatic School and here made its representative (though Xenophanes before him, and Zeno after him, taught similar principles), held the doctrine directly opposed to the Heracleitean, namely, that the universe is one, continuous, stable: that only 'being' is; 'non-being' is not; there is no 'becoming.'

[6] Ἐμπεδοκλῆς. Prof. Campbell justly says that Plato introduced the words κράσεως πρὸς ἄλληλα in order to include Empedocles of Agrigentum, who, without accepting the doctrine of Heracleitus, that οὐδὲν ἔστι, πάντα γίγνεται, denied the Eleatic unity, continuity and stability of substance, teaching that phenomenal changes are caused by the intermixture of four elements (fire, air, water, earth) which are themselves alone unchangeable.

in the comic, Epicharmus[7], in the tragic, Homer[8]; for in saying

Ocean of gods progenitor and Tethys mother

he has said that all things are born from flux and motion. Does he not seem to say so?

Theae. I think he does.

[*The Heracleitean doctrine* (πάντα ῥεῖ) *is further expounded and seemingly defended. But, as it is confuted afterwards* (28), *we must explain this defence as an instance of the Socratic* εἰρωνεία.] 9

So. After this then, who that disputes with so great a host, and Homer its captain, can avoid making himself ridiculous?

Theae. It were not easy, Socrates.

So. No indeed, Theaetetus. Since our statement—that motion produces the semblant[1] 'being,' and the 'coming to be,' while 'non-being' and 'perishing' are produced by rest—has in its favour many competent proofs. The heat of fire, which engenders and protects other things, is itself engendered by vection and attrition. And these are motions[2]. Are not these the parents of fire?

[7] Ἐπίχαρμος. Diogenes Laertius, III. 10, quotes verses from Epicharmus, the comic poet of Syracuse (490 B.C.), which contain the doctrine of perpetual mutation.

[8] Τραγῳδίας δὲ Ὅμηρος. Plato recognizes only two forms of poetry, viz. Comedy and Tragedy, including in the latter Epic poetry, and its great master Homer. See Rep. X. 495 D, ἐπισκεπτέον τήν τε τραγῳδίαν καὶ τὸν ἡγέμονα αὐτῆς Ὅμηρον.

9 [1] Τὸ μὲν εἶναι δοκοῦν. As he is professing to expound the Heracleitean theory, which does not admit τὸ εἶναι, he evasively says τὸ εἶναι δοκοῦν, 'the semblant being.'

[2] Τούτῳ δὲ κινήσεις. This is the reading in most codd., for which

Theae. They are.

So. Moreover the race of animals is produced from them?

Theae. To be sure.

So. Again: is not the habit of bodies ruined by rest and laziness, and preserved in general[3] by exercise and motion?

Theae. Yes.

So. And does not the habit of the soul by learning and study, which are motions, acquire doctrines and preserve[4] them and become better, while through rest, which is the absence of study and learning, it both learns nothing, and forgets what it has learnt?

Theae. Decidedly.

So. The one then, namely motion, is a good both in soul and body, the other is the reverse.

Theae. Seemingly.

So. Must I farther mention to you calms and serenities and such-like things, showing that quietudes rot and destroy, while their opposites preserve? and besides these must I clinch the matter[5], and evince that by the golden cord[6] Homer means nothing but the sun, and indicates that, as long as the revolution continues, and the sun keeps moving,

κινήσει (dual) is suggested. But some have τοῦτο δὲ κίνησις, which Bekker edits, and Campbell approves.

[3] In general, ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, read in many codd. and by Stobaeus. Professors Jowett and Campbell prefer ἐπὶ πολὺ 'for a long time,' as in cod. Bodl.

[4] Σώζεται. The middle voice of σώζω is specially used of 'memory.'

[5] Τὸν κολοφῶνα ἀναγκάζω προσβιβαζων; 'must I bring up my crowning reason and prove conclusively (ἀναγκάζω)'? See Strabo's explanation of κολοφὼν in Liddell and Scott's Lexicon. Others have been given, for which see Heindorf's note.

[6] For Homer's χρυσῇ σειρά see Il. VIII. 47.

all things in heaven and earth exist and are preserved; but should this stand still as if fettered, all things would be spoilt, and, as the saying is, turned upside down?

Theae. In my judgment, Socrates, he does indicate what you say.

[*The relativity of the facts of sensation is illustrated by the phenomena of colour, number and size. What you call colour has no definite place or existence within or without you. It is the result of a passing collision between your eyes and the flux of things suited to act on them. It is neither in the agent nor in the patient, but generated in passage between them. It will not be the same to two subjects nor to the same subject at different times. The object measured or touched cannot be in itself great, white, hot or anything else; if it were, it would not appear different to another subject. The subject touching or measuring cannot be any of these, for, if so, it would be so always, and would not be modified by application to another object. Socrates illustrates by six dice, which, as compared with four, are more, and half as many again (i.e. 3 : 2), but fewer and half compared with twelve (i.e. 1 : 2). Can then anything become more without being increased; or fewer without being diminished? Theaetetus is puzzled; and Socrates merrily suggests that they are amusing themselves with mere quibbles, like Megarian disputants.*] 10

So. Conceive the matter in this way, my good friend. As to vision first: that what you call white colour is not in itself something outside your eyes or in your eyes. And do not assign to it any place: for then, being somewhere in position, it would 'be' and remain, and would not by generation 'come to be.'

Theae. How so?

So. Let us follow the doctrine we were lately stating, that nothing exists as an independent unit; and in that way we shall see that black and white and every other colour have 'come to be' from the coincidence of the eyes with the suitable motion; and that what in each case we call

colour, is neither that which makes nor that which receives the impact, but something between, which is peculiar to each. Or would you insist that what each colour appears to you, such it appears also to a dog or any other animal?

Theae. No indeed, I would not.

So. Again: does anything appear to another man like what it appears to you? Are you strongly convinced it does, or are you much rather sure that even to yourself it is not the same, because at no two times are you exactly the same?

Theae. The latter seems to me truer than the former.

So. Accordingly, if a thing beside which we measure ourselves, or which we handle, were large or white or hot, it would never have become different by contact with some other, unless it underwent a change in itself. And if again the measuring or handling subject had been any of these, it would not have become different when another approached or suffered any affection, if there were no affection in itself. For now, my friend, we are compelled in a careless sort of way to say marvellous and ridiculous things, as Protagoras would affirm, and every one who ventures to propound the same that he does.

Theae. How do you mean? and what kind of things?

So. Take a small sample, and you will know what I mean. Six dice, if you place four beside them, we say are more in number and half as many again. If you bring twelve, we say the six are fewer in number, and half the second set. To say otherwise were intolerable. Will you tolerate it?

Theae. No, I will not.

So. Well: suppose Protagoras or some one else were to ask you:—Theaetetus, is it possible for anything to

become greater or more, except by being increased? What answer would you give?

Theae. If I were to answer what I think in reply to your present question, Socrates, I should say 'no': but if with reference to the former one, to avoid self-contradiction, I should say 'yes.'

So. Well said, my friend, by Hera, and divinely. But if you answer 'yes,' something will occur like the case in Euripides[1]: our tongue will be unconvicted, but our mind not unconvicted.

Theae. True.

So. So then, if you and I were clever and wise folk who had intimately studied the whole sphere of mind, and from that time forth amused ourselves with trying one another's powers, we should have engaged in a sophistical conflict of this kind, and be bandying arguments with each other[2]. But now, as we are not professors, we shall wish to look at the statements comparatively, and see what it is we mean; whether they are consistent with each other or inconsistent.

Theae. Certainly that is what I should wish.

[*The contradictions and difficulties implied in these statements are now set forth. It cannot possibly be true that anything becomes greater or less while it is equal to itself, or is increased without addition or diminished without subtraction, or that it is what it was not before without having 'come to be.' And yet the case of the six dice, and the case of an old man who was taller than a growing youth and in the course of one year is shorter without having 'come to be' different, seem to clash with these indubitable propositions. What are we to* 11

10 [1] Εὐριπίδειόν τι. See Hippol. 612, ἡ γλῶσσ' ὀμώμοχ' ἡ δὲ φρὴν ἀνώμοτος.

[2] In this passage Plato censures the pseudo-dialectic (eristic) practice of certain sophistic teachers as idle waste of time.

say? Theaetetus wonders till he feels dizzy. Wonder, says Socrates, is a philosophic affection, and I will try to enlighten you by a fuller exposition of the Heracleitean doctrine.]

So. So should I. But, since this is the case, shall we not calmly, as we have plenty of leisure, re-examine (not losing our temper, but really probing ourselves) what these fancies in us are? Looking at the first of them, we shall say, I think, that nothing ever becomes greater or less either in bulk or number, so long as it is equal to itself. Is it not thus?

Theae. Yes.

So. Secondly, that what suffers neither addition nor subtraction, is never either increased or wasted, but is always equal to itself.

Theae. Unquestionably.

So. Is not this also a third proposition, that what was not before, cannot afterwards be without 'having come to be' and 'coming to be'?

Theae. So it seems.

So. These three admissions, I think, severally clash with each other in our soul, when we say what was said about the dice, or when we say that I, being of the age I am, without having suffered increase or decrease, within the space of a year begin by being bigger than you, who are young, and afterwards become less,—when nothing has been withdrawn from my size, but yours has increased. For thus 'I am' afterwards what before I was not, without having 'come to be' so. Now without 'coming to be' it is impossible 'to have come to be,' and without losing any size I could never 'come to be' smaller. And other like instances there are, myriads upon myriads, if we choose to admit these. I suppose you follow me, Theaetetus: at all events you seem to me not inexperienced in such matters.

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Theae. I do, Socrates; and by all the gods I wonder immensely what these things are, and really sometimes I feel dizzy when I look at them.

So. Ay, my friend; evidently Theodorus forms no bad estimate of your genius. This affection, I mean of wondering, is quite that of a philosopher; for philosophy has no other origin but this; and he who said that Iris is the child of giant Wonder seems to be no bad genealogist. But do you by this time understand why these things result from the statements we ascribe to Protagoras?

Theae. Not yet, I think.

So. You will be thankful to me then, if, when a notable man, or rather when notable men have truth hidden away in the mind, I help you to search it out from them.

Theae. Thankful indeed I must be in the highest degree.

[*The doctrine of Heracleitus is now set forth in its complication with the doctrine imputed to Protagoras. Agent and Patient engender all things by motion: and there is no absolute Ens. Socrates asks if Theaetetus is so far content with the product of his intellectual labour. His answer is indecisive: and Socrates prepares him for a new dialectic discussion.*] 12

So. Look about then, and see that none of the uninitiated are listening. These are men who think that nothing 'is' but what they are able to grasp with their hands, not accepting actions and generations and all that is invisible as in the category of being.

Theae. Upon my word, Socrates, stubborn and refractory people are these you tell of.

So. They are indeed, my boy, a fine set of boors[1].

12 [1] A fine set of boors, μάλ' εὖ ἄμουσοι. In these days they would be called 'Philistines,' a term derived from German Universities.

Others there are much more refined, whose mysteries I am going to describe to you. Their principle is, and upon it all we were just now saying depends—that the whole universe is motion, and nothing else but this, and of motions two kinds, each in number infinite, but, in respect of power, the one involving action, the other suffering. From the association and attrition of these with each other are formed products in number infinite, but of two sorts, one perceptible, the other perception, which continually breaks forth and is born with the perceptible objects. Perceptions, we find, have the following names; sight, hearing, smell, feelings of cold and heat, pleasure and pain and desire and fear and others: infinite are those without names; and those with names very numerous. And the objects of perception again are born with each of these, colours of all kinds with all kinds of vision, sounds with hearing similarly, and with the other perceptions other objects of perception are connate and 'come to be.' What meaning has this tale for us, Theaetetus, in reference to the former questions? do you perceive?

Theae. No, Socrates.

So. See then if it can be brought to its closing point. It means that all these things, as we say, are in motion, and in their motion are found swiftness and slowness. That which is slow has its motion in the same place and in reference to things near, and so engenders: and the things thus engendered [are slower. But that which is swift has its motion in reference to things at a distance, and so engenders, and the things thus engendered][2] are swifter, for they

[2] The words in brackets are not found in codd., but introduced by Stephens from the Eclogae of Cornarius. Bekker is so convinced of their being Plato's, that he prints them without bracketing. And Heindorf maintains them. But Professors Jowett and Campbell reject

are conveyed, and their motion naturally consists in vection. When then the eye and any other of its suitable objects approach and beget whiteness and its kindred perception, which could never have 'come to be' if either of them had gone to something else, then, while the sight on the part of the eyes and the whiteness on the part of that which co-engenders the colour are moving in mid space, the eye becomes full of sight, and at length sees and 'comes to be,' nowise sight, but a seeing eye, and that which co-engendered the colour is filled full with whiteness, and 'comes to be' not whiteness but a white thing, whether it be wood or stone or anything else that happens to have been coloured with this hue. And other things similarly, hard and warm and all the rest, we must understand in the same manner 'to be' nothing by themselves, as we heretofore said, but in their mutual intercourse 'to become' all and of all kinds from motion: since of agent and patient, as they affirm, taken apart (ἐπὶ ἑνός) it is impossible to form any definite

them, holding that τὰ βραδύτερα mean τὸ ποιοῦν and τὸ πάσχον, and τὰ θάσσω the αἰσθήσεις and αἰσθητὰ engendered by them. I have been unable to convince myself that this latter view is right. The words πρὸς τὰ πλησιάζοντα τὴν κίνησιν ἴσχει seem intended to describe the organs of touch and taste, as distinguished from those of sight and hearing, which can be employed on distant objects. It may be replied that the example given is that of sight and its object, and the latter is spoken of as πλησιάσαν to the eye: which may seem to prove that anything on which τὸ ποιοῦν can act may be said πλησιάζειν αὐτῷ, whether more or less distant. Weighty as this reply is, it does not remove my difficulty; for I am unable to discern the use of discriminating between agent-patient and their products as to slowness and swiftness. The act of generation between the eye and a very distant object must surely have been regarded by Plato (whatever later mathematicians may say of it) as a swift act. I admit however that the question at issue is difficult and doubtful: but it does not embarrass Plato's general meaning here. See note at the close of the Translation.

notion: for nothing is an agent till it concurs with a patient, nor a patient till it concurs with an agent; and that which concurs with one thing and is an agent, if it lights upon another, proves to be a patient, so that, as we before said, nothing is 'one by itself,' but always 'comes to be' to some other; and the term 'being' must be removed on all sides, although we are often, even in our present discussion, compelled to use it from habit and ignorance. But it is not proper, as the wise lay down, to allow the use of the word 'some,' or 'of some' or 'me' or 'this' or 'that' or any other term which 'fixes,' but in accordance with nature to speak of things as 'coming to be' and 'being created' and 'perishing' and 'taking new forms.' Since if any one fixes anything in speech, he who does so is easily confuted. And we ought to speak in this way both of individuals and of many in the aggregate, by which aggregation we determine 'man' and 'stone' and each class of animals. Do these views seem pleasant to you, Theaetetus, and will you find a taste of them agreeable?

Theae. I don't know, Socrates; for about you too I cannot discern, whether you are speaking these as your own opinions, or trying me.

So. Do you not remember, my friend, that I indeed neither know nor adopt any of such things as mine? but I am barren, and act as midwife to you, and on that account I charm, and offer you, to be tasted, wise things of various sorts, until I can help to bring to light your opinion; and when it is brought forth, then and not before I will examine if it shall prove a wind-egg or a genuine offspring. So then with courage and patience answer well and manfully whatsoever appears to you to be right concerning my several questions.

Theae. Ask then.

[*Arguments against the Protagorean doctrine from dreams, fevers and madness are suggested and answered. Persons so affected perceive different things from those perceived when they are awake and in health. Are these contradictory perceptions in each case equally true to the percipient?*] 13

So. Say then again, whether you are satisfied that nothing should 'be,' but ever 'come to be,' good and noble and all things which we were lately recounting.

Theae. Yes; since I have heard this recital of yours, it appears to me marvellously clear that it is reasonable, and that we must accept the principles as you have stated them.

So. Let us then not abandon what remains of our question. There remains the topic of dreams and diseases, madness especially, and all that is called mis-hearing or mis-seeing or any other wrong perception. For you know, I suppose, that in all these cases the principle we lately explained seems by admission to be confuted, since undoubtedly false perceptions occur to us in them, and things that appear to each are far from 'being,' but, quite contrariwise, none of the things that appear 'are.'

Theae. You speak most truly, Socrates.

So. What reason then is left, my boy, to him who lays down that perception is knowledge, and that things which appear to each 'are' in every such case?

Theae. For my own part, Socrates, I shrink from answering that I have nothing to urge, because just now you rebuked me for saying so. Yet in very truth I cannot contend that maniacs or dreamers do not imagine falsities, when some of them think they are gods, and others suppose they are fowls, and imagine they are flying in their sleep.

So. Have you not in mind then a certain difficulty raised about them, especially as to the sleeping and waking vision?

Theae. What difficulty?

So. A question which I think you have often heard people ask, what proof one would have to give, if somebody were to ask at this moment, whether we are sleeping and dreaming all that we imagine, or are awake and talking to one another in that state.

Theae. Indeed, Socrates, it is a perplexing thing to say by what proof we could establish it: for all the facts succeed one another as counterparts. Even the whole discussion we have now held there is nothing to prevent our seeming to have held in a dream. And when in a dream we seem to be relating dreams, the similarity between the cases is marvellous.

So. You see then that it is not difficult to raise a question, since it can be questioned even whether we are waking or dreaming. And as the time during which we are asleep is equal to that in which we are awake, our soul in each state contends that the fancies which from time to time occur are true, so that for half the time we say that the one are existent, for half the other, and we are equally confident in regard to each.

Theae. Yes, unquestionably.

So. And is not the same true of diseases and madness, except that the times are not equal?

Theae. Yes.

So. Well, shall truth be determined by length or shortness of time?

Theae. That were ridiculous on many grounds.

So. Have you then any other clear sign to show which of these fancies are true?

Theae. I think not.

[*The answer is, that a percipient is not the same subject in each of two* 14
different states: and if either of the two factors (τὰ γεννῶντα) *is changed, the result* (τὸ γεννώμενον) *is changed. Grote says that the cardinal principle set forth exhibits itself in a perpetual series of definite manifestations. To say that I the subject perceive is to say that I perceive some object: to perceive, and perceive nothing, is a contradiction. Again, if an object be sweet, it must be sweet to some percipient subject: sweet, but sweet to no one, is an impossibility. Necessity binds the percipient to a thing perceived. Every term applied to one implies some reference to the other: no name can be truly predicated of the one which implies 'being' or 'coming to be' apart from the other.*]

So. Hear then from me what they will say on this point, who lay it down that what from time to time 'seems,' 'is' true for him who so beholds it. Their opinion, I think, is expressed by this question: 'O Theaetetus, of two things which are totally different, can the one and the other have any identical powers?' We must not assume that the things in question are in one respect the same, in another different, but that they are wholly different.

Theae. It is impossible that they should have anything the same, either in power or in aught else, when they are wholly different.

So. Must we not also perforce confess the two things to be unlike?

Theae. I think so.

So. If, then, anything happens 'to become' like, either to itself or to another, shall we say that when made like it 'becomes' the same; when it gets unlike, different?

Theae. Necessarily.

So. Were we not previously saying that agents are many and infinite, and patients likewise?

Theae. Yes.

So. And also that a thing combining first with one, then with another, will not produce the same things, but different?

Theae. Certainly.

So. Let us now specify myself, or you, or anything else, in the same relations. Say Socrates in health and Socrates out of health. Shall we say the latter is like the former, or unlike?

Theae. Socrates out of health, you say; do you compare this as a whole with the former as a whole, with Socrates in health?

So. Very well put: that is my meaning.

Theae. Unlike, of course.

So. And different, as being unlike?

Theae. Necessarily.

So. And you will say the same of Socrates sleeping, and in all the states we cited?

Theae. I would.

So. And will not each of the things which have an active nature, when they find Socrates in health, deal with me as one thing; when out of health, as a different one?

Theae. They must.

So. And I, the patient, and that agent, will in each case produce different things?

Theae. To be sure.

So. When I drink wine in health, does it appear to me agreeable and sweet?

Theae. Yes.

So. True; for, by our admissions, the agent and the patient produced sweetness and perception, both of them in motion together; and perception on the side of the patient made the tongue percipient, and sweetness on the

part of the wine, moving about it, made the wine to be and to appear sweet to the healthy tongue.

Theae. Such certainly were our previous admissions.

So. But when it finds me out of health, does it not in the first place find one who is not the same? It comes to an unlike object.

Theae. Yes.

So. Such a Socrates, then, and the draught of wine, produce different things; in regard to the tongue a perception of bitterness, in regard to the wine a bitterness beginning to be and moving; and the wine it makes not bitterness, but bitter, and me not perception, but one that perceives.

Theae. Assuredly.

So. I then shall never become percipient of anything else in the same way; for perception of another is another thing, and makes the percipient different and another; nor will that which acts on me, if it concur with another, ever engender the same and become similar: for from another it will engender another and become different.

Theae. That is true.

So. I then shall never become similar to my former self; nor will the object become similar to its former self.

Theae. No, surely not.

So. When I perceive, I must needs become percipient of something: for to become percipient, yet percipient of nothing, is impossible; and the object, when it becomes sweet or bitter, or anything of the kind, must become so to some one: for to become sweet, yet sweet to no one, is impossible.

Theae. Assuredly.

So. Then, I think, the inference remains, that to each other we 'are,' if we are, or we 'come to be,' if we come

to be: since necessity binds our essence indeed, but binds it to nothing else, nor yet to ourselves individually; it remains then that we are bound to one another. So that if a person says that anything 'is' or 'becomes,' he must say that it 'is' or 'becomes' 'to something,' or 'of something,' or 'in relation to something'; but, if we have come to a right conclusion, he must not say or allow of anyone else saying, that anything 'is' or 'comes to be' absolutely.

Theae. Undoubtedly, Socrates.

So. And so, when that which acts on me is to myself and not to another, I perceive it, and no one else does.

Theae. Certainly.

So. Then my perception is true to me: for it belongs always to my being; and, according to Protagoras, I am judge of things which are to me, that they are, and of things which are not, that they are not.

Theae. So it seems.

15 [*Having thus by a series of plausible arguments brought to birth the suggestion of Theaetetus, that knowledge is sensuous perception, Socrates asks if he can bear to learn that the bantling after all is not worth rearing. Theodorus interferes, and pledges himself for the tolerant temper of his pupil. He is reminded that Socrates only professes to draw out the thoughts of those who converse with him.*]

So. How then, being infallible and unerring in mind as regards things which 'are' and 'come to be,' can I be unknowing of things whereof I am percipient[1]?

Theae. In no sort of way.

So. Therefore you have said very well that knowledge

15 [1] Αἰσθητής, a novel word, but here pretty certainly the true one.

is nothing else than perception; and it turns out to be one and the same thing, that (as Homer and Heracleitus, and their whole tribe, affirm) all things move like streams, and that (after the opinion of the consummately wise Protagoras) man is the measure of all things, and that (as Theaetetus infers from these premises) perception is proved to be knowledge. Is it so, Theaetetus? Must we say, that this, as it were, is your newborn child, and the product of my midwifery? What say you?

Theae. It must be so, Socrates.

So. This then, seemingly, we have with much difficulty brought to birth, whatever it prove to be. And now, after its birth, we must, in good sooth, run round the hearth with it in our discourse[2], not failing to observe whether the child be worth nurture, and not a wind-egg and an unreality. Or do you deem it absolutely necessary to rear your offspring, and not to put it away? Can you bear to see it confuted, and not be greatly out of temper if some one should filch from you your firstborn?

Theo. Theaetetus will bear it, Socrates. He is not the least ill-tempered. But in heaven's name tell me, is not this then true?

So. You are a very gourmand of discussion, Theodorus, and a good creature, in that you take me to be a sack of arguments, and think I can pull out another, and aver that what we have said is untrue. But you do not note what is taking place: that none of the arguments proceed from myself, but from him who is conversing with me at the time; and that I know nothing more than this little feat, how to obtain an argument from another wise person and to treat

[2] The fifth day after a child's birth the festival was called Ἀμφιδρόμια, when the babe was carried round the ἑστία and received its name.

it fairly. And I will now try to obtain one from our friend, and not to say something of my own.

Theo. You put the thing well, Socrates: so be it.

13 [*Socrates now assails the doctrine of Protagoras. If man is a measure, why not an ape or a frog? If his own sensation is true to every man, what makes Protagoras superlatively wise? or what is the good of arguing on any subject? Theodorus, who was challenged as a friend of Protagoras, declines to take up his defence, and refers Socrates back to Theaetetus.*]

So. Do you know then, Theodorus, what surprises me in your friend Protagoras?

Theo. What is that?

So. I am much pleased with everything else he has said, how what 'seems' to each 'is' to each. But the commencement of his treatise does surprise me. I wonder that in the outset of his 'Truth' he did not say that a pig, or a dog-faced baboon, or any other more monstrous specimen of things that have perception, is the measure of all things, that so he might have spoken to us at once in a magnificent and very disdainful style, ostentatiously shewing that, while we were marvelling at his wisdom, as if he were a god, he was all the while not a whit superior in judgment to a tadpole, not to say, to any of his fellow-men. Or how are we to put the case, Theodorus? For if that opinion shall be true to each man which he gets by perception, and nobody's affection shall be better determined by another person, nor one be more entitled than another to review opinion, and to say whether it be true or false, but, as has been often said, each person singly shall form his own opinions, and all these shall be right and true—why in the world, my friend, is Protagoras so wise as to be justly deemed a worthy teacher with high fees, and we dunces in

comparison, who must go to school to him, though each of us is the measure of his own wisdom? Must we not say that Protagoras speaks thus to amuse the vulgar? while as to my case, and that of my art of midwifery, I forbear to say what ridicule we incur: so indeed does the whole practice of dialectic. For, as to reviewing and criticising each other's fancies and opinions, when each man's are right, is it not a tedious and monstrous folly, if the 'Truth' of Protagoras is true, and he did not proclaim it in jest from the shrine of his book?

Theo. He was my friend, Socrates, as you said just now. I cannot therefore allow Protagoras to be confuted by my admissions, nor yet resist you contrary to my opinion. So take in hand Theaetetus again. For certainly he appeared some time back to follow your lead very prettily.

So. If you went to the wrestling-courts at Lacedaemon, Theodorus, and there beheld naked people, some your inferiors, would you refuse to strip yourself beside them, and exhibit your own form competitively?

Theo. Why do you think I would not refuse, Socrates, with their permission and consent? So now I shall try to persuade you to let me look on, rather than be dragged to the play-ground in my present stiff condition, and to wrestle it out yourself with one who is younger and more supple.

[*Socrates asks Theaetetus if his faith in the Protagorean doctrine is shaken by what has been said. When he admits that it is, he is rallied by Socrates for his facility, and recalled to the question, 'Knowledge is sensation.' Are we to say we know the barbarian tongues because we hear them spoken, or letters because we see them? Theaetetus replies that we know them in some respects, not in others.*] 17

So. If such is your will, Theodorus, I don't say 'nill,' as proverbialists have it. So I must turn again to the wise

Theaetetus. Tell me then, Theaetetus, first of all, as to our late discussions; do you not share my surprise if thus all of a sudden you shall turn out to be no wise inferior in wisdom to any man or even any god? Or do you suppose that the 'measure' of Protagoras is less applicable to gods than to men?

Theae. Upon my word I do not. And as to your question, I am much surprised. For when we were engaged in showing how that which 'seemed' to each 'was' also to him who thought it, the statement appeared to me very good; but now another view has taken its place all of a sudden.

So. You are young, my dear boy: you quickly succumb to popular declamation, and become a convert. For Protagoras, or some one on his part, will say in reply: My fine gentlemen, young and old, ye sit together and declaim, bringing gods into question, whom I, after speaking and writing about them, as to their existence or non-existence, set aside: and you say just what the populace would hear with approval, that it is too bad for mankind not to differ in wisdom from every kind of beast: but you offer no convincing proof whatever; you resort to probability, which if Theodorus or any other geometrician sought to use in geometry, he would be good for nothing. Just consider then, you and Theodorus, if on such important subjects you will accept arguments relying on mere persuasion and probability.

Theae. No, Socrates, we should not any more than yourself affirm that to be just.

So. We must view it then in some other way, as you and Theodorus suggest.

Theae. In some other way certainly.

So. In this way then let us consider it: whether know-

ledge and perception are the same or different. For to this point, I ween, our whole argument tended; and for this purpose we stirred all these many strange questions. Did we not?

Theae. Assuredly.

So. Shall we then admit that all the things which we perceive by sight and hearing we at the same time know? For instance, before we have learnt the language of the barbarians[1], shall we say that we do not hear them when they speak, or that we both hear and understand what they say? And again, if we do not know letters, shall we, when we look at them, say we do not see them, or shall we insist that we know, since we see them?

Theae. So much of them, Socrates, as we see and hear, we shall say we know; we shall say we both see and know the figure and the colour, and that we both hear and know the sharp and flat sound: but what grammarians and interpreters teach concerning them we shall say we neither perceive by sight and hearing, nor know.

So. Excellent, Theaetetus. And it is not worth while to dispute these positions of yours, that you may grow.

[*Socrates now brings an argument against the Protagorean doctrine which he afterwards acknowledges to be captious and eristic. He says that Theodorus ought to champion the cause of his friend's children, as their guardian. Theodorus naively says that Callias holds that office, not himself.*] 18

But look at this other question also which approaches, and consider how we shall repel it.

17 [1] All who spoke another language than Greek were by the Hellenes called βάρβαροι. Hence Prof. Jowett renders this word in English, 'foreigners.'

Theae. What is that?

So. This. If any one shall ask—'Suppose a man has become cognisant of anything, is it possible that, having and preserving memory of this thing, at the time when he remembers he should not know the very thing which he remembers?' But I am verbose, apparently, when I wish to ask if a man remembering anything he has learnt does not know it.

Theae. How could that be, Socrates? The thing you suggest would be a miracle.

So. Perhaps then I am trifling: but consider. Do you not call seeing perceiving, and sight perception?

Theae. I do.

So. Has not then one who has seen something become cognisant of the thing he saw according to your last statement?

Theae. Yes.

So. Well: do you not grant there is such a thing as memory?

Theae. Yes.

So. Memory of something or of nothing?

Theae. Of something, certainly.

So. Of what one has learnt then, and of what one has perceived; of such things, is it not?

Theae. Undoubtedly.

So. What a man has seen, he remembers at times, I suppose?

Theae. He does.

So. Even when he has shut his eyes? or on doing so has he forgotten?

Theae. It were monstrous to suppose that, Socrates.

So. We must, I can tell you, if we are to maintain our former argument. If not, there is an end of it.

Theae. I really suspect so myself; but I cannot quite make up my mind. Tell me how.

So. In this way. One who sees becomes, we say, cognisant of what he sees. For sight and perception and knowledge are admitted to be the same.

Theae. Quite so.

So. And he who saw and became cognisant of what he saw, if he shuts his eyes, remembers, but does not see the thing. Is it so?

Theae. Yes.

So. And not seeing means not knowing, if seeing means knowing.

Theae. True.

So. The inference then is, that, while a man remembers something of which he has become cognisant, yet, since he does not see, he does not know it: and this we said would be a miracle.

Theae. All quite true.

So. If then anybody says that knowledge and perception are the same, there results an evident impossibility.

Theae. So it seems.

So. Therefore we must distinguish one from the other.

Theae. I suppose so.

So. What then will knowledge be? We must begin our statement over again, it seems. Yet what are we going to do, Theaetetus?

Theae. About what?

So. We seem to me, like an ignoble cock, to hop away from the argument and crow, before we have gained the victory.

Theae. How so?

So. Like rhetorical disputants we seem to be content that we have come to a mutual agreement as to the admitted

uses of words, and by some such method mastered the question. And though we say we are not Eristics but philosophers, we unconsciously imitate the practice of those clever fellows.

Theae. I do not yet understand your meaning.

So. Well then, I will try to explain my view of the matter. We were asking whether a man who has learnt and remembers something does not know it; and taking the case of one who had seen, and after shutting his eyes remembered though he did not see, we shewed that he did not know at the same time that he remembered; and this, we said, was impossible. And so the Protagorean fable came to ruin, and yours with it, as to knowledge and perception being the same.

Theae. Apparently.

So. But it would not, my friend, if the father of the former fable had been alive. He would have made a strong defence for it: but now that it is an orphan, we insult it. For even those trustees, whom Protagoras appointed, one of whom was Theodorus here, do not come to the rescue. Well, in the interest of justice, I will run the risk of helping him myself.

Theo. No, Socrates, I was not his children's trustee, but rather Callias son of Hipponicus. I diverged somewhat earlier from abstract studies to geometry. But we shall be much obliged to you if you will succour him.

So. Well said, Theodorus. Have an eye then to my succour. For a man would have to make stranger admissions than we lately made, if he did not attend to the terms in which we are generally wont to affirm and deny. Shall I explain how to you or to Theaetetus?

Theo. To the company generally, but let the younger one answer. For he will incur less disgrace by defeat.

[*Socrates produces some more eristic puzzles.*] 19

So. I put now the most startling question. To this effect, I think: Is it possible for the same man knowing a thing not to know what he knows?

Theo. What answer shall we give, Theaetetus?

Theae. Impossible, in my opinion.

So. Not if you lay it down that seeing is knowing. For how will you deal with that inevitable question, when, as they say, you are caught in a well, and an unabashed man claps his hand to one of your eyes and asks, whether with the closed eye you see your cloak.

Theae. Not with that one, I suppose I shall say, but with the other.

So. Then you see and do not see the same thing at the same time?

Theae. In a sort of way.

So. I do not, he will say, define anything, nor did I ask how, but only whether you know that which you do not know. And now you are shown to see what you do not see; and you have admitted that seeing is knowing and not seeing not knowing. Consider the inference from these premises.

Theae. I consider that it directly contradicts my former assertion.

So. Probably, my fine gentleman, you would have had more such experiences, if somebody had further asked you whether it is possible to know keenly or to know bluntly, and to know near and not at a distance, and to know the same thing intensely or moderately, and other questions, countless in number, which a light-armed mercenary ambushed in the arguments might have asked, when you laid

it down that knowledge and perception are the same; and attacking your senses of hearing and smelling and the like he might have worried you with incessant confutation, until, admiring his accursed wisdom, you were entangled by him so far, that after mastering and binding you tight he might then have ransomed you for what sum you and he agreed on. Now what argument, perhaps you may say, will Protagoras advance in aid of his doctrine? Must we not try to state it?

Theae. Certainly we must.

20 [*Socrates, having obtained from Theaetetus an admission that Protagoras ought to be heard in his own defence, undertakes to plead his cause, and does so in the assumed person of Protagoras himself.*]

So. Besides all this that we urge in his defence, he will also, methinks, come to close quarters, contemning us, and saying: Here's this good creature Socrates, who—when a lad got frightened on being asked whether it is possible for the same person at once to remember some particular thing and not know it, and in his fright said 'no,' because he could not see before him,—made a laughing-stock of me in the course of his arguments. But the fact, my easy-going Socrates, stands thus: when you examine any of my doctrines by the method of interrogation, if the person questioned give such answers as I should, and be defeated, I am confuted; but if they differ from mine, then the person questioned is confuted. For instance, if mutual word-catching is the thing to guard against, do you think anybody will concede to you that the memory of a past feeling is anything like what the feeling itself was at the time when it was experienced? Far from it. Or again, that he will shrink from admitting that it is possible for

the same person to know and not to know the same thing? Or, if he dread this—that he will grant an altered person to be the same he was before he was altered? Or rather—that anybody can be called 'one' and not 'many'—infinitely multiplied, if alteration goes on. But, O my good sir, he will say, encounter my main doctrine more generously, if you can, and prove against it that individual perceptions do not 'come-to-be' to each of us, or that, supposing they do, it does not follow that the appearance will 'come-to-be' (or 'be,' if that is the proper term) to that person alone, unto whom it appears. When you talk of swine and dog-headed baboons, you are not merely swinish yourself, but you likewise induce your hearers to act as such towards my treatises without any decency. For I say that the Truth is as I have written: that each of us is a measure of things that are and are not: but that, nevertheless, one man differs vastly from another in this very respect, that to one man some things are and appear, to another other things. And I am far from denying that wisdom and a wise man exist, but the man I call wise is he who, by working changes, makes things to appear and to be good to any one of us, to whom they appear and are evil. And again, do not press my argument literally; but understand from the following explanation more clearly what I mean. Recollect how it was formerly said, that to a sick man his food appears to be and is bitter, but to a man in health the opposite is the fact and appears so. Neither of these persons ought we to make wiser than the other; that is impossible: nor may we declare that the sick man is ignorant for holding such an opinion, or the man in health is wise for holding another. We must effect a change to the opposite state: for the one habit is better than the other. So also in education we must cause a change from

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the one habit to the better. Now the physician changes by medicines; the wise teacher by arguments. Never indeed did anybody make one who had false opinions afterwards to hold true ones. For it is not possible either to think what is not, or anything but what one feels; and this is always true. But, I suppose, when through a bad habit of mind a man has corresponding opinions, a good habit makes him hold opinions resembling it; phantasms which some persons from inexperience call true: but I call some better than others, not truer. And wise men, dear Socrates, I am far from calling frogs: but in relation to bodies I call them physicians, in relation to plants husbandmen. For I say that these last also produce in plants, instead of evil sensations when any of them are sickly, good and healthy sensations and truths, while wise and good rhetoricians make good things instead of evil seem just to states. Since whatever things seem just and good to each state, are such to it, as long as it deems them lawful; but the wise man, in the place of those things which are severally evil to each, makes the good both to be and to seem right. And on the same principle the sophist also, who is able to instruct his pupils thus, is both wise and worthy of high fees at their hands. And thus some are wiser than others, and nobody thinks falsities: and you, whether you will or not, must submit to be a measure. For on these grounds this doctrine is maintained. And, if you wish to revive your dispute with it, dispute by counter-arguing at full; or if you prefer the method of questioning, adopt it; for no person of sense will avoid this method, but will pursue it most willingly. Mind this however; you must not question unfairly. For it is most unreasonable in one who professes esteem for virtue to be constantly pursuing an unfair method of argument. Now unfairness is shown, when a man fails to con-

duct his arguments diversely; in one way as a combatant, in another as a dialectician: in the former case rallying and tripping up as much as he can, in the latter being serious, and correcting his respondent, showing him only those errors into which he was led by his own fault or in consequence of former discussions. If you act thus, your fellow-debaters will impute to themselves the fault of their own confusion and perplexity, not to you; and they will follow and love you, and fly from themselves to philosophy, that they may become different, and get rid of their former selves. But if you take the contrary course, as most do, you will find an opposite result, and your pupils instead of philosophers will turn out haters of philosophy, when they grow older. If then you will follow my advice, as was before said, you will, in no hostile or contentious spirit, but with a really mild and condescending temper, consider what we mean, when we declare that all things are in motion, and that what seems 'is' also to each, individual as well as state. From these considerations you will discern whether knowledge and perception are the same: but not, as you lately sought, from the use of words and names, which most people pervert in every sort of way, causing each other all kinds of perplexity. Such, Theodorus, is the slight assistance which, from slight resources, I have supplied, as I best could, to your old friend. Had he been alive, he would have helped his own cause in grander language.

[*Protagoras had been made in the pleading of Socrates to complain that admissions hostile to his doctrine had been wrung from the mouth of a terrified lad. Socrates now constrains Theodorus to submit, very reluctantly, to a dialectic argument on the general question at issue.*] 21

Theo. You are joking, Socrates: for you have helped him most valiantly.

So. You are very obliging, my friend. Allow me one word. You noticed probably that Protagoras in what he said reproached us for holding our discussions with a boy, and using that boy's alarm as a weapon of contention against his propositions: and while he represented this as mere amusement, he called 'the measure of all things' a grave topic, and urged us to deal seriously with his argument.

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Theo. Nothing else.

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So. Well then, how shall we deal with the argument, Protagoras? Must we say that men always have true opinions, or sometimes true, sometimes false? From both views it results that they do not always think true things, but at times true things, at times false. For consider, Theodorus, whether any Protagorean, or you yourself, would wish to contend that no one person considers any other to be unlearned and to have false opinions.

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So. When you, after forming some judgment in your own mind on any point, declare to me your opinion, be it granted according to his doctrine that this is true to you: but is it not allowed to the rest of us to become judges respecting your judgment? must we always judge that you have true opinions? do not a countless number in each instance contend against you with contrary opinions, believing that you judge and think falsities?

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So. And how as to Protagoras himself? Supposing he did not think man a measure, and the public did not think so, (as indeed they do not), would it not necessarily follow that what he delivered in writing as Truth, is Truth to nobody? or if he thought so, and the public does not agree with him, do you see that in proportion as those who deny are more numerous than those who affirm, so much more decidedly it is or is not so?

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So. But the others on their side do not admit that they think falsely.

Theo. No, they do not.

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So. But it is doubtful, my friend, if we are outrunning the fact. It is likely that he being older is wiser than we: and if he could at once pop up his head where we are, he would not sink down and run away again, until, probably, he had convicted me of talking much nonsense, and you of agreeing to it. As it is, we must needs, I think, make the best of ourselves, such as we are, and state our real opinions for the time being. And must we not now say that everybody will confess this—that one man is wiser, one more ignorant, than another?

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So. Must we not also say that our argument is most stably conducted on the lines we prescribed in our defence of Protagoras, averring that most things are as they seem to each, hot, dry, sweet, all such-like[1]? but that, if he will grant that one excels another in anything, he will be ready to say so in judgments upon health and disease: not every woman or child or beast, he will admit, knows what is wholesome in its own case, and is competent to cure itself: here, if anywhere, one excels another.

Theo. I think so.

So. In politics, too, will he not say, that of things honourable and dishonourable, just and unjust, holy and unholy, whatsoever each state shall deem and enact to be lawful for itself are also lawful in truth for each, and that in these no individual or state is wiser than another? but in enacting things expedient or inexpedient, here, if anywhere, he will confess that counsellor differs from counsellor and the opinion of one city from that of another in respect of truth, and he will certainly not venture to affirm, that whatever a state shall deem and enact to be expedient for itself will most assuredly be expedient. But of the former things I named, justice and injustice, holiness and unholiness, they (the Protagoreans) are ready to insist that none has any essential nature, but that whatever has seemed good by public consent is true when it has seemed good, and as long as it seems good[2]. And those who do not altogether echo

23 [1] Such-like, ὅσα τοῦ τύπου τούτου, lit. all that are of this type, i.e. (as Prof. Jowett says) 'immediate sensations.'

[2] In the first two speeches (§ 23) assigned to Socrates the subjects who express or allow opinions are very indistinctly stated. The reason

the doctrine of Protagoras, take some such philosophic view. But now, Theodorus, we have question growing out of question, greater out of less.

Theo. Are we not at leisure, Socrates?

So. We appear to be. On many occasions, my good sir, I have noticed, but especially on this, how natural it is for those who have spent much time on philosophy, when they go into the law-courts, to shew themselves absurd orators.

Theo. How do you mean?

So. People who from their youth have been knocking about in law-courts and such-like scenes, as compared with those who have been reared in philosophic and literary society, seem to have had a breeding like that of slaves compared with freemen.

Theo. In what respects?

So. In that (referring to your last observation) philosophers have leisure at all times, and hold their discussions peacefully and with leisurely ease, and as we have now been

of this seems to be, that he is referring throughout to what was said in his defence of Protagoras made in the name of Protagoras (§ 20). The oratio obliqua with which the first speech begins is dependent (as the translation indicates) on the ἄλλο τι φῶμεν (*must we not say?*) at the close of the previous speech in § 22. Of ξυγχωρήσεται and ἐθελῆσαι ἂν φάναι, according to Heindorf and Stallbaum, τις τινὰ understood are severally the subjects. I am rather disposed to understand Πρωταγόρας and Πρωταγόραν, as Protagoras had been mentioned just before, and his confession would be appropriate here. For the same reasons I suppose him to be the subject on whose statement or admission the oratio obliqua depends in the first paragraph of the second speech (οὐκοῦν κ.τ.λ.), after which ὁμολογήσει comes, where Protagoras is the natural subject. In the next sentence, where he recurs to τὰ καλὰ κ.τ.λ., Plato uses the plural ἐθέλουσιν ἰσχυρίζεσθαι. We cannot doubt that he speaks of the scholars of Protagoras, who still profess their master's doctrine on the question specified.

pursuing three arguments in succession, so do they also, if one which follows pleases them better than the preceding; nor do they care whether they speak briefly or at length, if only they can attain truth. The other class always speak in haste; for the flow of water[3] quickens them, and they are not allowed to make their speeches on anything they desire; and the opponent stands over them holding compulsion in the shape of a prescribing document read in the ear, beyond the limits of which they must not speak, yclept an affidavit[4]: and the arguments are always about a fellow-slave addressed to a master on the bench, who holds justice between his finger and thumb; and the contests are never away from the point[5], but to the point of self-interest; and often too the race is for life. So that on all these grounds they become keen and shrewd, knowing how to wheedle the master by word and gratify him by deed, being stunted and crooked in soul. For their slavery from childhood has robbed them of growth and uprightness and freedom, compelling them to act tortuously, setting before their yet tender souls great perils and fears. And as they cannot bear up against these with the help of justice and truth, they have recourse at once to falsehood and mutual injury, and twist themselves in many ways, and become warped; and so they pass from youth to manhood without any mental soundness, becoming, as they imagine,

[3] *Flow of water.* The κλεψύδρα or water-clock, used to measure the time allowed to each orator, and placed within his view.

[4] Affidavit, ἀντωμοσία, literally counter-affidavit. The pleas of each party in a cause were affirmed by their several oaths: and by these affirmations they or their advocates would be bound, and could not stray from them.

[5] Away from the point, τὴν ἄλλως (ὁδόν), a proverbial phrase. Such also is περὶ ψυχῆς ὁ δρόμος.

clever and wise. Such is this class of men, Theodorus. Would you wish us now to describe those of our circle, or to pass them by and return to our argument, that we may not, as we just now said, abuse too far our freedom in the change of topics?

Theo. Not so, Socrates; finish the description. For you have said with great truth that we who form a circle like this are not servants of our discussions: our discussions are, as it were, our servants, and each of them waits to be completed when we think fit. For amongst us there is no presiding authority; neither dicast to rule, nor spectator, as in the case of poets, to censure.

[*The habits and character of the true philosopher are depicted in this and the succeeding chapter.*] 24

So. We must speak then, seemingly, since you think proper, concerning the leaders of such a circle; for why need one mention the inferior students of philosophy? This class from their youth, in the first place, do not know the way to the agora, nor where a law-court is or a council-hall or any other political meeting-room: laws and decrees spoken or written they neither see nor hear. Societies agitating for office and clubs and dinners and wine-bouts with flute-girls—these are practices which even in dreams do not occur to them. Whether any one in the city is well or ill born, whether a person has inherited any disgrace from ancestors on the male or female side, he knows no more than he does of the proverbial 'gallons in the sea.' He does not even know that he is ignorant of all these things; for it is not for credit's sake that he stands aloof from them, but in point of fact it is only his body that reposes and resides in the city, while his mind, deeming

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pursuing three arguments in succession, so do they also, if one which follows pleases them better than the preceding; nor do they care whether they speak briefly or at length, if only they can attain truth. The other class always speak in haste; for the flow of water[3] quickens them, and they are not allowed to make their speeches on anything they desire; and the opponent stands over them holding compulsion in the shape of a prescribing document read in the ear, beyond the limits of which they must not speak, yclept an affidavit[4]: and the arguments are always about a fellow-slave addressed to a master on the bench, who holds justice between his finger and thumb; and the contests are never away from the point[5], but to the point of self-interest; and often too the race is for life. So that on all these grounds they become keen and shrewd, knowing how to wheedle the master by word and gratify him by deed, being stunted and crooked in soul. For their slavery from childhood has robbed them of growth and uprightness and freedom, compelling them to act tortuously, setting before their yet tender souls great perils and fears. And as they cannot bear up against these with the help of justice and truth, they have recourse at once to falsehood and mutual injury, and twist themselves in many ways, and become warped; and so they pass from youth to manhood without any mental soundness, becoming, as they imagine,

[3] *Flow of water.* The κλεψύδρα or water-clock, used to measure the time allowed to each orator, and placed within his view.

[4] Affidavit, *ἀντωμοσία*, literally counter-affidavit. The pleas of each party in a cause were affirmed by their several oaths: and by these affirmations they or their advocates would be bound, and could not stray from them.

[5] Away from the point, *τὴν ἄλλως* (*ὁδόν*), a proverbial phrase. Such also is *περὶ ψυχῆς ὁ δρόμος.*

clever and wise. Such is this class of men, Theodorus. Would you wish us now to describe those of our circle, or to pass them by and return to our argument, that we may not, as we just now said, abuse too far our freedom in the change of topics?

Theo. Not so, Socrates; finish the description. For you have said with great truth that we who form a circle like this are not servants of our discussions: our discussions are, as it were, our servants, and each of them waits to be completed when we think fit. For amongst us there is no presiding authority; neither dicast to rule, nor spectator, as in the case of poets, to censure.

[*The habits and character of the true philosopher are depicted in this and the succeeding chapter.*] 24

So. We must speak then, seemingly, since you think proper, concerning the leaders of such a circle; for why need one mention the inferior students of philosophy? This class from their youth, in the first place, do not know the way to the agora, nor where a law-court is or a council-hall or any other political meeting-room: laws and decrees spoken or written they neither see nor hear. Societies agitating for office and clubs and dinners and wine-bouts with flute-girls—these are practices which even in dreams do not occur to them. Whether any one in the city is well or ill born, whether a person has inherited any disgrace from ancestors on the male or female side, he knows no more than he does of the proverbial 'gallons in the sea.' He does not even know that he is ignorant of all these things; for it is not for credit's sake that he stands aloof from them, but in point of fact it is only his body that reposes and resides in the city, while his mind, deeming

all these things petty and insignificant, moves in every direction, as Pindar says, measuring things beneath the earth and on its surface, and star-gazing above the heaven, and searching out everywhere the nature of each class of existing things, condescending to none of those which are near it.

Theo. How do you mean, Socrates?

So. Compare the case of Thales, O Theodorus. While he was astronomising and gazing upward he fell into a well; and a clever and witty Thracian maidservant is said to have taunted him with desiring to know what was in heaven, but not seeing what was before him and at his feet. The same taunt is good for all who are devoted to philosophy. For in fact such a student is not only unaware of what his next neighbour is doing, but does not even know whether he is a man or some other creature. But what man is, and what it belongs to such a nature to do or to suffer differently from all others, this he inquires, and takes pains to search out. You understand, I hope, Theodorus, do you not?

Theo. I do, and your words are true.

So. Therefore, my friend, a man like this, in his associations private and public, as I said at first, when in a law-court or elsewhere he is compelled to discourse of things at his feet and before his eyes, becomes a laughing-stock not only to Thracian maids, but to the general public, falling into wells and perplexities of every kind from inexperience; and his awkwardness is marvellous, raising a suspicion of imbecility. For when personal reviling is the order of the day, he has no scandalous charge to bring, knowing no evil of anybody, because he has never taken the trouble. So he gets laughed at for his helplessness. And when eulogies and glorification of others are the theme, he is seen to laugh in right earnest without any affectation; and

rather to tend in Sciron's[1] direction. The Lacedaemonians indeed bid one depart or strip, but you seem to me to act your part like Antaeus[2]: you will not let one who comes to you go away before you have forced him to strip and wrestle with you in argument.

So. You have found very good precedents for my malady, Theodorus: but I am more robust than they were. Many a Hercules and Theseus strong in argument have ere now met and thumped me very hard; but I do not flinch for all that: with such a wonderful love of this kind of exercise am I possessed. Do not then refuse to benefit yourself as well as me by trying a fall with me.

Theo. Be it as you will: I refuse no longer. I must inevitably endure by cross-examination whatever destiny you spin for me in this discussion. I shall not however be able to put myself in your hands beyond the limit which you have proposed.

So. That limit is sufficient. And pray help me to be careful of this, that we do not unawares carry on any childish kind of argument, and incur reproach again for doing so.

Theo. Very well, I'll try my best.

[*The argument of Socrates against the doctrine of Protagoras, that 'man* 22
is a measure to himself,' may be briefly summarised thus. That doctrine means, 'what seems to each is to each.' Now to the mass of mankind this doctrine seems to be untrue, because it is certain that men in general do consider some to be wiser than others, and look up to the wise as teachers and guides. Therefore to them it is untrue.

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And Protagoras, on his own principle, must allow that they are right; from which it necessarily follows that he is wrong, even in his own opinion. In short 'the Truth' of Protagoras is not true to himself or to any body else.]

So. Let us first revert to the objection we took before, and see whether we were right or wrong in being out of humour and censuring the doctrine, in that it made every one competent in wisdom; and whether Protagoras rightly conceded to us, that, in respect of better and worse, some do surpass, and they are wise. Is it not so?

Theo. Yes.

So. Now if he had himself been present and made this admission, instead of our making it in his defence, we need not have strengthened ourselves by recurring to the subject: but now perhaps some one may allege that we are incompetent to make the confession on his part. It is better to come to a clearer mutual understanding on this special point. For whether it is so or not makes a great difference.

Theo. Very true.

So. Let us obtain the admission not through others, but from his statement, as briefly as we can.

Theo. How?

So. In this way. He says, does he not, that what seems to every one 'is' also to him unto whom it seems?

Theo. Yes, he does.

So. Do not we also, Protagoras, state a man's opinion, or rather the opinions of all men, when we say that there is nobody who does not deem himself wiser than others in some respects, and others wiser than himself in other respects; and, moreover, that in the greatest perils, when they are distressed in war or disease or at sea, men regard their rulers on such occasions as gods, expecting

them to be their saviours, though they differ from them in nothing but knowledge? And all human life teems with people who are seeking teachers and rulers of themselves and of other living creatures and of the various trades; and teems, again, with other people who deem themselves competent to teach and competent to rule. And in all these cases what else can we say than that men themselves think there exists among them wisdom and ignorance?

Theo. Nothing else.

So. Do they not deem wisdom to be true thought, and ignorance false opinion?

Theo. Certainly.

So. Well then, how shall we deal with the argument, Protagoras? Must we say that men always have true opinions, or sometimes true, sometimes false? From both views it results that they do not always think true things, but at times true things, at times false. For consider, Theodorus, whether any Protagorean, or you yourself, would wish to contend that no one person considers any other to be unlearned and to have false opinions.

Theo. That is incredible, Socrates.

So. And yet the doctrine which says that man is the measure of all things is brought to this unavoidable conclusion.

Theo. How so?

So. When you, after forming some judgment in your own mind on any point, declare to me your opinion, be it granted according to his doctrine that this is true to you: but is it not allowed to the rest of us to become judges respecting your judgment? must we always judge that you have true opinions? do not a countless number in each instance contend against you with contrary opinions, believing that you judge and think falsities?

Theo. Yes verily, Socrates, countless myriads indeed, as Homer says, who give me all the trouble in the world.

So. Well? would you have us say that in that case you have opinions true to yourself but false to the countless myriads?

Theo. Such seems to be the necessary inference from the statement.

So. And how as to Protagoras himself? Supposing he did not think man a measure, and the public did not think so, (as indeed they do not), would it not necessarily follow that what he delivered in writing as Truth, is Truth to nobody? or if he thought so, and the public does not agree with him, do you see that in proportion as those who deny are more numerous than those who affirm, so much more decidedly it is or is not so?

Theo. Of necessity, if according to each individual opinion it will be or will not be so.

So. In the next place it involves this very queer result, that he on his side, by confessing that all men hold true opinions, admits that the opinion of the opposite party about his opinion (which they deem false) is a true one.

Theo. Certainly.

So. Will he not admit that his own is false, if he confesses that the opinion of those who suppose him to think falsely is true?

Theo. Of course.

So. But the others on their side do not admit that they think falsely.

Theo. No, they do not.

So. And he again confesses also this opinion to be true according to his written doctrines.

Theo. Evidently.

So. By all parties then it will be contended, including

Protagoras (by him it will rather be confessed, for when he grants to a gainsayer that the latter thinks what is true, then does Protagoras himself confess), that no dog or man he meets with is a measure concerning anything which he has not learnt. Is it not so?

Theo. Yes.

So. Since this is the contention of all, to nobody will the Truth of Protagoras be true, neither to himself nor to anyone else.

Theo. We run down my friend very hard, Socrates.

So. But it is doubtful, my friend, if we are outrunning the fact. It is likely that he being older is wiser than we: and if he could at once pop up his head where we are, he would not sink down and run away again, until, probably, he had convicted me of talking much nonsense, and you of agreeing to it. As it is, we must needs, I think, make the best of ourselves, such as we are, and state our real opinions for the time being. And must we not now say that everybody will confess this—that one man is wiser, one more ignorant, than another?

Theo. Yes, I think so.

[*If we admit, Socrates goes on, that each may judge for himself with equal truth as to some sensible things, as 'hot' and 'cold;' this is not universally applicable. For instance, all do not know with equal truth what is 'wholesome' for them. Again, if we admit that states and persons may judge with equal truth of 'right' and 'wrong,' 'holy' and 'unholy,' they certainly cannot equally well decide what is and will be 'expedient' and 'inexpedient' for them. But, he adds, this opens new questions. Well, says Theodorus, have we not leisure for them? Yes, replies Socrates, we have; and this is the reason why philosophers make such a poor figure in the law-courts. Their habits are those of freemen; those of lawyers are in a manner slavish. Then follows the Socratic picture of an Athenian lawyer's habits and character.* 23

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Theo. You are joking, Socrates: for you have helped him most valiantly.

So. You are very obliging, my friend. Allow me one word. You noticed probably that Protagoras in what he said reproached us for holding our discussions with a boy, and using that boy's alarm as a weapon of contention against his propositions: and while he represented this as mere amusement, he called 'the measure of all things' a grave topic, and urged us to deal seriously with his argument.

Theo. Of course I noticed it, Socrates.

So. Well: do you bid us take his advice?

Theo. Very earnestly.

So. Do you see that all here are boys except you? If then we are to take his advice, you and I must deal seriously with his doctrine by mutual questions and answers, that he may not have to reproach us with considering this subject in a jocular manner with lads.

Theo. Nay, but would not Theaetetus follow the investigation of a doctrine better than many who have great beards?

So. Not better than you, Theodorus. Do not suppose that I am bound to defend your deceased friend in every manner, and that you are bound in no manner. But come, good sir, follow the argument a little way, till such time as we know whether you are to be the measure of diagrams, or if all are competent in themselves, equally with you, to treat of astronomy and the other subjects wherein you are reported to excel.

Theo. When one sits beside you, Socrates, it is not easy to decline discussion. Indeed I spoke nonsense just now when I said you would allow me not to strip, and that you would not compel me as the Lacedaemonians do: you seem

rather to tend in Sciron's[1] direction. The Lacedaemonians indeed bid one depart or strip, but you seem to me to act your part like Antaeus[2]: you will not let one who comes to you go away before you have forced him to strip and wrestle with you in argument.

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23 [1] Such-like, ὅσα τοῦ τύπου τούτου, lit. all that are of this type, i.e. (as Prof. Jowett says) 'immediate sensations.'

[2] In the first two speeches (§ 23) assigned to Socrates the subjects who express or allow opinions are very indistinctly stated. The reason

the doctrine of Protagoras, take some such philosophic view. But now, Theodorus, we have question growing out of question, greater out of less.

Theo. Are we not at leisure, Socrates?

So. We appear to be. On many occasions, my good sir, I have noticed, but especially on this, how natural it is for those who have spent much time on philosophy, when they go into the law-courts, to shew themselves absurd orators.

Theo. How do you mean?

So. People who from their youth have been knocking about in law-courts and such-like scenes, as compared with those who have been reared in philosophic and literary society, seem to have had a breeding like that of slaves compared with freemen.

Theo. In what respects?

So. In that (referring to your last observation) philosophers have leisure at all times, and hold their discussions peacefully and with leisurely ease, and as we have now been

of this seems to be, that he is referring throughout to what was said in his defence of Protagoras made in the name of Protagoras (§ 20). The oratio obliqua with which the first speech begins is dependent (as the translation indicates) on the ἄλλο τι φῶμεν (*must we not say?*) at the close of the previous speech in § 22. Of ξυγχωρήσεται and ἐθελῆσαι ἄν φάναι, according to Heindorf and Stallbaum, τις τινὰ understood are severally the subjects. I am rather disposed to understand Πρωταγόρας and Πρωταγόραν, as Protagoras had been mentioned just before, and his confession would be appropriate here. For the same reasons I suppose him to be the subject on whose statement or admission the oratio obliqua depends in the first paragraph of the second speech (οὐκοῦν κ.τ.λ.), after which ὁμολογήσει comes, where Protagoras is the natural subject. In the next sentence, where he recurs to τὰ καλὰ κ.τ.λ., Plato uses the plural ἐθέλουσιν ἰσχυρίζεσθαι. We cannot doubt that he speaks of the scholars of Protagoras, who still profess their master's doctrine on the question specified.

So. Thus, Theodorus, we have got rid of your friend, and do not yet concede to him that every man is the measure of every thing, if he be not a wise man; nor yet will we concede that knowledge is perception, at least on the supposition of all things moving.

Theo. A good hearing, Socrates: for, as this topic is concluded, I must be rid of the task of answering you, as by our compact I was to be, when the question about the doctrine of Protagoras should come to an end.

29 [*Theodorus rejoices that, according to the bargain, he was to be let off from the argument at this point. Theaetetus thinks he should go on to discuss the opposite theory of Rest. Theodorus jocularly scolds him, and insists on his taking his turn. He consents. But Socrates, professing the highest respect for Parmenides, and alluding to the difficulties which his writings present, prefers adhering to the question at issue, the definition of knowledge. Returning to his dialectic process, he leads Theaetetus to admit that it is more proper to say we perceive through the senses than with the senses, thus pointing to a central percipient (the soul). Next he makes him admit that the senses belong to the body, and that things perceived by one organ are not perceived by another. Hence any common notion acquired about things which are perceived by two different organs is not acquired through either organ, as existence, sameness, difference, likeness, and so on. What are the organs through which all these and other abstract notions are acquired? Theaetetus thinks they have no peculiar organs assigned to them; but that the soul by its own powers observes these common properties. Socrates commends his conclusion as agreeing with his own.*]

Theae. Nay, Theodorus, not before you and Socrates have discussed, as you just now proposed, the doctrine of those who on the other hand affirm that the universe is at rest.

Theo. What? you, Theaetetus, a mere youth, teaching your elders to commit the sin of violating compacts! Come, gird yourself up to debate with Socrates that which remains.

Theae. Oh, certainly, if he wishes. But I should have been delighted to hear the other topic discussed.

Theo. You challenge cavalry to the plain when you challenge Socrates to argument. Ask him, and you will hear his answer.

So. Ay, Theodorus; but I do not think I shall obey the call which Theaetetus makes.

Theo. Why not obey it?

So. As to Melissus and the others who represent the universe as one and at rest, I respect them too much to treat their views cursorily; but in still greater respect do I hold the single name of Parmenides. He appears to me to meet Homer's definition, 'venerable and likewise awful[1].' I was brought into contact with him when I was very young and he very old, and he struck me as possessing a depth of character pre-eminently noble. I fear that we may not understand his language, still more that we may fail to achieve his meaning: above all, I am afraid that our original question, the definition of knowledge, may cease to be considered, if a fresh crowd of arguments rushes in, and gains our attention. In particular, this hopelessly large argument which we are awakening, if considered as a digression, would be unworthily treated; or, if pursued adequately at full length, it will swamp the question of knowledge. We should do neither one nor the other, but endeavour by our art of midwifery to deliver Theaetetus of his conceptions about knowledge.

Theo. Very well; we must, if you please.

So. Once more then, Theaetetus, consider this part of our previous discourse. You said in reply to me that knowledge is perception. Did you not?

Theae. Yes.

[1] *Il.* III. 172.

So. If anybody were to ask you the question, with what a man sees white things and black, and with what he hears sharp things and flat, you would say, I suppose, with the eyes and with the ears.

Theae. I should.

So. The easy acceptance of names and terms, and the non-exaction of strict accuracy, is indeed generally not out of place in a well-bred man; we may rather say the reverse is vulgar, yet is it occasionally necessary. And so in the present instance I must perforce take exception to the answer which you give, in so far as it is wrong. Consider which answer is more correct, that the eyes are that with which, or that through which we see, and the ears that with which, or that through which we hear.

Theae. 'Through' which in each case, I think, Socrates, rather than 'with' which.

So. Yes, my boy; it is strange, I ween, if in us, as though we were 'wooden horses[2],' many independent senses are seated, instead of all these tending in common to some centre, whether we call it soul or anything else, whereby, through these senses as instruments, we perceive all things perceptible.

Theae. I think this latter view the truer one.

So. Why am I putting these minute questions to you? If with some one and the same part of ourselves we through the eyes apprehend things white and black, and through the other organs other things, and you will be able, on being asked, to refer all such perceptions at once to the body...perhaps however it is better you should specify them in answer to me than that I should save you that trouble. Now tell me. The organs through which you perceive hot things and hard

[2] Plato alludes here to the famous wooden horse of the Trojan legend.

and sweet—do you not state them to belong
the body, or do they belong to anything else?

To nothing else.

Will you also be ready to admit, that what you perceive through any one organ, you cannot possibly perceive through another; for instance, what you perceive by hearing, you cannot perceive by sight, or the converse?

Theae. I most readily admit it.

So. If you have any common notion about both, you would not acquire it from the one organ or from the other concerning both?

Theae. I should not.

So. As to sound and colour, in the first place, have you this same notion respecting both, that both 'are'?

Theae. I have.

So. You suppose also, that each is different from each, and the same with itself?

Theae. To be sure.

So. And that both are twain, but each is one?

Theae. Yes.

So. Are you not also able to observe whether they are like one another or unlike?

Theae. Probably.

So. Through what do you form all these notions concerning both? For neither through hearing nor through sight is it possible to obtain a common notion of them. Here again is another instance in point. If it were possible to examine, whether both are briny or not, you know that you will be able to say with what you will examine, and this is evidently neither sight nor hearing, but something else.

Theae. No doubt it is; namely, the power exercised through the tongue.

So. Well said. Now, through what does the power act which makes manifest to you what all things generally have in common with these particularly—what you mean, to wit, in saying 'is,' 'is not,' and all else comprised in our late questions? What organs will you assign as those through which our percipient faculty perceives all these severally?

Theae. You mean being and non-being, and likeness and unlikeness, and sameness and difference, and moreover unity and any other number applicable to things perceived? Evidently too your question includes the even and the odd, and all other such notions; asking through what bodily organ we perceive them with the soul.

So. You follow me admirably, Theaetetus, and these are the very questions I ask.

Theae. Well, Socrates, I really can give no other answer than this, that in my opinion these have originally no organ peculiar to them, such as the sensible objects have, but the soul through its own individual power appears to me to observe the common properties of all.

So. Yes, Theaetetus, you are a beauty, and not, as Theodorus said, ugly: for he who speaks beautifully is beautiful and good. And besides your beauty, I am much obliged to you for releasing me from a world of talk, if the soul appears to you to observe some things through itself, and other things through the bodily organs. This was my own opinion, and I was wishing it to be yours.

Theae. Yes: to me it is apparent.

30 [*Socrates now draws from Theaetetus the admission that while certain properties, as hardness and softness, are perceived through the senses common to men and beasts, essence, difference, use, and the like are matter of reflection by the soul attained through education. Without attaining essence, truth is not attained, nor without truth knowledge.*

It is not in the affections themselves, but in the reasonable conclusions concerning them, that knowledge lies. And what is the common name for all these affections? Perception, which cannot therefore attain essence or truth or knowledge. Hence it follows that perception and knowledge cannot be the same thing. Theaetetus admits the failure of this theory. Socrates reminds him that the search is not to find what knowledge is not, but to find what it is, and then begs him to consider what it is that the soul is said to do, when it forms a judgment on existing things. Theaetetus replies: It is said to opine—to form an opinion. Socrates now asks if he can give a new answer to the question, What is knowledge?]

So. To which of the two classes do you assign 'being'? For this is the notion most universally present.

Theae. I assign it to that class which the soul attains to by itself.

So. Do you say the same of likeness and unlikeness, of sameness and difference?

Theae. Yes.

So. And again of nobleness and baseness, good and evil?

Theae. Yes: these are things the essence of which, above all others, I believe that the soul observes in their mutual relativity, comparing within itself the past and the present with the future.

So. Wait a moment. Will it not perceive the hardness of a hard object through the touch, and so again the softness of a soft one?

Theae. Yes.

So. But their being, and what they are, and their mutual opposition, and again the being of that opposition, the soul itself, by reflecting and by comparing them with each other, endeavours to determine for us?

Theae. Quite so.

So. Men and beasts then, as soon as they are born, are

able by nature to perceive some things, those affections I mean which reach through the body to the soul. But the reflections concerning these in regard to essence and use are acquired, by those who do acquire them, painfully and gradually through the troublesome process of education.

Theae. Undoubtedly.

So. Can any one attain truth, who does not attain being?

Theae. He cannot.

So. And if he fail to attain the truth of a thing, will he ever have knowledge of it?

Theae. Impossible, Socrates.

So. Knowledge, then, does not lie in the affections of sense, but in the reasoning concerning them: for in this it seems possible to grasp essence and truth, and not in the affections?

Theae. Evidently.

So. Do you call two things the same which are in so many respects different?

Theae. There were no justice in doing so.

So. What name do you give to the one class—seeing, hearing, smelling, being cold and hot?

Theae. 'Perceiving' I would certainly call them.

So. Their common notion then you would call perception?

Theae. Of course.

So. And this, we say, has no share in the attainment of truth, having none in the attainment of being.

Theae. It has none.

So. Nor yet in the attainment of knowledge?

Theae. No.

So. Then, Theaetetus, perception and knowledge will not be the same?

Theae. Evidently not, Socrates. Now especially has knowledge been very clearly proved to be a different thing from perception.

So. But it was not by any means with this view that we began our argument, to find what knowledge is not, but to find what it is. Nevertheless we have so far advanced as not to seek it in perception at all, but in that name which, whatever it be, is applicable to the soul's action when by itself it deals with existing things.

Theae. This, I imagine, Socrates, is called 'opining' (forming opinion).

So. You imagine rightly, my friend. Now go back again and, erasing all that went before, see if you have any clearer view, after having advanced to this point. Tell me once more what knowledge is.

[*The first definition proposed by Theaetetus—that sensuous perception is knowledge—being thus overthrown by the elenchus concluded in* § 30, *he is invited to attempt a second. He hopes now to find one in that realm of pure thought which consists in believing, judging, or opining* (*forming opinion*). *But as it occurs to him that opinions formed are not always true, he sees that he must limit his definition; and, accordingly, he ventures to suggest that* TRUE OPINION *is knowledge. Against this doctrine Socrates opens a battery of argument without delay. It implies that such a thing as 'false opinion' is possible: and that possibility Socrates is not prepared to admit. All things subject to opinion are, he says, such as a man either knows or does not know. If he opines, he either knows or does not know that about which he opines: he cannot know, and not know, one and the same thing. Can he then* (*when he opines falsely*) *mistake one known thing for another known thing?—No.—Or a known thing for an unknown?—No.—Or an unknown for a known?—No.—Or one unknown for another unknown?—Impossible.—But if he forms a false opinion, he must err in one of these four ways:—all which are impossible. Therefore to form false opinion is impossible. But perhaps, adds Socrates, we should regard 'being' and 'not-being'* 31

rather than knowing and not-knowing. May not a man opine what is false, if he opines 'what is-not'? But he goes on to argue that nobody can opine 'what is not' any more than he can see or hear what is not: to opine 'what is not' is to opine 'nothing:' that is, not to opine at all. Therefore false opinion is no more possible from this point of view than it was from the former.]

Theae. To say that it is opinion generally, Socrates, is impossible, since there is false opinion. But true opinion probably is knowledge: so let this be my answer. If it shall be disproved while we proceed, as in the last case, we will try some other statement.

So. Your present forwardness to speak, Theaetetus, is more to the purpose than your original reluctance to answer. For in this way, we shall secure one of two advantages: we shall either find what we are in quest of, or our conceit of knowing what we do not know will be diminished. And this will be no despicable reward. Now let us see what it is you say. There being two kinds of opinion, the true and the false, do you make TRUE OPINION the definition of knowledge?

Theae. I do, according to my present view.

So. Is it worth while to resume the question of opinion?

Theae. Which do you mean?

So. I am somewhat disturbed now, as often before, and have found myself sorely perplexed in my own mind and in conversation, from my inability to say what this condition is in us, and in what way engendered.

Theae. What condition?

So. The holding of false opinion. Now again I am still considering and doubting whether we should leave it, or review it in a way different from that we took some little time ago.

Theae. Why not review it, Socrates, if there is any clear gain in doing so? For, as to leisure, you and Theodorus said very justly, that there is nothing to hurry us in such cases.

So. Well reminded. And perhaps it is not unreasonable to return upon our tracks. It is better, you'll allow, to achieve a little well than much inadequately.

Theae. Of course.

So. Well then? What do we in fact affirm? do we say that there is in each case false opinion, and that some one of us opines falsely, another again truly, as if such were the natural rule?

Theae. Yes, we do.

So. Does not this occur to us in respect of all things generally, and of each particularly—either knowing or not-knowing? for learning and forgetting, which lie between these, I set aside for the moment, as having no relation to our present argument.

Theae. In fact, Socrates, nothing else remains in each case but knowing and not-knowing.

So. Is it not a necessary consequence that he who opines must opine about one of the things which he knows, or one of those which he does not know?

Theae. It is.

So. And it is impossible, if he knows a thing, not to know it, or, if he knows it not, to know it?

Theae. Quite impossible.

So. Does then he who holds a false opinion think that things which he knows are not what they are, but some other things within his knowledge, and knowing both, is he ignorant of both?

Theae. It cannot be so, Socrates.

So. Or does he suppose things which he does not

know to be some other things outside of his knowledge? Does it happen to one who knows neither Theaetetus nor Socrates to imagine that Socrates is Theaetetus or Theaetetus Socrates?

Theae. How can that be?

So. But surely a man does not think that what he knows is what he does not know, or that what he does not know is what he knows.

Theae. That were a miracle.

So. In what other way then can any one hold false opinions? Except under the conditions stated it is impossible, I suppose, to have opinion. In every case we either know or do not know, and so situated, it is manifestly impossible for us ever to have false opinions.

Theae. Very true.

So. Perhaps we ought to examine our question with reference not to knowing and not-knowing, but to being and not-being.

Theae. How do you mean?

So. Consider if it be not a simple truth that one who thinks concerning anything that which is not, will inevitably think what is false, whatever the condition of his mind in other respects.

Theae. This again is probable, Socrates.

So. How then? What shall we reply, Theaetetus, if any one examine us: 'Is what you say possible for any one, and will any human being think what is not, either about some existing thing, or in the abstract?' Seemingly we shall say in reply: 'Yes, when he thinks, and does not think what is true.' Or how are we to speak?

Theae. As you say.

So. Does the like happen in any other case?

Theae. What do you mean?

So. That a person sees something, yet sees nothing.

Theae. How can that be?

So. If he sees some one thing, that 'something' is among things that are. Or do you think 'the one' is ever among the things that are not?

Theae. Not I.

So. He then, who sees some one thing, sees some thing that is.

Theae. Evidently.

So. And he who hears something hears some one thing, and a thing that is.

Theae. Yes.

So. And he who touches, I suppose, touches some one thing, and a thing that is, since it is one.

Theae. Yes.

So. And does not he who opines form opinion of some one thing?

Theae. He must.

So. And does not he who forms opinion of some one thing form it of some thing that is?

Theae. I grant this.

So. He then who opines what is not opines nothing.

Theae. Evidently.

So. Well, but he who opines nothing does not opine at all.

Theae. That seems clear.

So. Therefore it is not possible to think what is not, either about things that are, or in the abstract.

Theae. Manifestly not.

So. Thinking falsities is therefore different from thinking what is not.

Theae. It seems different.

So. And thus neither from our present consideration

(of being and not-being), nor from our previous one (of knowing and not knowing), do we find false opinion to exist in us.

Theae. No, we do not.

32 [*Socrates asks, whether false opinion may not possibly be found in what he calls 'allodoxy,' the mental exchange of one existing thing for another existing thing. Theaetetus would like to accept this explanation. But Socrates disappoints him. A short dialectic elenchus (in the course of which Socrates describes opinion as the result of a conversation which the soul holds with itself) leads to the conclusion that, assuming two different things—the noble and the base—the just and the unjust—a horse and an ox, &c., nobody can mistake one for the other, either if he has formed an opinion of both, or if he has formed an opinion of one, but not of the other: so that allodoxy (which he now terms heterodoxy) does not supply any rational definition of false opinion.*]

So. But can we not speak of it as happening in this way?

Theae. How?

So. We can say that an opinion which may be called an 'allodoxy' is false when anybody says that some one existing thing is another existing thing, exchanging them in his mind. For thus he always thinks of what exists, but of one thing instead of another, and, as missing that which he had in view, he may be said to have false opinion.

Theae. Your present statement seems to me very correct. For when any one opines that a thing is ugly instead of beautiful, or beautiful instead of ugly, then he very truly has false opinion.

So. Evidently, Theaetetus, you speak in contempt of me, and without fear.

Theae. Pray why?

So. You do not expect, I fancy, that I shall lay hold of your term 'truly false', and ask if it is possible for the swift to 'come-to-be' slowly, or the light heavily, or for any other opposite to come-to-be—not according to its own nature, but according to the nature of its opposite—in a manner opposed to itself. This however—that your confidence may not be fruitless—I pass over. You say you are pleased with the notion that opining falsities is 'allodoxy.'

Theae. I am.

So. Then in your opinion it is possible to determine in your mind that one thing is another, and not itself.

Theae. It is.

So. When therefore the mind does this, must it not perforce think either of both things, or of one of the two?

Theae. Yes, it must.

So. At the same time, or else by turns.

Theae. Very good.

So. Do you employ the term 'thinking' in the same sense that I do?

Theae. How do you define it?

So. A discourse which the soul holds with itself about what it considers. I am representing this to you not as a fact that I know. In the exercise of thought, the soul, as I fancy it, is simply engaged in conversation, questioning itself and answering, affirming and denying. And when, having reached a definition, whether slowly or by a more rapid impulse, it at length agrees and affirms undoubtingly, we state this to be its opinion. So that I call opining the soul's speaking, and opinion its spoken word, not addressed to another or uttered by the voice, but silently to itself.

Theae. So do I.

So. Therefore, when any one opines that one thing is another, he says to himself, it would seem, that one thing is another.

Theae. Certainly.

So. Try to remember whether you ever said to yourself, 'Assuredly the noble is base,' or, 'The unjust is just.' Or, to sum up, consider if you ever attempted to convince yourself that assuredly one thing was another: or if, on the contrary, you never even in sleep ventured to say to yourself, Undoubtedly the odd is even, or any such thing?

Theae. You say the truth.

So. Do you think any body in or out of his senses ever ventured seriously to say to himself, trying to make himself believe, that an ox must needs be a horse, or two things one?

Theae. No indeed, not I.

So. If then to speak to oneself is to opine, nobody who speaks and thinks of both things, and apprehends both with his soul, can say and think that one is the other. But you must avoid the terms 'one and other.' I'll state the point in this way: Nobody thinks that the noble is base, or anything of the sort.

Theae. Well, Socrates, I give up the terms, and I agree with you.

So. That one who thinks of both cannot possibly opine that one is the other?

Theae. Seemingly not.

So. Again, if he thinks of the one alone, and of the other not at all, he will never opine that one is the other.

Theae. True: for so he would be forced to apprehend that of which he has no thought.

So. Accordingly allodoxy is inadmissible for any one

who thinks either of both or of one. So that whoever shall define false opinion to be heterodoxy will talk nonsense: for it is shown by this method as well as by the former that false opinion cannot exist in us.

Theae. Seemingly not.

[*Socrates seems, or feigns, to be driven to despair by the failure of his* 33
three attempts to find the habitat of false opinion. It is not in the region of knowledge, nor in that of being, nor in that confusion of phenomena, which he terms allodoxy. Surely it must be somewhere. Surely mistakes are made. May not a person know something, and, seeing something else which he does not know, mistake it for that thing which he knows? At this point in the dialogue Plato introduces two parables or myths. He supposes first, a memorial waxen block, and, later on, a bird-cage or aviary, to be situated in the human mind. (In figments of this kind Plato takes great delight: he has scattered them with profusion throughout his works. They do not supply to the pure intellect that verification which it demands in order to accept a philosophic theory. But the literary composer finds them a very convenient resource. They fill up gaps in serious argument. They rouse the imagination, they charm the fancy: they attract and amuse the general reader, when fatigued with dry dialexis. In short, they are a valuable part of that ψυχαγωγία, which Plato, who has a rhetoric of his own, is far from disdaining for his own use. See Dr Thompson's Introduction to his edition of the Phaedrus, especially pp. xxi—ii, also p. 141.) *In this section a general description is given of the waxen block or tablet, as Mr Grote calls it* (ἐκμαγεῖον). *The wax varies in various cases, in some being larger, firmer, cleaner, and in every way better than in others. The receptacle also is more or less wide and convenient. The tablet is a gift of Mnemosyne* (*memory*) *for impressing by seals every one's sensations and thoughts. These are remembered and known while the impressions remain: when these fade, they are forgotten and no longer known. Socrates goes on to state when false notions cannot be formed, and when they can.*]

So. And yet, Theaetetus, if this shall be proved im-

possible, we shall be compelled to admit many absurd consequences.

Theae. What are they?

So. I will not say till I have tried every point of view. For I should blush for us if, in a moment of perplexity, we were forced to admit such things as I allude to. But if we find a way to get free, then and not before we will speak of others as thus perplexed, standing clear of ridicule ourselves. But, if we find ourselves posed on every side, then, in a humble frame, I suppose, like sea-sick men, we shall allow the argument to trample on us and treat us as it will. Listen, while I tell you how I may still find a way of escape from our inquiry.

Theae. Pray tell me.

So. I will say we were wrong in admitting that it is impossible to opine that what one knows is what one does not know, and so to be deceived: for it is in a certain way possible.

Theae. Do you mean what I myself suspected at the time we made the assertion—a case occurring sometimes like this, that I, knowing Socrates, and seeing at a distance another whom I do not know, think it is the Socrates whom I know? For in such a case something like what you say comes to pass.

So. Did we not abandon that view, because it made us, while knowing, not to know what we do know?

Theae. Certainly.

So. Suppose we do not state it thus, but in the following manner. Perhaps it will give way to us, perhaps resist. But indeed we are in such a strait, that we must perforce turn about and examine every argument. See if I ask a rational question. Is it not possible to learn something which you formerly did not know?

Theae. Yes, it is.

So. And one thing after another?

Theae. Why not?

So. Suppose, for the sake of argument, that there is in our souls a waxen block, in one soul larger, in another smaller, of purer wax in one, in another of less pure, harder in some, moister in others; in some of medium quality.

Theae. Well.

So. Let us say it is a gift of Mnemosyne, mother of the Muses, and that on this we strike off, as if we were impressing ring-seals, any thing we wish to remember among those we see or hear or imagine, submitting the block to our senses and imaginations; and that whatever is impressed, we remember and know as long as its image subsists; but that, when it is obliterated or fails to be impressed, we have forgotten and do not know.

Theae. Be it so.

So. See then if he who knows things, and considers anything he sees or hears, may have false opinions in some such way as the following:

Theae. In what way?

So. By thinking sometimes that what he knows is what he does know, sometimes what he does not know. In our previous statements we were wrong in denying this to be possible.

Theae. How do you state it now?

So. Our statement on the subject must be this. We first determine, that what a person knows, having a record of it in his soul, but without perceiving it, he cannot possibly think to be some other thing which he knows, having an image of this also, but not perceiving it. And again it is impossible to think that what he knows is what he

knows not and has no seal of: and that what he knows not is [something else] which he knows not: and that what he knows not is what he knows: and to think what he perceives is some other thing which he perceives; and what he perceives, a thing which he does not perceive; and what he does not perceive to be another thing which he does not perceive; and what he does not perceive to be a thing which he perceives. And again to think that a thing which he knows and perceives, having the seal of it according to perception, is some other thing which he knows and perceives having its seal also according to perception—this is, if it can be, still more impossible than the preceding suppositions. And what one knows and perceives, having its record correctly, it is impossible to think [something else] which one knows: and what one knows and perceives under similar conditions, to be [something else] which one perceives: and what one neither knows nor perceives to be [something else] which one neither knows nor perceives: and what one neither knows nor perceives, to be [something else] which one does not know; and what one neither knows nor perceives, to be [something else] which one does not perceive. All these things involve the very utmost impossibility of having any false opinion about them. There remain the following cases, in which, if anywhere, such a thing may happen.

Theae. What are they? perhaps they may help me to understand. At present I do not follow you.

So. In the case of things which a person knows, to think that they are some other things which he knows and perceives; or some other things which he does not know, but perceives: or that [some things] which he knows and perceives are [some others] which he also knows and perceives.

Theae. I am more in the dark now than before.

[*In this section it is shewn how, by the misuse of the waxen tablet, false opinion may be supposed to occur; namely, by an erroneous union of sensation and impression. Mr Grote states it as follows: "A man, having sealed on his memorial tablet the impressions of two objects A and B, which he has seen before, may come to see one of these objects again: but he may by mistake identify the present sensation with the wrong past impression,* i. e. *with that past impression to which it does not belong. Thus, on seeing A, he may erroneously identify it with the past impression B, instead of A; or vice versa. And so false opinion will lie, not in the conjunction or identification of sensations with sensations, nor of thoughts (or past impressions) with thoughts, but in that of present sensations with past impressions or thoughts." Such an occurrence Socrates imputes to defects in the waxen block; which may be too shallow or too hard or too soft or too narrow, or impure, or inclosed in too small a space.*] 34

So. Listen to this restatement. Do not I, knowing Theodorus and remembering in my mind what sort of man he is, and Theaetetus similarly, sometimes see them, sometimes not, and sometimes touch them, at other times not, and hear them or have some other perception of them, and again have no perception of you, but not the less remember you and know you in my mind?

Theae. Certainly.

So. This is the first lesson which I wish to make known to you, that a man may not perceive, or may perceive, things which he knows.

Theae. True.

So. Things too which he does not know, a man may often not perceive, often perceive merely?

Theae. This too is possible.

So. Now see if you follow me more easily. Socrates knows Theodorus and Theaetetus, but sees neither, and has no other present perception about them. He could never

form an opinion in his mind that Theaetetus is Theodorus? Do I speak sense or not?

Theae. All quite true.

So. This was the first of the cases spoken of.

Theae. It was.

So. The second was, that knowing one of you, and not knowing the other, and perceiving neither, I can never suppose the one I know to be the one I do not know.

Theae. Right.

So. Thirdly, knowing and perceiving neither, I cannot suppose one whom I do not know to be some other whom I do not know. And as to all my former suppositions, imagine that you have heard them stated again in order, wherein I can never have false opinions about you and Theodorus, either if I know or if I do not know both, or if I know one, but not the other. And similarly with regard to perceptions, if you follow me.

Theae. I do.

So. False opinion remains possible in a case like this: when, knowing you and Theodorus, and having in that waxen block the seals of both of you as from rings, then, seeing both at a distance and indistinctly, I strive to assign the proper seal of each to its proper visage, and to introduce and adapt this to its own mould, in order that recognition may take place: but if, failing in the attempt, and interchanging, like those who put on the wrong shoes, I apply the visage of each to the other's seal; or again, if I go wrong by an affection like that of sight in mirrors, when it flows from right to left:—then heterodoxy and false opinion occur.

Theae. You describe with marvellous truth, Socrates, the conditions to which opinion is liable.

So. Moreover [false opinion happens] when, knowing

both, I perceive one, as well as know him, but not the other, and so my knowledge of the second of the two is not according to perception—a case put in my former statement, which you did not then understand.

Theae. I did not.

So. Well, I meant to say that a person knowing and perceiving the one, and having his knowledge according to perception, will never think that he is some other whom he knows and perceives, and of whom his knowledge is also according to perception. Was it so?

Theae. Yes.

So. There remained, I think, the case we now deal with, in which we say that false opinion happens when a person knowing and seeing both, or having any other perception of both, does not keep each of the seals in accordance with his perception, but like a bad archer shoots beside the mark and so errs; and such error is called a falsity.

Theae. And reasonably.

So. And so, when to one of the seals perception is present, but not to the other, and the mind adapts the seal which is without perception to the perception present, in every such case it is deceived. In one word, about things which a person knows not and never perceived, error and false opinion seem out of the question, if there is any soundness in our present argument: but in those things about which we have knowledge and perception, opinion turns and twists about, becoming true or false; true, when it brings the proper impressions and forms to meet oppositely and straightly; false, when it brings them crosswise and crookedly.

Theae. Is not this a noble statement, Socrates?

So. You will say so with more assurance after hearing

what I have further to state: for to think the truth is noble, to be deceived is base.

Theae. No doubt.

So. These things are said to happen as follows. When the wax in any person's soul is deep and abundant and smooth and nicely wrought, the impressions become durable which pass through the senses and are sealed on this (waxen) heart of the soul, as Homer called it in allusion to the resemblance of wax; for then, and in all such cases, they are formed in it pure, and have depth enough. And such persons are in the first place quick to learn, in the next retentive, and finally they do not interchange the seals of the perceptions, but form true opinions. For as their impressions are distinct and have ample room, they rapidly distribute them to their several niches; and such impressions are called 'real:' and these persons are termed 'wise.' Do you not think so?

Theae. With entire conviction.

So. When any person's heart is shaggy, as that all-wise poet sang, or when it is miry and of impure wax, or exceedingly soft or hard—they whose heart is soft, are quick to learn, but forgetful; they whose heart is hard, the opposite: and they who have a shaggy and rough and gritty heart, or one defiled with a mixture of earth or mire, have their impressions indistinct. In those who have hard hearts, they are indistinct too, for depth is wanting: likewise in those who have soft hearts, for through confusion they soon become faint. And if besides all these faults they are furthermore crushed one upon another for want of room, when a man's soul is small, they are still more indistinct than in the former cases. All these people are capable of having false opinions. For when they see or hear or imagine anything, being unable to

assign each thing quickly to its proper impression, they go tardily to work, and, assorting erroneously, they see and hear and conceive most things wrongly. And of these persons again we say, that they have false notions of things, and are ignorant.

Theae. Never was a truer statement, Socrates.

So. May we say then that false opinions exist in us?

Theae. Decidedly.

So. And true?

Theae. Yes.

So. Now we think it sufficiently agreed that both these kinds of opinion certainly exist?

Theae. Beyond all question.

[*Socrates has no sooner reached his conclusion as to the formation of false opinion, than he proceeds to confute it. There are phenomena for which it does not account. Errors occur in the identification of one past impression with another: and this leads to the dilemma that either false opinion is impossible, or it is possible for a person not to know what he does know. This dilemma Theaetetus cannot solve. And Socrates remarks that this discussion has become impure, in that they have constantly used the terms 'knowing,' 'knowledge,' and 'ignorance' before they have reached a definition of these terms. As, however, he admits that he cannot carry on the discussion without using them in some sense or other, he declares himself willing to make the attempt, and Theaetetus applauds his resolution.*] 35

So. What a truly terrible and disagreeable creature, Theaetetus, a chattering man appears to be.

Theae. How so? What do you say this for?

So. Because I am so annoyed by my own dullness and manifest garrulity. For what else can one call the conduct of a man, who wears every argument threadbare, and cannot be made to quit it, because he is too stupid to be convinced?

Theae. What vexes you?

So. I am not only vexed, but at a loss how to answer, should any one question me and say: 'Have you now,

Socrates, discovered that false opinion lies neither in the mutual relation of perceptions, nor in that of thoughts, but in the union of perception with thought?' I shall say, 'Yes,' I suppose, with a triumphant air, as if we had made some beautiful discovery.

Theae. I see nothing the reverse, Socrates, in what has now been proved.

So. Do you mean, he will say, that we can never suppose the man, whom we think of but do not see, to be a horse, which again we neither see nor touch but only think of, and in no way perceive? I suppose I shall say that I do mean it.

Theae. Yes, and rightly.

So. Well, he will say, as to the number eleven, which is an object of thought only, must it not follow from this statement that nobody could ever suppose it to be twelve, which is also an object of thought only? Come now, reply yourself.

Theae. I shall reply that any one who saw and touched them might think eleven to be twelve, but so far as he had them in thought, he could never conceive such an opinion regarding them.

So. Well, take the case of one who set before himself and regarded in his own mind five and seven. I don't mean seven and five men or anything of the sort, but the notions of five and seven, of which we say that they are recorded there on the waxen block, and that as to them it is impossible to have false opinion. Of these things I ask if it never chanced, that while people were considering them, and conversing with themselves, and inquiring how many they come to—one person would think and say they were eleven, another twelve:—or would all say and think that they make twelve?

Theae. No, indeed, not all; many will say, eleven.

And if a person has higher figures under consideration, he is still more liable to error. I suppose you are speaking of number generally.

So. Your supposition is right. Consider whether anything happens in such a case but imagining the number twelve, in the block, to be eleven.

Theae. Nothing else, seemingly.

So. We are thus carried back to our former discussion. The person in such a case supposes a thing which he knows to be another thing which he knows. This we said was impossible; and on this very ground we forced the conclusion that false opinion does not exist, in order that the same person might not be compelled to know and not know the same things at the same time.

Theae. Very true.

So. Therefore we must declare that holding false opinion is something else than a discrepancy between thought and sensation. For, if it were this, we could never be deceived in our mental concepts themselves. But now either there is no false opinion, or it is possible for a person not to know what he knows. Which alternative do you choose?

Theae. You offer an impossible choice, Socrates.

So. Ay, but the argument will hardly allow both. Nevertheless, as we must risk the utmost, suppose we venture to be shameless?

Theae. How?

So. By making up our minds to say what 'to know' means.

Theae. Why is this a shameless act?

So. You seem not to bear in mind that all our discussion from the first has been a quest of knowledge, assuming that we do not know what it is.

Theae. I do bear this in mind.

So. Is it not then shameless, if we do not know knowledge, to proclaim what knowing means? But in fact, Theaetetus, we have been long infected with an impure method of discussion. Over and over again we have used the terms 'we know,' and 'we do not know,' 'we have knowledge' and 'we have not knowledge,' as if we could understand one another, while we are yet ignorant of knowledge. If you remark, at this very moment we have again used the terms ignorance and understanding, as though it were fit for us to use them, if we are destitute of knowledge.

Theae. But in what way will you argue, Socrates, if you abstain from these terms?

So. In no way, while I am the man I am: but I could if I were a votary of contention. Were a man of that school now present, he would profess to abstain from such terms, and would rebuke us sternly for our conduct. Since however we are such poor creatures, will you let me venture to say what 'knowing' is? For I am clear that it will be of some help to us.

Theae. Oh yes! pray venture. You will have great excuse for not abandoning these terms.

[*Having consented, for the sake of discussion, to use the term 'knowing,'* 36
though still undefined, Socrates now observes that most people suppose it to mean 'the having of knowledge.' For his own part, he would rather say 'the possessing,' than 'the having:' for a person cannot justly be said 'to have' what he never uses, though he may 'possess' it, like a coat kept in a wardrobe but never worn. This distinction he illustrates by his second parable, that of the mental dove-cage. A person may be supposed to have caught a number of doves (i.e. to have acquired sciences or cognitions) which he has turned into his cage or aviary, and so 'possesses.' But, if he wants to catch one of his doves (i.e. to recall and use one of his acquired cognitions), he has

to pursue another chase in his mental aviary; and this may not always be successful. He may fail to catch the dove he wants (i.e. he may find that he has forgotten the science he had once acquired) or he may get hold of a wrong dove (i.e. he may confuse things which he could accurately distinguish at a former time).]

So. You have heard then what people now mean by 'knowing?'

Theae. Possibly: but I do not remember at the moment.

So. They say it is a having of knowledge.

Theae. True.

So. Let us make a slight change and say, possession of knowledge.

Theae. What will you say is the difference between them?

So. Perhaps none: but you may as well hear, and help me to test my opinion.

Theae. I will if I can.

So. 'Having' does not appear to me the same thing as 'possessing.' For instance, if any one bought a coat, and being master of it did not wear it, we should not say he had, but possessed it.

Theae. Right.

So. Now see if it is possible in the same manner to possess knowledge without having it. Suppose a person had caught wild birds, doves or any other sort, and built a dove-cage in his dwelling and fed them. In a certain way we should say he always has them, because he possesses them. Should we not?

Theae. Yes.

So. In another sense we should say he has none of them, but he has got a power over them, since he has made them subject to him in a domestic inclosure of his own.

He can take and hold them when he likes, catching any one he wishes, and he can let it go again. And it is free to him to do this as often as he thinks proper?

Theae. It is.

So. So then, even as in the previous part of our discourse we framed in human souls a strange sort of waxen figment, let us again make in every soul a certain cage of various kinds of birds, some in flocks apart from the rest; others in small groups; others alone, flying among all wherever they may chance.

Theae. Suppose it made. What next?

So. While we are children (we must say) this structure is empty: and we must think of sciences instead of birds: and whatever science any one has acquired and shut up in his inclosure, we must say that he has learnt or discovered the thing of which it is the science: and this is 'knowing.'

Theae. Be it so.

So. Again, as to catching any one of the sciences a person chooses, and taking and holding it, and letting it go again,—consider by what terms these acts should be described, whether by the same as when he was first acquiring the sciences, or by others. You will learn what I mean more clearly from the following illustration. There is an art you call arithmetic?

Theae. Yes.

So. Suppose this to be a pursuit of the knowledge of odd and even.

Theae. Well, I do.

So. By this art, I imagine, a person both has the cognitions of all numbers in his power, and transmits them to another.

Theae. Yes.



So. And we say that one who transmits teaches, and one who receives learns, and one who has them by possessing in that cage 'knows?'

Theae. Quite so.

So. Attend and see what next follows. Does not a perfect arithmetician know all numbers? For he has in his soul the science of all numbers.

Theae. Certainly.

So. Could not such a person count any sum mentally, or any outward objects capable of numeration?

Theae. No doubt he could.

So. And shall we say that counting means anything but considering how great any number is?

Theae. Such is its meaning.

So. Then what a person 'knows,' he is shown to consider as if he did not know, though we have allowed that he knows all number. You have heard, I suppose, of these vexed questions?

Theae. I have.

[*Socrates now confutes his own hypothesis. Catching a dove which you* 37
acquired and possess, seems to mean learning from yourself what you know already. This Theaetetus sees to be absurd. And the confusion of two known things appears to be not less absurd. For this knowledge is shewn to produce the effect of ignorance. Why may not ignorance as well be shewn to produce the effect of knowledge, and blindness that of sight? May we not imagine, says Theaetetus, that the cage contains nesciences (non-cognitions) as well as sciences (cognitions) and that false opinion may take place when a person, hunting for a science, gets hold of a nescience in its stead? By a short elenchus Socrates shews that this hypothesis implies consequences which have been already acknowledged to be impossible. For the man who has thus got hold of nescience mistakes it for science, does he not? Yes, says Theaetetus. But how can anybody, knowing two things, take one for the other, or, knowing neither, take what he does not know, for something else that

he does not know: or knowing one but not the other, take what he does know for what he does not know, or the converse. All these are impossibilities: and so we, until we know what knowledge is, cannot know what false opinion is.]

So. We then, following the similitude of the possession and chase of doves, will say that the chase was double; one before acquirement, with a view to possession: the other after possession, in order to take and hold in hand what the owner had long ago acquired. So even those same things of which a person had the knowledge long since by learning, and which he then knew, he may again thoroughly learn by resuming and holding the knowledge of each, which he had indeed long ago acquired, but had not within his mental grasp.

Theae. True.

So. I was just now asking what terms we must use to speak of such cases, as when the arithmetician proceeds to count or the grammarian to read. Does he in this case, although he knows, come to learn from himself what he knows?

Theae. That were absurd, Socrates.

So. But must we say that he will read and count what he does not know, after allowing him to know all letters and all number?

Theae. This again is unreasonable.

So. Would you have us state that, as to terms, we do not care at all in what way anybody likes to twist the words 'knowing' and 'learning;' but that since we defined 'possessing' knowledge to be one thing, 'having' it another, we say it is impossible for any one not to possess what he has acquired; so that it never happens that any one does not know what he knows, but it is possible to get hold of a false opinion concerning it: for it is possible not to

have the knowledge of this one, but of another in its stead, when chasing any of the sciences which flit from him, he mistakes and lays hold on one instead of another, as in the case when he thought eleven to be twelve, getting hold of the knowledge of eleven, instead of that of twelve, the ring-dove as it were within him instead of the pigeon?

Theae. Yes, that is reasonable.

So. But when he gets hold of that which he tries to take, shall we say, that then he is free from error and opines realities, and that in this way there is true and false opinion, and that none of the difficulties which we found in our foregoing arguments come in our way? Perhaps you will endorse my statement. Will you?

Theae. I will.

So. Then so far we are rid of the notion that people do not know what they know: for it no longer happens in any case not to possess what we do possess, whether deceived about it or not. And yet there seems to glance sideways on me a trouble still more formidable.

Theae. Of what nature?

So. Whether the interchange of cognitions will ever come to be false opinion.

Theae. How do you mean?

So. First, as to the notion of anybody's having knowledge of a thing, and at the same time being ignorant of it, not by inacquaintance, but by his own knowledge: next, as to opining this to be one thing, and the other thing to be this—is it not the height of unreason, that, when knowledge is present the soul should recognize nothing, and be ignorant of everything? for on this principle there is nothing to prevent ignorance being present and causing one to know something, and blindness causing to see, if knowledge shall ever cause any one to be ignorant.

Theae. Perhaps, Socrates, we did not arrange the birds well in placing sciences only, but we ought to have placed also nesciences flying about with them in the soul; and the chaser, at one time getting hold of a science, at another of a nescience, has about the same thing opinions false by nescience, true by science.

So. It is not easy, Theaetetus, to avoid praising you. But review your proposition. Suppose it as you state. He who lays hold on nescience, you say, will have false opinions. Is it so?

Theae. Yes.

So. He will not, I suppose, think he has false opinions?

Theae. How can he?

So. He will think he has true ones then, and as to things in which he is deceived, he will be in the same condition as if he knew them?

Theae. No doubt.

So. He will think that he has chased and got science, not nescience?

Theae. Evidently.

So. Accordingly, after a long circuit we have reached our original perplexity. Our critic will again laugh and say: 'My right worthy friends, will one who knows them both, science and nescience, suppose that which he knows to be the other which he knows? or knowing neither of them, does he imagine what he knows not to be the other which he knows not: or, knowing one but not the other, does he suppose the one he knows to be the one he knows not, or the one he knows not to be the one he knows? Or will you tell me again that there are also sciences of sciences and of nesciences, which he who possesses has shut up in some other ridiculous dove-cage or waxen

figment, and knows as long as he possesses them, even if he have them not ready to hand in his soul? and so will you be compelled to run round and round to the same point without gaining anything by it?' What answer shall we give to these questions, Theaetetus?

Theae. Really, Socrates, I do not know what we ought to say.

So. Does not the argument, my boy, rebuke us justly, and show that we are wrong in leaving the question of knowledge, and investigating false opinion first? It is impossible to know this latter, before we have adequately settled what knowledge is.

Theae. At this point, Socrates, I must accept your view.

[*Are we then to abandon the inquiry—'what is knowledge?' Theaetetus will not do so, if Socrates is ready to continue it; but he reverts to his second definition, that true opinion is knowledge. Socrates says that the whole profession of lawyers and orators gainsays this doctrine: for their whole business is to persuade dicasts that certain things which the dicasts did not personally witness, are true, and that they ought to decide accordingly. If they do so decide, and that rightly, they have formed a true opinion, which cannot be called knowledge, but the result of persuasion. Therefore true opinion and knowledge are not identical. Theaetetus now remembers that he once heard it said, that true opinion with rational explanation* (λόγος) *is knowledge, Things are unknowable, if they cannot be rationally defined: if they can, they are knowable.*] 38

So. Returning to the original question, what is one to say that knowledge is? For we shall not give in yet, I suppose.

Theae. Certainly not, if you do not set the example.

So. Say then how we must define it in order to escape best from self-contradiction.

Theae. As we proposed in our foregoing discussion, Socrates. I have no other suggestion to make.

So. What was the definition?

Theae. That true opinion is knowledge. True opinion is, I suppose, free from error, and its results are all noble and good.

So. The man who led the way into the river, Theaetetus, said 'the trial will prove;' and if we search for this as we go, perhaps the fact will stop us and exhibit what we are looking for. If we stand still, we shall see nothing.

Theae. Right. Let us proceed and look out.

So. This look-out of ours will be a brief one: for a whole profession indicates that true opinion is not knowledge.

Theae. How so? What is that profession?

So. The profession of the mightiest in wisdom, who are called orators and lawyers. These men in their art persuade, not by teaching, but by making men opine whatever they will. Do you suppose there are any teachers clever enough, within the flowing of a little water, to teach adequately the truth of facts to certain persons, who were not present when they were robbed of money, or when they received some other violence?

Theae. I do not suppose they could; but they would persuade.

So. By persuading you mean, 'causing to form an opinion?'

Theae. Certainly.

So. When therefore dicasts are justly persuaded about things which can be known by seeing only, not otherwise, in that case, judging the things by what they hear, they judged without knowledge, though persuaded rightly, if their verdict was good?

Theae. Unquestionably.

So. If, my friend, true opinion and knowledge were the same, a perfect dicast would never form a right opinion without knowledge. But now it seems they are not one and the same.

Theae. As to this I had forgotten, Socrates, a thing which I once heard somebody say: but I now recollect it. He said that true opinion accompanied with rational explanation was knowledge, but unexplained opinion out of the sphere of knowledge: things of which there is no explanation are, he said, not knowable, using that very term; but those which have explanation are knowable.

So. Well said. But what distinction did he draw between these knowable and unknowable things? Tell me, that I may see whether you and I have heard the same version or not.

Theae. I am not sure that I can recall it: but, if another told it, I think I could follow him.

[*Socrates says that he too has heard a similar definition, which he proceeds* 39
to explain by the analogy of words and letters. The primordial elements of things are not matters either of knowledge or of true opinion, or of rational explanation, but of sensible perception merely. An element can only be perceived and called by its name. You can give it neither predicate nor epithet: you cannot speak of it as 'being,' as 'this' or 'that' or 'each,' or 'single:' for so you add to it something foreign to itself, and it is no longer an element. But the compounds of these elements may be known and explained by enumerating the elements of which they are composed. And to do this is to furnish a rational explanation (Λόγος) *of them. Theaetetus accepts this statement, and repeats the new definition of knowledge stated in the preceding section. Socrates intimates that he is dissatisfied with the statement that elements are unknowable, while their compounds are knowable. He further proposes to discuss this question in reference to syllables and the letters or elements of which they are composed.*]

So. Hear then dream for dream. Methought I heard some say that the primal elements, as it were, of which we and all other things are compounded, have no reason: for it is only possible to name each by itself, not to predicate anything else of it, either that it is or is not, as in such case 'being' or 'not-being' is attached: while it is wrong to ascribe either, if one is to speak of the thing itself alone. We must not, they say, ascribe the term 'self' or 'that' or 'each' or 'single' or 'this,' or many other like expressions: for these run about and are applied to all things, being different from the things to which they are attached. If the primal element were capable of being described, and had a proper description of its own, the fitting course would be, that it should be described apart from all others. Since, however, it is impossible for any one of the first rudiments to be defined in words, there is nothing for it except to be named only: name is all it has. But, as to the things compounded of these, as they are themselves complex, so also their names being combined constitute definition: for a complex of names is the essence of definition. Thus I dreamed that the elements are undescribed and unknown, but perceptible; while their combinations are known and expressed and conceived by true opinion. Whenever any one gains the true opinion of anything without definition, his soul is truthful with regard to it, but does not know it, for one who cannot give and receive a spoken account of anything is incognisant of it. But after adding such an account, he is capable of becoming all this, and is perfect in knowledge. Have you heard the dream thus or otherwise?

Theae. Exactly thus.

So. Are you content with it, and do you lay it down that true opinion combined with explanation is knowledge?

Theae. Quite so.

So. Have we to-day, Theaetetus, in this manner found at last what from ancient time so many wise men have grown old without finding?

Theae. At all events, Socrates, I think our present statement a good one.

So. It may naturally seem so. For what can be called knowledge apart from definition and right opinion? Yet I am displeased with one of the things we said.

Theae. What was that?

So. One that seems to be stated very neatly, how that the elements are unknown, but the class of combinations known.

Theae. Is not that true?

So. We must see. For we have as hostages all the examples which he used in saying what he did.

Theae. What are they?

So. Letters and syllables. Do you think the speaker had anything but these in view when he said what we cite?

Theae. No: he thought of these.

[*Assailing the new definition with reference to letters and syllables, and taking as an instance the first syllable of his own name, Σω, Socrates, by a short elenchus, proves that the syllable is not known, unless the letters sigma and ōmega are known also. But, starting a fresh argument, he suggests that possibly a syllable is a general notion having a nature independent of its letters. Theaetetus is willing to accept this view. Then, says Socrates, it can have no parts. Why? Because 'a whole' must mean 'all its parts.' Can a whole be a notion distinct from all its parts? Theaetetus ventures to say it can. Socrates asks if 'the all and the whole' are different. Theaetetus risks the answer: 'they are different.'*] 40

So. Let us then take and test them; or, rather test ourselves, whether we learnt letters on this principle or any

other. To begin: can syllables be defined, but letters not?

Theae. Probably.

So. I take the same view. If some one asked about the first syllable of Socrates for instance and said, 'Tell me, Theaetetus, what Sō is: how would you answer?

Theae. Sîgma and Ōmega.

So. This then you hold to be the definition of the syllable?

Theae. I do.

So. Well now, tell me similarly the definition of Sigma.

Theae. How can one tell the elements of an element? For indeed, Socrates, Sigma is one of the consonants, a sort of noise only, as when the tongue hisses; Beta again has neither sound nor noise: nor have most of the letters. So they may very well be called undefined, as the cleârest of them have sound alone, but no definition at all.

So. So much then, my friend, we have rightly determined concerning knowledge?

Theae. Apparently.

So. Well now? Have we rightly admitted that the letter is not known, but only the syllable?

Theae. Seemingly.

So. Do we now say that the syllable is both letters, or if there be more than two, all these, or some one idea arising from their combination?

Theae. I think we should say, all of them.

So. Take the case of two, Sigma and Ōmega. These two form the first syllable of my name. Does not one who knows the syllable know both?

Theae. To be sure.

So. He knows Sigma and Ōmega?

Theae. Yes.

So. How then? is he ignorant of each, and, knowing neither, does he know both?

Theae. That were strange and unreasonable, Socrates.

So. And yet, if a person must perforce know each, in order to know both, it is absolutely necessary for one who is ever to know a syllable, to know the letters first. And thus our beautiful argument will have run clear away from us.

Theae. Ay, and in a very sudden way.

So. We do not keep a good watch on it. Perhaps we ought to have laid it down that a syllable is not the letters themselves, but some notion arising from them, having one form belonging to itself, while another belongs to the separate letters.

Theae. Quite so. And perhaps this statement may be truer than the other.

So. We must consider the point, and not abandon in this cowardly way a great and dignified theory.

Theae. Surely not.

So. Suppose it be as we now say. The syllable is one general form arising from the harmonious adaptation of the several elements; both in grammar and everywhere else.

Theae. Very well.

So. Then there must be no parts of it.

Theae. Why?

So. Because, if a thing has parts, the whole must necessarily be all the parts. Or do you say that a whole formed of parts is a notion distinct from all its parts?

Theae. Yes, I do.

So. Do you call the all and the whole the same or different?

Theae. I have no clear view: but as you bid me answer readily, I take the risk of saying they are different.

So. Your readiness, Theaetetus, is right. Whether the answer is so too, we must consider.

Theae. We must.

41 [*The first eighteen questions of this section comprise an elenchus, by which Socrates compels Theaetetus to admit, that there is no difference between 'the all' and 'the whole,' and that both terms, in a thing that has parts, mean 'all the parts.' He then puts this alternative, which Theaetetus grants: if the syllable is not the letters, they are not its parts: if it is the same with them, both must be known equally. And it was to avoid this latter consequence that it was taken to be different. But what are the parts of syllables, if the letters are not? Theaetetus admits, that, if syllables have parts, these must be the letters. In that case, says Socrates, according to the doctrine assumed, a syllable must be a single form without parts. And in that case, he now proves, it must be elementary, and so undefinable and unknown. It is not true, therefore, that the syllable can be defined and known, unless the letters can be so likewise. This proof Socrates strengthens by the testimony of experience. In learning to read, did not Theaetetus endeavour to distinguish each individual letter? In learning music, did he not strive to distinguish each particular note; and are not the notes the elements of music? All this Theaetetus admits. And Socrates draws the conclusion, that elements may be known even more clearly than compounds (syllables).*]

So. Will not the whole differ from the all, according to your present argument?

Theae. Yes.

So. Well now, is there any difference between all (plural) and the all (singular)? For instance, when we say, one, two, three, four, five, six, and if we say twice three or thrice two, or four and two, or three and two and one, do we in all these cases speak of the same or something different?

Theae. Of the same.

So. That is, six; is it not?

Theae. Yes.

So. In each form of speech we have spoken of all the six?

Theae. Yes.

So. Again, when we speak of all, do we not speak of one thing[1]?

Theae. We must.

So. Is it not of the six?

Theae. Yes.

So. Do we predicate the same unity of all things consisting of number, whether under the term πᾶν or τὰ πάντα (in singular or plural form)?

Theae. Evidently.

So. Let us now state the question as follows: The number of the acre and the acre are the same; are they not?

Theae. Yes.

So. And so of the furlong?

Theae. Yes.

So. Again, the number of the camp and the camp, and all such things similarly? For the whole number is the essential whole in each case?

Theae. Yes.

So. And is not the number of each the parts of each?

Theae. Yes.

So. And all things which have parts will consist of parts?

Theae. Evidently.

So. And all the parts have been admitted to be the all, if the entire number is to be the all.

[1] Reading, with K. F. Hermann, δ' οὐχ ἓν for MS δ' οὐδέν.

Theae. True.

So. Then the whole does not consist of parts. For it would be the all, being all the parts?

Theae. Seemingly not.

So. But can any thing which is a part, be a part of any thing except of a whole?

Theae. Yes, of the all.

So. You show fight manfully, Theaetetus. But is it not in the very case when nothing is absent that the all is all?

Theae. Necessarily.

So. And will not the whole be the very same thing—that from which nothing is anywhere absent? For that from which anything is absent, is neither a whole nor an all, each of these being equally constituted by the same combination of parts.

Theae. I now think there is no difference between an all and a whole.

So. Did we not say, that whenever a thing has parts, the whole and all will mean all the parts?

Theae. Certainly.

So. Again: to resume my late essay, if the syllable is not the letters, does it not follow that it has not the letters for its parts, or if it be the same with them, it must be known equally with them?

Theae. Yes.

So. Was it not to obviate this result that we defined it to be different from them?

Theae. Yes.

So. Well, if the letters are not parts of a syllable, have you any other things to name, which are parts of a syllable, besides its letters?

Theae. By no means. For if I allowed it to have

parts, it would be ridiculous to abandon the letters, and seek anything else.

So. Decidedly, Theaetetus, according to the present view a syllable must be a single generality without parts.

Theae. Seemingly.

So. Do you remember, my friend, that a short time back we accepted the statement, deeming it a good one, that of the primal elements, of which all things are composed, there is no definition, because each by itself is uncompounded, and that it is not right to apply to it the term 'is,' nor yet 'this,' which are alien and foreign to it; and this cause makes such element undefinable and unknown?

Theae. I remember.

So. Is there any other cause than this of its being simple and indivisible? I see no other.

Theae. Apparently none.

So. Accordingly, the syllable is shown to belong to the same class as the element, if it has no parts, and is one general notion?

Theae. Undoubtedly.

So. If then the syllable has many letters, and is a certain whole, and they are its parts, syllables and letters are alike knowable and utterable, since 'all the parts' were shown to be the same with the whole?

Theae. Assuredly.

So. But if it is one and indivisible, both syllable and letter are equally undefinable and unknowable: for the same cause will make them both so?

Theae. I cannot contradict you.

So. Let us not accept this statement from anybody, that a syllable can be known and expressed, but not a letter.

Theae. We must not, if we concur with the argument.

So. Yet further: would you not rather accept the opposite view, from knowing what happened to yourself when you learnt to read?

Theae. What is that?

So. That all you went on doing in the course of learning was, to try to distinguish each individual letter as you saw and heard it, that their order might not confuse you when they were spoken and written.

Theae. Very true.

So. And did not a complete instruction at your music-master's mean the being able to follow each note, and say what string answered to it? These everybody would own to be properly called the elements of music.

Theae. Yes.

So. So far then as we have experience of letters and syllables, if from these cases we may draw inferences as to others, we shall say that the class of elements admits of a knowledge much clearer than the syllable, and more important for the perfect mastery of each study; and, if any one shall say that the syllable is naturally known, but the element unknown, we shall think he is joking or talking nonsense?

Theae. Undoubtedly.

42 [*Recurring to the third definition of knowledge proposed by Theaetetus —true opinion with rational explanation* (λόγος)*—Socrates now criticises this adjunct. What does it mean? Three answers may be given.* (1) *It may simply mean—speech. Well; but all who are not born deaf and dumb speak sooner or later; and all true opinion will carry speech with it; and so it can never be separate from knowledge.* (2) Λόγος *may mean the power of describing anything by the elements of which it consists. Hesiod says: 'a wagon has a hundred*

planks.' But you and I, says Socrates, cannot detail these: we describe a wagon by certain known parts: axle, wheels, body, yoke, &c. Thus we have a right opinion about it: but, as we cannot enumerate the elements, we have not the full knowledge. Or again, in the case of spelling: perhaps somebody can spell the name Theaetetus quite correctly, having a true opinion about it, and being able to enumerate its syllables correctly: but, when another name, Theodorus, is in question, he is found to spell it wrongly (writing Τε *for* Θε*) This proves that his true opinion in the former instance did not amount to knowledge: and thus again we find 'true opinion with rational explanation' to fall short of knowledge.*]

So. Other proofs of this fact might be shewn, I think; but let us not for their sake forget to keep in view the proposed topic, namely, what is meant by saying that true opinion combined with rational explanation is the most perfect knowledge.

Theae. We must keep it in view.

So. Well now, what does the term explanation indicate to us? I think it means one of three things.

Theae. What are they?

So. The first will be — making one's meaning clear through the voice with verbs and nouns, imaging opinion in the stream through the voice as in a mirror or in water. Do you not consider explanation to be something of this sort?

Theae. I do. We say therefore that one who does so explains.

So. This however is not everybody able to do sooner or later,—to shew what he thinks about anything—if he is not born deaf or dumb? and so all those who have any right opinion, will appear to have with it the faculty of explanation, and right opinion will thus nowhere be formed without knowledge.

Theae. True.

So. Let us not however lightly pronounce sentence on him who defined knowledge in the way we are now considering—that he is guilty of talking nonsense. Perhaps he did not mean to say this, but rather the being able, when asked what anything is, to make answer to the questioner in terms of its elements.

Theae. Instance what you mean, Socrates.

So. As Hesiod speaking of a wagon says, 'A wagon consists of a hundred planks.' I cannot describe them, probably you cannot. If we were asked what a wagon is, we should be content if we could say, wheels, axle, body, seat, yoke.

Theae. Quite so.

So. The questioner might perhaps think us ridiculous, as he would if being asked your name and making answer by syllables,—while all we thought and said was right—we deemed that as skilful grammarians we had in mind and stated grammatically the definition of the name Theaetetus; though the fact is that nobody can define anything with knowledge, until he fully describe it in its elements with true opinion; as was before, I think, laid down.

Theae. It was.

So. So too he might consider, with respect to a wagon, that we have right opinion indeed, but that one who was able to detail its nature by those hundred planks, had, through this addition, joined explanation to true opinion, and instead of opinion had got technical knowledge about the nature of a wagon, having fully described the whole in its elements.

Theae. Do you not think his opinion good, Socrates?

So. If you think so, my friend, and accept this view, that the full description of everything by its elements is

explanation, but the description by syllables or anything more comprehensive is failure of explanation, tell me so, that we may criticize it.

Theae. I quite accept that view.

So. Do you accept it under the belief that a person is cognisant of anything when he thinks that the same thing sometimes belongs to the same, sometimes to another, or when he thinks that to the same thing at one time one thing belongs, at another time another?

Theae. I believe nothing of the sort.

So. Do you forget that, when you learnt your letters at first, you and the other scholars did such things?

Theae. Do you mean that we thought first one letter, then another, belonged to the same syllable, and that we assigned the same letter sometimes to its proper syllable, sometimes to another?

So. That is what I mean.

Theae. No, I do not forget; nor do I consider that they who are in this condition have yet acquired knowledge.

So. Well, when a child of that age writing 'Theaetetus,' thinks he ought to write, and does write 'theta' and 'epsilon,' and again attempting to write Theodorus thinks he ought to write and does write 'tau' and 'epsilon,' shall we say that he knows the first syllable of your names?

Theae. It has been just allowed that such an one does not yet know.

So. Is there anything to hinder the same child from making a similar error in respect of the second, third, and fourth syllables?

Theae. Nothing at all.

So. Will one who has in mind the description by

elements write 'Theaetetus' with true opinion, whensoever he writes it in just order?

Theae. Evidently.

So. Being still without knowledge, though having right opinion, do we say?

Theae. Yes.

So. And yet he unites explanation with right opinion: for he wrote that description by elements which we admitted to be rational explanation?

Theae. True.

So. And thus, my friend, there is a right opinion with explanation, which we cannot yet call knowledge.

Theae. Apparently.

43 [*There remains* (3) *a third meaning of* λόγος, *viz. a mark of difference by which anything is shewn to be distinct from everything else. It is said that, while you perceive only those features which the thing has in common with others, you have true opinion of it only: but that, when you add those which are peculiar to it and characteristic, then you have the knowledge of it. Socrates proves this to be fallacious. You have not a true opinion about anybody or anything, until you are cognisant of the peculiarities in your object. Hence it follows that such a* λόγος *is already included in true opinion, and that, if an adjunct to this, it is merely superfluous and absurd. So then, says Socrates, all our three attempts to define knowledge have failed. Have you any other conception, Theaetetus? No, says the youth: you have already helped me to say much more than was in my own mind.*]

So. So we seem only to have dreamt we were rich in thinking we had the truest explanation of knowledge. Or must we suspend this charge? Somebody, perhaps, will not define 'explanation' thus: but rather as the remaining form of those three, one or other of which we said would

be taken as 'explanation,' by one who defined knowledge to be 'true opinion with explanation.'

Theae. You justly remind me. There was one form left. The first was the image, as it were, of thought in utterance: the second, now discussed, was the road to the whole through the elements. What do you call the third?

So. That which most people would define as being able to mention some sign by which the thing in question differs from all others.

Theae. Can you give me an instance of any such explanation of anything?

So. Yes, one which, if you like, I think you may competently accept concerning the sun, that it is the brightest of the bodies which travel in the heaven round the earth.

Theae. Certainly.

So. Now learn why this is said. The fact is, as we were lately saying, that, if you take the difference between each individual and all others, you will get a definition, as some say: but, as long as you lay hold of some common feature only, your account will be about those things which have that community.

Theae. I understand. And I think it right to call such a process definition.

So. But whosoever with right opinion about any thing learns furthermore its difference from others, will have gained knowledge of that of which before he had opinion.

Theae. Yes, we state it so.

So. Now then most decidedly, Theaetetus, since I have come near to our proposition, as it were to a drawing, I do not understand it in the least. As long as I stood at a distance from it, there appeared to be some sense in it.

Theae. What do you mean by this?

So. I will tell you, if I can. Having a right opinion of you, if I add to this your definition, I know you; if not, I have opinion of you only.

Theae. Yes.

So. And the definition was the interpretation of your distinction.

Theae. Even so.

So. When I was opining only, was it not the case that I did not grasp with my mind any of the points in which you differ from others?

Theae. Seemingly.

So. Then I was taking note of some of the common features, which belong no more to you than to other people?

Theae. Of course.

So. Now do pray tell me: in such a case how will you more than anybody else have been conceived by me? Suppose me to imagine that this is Theaetetus, whoever is a man, and has a nose and eyes and mouth, and any other individual member. Will this imagination cause me to conceive Theaetetus more than Theodorus, or, proverbially speaking, any rapscallion whatever?

Theae. How can it?

So. Or, if I imagine him having not only nose and eyes, but also as the one who has a flat nose and prominent eyes, shall I have a notion of you more than of myself, or of any other with these features?

Theae. No.

So. Theaetetus, I fancy, will not be conceived in my mind until this flatness of nose shall have stamped and deposited in my heart some memorial different from all other snubnesses of nose seen by me (I might say the same of all

your other features), which shall bring you to my mind, if I meet you to-morrow, and make me to have right opinion about you.

Theae. Most true.

So. Right opinion then in each case will be concerned with differentiation.

Theae. Evidently.

So. What then will be 'the adding explanation to right opinion?' For if it means, to add an opinion of the manner in which one thing differs from all others, this direction becomes utterly ridiculous.

Theae. How?

So. Of things whereof we have a right opinion as to the nature of their difference from others, it bids us add a right opinion of the nature of their difference from others. And thus the proverbial twirl of the scytal or the pestle or anything else would be a mere trifle compared with this direction: nay it might more fairly be called a blind man's direction: for to bid us add what we have got already, that we may learn what we think already, is a splendid illustration of a man groping in the dark.

Theae. Tell me now what answer you meant to give to your last question.

So. If bidding us to add explanation is bidding us to know distinction,—not to have an opinion of distinction—the finest of our definitions of knowledge will turn out to be a nice sort of thing. For to know is, I suppose, to get knowledge. Is it not?

Theae. Yes.

So. Then, if asked, it seems, what knowledge is, a person will reply that it is right opinion with a knowledge of difference: for the addition of explanation will mean this in his view.

Theae. Seemingly.

So. Yet it is utterly silly, when we are seeking knowledge, to say that it is right opinion with knowledge whether of difference or of anything else. So, Theaetetus, neither sensible perception, nor true opinion, nor explanation accompanying true opinion will be knowledge.

Theae. Seemingly not.

So. Do we still conceive anything and feel throes, my friend, about knowledge, or have we given birth to everything?

Theae. By all that's sacred, Socrates, with your help I have said more than I had in my own mind.

So. And does not our art declare that all these products have turned out to be wind, and not worth rearing?

Theae. Decidedly so.

44 [*Well, Theaetetus, says Socrates in conclusion, the discussion of to-day will have done you good service in every way. You will cease to think you know things which you do not know, and your future conceptions will be consequently truer. Also you will be a more amiable companion, more willing to tolerate the mistakes of other disputants. I must now leave you, to keep an appointment with my accuser Melitus. To-morrow, Theodorus, let us meet here again.*]

So. Well, Theaetetus, if you seek to become, and do become, pregnant with other thoughts hereafter, the present enquiry will have improved your conceptions; and, if you do not, you will be less severe to your associates, more mild and temperate, not supposing that you know what you do not know. So much only as this my art can do, no more. Nor do I know any of the things which others do, who are — and have made themselves — great and

wondrous men. This midwifery I and my mother received as our function from God, she to practise it on women, I on young, noble and beautiful men.

Now, however, I must encounter Melitus and his indictment against me at the Porch of the King[1]. In the morning, Theodorus, let us meet again here.

44 [1] The indictment against Socrates for impiety was brought by his accusers Anytus and Melitus in the court of the ἄρχων βασιλεύς, situated at the στόα thence called βασιλική, the Porch of the King.

APPENDED NOTES.

[*The references are* (1) *to chapters in translation;* (2) *to pages in text and translation;* (3) *to pages in Ed. I. of Stephens, as shewn in margin of text.*]

5 pp. 10, 109. St. 147. D. περὶ δυνάμεών τι ἡμῖν Θεόδωρος ὅδε ἔγραφε, τῆς τε τρίποδος πέρι καὶ πεντέποδος ἀποφαίνων ὅτι μήκει οὐ ξύμμετροι τῇ ποδιαίᾳ, 'Theodorus was describing to us something about powers, proving as to the root of 3 and root of 5, that they are not in length commensurable with the foot-unit:' i.e. shewing that $\sqrt{3}$ is greater than 1 and less than 2, and that $\sqrt{5}$ is greater than 2 and less than 3; that therefore they do not contain unity so many times; that they are fractions, not integers. With ποδιαίᾳ understand γραμμῇ.

H. Schmidt in his Exegetic Commentary tries to shew that what Theodorus taught was a corollary to the Pythagorean Theorem (Euclid I. 47); that δυνάμεις mean the powers a^2, b^2 &c. as in modern algebra, and that ποδιαία here is a unit square a^2, by which the squares of a series of hypotenuses of right-angled triangles, having for their kathetes a and the foregoing hypotenuse, are all commensurable: since

$b^2 = 2a^2$, $c^2 = 3a^2$, $d^2 = 4a^2$, &c. Theodorus may have taught this truth, but it is certainly not introduced here, as the word *μήκει* proves, shewing *ποδιαία* to be the linear foot-unit. And that *δυνάμεις* mean roots, not the modern 'powers,' is clear from what follows 148 A, *ὅσαι δὲ τὸν ἑτερομήκη, δυνάμεις, ὡς μήκει μὲν οὐ ξυμμέτρους ἐκείναις, τοῖς δ' ἐπιπέδοις ἃ δύνανται*, i.e. $\sqrt{3}$, $\sqrt{5}$ &c. are called 'powers,' because they have *power*, when squared, to form areas which are commensurable with the squares 4, 9, 16, 25, &c. So Professors Jowett and Campbell.

8 pp. 15, 116. St. 151 E. *ὃν ἔλεγε καὶ Πρωταγόρας.* The words in which Plato recites the famous doctrine of Protagoras on the relativity of knowledge (*μέτρον ἄνθρωπος*, homo mensura) are probably cited from that philosopher's treatise called *Ἀλήθεια*, Truth. But the identification of it with the suggestion of Theaetetus that knowledge is sensuous perception, I suppose with Grote, (Plato, II. p. 323 note) to be Plato's own view, which Grote considers unjust, contending at some length against it (322—336). His main argument is, that implication of object and subject is universal, affecting Noumena as well as Phaenomena: 'cogitata' suppose a 'cogitans,' as much as 'sensibilia' suppose a 'sentiens.' Therefore Protagoras would not have limited the application of his maxim to *αἴσθησις* alone. We must concur with Grote in lamenting that we get the statements and arguments of Protagoras at second hand only; and that the views of others, as of Heracleitus and his great opponent Parmenides, are known to us only in fragments and citations, and from the late biographies of Diogenes Laertius.

pp. 16, 117. St. 152 A. *Ἄνθρωπος δὲ σύ τε κἀγώ*; Socrates means: as Protagoras applies his doctrine to man generally, he applies it to you and me, seeing that we are men.

pp. 16, 117. St. 152 B.C. By the illustration here used Socrates proves that the maxim of Protagoras means that what appears to any one 'is' to him: and, as appearance implies perception, it follows that perception is knowledge.

pp. 16, 118. St. 152 C. Ἆρ' οὖν κ.τ.λ. Why this outburst? Socrates has just drawn from Theaetetus the admission that αἴσθησις τοῦ ὄντος ἐστί, perception is of the existent, of that which 'is.' But the Heracleitean doctrine does not allow that anything 'is' (ἐστί) but says that all things γίγνεται 'come to be.' And Protagoras in his Ἀλήθεια adopts this: so we must infer from what follows. What? says Socrates: did Protagoras then teach an obscure exoteric doctrine (ᾐνίξατο) to the multitude, and tell the truth in esoteric confidence (ἐν ἀποῤῥήτῳ ἔλεγεν) to his disciples? Did he teach the one to believe in ὄντα, the others in nothing but γιγνόμενα? Αἰνίττεσθαι, 'to speak in riddles,' is used of obscure or purposely veiled language. That Plato considered the doctrines which now follow to be involved in the teaching of Protagoras, is evident; indeed he distinctly says so; nor can we doubt that he had foundation for his statement in the writings of that sophist. But it is evident also that he does not here quote his precise words: and it must always be doubtful how far Protagoras was committed to all the refinements of the Heracleitean school, which appear in the next passage and afterwards.

9 pp. 17, 119. The Platonic complication of the three doctrines (1) the Heracleitean (οἷον ῥεύματα κινεῖσθαι τὰ πάντα) (2) the Protagorean (πάντων χρημάτων ἄνθρωπον μέτρον εἶναι) and that put forth by Theaetetus (αἴσθησιν ἐπιστήμην γίγνεσθαι) is summarised below, 15, pp. 28, 135. The following observations of Grote (Plato, II. p. 324) deserve special attention, and supply a valuable key to the difficulties occurring in Plato's treatment of this subject from 9 to 15

and again from 15 to 30, where the definition αἴσθησις is finally abandoned. 'Upon all the three opinions, thus represented as cognate or identical, Sokrates bestows a lengthened comment (occupying a half of the dialogue).... His strictures are not always easy to follow with assurance, because he often passes with little notice from one to the other of the three doctrines which he is examining: because he himself, though really opposed to them, affects in part to take them up and to suggest arguments in their favour: and further because, disclaiming all positive opinion of his own, he sometimes leaves us in doubt what is his real purpose—whether to expound or to deride the opinions of others—whether to enlighten Theaetetus, or to test his power of detecting fallacies. We cannot always distinguish between the ironical and the serious. Lastly, it is a still greater difficulty that we have not before us any one of the three opinions as set forth by their proper supporters.'

12 pp. 21, 125. St. 155 E. τῶν ἀμυήτων. Prof. Campbell in his learned Introduction to this dialogue examines at large the question, who are the men whom Plato glances at here in such uncomplimentary language. Had he in mind Antisthenes and the Cynics? or Democritus and the Atomists? If Plato had either of these two schools in view, it seems more probable that these were the followers of Democritus. The γηγενεῖς mentioned in the Sophistes (p. 246 &c.) are evidently the same as the σκληροὶ καὶ ἀντίτυποι (εὖ μάλ' ἄμουσοι) in this place. See Campbell, pp. xx, xxx.

pp. 22, 126. St. 156 D. I must retract the partial favour which my notes in the text and translation shew to the interpolated words of Cornarius. I find the view taken by Prof. Campbell and Prof. Jowett supported also by H. Schmidt (though Müller in his German translation

renders the words of Cornarius, and Steinhart does not contradict him): to which authorities I have to add an opinion which I highly value, that of my friend and former pupil Mr R. D. Archer-Hind, Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge. I had never felt disposed to follow Bekker in printing the passage as an unquestioned portion of the text; yet I hardly know that I regret having given my readers the opportunity of seeing and estimating that which conciliated the favour of so many eminent scholars. My own judgment in a case of this kind I regard as of little or no value.

20 pp. 35, 144. St. 166 A. Socrates, who up to this point has seemed to play with the doctrine of his intended victim Protagoras, as a cat with a wretched mouse, sometimes expounding and apparently supporting it, but only to strike it immediately with a harder blow, now professes to make a formal defence of it in the name of its author, for the express purpose of obliging Theodorus to take his turn in the dialogue, instead of Theaetetus, and submit to an elenchus, in defence of his old friend Protagoras.

Τὸν ἐμὲ is an assumption of dignity: 'a man like me.'

26 pp. 52, 166. St. 179 A. *if he had tried...a man's own self.*' In this translation we follow the reading εἴ πῃ τοὺς συνόντας ἔπειθεν instead of the vulgate εἰ μή. Prof. Campbell, though he keeps εἰ μή in the text, accepts emendation in his note, but prefers εἰ δή. I can have no doubt that αὐτὸς must not be referred to Protagoras by reading αὐτῷ after it, but that the sense must be as I have given it, αὐτὸς αὐτῷ, '*a man's own self.*' So Prof. Jowett (who also reads δή) '*every one for himself.*'

28 pp. 56, 172. St. 182 B. ἀλλ' ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων κ.τ.λ. The meaning of this passage can be none other than what is given in my translation, which is the same as Prof.

Jowett's in effect. But how the Greek construction is to be explained is doubtful. Prof. Campbell's note gives very faint assistance, and neither Heindorf's ἑαυτῶν for ἀμφοτέρων, nor ἀποτικτόμενα for ἀποτίκτοντα, fully satisfy. All we can say of the place is—medicam manum expectat.

38 pp. 82, 209. St. 201, C. It is commonly supposed that the words εἰπόντος του ἀκούσας refer to Antisthenes.

44 As respects the definition of knowledge, this dialogue only arrives at certain negative conclusions; namely, that knowledge is neither perception, nor true opinion, nor true opinion combined with rational explanation. Yet, in the course of it, Plato has achieved certain objects, which he had in mind, and which he valued. For (1) he has paid a debt of gratitude to his Megarian friends and hosts, Eucleides and Terpsion; (2) he has shewn what he afterwards declared by his inscription on the Academy, μηδεὶς ἀγεωμέτρητος εἰσίτω, that mathematical studies (*i.e.* exact science) are a necessary avenue to mental studies (*i.e.* to transcendental or abstract science); (3) he has shewn that minds capable of pursuing the former with success are not necessarily capable of mastering the latter: this he indicates by the nature of Theodorus, which is unphilosophic, as compared with that of Theaetetus, who is an apt student of philosophy; (4) he has confuted doctrines (Protagorean and Heracleitean), which he considers erroneous and mischievous, and has exhibited the errors of the great leader of that sophistic band, which he had, from his master Socrates, a mission to combat and defeat; (5) he has found a noble opportunity to develope those moral and political doctrines, as to the struggle of philosophic truth against fallacious rhetoric, which he mooted in the Gorgias, and developed more fully in the Republic at a later time; (6) he does achieve a positive result by the victorious

assertion of a central seat of thought, to which all perceptions are conveyed, and so converted into ideas: this is ψυχή, the soul of man. The subsequent elenchi, which confute the second and third definitions attempted by Theodorus, seem to me little more than gladiatorial word-fights, intended by Plato to exercise and display the dialectic skill which he had acquired at Megara, and at the same time to amuse and puzzle the minds of his readers by the parables or myths of the waxen tablet and the dove-cage. But he may have had more serious aims in these elenchi than are obvious to my mind.

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